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fix(security): harden IP allowlist against XFF bypass and spoofing (#3)

Hardens the IP allowlist in require_auth against the two bypasses filed in #3.

1. Bypass via missing X-Forwarded-For (no IP to check, allowlist skipped).
2. Spoofing via attacker-controlled X-Forwarded-For (header trusted unconditionally).

Resolves both by deriving the client IP from the socket peer (ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>) and only honoring X-Forwarded-For when the immediate peer is in a new security.trusted_proxies allowlist (default empty = strict). Fails closed with 403 forbidden_ip when a non-empty allowlist is configured and the client IP cannot be determined. Empty ip_whitelist continues to mean allow all (preserved for dev installs).

27 pm-auth tests pass (12 new resolver + 8 new middleware + 7 existing). Spec: tasks/ip-allowlist-spec.md.
This commit is contained in:
Draco-Lunaris-Echo
2026-06-02 18:06:43 -05:00
committed by GitHub
parent 8873b2c70c
commit 3bdae4bcc5
11 changed files with 990 additions and 17 deletions

View File

@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
- Refresh tokens: opaque, server-side stored, 1-hour inactivity timeout, rotated on use, revocable
- mTLS for all agent communication (TLS 1.3 only)
- HTTPS for web UI (TLS 1.3 only)
- **IP whitelist enforcement on all connection points**
- **IP whitelist enforcement on all connection points** (with `security.trusted_proxies` to optionally honor `X-Forwarded-For` from a configured proxy; empty default = strict mode that uses the socket peer IP and ignores `X-Forwarded-For`; non-empty allowlist + unresolvable peer IP = fail-closed `403 forbidden_ip`) [Issue #3 / `tasks/ip-allowlist-spec.md`]
- Role-based access control:
- **Admin**: Full access to manage all aspects of Linux Patch Manager
- **Operator**: Can add/remove clients, manage schedules and patches only for devices in their group memberships