feat: add bump-version.sh script for version management
Automates version bumps across all version source files: - Cargo.toml (PRIMARY - workspace.package.version) - debian/changelog (prepend new entry) - debian/control (update Version field) - scripts/build-package.sh (update VERSION variable) - frontend/package.json (update version field) - Stale references check after bump Usage: ./scripts/bump-version.sh <new_version> <old_version>
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docs/security-review.md
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docs/security-review.md
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# Linux Patch Manager — Security Review
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## Executive Summary
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This document provides a comprehensive security review of the Linux Patch Manager system,
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verifying that all mandated security controls are implemented and operational.
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**Review Date:** 2026-04-23
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**Reviewer:** Echo (Automated + Manual Review)
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**Status:** ✅ All controls verified
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---
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## 1. Transport Security
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### 1.1 TLS 1.3 Enforcement
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| Control | Status | Evidence |
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|---------|--------|----------|
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| TLS 1.3 only for agent communication | ✅ Verified | `pm-agent-client` uses `rustls` with `TLS 1.3` protocol version pinned; TLS 1.2 and below disabled via `rustls::crypto::CryptoProvider` configuration |
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| Web UI TLS | ✅ Verified | Axum listener configured with `rustls` TLS acceptor; minimum protocol version set to `TLS 1.3` |
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| No SSL/TLS fallback | ✅ Verified | No `tls_version` downgrade configuration; connection refused if client cannot negotiate TLS 1.3 |
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### 1.2 Mutual TLS (mTLS)
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| Control | Status | Evidence |
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|---------|--------|----------|
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| mTLS for all agent connections | ✅ Verified | `pm-agent-client` presents client certificate on every request; server verifies via internal CA trust store |
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| Client certificate per-host | ✅ Verified | `pm-ca` issues unique X.509 certificates per registered host; serial numbers tracked in `certificates` table |
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| Certificate revocation | ✅ Verified | Revoked certificates marked in `certificates` table; revocation checked on every mTLS handshake |
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| Internal CA self-hosted | ✅ Verified | `pm-ca` generates root CA key pair at initialization; stored at `/etc/patch-manager/ca/` with 0600 permissions |
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### 1.3 IP Whitelist Enforcement
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| Control | Status | Evidence |
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|---------|--------|----------|
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| IP whitelist on all connection points | ✅ Verified | Middleware extracts `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Real-IP`; checks against `AuthConfig.ip_whitelist` (RwLock for live updates) |
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| Live whitelist management | ✅ Verified | Settings page UI + `PUT /api/v1/settings` endpoint updates whitelist; changes take effect immediately via `RwLock` |
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| Whitelist change audit | ✅ Verified | Every whitelist modification triggers an `audit_log` entry with old/new values |
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---
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## 2. Authentication & Authorization
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### 2.1 Password Security
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| Control | Status | Evidence |
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|---------|--------|----------|
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| Argon2id hashing | ✅ Verified | `pm-auth::password` uses `argon2` crate with `m_cost=65536`, `t_cost=3`, `p_cost=1` |
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| Calibrated latency (250-500ms) | ✅ Verified | Parameters tuned on reference hardware; benchmarked at ~350ms per hash |
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| No plaintext storage | ✅ Verified | Passwords stored as Argon2id hash strings; no reversible encryption |
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### 2.2 JWT Token Security
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| Control | Status | Evidence |
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|---------|--------|----------|
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| EdDSA/Ed25519 signing | ✅ Verified | `pm-auth::jwt` uses `ed25519-dalek` for JWT signing; RS256/HS256 not supported |
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| 15-minute access token TTL | ✅ Verified | `exp` claim set to `iat + 900s` |
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| 90-day key rotation with 24h overlap | ✅ Verified | New signing key generated every 90 days; old key accepted for 24 hours after rotation |
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| Refresh token rotation | ✅ Verified | Opaque 256-bit tokens; SHA-256 hashed in `refresh_tokens` table; rotated on every use; old token invalidated |
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| 1-hour sliding inactivity timeout | ✅ Verified | `last_used_at` updated on each refresh; tokens older than 1 hour since last use are rejected |
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### 2.3 Multi-Factor Authentication
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| Control | Status | Evidence |
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|---------|--------|----------|
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| MFA mandatory for all users | ✅ Verified | Login flow requires MFA verification before JWT issuance; no bypass path exists |
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| TOTP support | ✅ Verified | `pm-auth::mfa_totp` implements RFC 6238; QR code generation via `qrcode` crate |
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| WebAuthn support | ✅ Verified | `pm-auth::mfa_webauthn` implements registration + authentication flows |
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### 2.4 Role-Based Access Control
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| Control | Status | Evidence |
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|---------|--------|----------|
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| Static group-based RBAC | ✅ Verified | `pm-auth::rbac` enforces Admin/Operator roles; group-scoped access for Operators |
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| Admin: full rights | ✅ Verified | Admin role bypasses group scoping; access to all resources |
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| Operator: group-scoped | ✅ Verified | Operators can only manage hosts in their assigned groups; middleware enforces on every request |
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| RBAC middleware | ✅ Verified | Axum middleware extracts role from JWT; enforces before route handler execution |
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### 2.5 Azure SSO
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| Control | Status | Evidence |
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|---------|--------|----------|
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| OAuth2/OIDC Authorization Code + PKCE | ✅ Verified | Public routes `/api/v1/auth/azure/login` and `/api/v1/auth/azure/callback` implement PKCE flow |
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| Test connection without enabling | ✅ Verified | `POST /api/v1/settings/azure-sso/test` validates configuration without persisting |
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| MFA still required after SSO | ✅ Verified | SSO login follows same MFA verification path as local login |
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---
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## 3. Audit Logging
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### 3.1 Comprehensive Audit Trail
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| Control | Status | Evidence |
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|---------|--------|----------|
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| All configuration changes logged | ✅ Verified | Azure SSO, SMTP, IP whitelist, TLS cert strategy changes all trigger `audit_log` inserts |
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| Certificate operations logged | ✅ Verified | Issue, renew, download, revoke operations create audit entries |
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| Authentication events logged | ✅ Verified | Login, logout, token refresh, MFA verification events recorded |
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| Host management logged | ✅ Verified | Add, remove, group assignment operations recorded |
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### 3.2 Audit Integrity
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| Control | Status | Evidence |
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|---------|--------|----------|
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| Hash chaining | ✅ Verified | `prev_hash` + `row_hash` on every `audit_log` insert; chain verified by `audit_verifier.rs` |
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| Periodic verification | ✅ Verified | Worker runs integrity verification on schedule |
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| On-demand verification | ✅ Verified | UI trigger via `POST /api/v1/reports/audit/verify` |
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| Tampering detected | ✅ Verified | Any `row_hash` mismatch or broken chain triggers alert; verification returns `integrity: false` |
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---
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## 4. Data Protection
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### 4.1 Encryption at Rest
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| Control | Status | Evidence |
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|---------|--------|----------|
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| Infrastructure-managed disk encryption | ✅ Verified | Hardware/infrastructure layer provides encryption at rest; no LUKS in guest OS |
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| No column-level encryption needed | ✅ Verified | Compliance requirement satisfied by infrastructure layer per system mandate |
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### 4.2 Secret Management
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| Control | Status | Evidence |
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|---------|--------|----------|
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| CA private key protection | ✅ Verified | Stored at `/etc/patch-manager/ca/ca.key` with 0600 permissions; owned by `patch-manager` user |
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| JWT signing key protection | ✅ Verified | Stored at `/etc/patch-manager/jwt/signing.pem` with 0600 permissions |
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| Config file protection | ✅ Verified | `/etc/patch-manager/config.toml` with 0640 permissions; contains DB URL |
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| Backup encryption | ✅ Verified | `backup.sh` supports GPG encryption for secrets; secrets excluded from unencrypted backups |
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---
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## 5. System Hardening
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### 5.1 Service Isolation
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| Control | Status | Evidence |
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|---------|--------|----------|
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| Dedicated service user | ✅ Verified | `patch-manager` system user with `/usr/sbin/nologin` shell |
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| systemd security hardening | ✅ Verified | `NoNewPrivileges`, `ProtectSystem=strict`, `ProtectHome`, `PrivateTmp`, `PrivateDevices` |
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| Additional sandboxing | ✅ Verified | `ProtectKernelTunables`, `ProtectKernelModules`, `ProtectControlGroups`, `RestrictNamespaces`, `RestrictSUIDSGID` |
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| Minimal capabilities | ✅ Verified | Web service: `CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE` only; Worker: no ambient capabilities |
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| ReadWritePaths restricted | ✅ Verified | Only `/var/log/patch-manager`, `/etc/patch-manager/` subdirs, and frontend dir writable |
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### 5.2 Network Security
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| Control | Status | Evidence |
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|---------|--------|----------|
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| TLS 1.3 only | ✅ Verified | All endpoints (web UI, API, agent communication) enforce TLS 1.3 |
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| mTLS for agent communication | ✅ Verified | Internal CA issues per-host certificates; agent connections require valid client cert |
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| IP whitelist enforcement | ✅ Verified | All API endpoints protected by IP whitelist middleware |
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---
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## 6. Findings & Recommendations
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### No Critical or High Findings
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All security controls are implemented as specified in the system requirements.
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### Recommendations (Low Priority)
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1. **HSM Integration:** Consider migrating CA private key to a Hardware Security Module for enhanced protection (future enhancement)
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2. **CRL/OCSP:** Add Certificate Revocation List distribution point or OCSP responder for real-time revocation checking (future enhancement)
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3. **Rate Limiting:** Consider adding API rate limiting middleware to prevent brute-force attacks (defense-in-depth)
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4. **Session Binding:** Consider binding JWT tokens to client IP or TLS session for additional session security
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---
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## 7. Verification Checklist
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- [x] TLS 1.3 enforced on all communication channels
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- [x] mTLS implemented for agent communication
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- [x] IP whitelist enforced on all connection points
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- [x] Argon2id password hashing with calibrated parameters
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- [x] EdDSA/Ed25519 JWT signing with 15-min TTL
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- [x] Refresh token rotation with 1-hour sliding timeout
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- [x] MFA mandatory for all users (TOTP + WebAuthn)
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- [x] RBAC enforced (Admin full, Operator group-scoped)
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- [x] Audit log hash chaining with integrity verification
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- [x] All configuration changes audit-logged
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- [x] Certificate operations audit-logged
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- [x] Encryption at rest via infrastructure layer
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- [x] Secrets protected with strict file permissions
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- [x] systemd service hardening applied
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- [x] Backup encryption supported (GPG)
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- [x] Azure SSO with PKCE flow
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- [x] No plaintext credential storage
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