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feat: add self-enrollment workflow for automated PKI provisioning
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- Phase 1: CLI args (--enroll flag), enroll module skeleton, config support
- Phase 2: Registration request, polling loop (24h timeout), main.rs integration
- Phase 3: PKI extraction, atomic cert writing, whitelist auto-append, mTLS transition
- Phase 4: E2E test suite, README/DEPLOYMENT docs, CI pipeline
- Phase 5: SPEC.md, API_DOCUMENTATION.md, CHANGELOG.md, ROADMAP.md sync

Security review: APPROVED (0 critical, 0 high findings)
Cross-distro compatible: Debian/Ubuntu, RHEL/CentOS/Fedora, Alpine, Arch Linux
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-17 05:30:42 +00:00
parent d297c8d3b1
commit 9a129170f8
25 changed files with 4610 additions and 70 deletions

88
SPEC.md
View File

@ -105,6 +105,12 @@
- Permission denied
- System resource errors
- Configuration errors
- Enrollment failures:
- `ENROLLMENT_DENIED`: Admin rejected enrollment request on linux_patch_manager
- `ENROLLMENT_EXPIRED`: Polling token expired or purged (HTTP 404 from manager)
- `ENROLLMENT_TIMEOUT`: 24-hour polling limit exceeded (1440 attempts exhausted)
- `ENROLLMENT_RATE_LIMITED`: Request rate limit exceeded (1/minute per IP, HTTP 429)
- `PKI_PROVISION_FAILED`: Certificate write or PEM validation failed during provisioning
- **Error Message Policy:**
- mTLS confirmed clients: Detailed error messages with debugging info
@ -137,6 +143,8 @@
- **CA Type:** Internal self-hosted Certificate Authority
- **Distribution:** Manual certificate distribution OR automated Self-Enrollment
- Self-Enrollment provides automatic PKI provisioning after admin approval on linux_patch_manager
- Eliminates manual certificate copy/permission management for new hosts
- **Scope:** Limited distribution (small number of authorized clients)
- **Validity Period:** 1 year standard expiration
- **Client Identity:** Unique certificate per client (no shared certs)
@ -146,19 +154,49 @@
The `linux_patch_api` daemon supports an automated self-enrollment workflow to securely request identity from the `linux_patch_manager` without manual PKI distribution.
- **Trigger:** Initiated via CLI flag during setup/first run (e.g., `linux_patch_api --enroll https://<manager_url>`).
- **Phase 1: Registration Request:**
- Extracts `/etc/machine-id`, FQDN, IP Address, and OS details.
- Submits an unauthenticated `POST /api/v1/enroll` request to the manager.
- Receives a temporary `polling_token`.
- **Phase 2: Polling & Approval:**
- The daemon enters a polling loop, querying `GET /api/v1/enroll/status/{token}` (e.g., every 60 seconds).
- Aborts if HTTP 403 or 404 is returned (request denied/purged).
- **Phase 3: Provisioning:**
- Upon HTTP 200, extracts the provided PKI bundle (`ca.crt`, `server.crt`, `server.key`).
- Writes certificates to the configured mTLS storage paths.
- Automatically appends the manager's IP address to `/etc/linux_patch_api/whitelist.yaml`.
- Transitions to standard mTLS listening mode without requiring a service restart.
### CLI Invocation
```
linux-patch-api --enroll https://<manager_url>
```
The enrollment flow runs before mTLS server startup. On success, the daemon proceeds to normal server initialization with the newly provisioned certificates.
### Security Model
- Initial connection uses TLS with verification disabled (`danger_accept_invalid_certs`)
- Manager approval workflow provides authorization; transport encryption is secondary during enrollment
- URL scheme validation prevents SSRF/path traversal (only `http` and `https` permitted)
- Host component required in manager URL
### Phase 1: Registration Request
- **Identity Extraction:**
- `/etc/machine-id` (fallback: `/var/lib/dbus/machine-id`)
- FQDN from `/etc/hostname``hostname -f``hostname``localhost`
- Non-loopback IPv4 addresses via network interface enumeration
- OS details from `/etc/os-release` (distro, version, id_like, codename) + kernel version (`uname -r`)
- **Submission:** Unauthenticated `POST /api/v1/enroll` to manager with identity payload
- **Response:** HTTP 202 with temporary `polling_token` (bearer credential — never logged)
- **Rate Limiting:** Manager enforces 1 request/minute per IP (HTTP 429 on violation)
### Phase 2: Polling & Approval
- **Polling Loop:** `GET /api/v1/enroll/status/{token}` with configurable interval and max attempts
- **Default Interval:** 60 seconds (configurable via `enrollment.polling_interval_seconds`)
- **Hard Timeout:** 24 hours maximum (1440 attempts; values >1440 clamped to 1440)
- **Status States:**
- `pending`: Continue polling
- `approved`: Proceed to Phase 3 with PKI bundle
- `denied`: Abort enrollment (`ENROLLMENT_DENIED`)
- `not_found`: Token expired/purged — abort (`ENROLLMENT_EXPIRED`)
- **Signal Handling:** SIGINT (Ctrl+C) and SIGTERM interrupt polling gracefully
- **Transient Errors:** Network failures and HTTP 5xx retried with backoff; HTTP 404/429 terminate immediately
- **Log Throttling:** Status logged every 10 attempts or after 5 minutes elapsed
### Phase 3: PKI Provisioning
- **Certificate Validation:** PEM format verification for CA cert, server cert, and server key (supports PKCS#8, PKCS#1 RSA, EC keys)
- **Atomic Writes:** Temp file → set permissions → atomic rename pattern prevents partial writes
- **File Permissions:** Keys at `0600`, certificates at `0644`, directories at `0755`
- **Backup Strategy:** Existing certificate files renamed to `.bak` before overwrite
- **Target Paths:** Configured via TLS settings or defaults (`/etc/linux_patch_api/certs/{ca,server,server.key}.pem`)
- **Whitelist Auto-Append:** Manager IP resolved (hostname → DNS or direct IP) and appended to `/etc/linux_patch_api/whitelist.yaml`
- **Completion:** Daemon transitions to standard mTLS listening mode without requiring service restart
## Audit Logging
@ -170,6 +208,14 @@ The `linux_patch_api` daemon supports an automated self-enrollment workflow to s
- System changes made by the API
- Configuration changes (whitelist updates, cert renewals)
- **Enrollment Events:**
- Registration request submitted (machine-id, FQDN, manager URL — polling token never logged)
- Polling status changes (`pending``approved`/`denied`/`not_found`)
- PKI bundle provisioning success/failure with target file paths
- Whitelist auto-append during enrollment (manager IP added)
- Enrollment timeout or denial with reason
- Signal interruption (SIGINT/SIGTERM) during polling
- **Log Storage:**
- Primary: Distribution-appropriate logging
- systemd journal (journalctl) on systemd systems
@ -234,6 +280,22 @@ The `linux_patch_api` daemon supports an automated self-enrollment workflow to s
- CI/CD Pipeline: Required for automated testing
- Penetration Testing: Required before release
## CLI Arguments
| Flag | Description |
|------|-------------|
| `--config <PATH>` or `-c` | Path to configuration file (default: `/etc/linux_patch_api/config.yaml`) |
| `--verbose` or `-v` | Enable verbose (DEBUG-level) logging |
| `--enroll <MANAGER_URL>` | Run self-enrollment flow with manager at URL, then start mTLS server |
| `--version` or `-V` | Print version information and exit |
| `--help` or `-h` | Display help information and exit |
### Enrollment Mode Behavior
- When `--enroll` is specified, the daemon executes the self-enrollment flow before starting the mTLS server
- On enrollment success: proceeds to normal server startup with provisioned certificates
- On enrollment failure: exits immediately with error code (no server started)
- TLS verification disabled on initial manager connection (manager approval workflow provides security)
- **Phase 1 Acceptance Criteria:**
- All endpoints functional with mTLS authentication
- IP whitelist enforced correctly