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feat: Complete Azure SSO implementation (v0.1.3)

- Add SSO session cleanup task (10-min expiry, 60s purge interval)
- Change callback to redirect to frontend with tokens as query params
- Add sso_callback_url to SecurityConfig with serde default
- Add SsoCallbackPage.tsx for handling SSO callback redirects
- Add /auth/sso/callback public route to App.tsx
- Add Sign in with Microsoft Azure button to LoginPage
- Replace insecure decode_jwt_payload with verify_id_token
- Implement JWKS caching (1-hour TTL) and RSA signature verification
- Validate iss, aud, exp claims on id_token
- Add jsonwebtoken dependency to pm-web crate
- Update config.example.toml with sso_callback_url setting
- Add sso_callback_url to settings response (read-only from TOML)
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-12 17:01:20 +00:00
parent 08add28b80
commit 86a6c714d4
18 changed files with 561 additions and 239 deletions

1
Cargo.lock generated
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@ -2328,6 +2328,7 @@ dependencies = [
"chrono", "chrono",
"dashmap", "dashmap",
"ipnet", "ipnet",
"jsonwebtoken",
"lettre", "lettre",
"pm-auth", "pm-auth",
"pm-ca", "pm-ca",

View File

@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ members = [
] ]
[workspace.package] [workspace.package]
version = "0.1.2" version = "0.1.3"
edition = "2021" edition = "2021"
authors = ["Echo <echo@moon-dragon.us>"] authors = ["Echo <echo@moon-dragon.us>"]
license = "MIT" license = "MIT"

View File

@ -101,3 +101,8 @@ ca_key_path = "/etc/patch-manager/ca/ca.key"
# point these paths to your certificate/key to use your own cert. # point these paths to your certificate/key to use your own cert.
web_tls_cert_path = "/etc/patch-manager/tls/web.crt" web_tls_cert_path = "/etc/patch-manager/tls/web.crt"
web_tls_key_path = "/etc/patch-manager/tls/web.key" web_tls_key_path = "/etc/patch-manager/tls/web.key"
# Frontend URL to redirect the browser to after Azure SSO callback.
# The backend sends tokens as query parameters to this URL.
# Default: "http://localhost:5173/auth/sso/callback" (Vite dev server)
sso_callback_url = "http://localhost:5173/auth/sso/callback"

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@ -80,6 +80,9 @@ pub struct SecurityConfig {
pub web_tls_cert_path: String, pub web_tls_cert_path: String,
/// Web UI TLS key path /// Web UI TLS key path
pub web_tls_key_path: String, pub web_tls_key_path: String,
/// Frontend URL to redirect to after SSO callback (default: http://localhost:5173/auth/sso/callback)
#[serde(default = "default_sso_callback_url")]
pub sso_callback_url: String,
} }
impl AppConfig { impl AppConfig {
@ -105,6 +108,10 @@ fn default_health_check_poll_interval() -> u64 {
300 300
} }
fn default_sso_callback_url() -> String {
"http://localhost:5173/auth/sso/callback".to_string()
}
impl Default for AppConfig { impl Default for AppConfig {
fn default() -> Self { fn default() -> Self {
Self { Self {
@ -142,6 +149,7 @@ impl Default for AppConfig {
ca_key_path: "/etc/patch-manager/ca/ca.key".to_string(), ca_key_path: "/etc/patch-manager/ca/ca.key".to_string(),
web_tls_cert_path: "/etc/patch-manager/tls/web.crt".to_string(), web_tls_cert_path: "/etc/patch-manager/tls/web.crt".to_string(),
web_tls_key_path: "/etc/patch-manager/tls/web.key".to_string(), web_tls_key_path: "/etc/patch-manager/tls/web.key".to_string(),
sso_callback_url: default_sso_callback_url(),
}, },
} }
} }

View File

@ -38,5 +38,6 @@ lettre = { version = "0.11", default-features = false, features = ["tokio1-rustl
rand = { workspace = true } rand = { workspace = true }
base64 = { workspace = true } base64 = { workspace = true }
sha2 = { workspace = true } sha2 = { workspace = true }
jsonwebtoken = { workspace = true }
url = { workspace = true } url = { workspace = true }
urlencoding = "2" urlencoding = "2"

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@ -10,10 +10,11 @@ use pm_auth::{
rbac::{require_auth, AuthConfig}, rbac::{require_auth, AuthConfig},
}; };
use pm_core::{config::AppConfig, db, logging, request_id::request_id_middleware}; use pm_core::{config::AppConfig, db, logging, request_id::request_id_middleware};
use routes::azure_sso::SsoSession; use routes::azure_sso::{JwksCache, SsoSession};
use routes::ws::WsTicket; use routes::ws::WsTicket;
use serde_json::{json, Value}; use serde_json::{json, Value};
use std::{net::SocketAddr, sync::Arc, time::Duration}; use std::{net::SocketAddr, sync::Arc, time::Duration};
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
use tower_http::{ use tower_http::{
services::{ServeDir, ServeFile}, services::{ServeDir, ServeFile},
trace::TraceLayer, trace::TraceLayer,
@ -30,6 +31,8 @@ pub struct AppState {
pub ws_tickets: Arc<DashMap<String, WsTicket>>, pub ws_tickets: Arc<DashMap<String, WsTicket>>,
/// In-memory store for SSO PKCE sessions (state → code_verifier). /// In-memory store for SSO PKCE sessions (state → code_verifier).
pub sso_sessions: Arc<DashMap<String, SsoSession>>, pub sso_sessions: Arc<DashMap<String, SsoSession>>,
/// Cached Azure AD JWKS for id_token signature verification.
pub jwks_cache: Arc<Mutex<JwksCache>>,
/// Internal certificate authority for mTLS client cert issuance. /// Internal certificate authority for mTLS client cert issuance.
pub ca: Arc<pm_ca::CertAuthority>, pub ca: Arc<pm_ca::CertAuthority>,
} }
@ -87,6 +90,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let ws_tickets: Arc<DashMap<String, WsTicket>> = Arc::new(DashMap::new()); let ws_tickets: Arc<DashMap<String, WsTicket>> = Arc::new(DashMap::new());
let sso_sessions: Arc<DashMap<String, SsoSession>> = Arc::new(DashMap::new()); let sso_sessions: Arc<DashMap<String, SsoSession>> = Arc::new(DashMap::new());
let jwks_cache: Arc<Mutex<JwksCache>> = Arc::new(Mutex::new(JwksCache::default()));
// Background task: purge expired WS tickets every 30 seconds. // Background task: purge expired WS tickets every 30 seconds.
{ {
@ -106,6 +110,25 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
}); });
} }
// Background task: purge expired SSO sessions every 60 seconds (sessions older than 10 minutes).
{
let sessions = sso_sessions.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(60));
loop {
interval.tick().await;
let now = chrono::Utc::now();
let cutoff = now - chrono::Duration::minutes(10);
let before = sessions.len();
sessions.retain(|_, v| v.created_at > cutoff);
let removed = before.saturating_sub(sessions.len());
if removed > 0 {
tracing::debug!(removed, "Purged expired SSO sessions");
}
}
});
}
let state = AppState { let state = AppState {
db: pool, db: pool,
config: Arc::new(config.clone()), config: Arc::new(config.clone()),
@ -114,6 +137,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
ws_tickets, ws_tickets,
sso_sessions, sso_sessions,
ca: Arc::new(ca), ca: Arc::new(ca),
jwks_cache,
}; };
let app = build_router(state); let app = build_router(state);

View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
//! //!
//! Public routes (no auth required): //! Public routes (no auth required):
//! GET /api/v1/auth/azure/login — redirect to Azure AD authorization URL //! GET /api/v1/auth/azure/login — redirect to Azure AD authorization URL
//! GET /api/v1/auth/azure/callback — handle Azure AD callback //! GET /api/v1/auth/azure/callback — handle Azure AD callback, redirect to frontend SPA
use axum::{ use axum::{
extract::State, extract::State,
@ -13,11 +13,15 @@ use axum::{
}; };
use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine as _}; use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine as _};
use chrono::Utc; use chrono::Utc;
use jsonwebtoken::{decode, decode_header, Algorithm, DecodingKey, Validation};
use pm_auth::{jwt::issue_access_token, refresh}; use pm_auth::{jwt::issue_access_token, refresh};
use pm_core::audit::{log_event, AuditAction}; use pm_core::audit::{log_event, AuditAction};
use serde::Deserialize; use serde::Deserialize;
use serde_json::{json, Value}; use serde_json::{json, Value};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256}; use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
use uuid::Uuid; use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::AppState; use crate::AppState;
@ -61,6 +65,24 @@ struct DbUserForSso {
mfa_enabled: bool, mfa_enabled: bool,
} }
/// Cache for Azure AD JWKS (JSON Web Key Set) with TTL-based refresh.
pub struct JwksCache {
pub keys: Option<serde_json::Value>,
pub fetched_at: Option<chrono::DateTime<Utc>>,
}
impl Default for JwksCache {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
keys: None,
fetched_at: None,
}
}
}
/// JWKS cache TTL in seconds (1 hour).
const JWKS_CACHE_TTL_SECS: i64 = 3600;
// ============================================================ // ============================================================
// Router // Router
// ============================================================ // ============================================================
@ -160,69 +182,61 @@ struct CallbackParams {
async fn azure_callback( async fn azure_callback(
State(state): State<AppState>, State(state): State<AppState>,
axum::extract::Query(params): axum::extract::Query<CallbackParams>, axum::extract::Query(params): axum::extract::Query<CallbackParams>,
) -> Result<Json<Value>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> { ) -> Result<Redirect, Redirect> {
let callback_url = &state.config.security.sso_callback_url;
// Helper to build error redirect
let error_redirect = |code: &str, message: &str| -> Redirect {
let url = format!(
"{}?error={}&error_description={}",
callback_url,
urlencoding::encode(code),
urlencoding::encode(message)
);
Redirect::to(&url)
};
// Check for error from Azure AD // Check for error from Azure AD
if let Some(error) = params.error { if let Some(error) = params.error {
let desc = params.error_description.unwrap_or_default(); let desc = params.error_description.unwrap_or_default();
return Err(( let message = format!("Azure AD error: {} - {}", error, desc);
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, return Err(error_redirect("sso_error", &message));
Json(
json!({ "error": { "code": "sso_error", "message": format!("Azure AD error: {} - {}", error, desc) } }),
),
));
} }
let code = params.code.ok_or_else(|| { let code = match params.code {
( Some(c) => c,
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, None => return Err(error_redirect("bad_request", "Missing authorization code")),
Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "bad_request", "message": "Missing authorization code" } })), };
)
})?;
let state_token = params.state.ok_or_else(|| { let state_token = match params.state {
( Some(s) => s,
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, None => return Err(error_redirect("bad_request", "Missing state parameter")),
Json( };
json!({ "error": { "code": "bad_request", "message": "Missing state parameter" } }),
),
)
})?;
// Look up code_verifier from sso_sessions // Look up code_verifier from sso_sessions
let sso_session = state let sso_session = match state.sso_sessions.remove(&state_token).map(|(_, v)| v) {
.sso_sessions Some(s) => s,
.remove(&state_token) None => return Err(error_redirect("bad_request", "Invalid or expired state token")),
.map(|(_, v)| v) };
.ok_or_else(|| {
(
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "bad_request", "message": "Invalid or expired state token" } })),
)
})?;
// Read Azure SSO config (including client_secret for token exchange) // Read Azure SSO config (including client_secret for token exchange)
let row: Option<(bool, String, String, String, String)> = sqlx::query_as( let row: Option<(bool, String, String, String, String)> = match sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT enabled, tenant_id, client_id, client_secret, redirect_uri FROM azure_sso_config WHERE id = 1", "SELECT enabled, tenant_id, client_id, client_secret, redirect_uri FROM azure_sso_config WHERE id = 1",
) )
.fetch_optional(&state.db) .fetch_optional(&state.db)
.await .await
.map_err(|e| { {
tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to load azure_sso_config"); Ok(r) => r,
( Err(e) => {
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to load azure_sso_config");
Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "Database error" } })), return Err(error_redirect("internal_error", "Database error"));
) }
})?; };
let (_enabled, tenant_id, client_id, client_secret, redirect_uri) = match row { let (_enabled, tenant_id, client_id, client_secret, redirect_uri) = match row {
Some(r) => r, Some(r) => r,
None => { None => {
return Err(( return Err(error_redirect("internal_error", "Azure SSO not configured"));
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
Json(
json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "Azure SSO not configured" } }),
),
));
}, },
}; };
@ -232,16 +246,16 @@ async fn azure_callback(
tenant_id tenant_id
); );
let client = reqwest::Client::builder() let client = match reqwest::Client::builder()
.timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10)) .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
.build() .build()
.map_err(|e| { {
Ok(c) => c,
Err(e) => {
tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to build HTTP client"); tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to build HTTP client");
( return Err(error_redirect("internal_error", "HTTP client error"));
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, }
Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "HTTP client error" } })), };
)
})?;
let params = [ let params = [
("grant_type", "authorization_code".to_string()), ("grant_type", "authorization_code".to_string()),
@ -254,57 +268,47 @@ async fn azure_callback(
let form_params: Vec<(&str, String)> = params.to_vec(); let form_params: Vec<(&str, String)> = params.to_vec();
let token_resp = client let token_resp = match client
.post(&token_url) .post(&token_url)
.form(&form_params) .form(&form_params)
.send() .send()
.await .await
.map_err(|e| { {
Ok(r) => r,
Err(e) => {
tracing::error!(error = %e, "Token exchange request failed"); tracing::error!(error = %e, "Token exchange request failed");
( return Err(error_redirect("sso_error", &format!("Token exchange failed: {}", e)));
StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY, }
Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "sso_error", "message": format!("Token exchange failed: {}", e) } })), };
)
})?;
if !token_resp.status().is_success() { if !token_resp.status().is_success() {
let status = token_resp.status(); let status = token_resp.status();
let body = token_resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default(); let body = token_resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
tracing::error!(status = %status, body = %body, "Token exchange failed"); tracing::error!(status = %status, body = %body, "Token exchange failed");
return Err(( return Err(error_redirect("sso_error", &format!("Token exchange failed: HTTP {}", status)));
StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
Json(
json!({ "error": { "code": "sso_error", "message": format!("Token exchange failed: HTTP {}", status) } }),
),
));
} }
let token_data: TokenResponse = token_resp let token_data: TokenResponse = match token_resp.json().await {
.json() Ok(d) => d,
.await Err(e) => {
.map_err(|e| {
tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to parse token response"); tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to parse token response");
( return Err(error_redirect("internal_error", "Failed to parse token response"));
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, }
Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "Failed to parse token response" } })), };
)
})?;
// Decode id_token JWT (without verification — trust HTTPS channel) // Verify id_token JWT signature using Azure AD JWKS and validate claims
let id_token = token_data.id_token.ok_or_else(|| { let id_token = match token_data.id_token {
( Some(t) => t,
StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY, None => return Err(error_redirect("sso_error", "No id_token in response")),
Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "sso_error", "message": "No id_token in response" } })), };
)
})?;
let claims = decode_jwt_payload(&id_token).map_err(|e| { let claims = match verify_id_token(&id_token, &tenant_id, &client_id, &state.jwks_cache).await {
tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to decode id_token"); Ok(c) => c,
( Err(e) => {
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to verify id_token");
Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "Failed to decode id_token" } })), return Err(error_redirect("internal_error", "Failed to verify id_token"));
) }
})?; };
let email = claims.email.unwrap_or_default(); let email = claims.email.unwrap_or_default();
let name = claims.name.unwrap_or_default(); let name = claims.name.unwrap_or_default();
@ -312,43 +316,33 @@ async fn azure_callback(
let preferred_username = claims.preferred_username.unwrap_or_else(|| email.clone()); let preferred_username = claims.preferred_username.unwrap_or_else(|| email.clone());
if email.is_empty() || oid.is_empty() { if email.is_empty() || oid.is_empty() {
return Err(( return Err(error_redirect("sso_error", "Missing email or oid in id_token"));
StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
Json(
json!({ "error": { "code": "sso_error", "message": "Missing email or oid in id_token" } }),
),
));
} }
// Look up or create user // Look up or create user
let user_opt: Option<DbUserForSso> = sqlx::query_as( let user_opt: Option<DbUserForSso> = match sqlx::query_as(
r#"SELECT id, username, display_name, role, is_active, mfa_enabled r#"SELECT id, username, display_name, role, is_active, mfa_enabled
FROM users WHERE email = $1 AND auth_provider = 'azure_sso'"#, FROM users WHERE email = $1 AND auth_provider = 'azure_sso'"#,
) )
.bind(&email) .bind(&email)
.fetch_optional(&state.db) .fetch_optional(&state.db)
.await .await
.map_err(|e| { {
tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to look up SSO user"); Ok(o) => o,
( Err(e) => {
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to look up SSO user");
Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "Database error" } })), return Err(error_redirect("internal_error", "Database error"));
) }
})?; };
let user = match user_opt { let user = match user_opt {
Some(u) if !u.is_active => { Some(u) if !u.is_active => {
return Err(( return Err(error_redirect("account_disabled", "Account is disabled"));
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
Json(
json!({ "error": { "code": "account_disabled", "message": "Account is disabled" } }),
),
));
}, },
Some(u) => u, Some(u) => u,
None => { None => {
// Auto-create user with role=operator, auth_provider=azure_sso // Auto-create user with role=operator, auth_provider=azure_sso
let id: Uuid = sqlx::query_scalar( let id: Uuid = match sqlx::query_scalar(
r#"INSERT INTO users (username, display_name, email, role, auth_provider, azure_oid) r#"INSERT INTO users (username, display_name, email, role, auth_provider, azure_oid)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 'operator', 'azure_sso', $4) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 'operator', 'azure_sso', $4)
RETURNING id"#, RETURNING id"#,
@ -359,13 +353,13 @@ async fn azure_callback(
.bind(&oid) .bind(&oid)
.fetch_one(&state.db) .fetch_one(&state.db)
.await .await
.map_err(|e| { {
tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to create SSO user"); Ok(id) => id,
( Err(e) => {
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to create SSO user");
Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "Failed to create user" } })), return Err(error_redirect("internal_error", "Failed to create user"));
) }
})?; };
log_event( log_event(
&state.db, &state.db,
@ -392,47 +386,41 @@ async fn azure_callback(
}; };
// Update last_login_at and azure_oid // Update last_login_at and azure_oid
sqlx::query( if let Err(e) = sqlx::query(
"UPDATE users SET last_login_at = NOW(), azure_oid = COALESCE(azure_oid, $1) WHERE id = $2", "UPDATE users SET last_login_at = NOW(), azure_oid = COALESCE(azure_oid, $1) WHERE id = $2",
) )
.bind(&oid) .bind(&oid)
.bind(user.id) .bind(user.id)
.execute(&state.db) .execute(&state.db)
.await .await
.map_err(|e| { {
tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to update last_login_at"); tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to update last_login_at");
( return Err(error_redirect("internal_error", "Database error"));
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, }
Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "Database error" } })),
)
})?;
// Issue JWT access token + refresh token // Issue JWT access token + refresh token
let access_ttl = state.config.security.jwt_access_ttl_secs as i64; let access_ttl = state.config.security.jwt_access_ttl_secs as i64;
let access_token = issue_access_token( let access_token = match issue_access_token(
user.id, user.id,
&user.username, &user.username,
&user.role, &user.role,
access_ttl, access_ttl,
&state.signing_key_pem, &state.signing_key_pem,
) ) {
.map_err(|e| { Ok(t) => t,
tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to issue access token"); Err(e) => {
( tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to issue access token");
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, return Err(error_redirect("internal_error", "Token issuance failed"));
Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "Token issuance failed" } })), }
) };
})?;
let raw_refresh = refresh::issue(&state.db, user.id, None, None) let raw_refresh = match refresh::issue(&state.db, user.id, None, None).await {
.await Ok(r) => r,
.map_err(|e| { Err(e) => {
tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to issue refresh token"); tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to issue refresh token");
( return Err(error_redirect("internal_error", "Refresh token issuance failed"));
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, }
Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "Refresh token issuance failed" } })), };
)
})?;
log_event( log_event(
&state.db, &state.db,
@ -447,42 +435,145 @@ async fn azure_callback(
) )
.await; .await;
Ok(Json(json!({ // Build user JSON for query parameter
"access_token": access_token, let user_json = json!({
"refresh_token": raw_refresh.0, "id": user.id.to_string(),
"token_type": "Bearer", "username": user.username,
"expires_in": access_ttl, "display_name": user.display_name,
"user": { "role": user.role,
"id": user.id.to_string(), "mfa_enabled": user.mfa_enabled,
"username": user.username, });
"display_name": user.display_name,
"role": user.role, // Redirect to frontend SPA with tokens as query parameters
"mfa_enabled": user.mfa_enabled, let redirect_url = format!(
"{}?access_token={}&refresh_token={}&token_type=Bearer&expires_in={}&user={}",
callback_url,
urlencoding::encode(&access_token),
urlencoding::encode(&raw_refresh.0),
access_ttl,
urlencoding::encode(&user_json.to_string()),
);
Ok(Redirect::to(&redirect_url))
}
// ============================================================
// JWT Verification Helpers
// ============================================================
/// Verify the id_token JWT signature using Azure AD JWKS and validate standard claims.
///
/// Steps:
/// 1. Decode JWT header to extract `kid` (key ID)
/// 2. Fetch JWKS from Azure AD if cache is empty or expired (1-hour TTL)
/// 3. Find the matching JWK by `kid`
/// 4. Construct RSA public key from JWK modulus (`n`) and exponent (`e`)
/// 5. Validate issuer, audience, and expiry via `jsonwebtoken::decode`
async fn verify_id_token(
token: &str,
tenant_id: &str,
client_id: &str,
jwks_cache: &Arc<Mutex<JwksCache>>,
) -> Result<IdTokenClaims, String> {
// 1. Decode JWT header to get the kid
let header = decode_header(token)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to decode JWT header: {}", e))?;
let kid = header.kid.ok_or("JWT header missing 'kid' field")?;
// 2. Check JWKS cache — fetch if expired or missing
let jwks = {
let cache = jwks_cache.lock().await;
let needs_fetch = match (&cache.keys, &cache.fetched_at) {
(None, _) => true,
(Some(_), None) => true,
(Some(_), Some(fetched)) => {
let elapsed = Utc::now().signed_duration_since(*fetched);
elapsed.num_seconds() > JWKS_CACHE_TTL_SECS
}
};
if needs_fetch {
// Drop lock before making async HTTP request
drop(cache);
let jwks_value = fetch_jwks(tenant_id).await?;
let mut cache = jwks_cache.lock().await;
cache.keys = Some(jwks_value);
cache.fetched_at = Some(Utc::now());
cache.keys.clone().unwrap()
} else {
cache.keys.clone().unwrap()
} }
}))) };
// 3. Find the matching JWK by kid
let keys_array = jwks
.get("keys")
.ok_or("JWKS response missing 'keys' array")?
.as_array()
.ok_or("JWKS 'keys' is not an array")?;
let jwk = keys_array
.iter()
.find(|k| k.get("kid").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) == Some(kid.as_str()))
.ok_or_else(|| format!("No matching JWK found for kid: {}", kid))?;
// 4. Construct RSA public key from JWK modulus (n) and exponent (e)
let n = jwk
.get("n")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.ok_or("JWK missing 'n' (modulus) field")?;
let e = jwk
.get("e")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.ok_or("JWK missing 'e' (exponent) field")?;
let decoding_key = DecodingKey::from_rsa_components(n, e)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to construct RSA decoding key: {}", e))?;
// 5. Configure validation rules
let mut validation = Validation::new(Algorithm::RS256);
validation.iss = Some(HashSet::from([format!(
"https://login.microsoftonline.com/{}/v2.0",
tenant_id
)]));
validation.aud = Some(HashSet::from([client_id.to_string()]));
validation.leeway = 60; // 60 seconds clock skew tolerance
// 6. Decode and verify the JWT
let token_data = decode::<IdTokenClaims>(token, &decoding_key, &validation)
.map_err(|e| format!("JWT signature verification failed: {}", e))?;
Ok(token_data.claims)
} }
// ============================================================ /// Fetch the JWKS from the Azure AD discovery endpoint.
// Helpers async fn fetch_jwks(tenant_id: &str) -> Result<serde_json::Value, String> {
// ============================================================ let jwks_url = format!(
"https://login.microsoftonline.com/{}/discovery/v2.0/keys",
tenant_id
);
/// Decode JWT payload without verification (trust HTTPS channel from Azure AD). let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
fn decode_jwt_payload(token: &str) -> Result<IdTokenClaims, String> { .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
let parts: Vec<&str> = token.split('.').collect(); .build()
if parts.len() != 3 { .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to build HTTP client for JWKS fetch: {}", e))?;
return Err("Invalid JWT format".to_string());
let resp = client
.get(&jwks_url)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("JWKS fetch request failed: {}", e))?;
if !resp.status().is_success() {
let status = resp.status();
let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
return Err(format!("JWKS fetch failed: HTTP {}{}", status, body));
} }
let payload_b64 = parts[1]; resp.json::<serde_json::Value>()
// Add padding if needed .await
let mut payload_b64_padded = payload_b64.to_string(); .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to parse JWKS response: {}", e))
while payload_b64_padded.len() % 4 != 0 {
payload_b64_padded.push('=');
}
let payload_bytes = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
.decode(&payload_b64_padded)
.map_err(|e| format!("Base64 decode error: {}", e))?;
serde_json::from_slice(&payload_bytes).map_err(|e| format!("JSON parse error: {}", e))
} }

View File

@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ pub struct SettingsResponse {
pub ip_whitelist: Vec<String>, pub ip_whitelist: Vec<String>,
pub web_tls_strategy: String, pub web_tls_strategy: String,
pub notification: NotificationConfig, pub notification: NotificationConfig,
pub sso_callback_url: String,
} }
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)] #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@ -202,6 +203,7 @@ fn build_settings_response(
email_from: get("notification_email_from"), email_from: get("notification_email_from"),
recipients, recipients,
}, },
sso_callback_url: get("sso_callback_url"),
} }
} }
@ -269,6 +271,9 @@ async fn get_settings(
) -> Result<Json<SettingsResponse>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> { ) -> Result<Json<SettingsResponse>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
admin_only(&auth)?; admin_only(&auth)?;
let cfg = load_system_config(&state.db).await?; let cfg = load_system_config(&state.db).await?;
// Inject read-only config values from TOML file (not stored in DB)
let mut cfg = cfg;
cfg.insert("sso_callback_url".to_string(), state.config.security.sso_callback_url.clone());
let azure = fetch_azure_sso_config(&state.db).await?; let azure = fetch_azure_sso_config(&state.db).await?;
Ok(Json(build_settings_response(&cfg, azure))) Ok(Json(build_settings_response(&cfg, azure)))
} }
@ -488,6 +493,9 @@ async fn update_settings(
// Return updated settings // Return updated settings
let cfg = load_system_config(&state.db).await?; let cfg = load_system_config(&state.db).await?;
// Inject read-only config values from TOML file (not stored in DB)
let mut cfg = cfg;
cfg.insert("sso_callback_url".to_string(), state.config.security.sso_callback_url.clone());
let azure = fetch_azure_sso_config(&state.db).await?; let azure = fetch_azure_sso_config(&state.db).await?;
Ok(Json(build_settings_response(&cfg, azure))) Ok(Json(build_settings_response(&cfg, azure)))
} }

View File

@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
<link rel="icon" type="image/svg+xml" href="/favicon.svg" /> <link rel="icon" type="image/svg+xml" href="/favicon.svg" />
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0" /> <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0" />
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy"
content="default-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self'; connect-src 'self' wss:;" /> content="default-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' wss:;" />
<title>Linux Patch Manager</title> <title>Linux Patch Manager</title>
</head> </head>
<body> <body>

View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{ {
"name": "patch-manager-ui", "name": "patch-manager-ui",
"private": true, "private": true,
"version": "0.1.0", "version": "0.1.3",
"type": "module", "type": "module",
"scripts": { "scripts": {
"dev": "vite", "dev": "vite",

View File

@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import { darkTheme } from './theme/theme'
import { useAuthStore } from './store/authStore' import { useAuthStore } from './store/authStore'
import AppLayout from './components/AppLayout' import AppLayout from './components/AppLayout'
import LoginPage from './pages/LoginPage' import LoginPage from './pages/LoginPage'
import SsoCallbackPage from './pages/SsoCallbackPage'
import MfaSetupPage from './pages/MfaSetupPage' import MfaSetupPage from './pages/MfaSetupPage'
import HostsPage from './pages/HostsPage' import HostsPage from './pages/HostsPage'
import HostDetailPage from './pages/HostDetailPage' import HostDetailPage from './pages/HostDetailPage'
@ -89,6 +90,7 @@ function App() {
<Routes> <Routes>
{/* Public */} {/* Public */}
<Route path="/login" element={<LoginPage />} /> <Route path="/login" element={<LoginPage />} />
<Route path="/auth/sso/callback" element={<SsoCallbackPage />} />
{/* Protected — wrapped in AppLayout with sidebar navigation */} {/* Protected — wrapped in AppLayout with sidebar navigation */}
<Route element={<RequireAuth><AppLayout /></RequireAuth>}> <Route element={<RequireAuth><AppLayout /></RequireAuth>}>

View File

@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ export default function AppLayout() {
<Divider /> <Divider />
<Box sx={{ p: 1.5 }}> <Box sx={{ p: 1.5 }}>
<Typography variant="caption" color="text.secondary"> <Typography variant="caption" color="text.secondary">
Linux Patch Manager v0.1.0 Linux Patch Manager v0.1.3
</Typography> </Typography>
</Box> </Box>
</Box> </Box>

View File

@ -4,11 +4,13 @@ import {
Box, Button, Container, TextField, Typography, Box, Button, Container, TextField, Typography,
Alert, CircularProgress, Paper, InputAdornment, IconButton, Alert, CircularProgress, Paper, InputAdornment, IconButton,
List, ListItem, ListItemIcon, ListItemText, List, ListItem, ListItemIcon, ListItemText,
Divider,
} from '@mui/material' } from '@mui/material'
import { import {
Visibility, VisibilityOff, Visibility, VisibilityOff,
Check as CheckIcon, Close as CloseIcon, Check as CheckIcon, Close as CloseIcon,
} from '@mui/icons-material' } from '@mui/icons-material'
import { Cloud as CloudIcon } from '@mui/icons-material'
import { authApi } from '../api/client' import { authApi } from '../api/client'
import { useAuthStore } from '../store/authStore' import { useAuthStore } from '../store/authStore'
import type { User } from '../types' import type { User } from '../types'
@ -323,6 +325,15 @@ export default function LoginPage() {
> >
{loading ? <CircularProgress size={24} /> : 'Sign In'} {loading ? <CircularProgress size={24} /> : 'Sign In'}
</Button> </Button>
<Divider sx={{ my: 3 }}>or</Divider>
<Button
fullWidth variant="outlined" size="large"
startIcon={<CloudIcon />}
onClick={() => { window.location.href = '/api/v1/auth/azure/login' }}
disabled={loading}
>
Sign in with Microsoft Azure
</Button>
</Box> </Box>
)} )}
</Paper> </Paper>

View File

@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import {
import { ContentCopy as CopyIcon } from '@mui/icons-material' import { ContentCopy as CopyIcon } from '@mui/icons-material'
import QRCode from 'qrcode' import QRCode from 'qrcode'
import { authApi } from '../api/client' import { authApi } from '../api/client'
import { useAuthStore } from '../store/authStore'
const STEPS = ['Get your QR code', 'Verify code', 'Done'] const STEPS = ['Get your QR code', 'Verify code', 'Done']
@ -23,6 +24,7 @@ export default function MfaSetupPage() {
authApi.getMfaSetup() authApi.getMfaSetup()
.then((res) => { .then((res) => {
setSetup(res.data) setSetup(res.data)
console.log('[MFA Setup] Success:', res.status, res.data)
// Generate QR code from otpauth URI // Generate QR code from otpauth URI
if (res.data.otp_uri) { if (res.data.otp_uri) {
QRCode.toDataURL(res.data.otp_uri, { QRCode.toDataURL(res.data.otp_uri, {
@ -31,10 +33,31 @@ export default function MfaSetupPage() {
color: { dark: '#000000', light: '#ffffff' }, color: { dark: '#000000', light: '#ffffff' },
}) })
.then((url) => setQrDataUrl(url)) .then((url) => setQrDataUrl(url))
.catch(() => setError('Failed to generate QR code.')) .catch((qrErr) => {
console.error('[MFA Setup] QR generation failed:', qrErr)
setError('Failed to generate QR code.')
})
} else {
console.error('[MFA Setup] No otp_uri in response:', res.data)
setError('MFA setup returned invalid data. No OTP URI found.')
}
})
.catch((err) => {
const status = err?.response?.status
const data = err?.response?.data
const message = err?.message
const token = useAuthStore.getState().accessToken
console.error('[MFA Setup] Failed:', { status, data, message, hasToken: !!token })
if (status === 401) {
setError('Authentication required. Please log in again.')
} else if (status === 403) {
setError('You do not have permission to set up MFA.')
} else if (message === 'Network Error') {
setError('Network error. Please check your connection and try again.')
} else {
setError(`Failed to load MFA setup: ${message || 'Unknown error'} (Status: ${status || 'N/A'})`)
} }
}) })
.catch(() => setError('Failed to load MFA setup.'))
}, []) }, [])
const handleCopySecret = () => { const handleCopySecret = () => {

View File

@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react'
import { useNavigate } from 'react-router-dom'
import {
Box, Container, Paper, Typography, Alert, Button, CircularProgress,
} from '@mui/material'
import { useAuthStore } from '../store/authStore'
import type { User } from '../types'
export default function SsoCallbackPage() {
const navigate = useNavigate()
const { setTokens, setUser } = useAuthStore()
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null)
const [processing, setProcessing] = useState(true)
useEffect(() => {
const params = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search)
// Check for error from backend
const errorCode = params.get('error')
const errorDescription = params.get('error_description')
if (errorCode) {
setError(errorDescription || `SSO authentication failed: ${errorCode}`)
setProcessing(false)
return
}
// Extract tokens
const accessToken = params.get('access_token')
const refreshToken = params.get('refresh_token')
if (!accessToken || !refreshToken) {
setError('Missing authentication tokens. Please try logging in again.')
setProcessing(false)
return
}
// Parse user JSON from query param
const userParam = params.get('user')
if (!userParam) {
setError('Missing user information. Please try logging in again.')
setProcessing(false)
return
}
let parsedUser: Record<string, unknown>
try {
parsedUser = JSON.parse(userParam)
} catch {
setError('Malformed user data received. Please try logging in again.')
setProcessing(false)
return
}
// Build a full User object from the SSO subset, filling in sensible defaults
const user: User = {
id: (parsedUser.id as string) || '',
username: (parsedUser.username as string) || '',
display_name: (parsedUser.display_name as string) || '',
email: (parsedUser.email as string) || '',
role: (parsedUser.role as User['role']) || 'operator',
auth_provider: 'azure_sso',
mfa_enabled: (parsedUser.mfa_enabled as boolean) ?? false,
is_active: true,
force_password_reset: false,
}
// Store tokens and user, then navigate
setTokens(accessToken, refreshToken)
setUser(user)
navigate('/dashboard', { replace: true })
}, [setTokens, setUser, navigate])
return (
<Container maxWidth="xs" sx={{ mt: 12 }}>
<Paper elevation={4} sx={{ p: 4 }}>
<Typography variant="h5" fontWeight={700} mb={3} align="center">
🐉 Linux Patch Manager
</Typography>
{processing ? (
<Box sx={{ display: 'flex', flexDirection: 'column', alignItems: 'center', py: 4 }}>
<CircularProgress size={48} sx={{ mb: 2 }} />
<Typography variant="body1" color="text.secondary">
Completing sign-in
</Typography>
</Box>
) : (
<Box>
<Alert severity="error" sx={{ mb: 2 }}>
{error}
</Alert>
<Button
fullWidth
variant="contained"
size="large"
onClick={() => navigate('/login', { replace: true })}
>
Back to Login
</Button>
</Box>
)}
</Paper>
</Container>
)
}

View File

@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import { useEffect, useState, useMemo } from 'react' import { useEffect, useState, useMemo } from 'react'
import { useNavigate } from 'react-router-dom'
import { import {
Box, Button, Chip, CircularProgress, Container, Dialog, DialogActions, Box, Button, Chip, CircularProgress, Container, Dialog, DialogActions,
DialogContent, DialogContentText, DialogTitle, FormControlLabel, IconButton, DialogContent, DialogContentText, DialogTitle, FormControlLabel, IconButton,
@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ function PasswordStrengthIndicator({ password }: { password: string }) {
export default function UsersPage() { export default function UsersPage() {
const currentUser = useAuthStore(s => s.user) const currentUser = useAuthStore(s => s.user)
const navigate = useNavigate()
const isAdmin = currentUser?.role === 'admin' const isAdmin = currentUser?.role === 'admin'
const [users, setUsers] = useState<User[]>([]) const [users, setUsers] = useState<User[]>([])
@ -327,8 +329,17 @@ export default function UsersPage() {
color={u.role === 'admin' ? 'primary' : 'default'} /> color={u.role === 'admin' ? 'primary' : 'default'} />
</TableCell> </TableCell>
<TableCell> <TableCell>
<Chip size="small" label={u.mfa_enabled ? 'On' : 'Off'} {u.mfa_enabled ? (
color={u.mfa_enabled ? 'success' : 'warning'} /> <Chip size="small" label="On" color="success" />
) : currentUser?.id === u.id ? (
<Tooltip title="Enable MFA">
<Chip size="small" label="Off" color="warning"
sx={{ cursor: 'pointer', '&:hover': { opacity: 0.8 } }}
onClick={() => navigate('/mfa/setup')} />
</Tooltip>
) : (
<Chip size="small" label="Off" color="default" />
)}
</TableCell> </TableCell>
<TableCell> <TableCell>
<Chip size="small" label={u.is_active ? 'Active' : 'Disabled'} <Chip size="small" label={u.is_active ? 'Active' : 'Disabled'}
@ -460,24 +471,41 @@ export default function UsersPage() {
/> />
</Box> </Box>
{/* MFA status & disable */} {/* MFA status */}
<Box sx={{ mt: 2, display: 'flex', alignItems: 'center', gap: 1 }}> <Box sx={{ mt: 2, display: 'flex', alignItems: 'center', gap: 1 }}>
<Typography variant="body2" color="text.secondary">MFA Status:</Typography> <Typography variant="body2" color="text.secondary">MFA Status:</Typography>
<Chip size="small" <Chip size="small"
label={editUser?.mfa_enabled ? 'Enabled' : 'Disabled'} label={editUser?.mfa_enabled ? 'Enabled' : 'Disabled'}
color={editUser?.mfa_enabled ? 'success' : 'default'} color={editUser?.mfa_enabled ? 'success' : 'default'}
/> />
{editUser?.mfa_enabled && ( {editUser?.mfa_enabled ? (
<Button size="small" color="error" variant="outlined" <Button size="small" color="error" variant="outlined"
onClick={() => editUser && handleMfaDisable(editUser)}> onClick={() => editUser && handleMfaDisable(editUser)}>
Disable MFA Disable MFA
</Button> </Button>
) : (
currentUser?.id === editUser?.id ? (
<Button size="small" color="primary" variant="outlined"
onClick={() => navigate('/mfa/setup')}>
Enable MFA
</Button>
) : (
<Typography variant="caption" color="text.secondary">
User must enable MFA from their own profile settings.
</Typography>
)
)} )}
</Box> </Box>
{editUser?.mfa_enabled && ( {editUser?.mfa_enabled ? (
<Typography variant="caption" color="warning.main" sx={{ display: 'block', mt: 0.5 }}> <Typography variant="caption" color="warning.main" sx={{ display: 'block', mt: 0.5 }}>
Disabling MFA reduces account security for this user. Disabling MFA reduces account security for this user.
</Typography> </Typography>
) : (
currentUser?.id === editUser?.id && (
<Typography variant="caption" color="info.main" sx={{ display: 'block', mt: 0.5 }}>
You will be guided through authenticator app setup.
</Typography>
)
)} )}
</> </>
)} )}

View File

@ -1,5 +1,27 @@
# Linux Patch Manager — Lessons Learned # Linux Patch Manager — Lessons Learned
## 2026-05-08: Asserting Unverified Conclusions Is a Critical Failure Mode
**Pattern:** I repeatedly asserted conclusions without verifying them first, then spun wheels on rabbit holes instead of checking the obvious source.
**Mistakes made in this session:**
1. Claimed vaultwarden-secrets wasn't in gitea — WRONG. It was there the whole time.
2. Claimed Vaultwarden credentials "may be stale" — WRONG. They were correct; my implementation was wrong.
3. Used wrong credential path (/a0/usr/credentials/gitea/ instead of /a0/usr/credentials/gitea-lxc/).
4. Spun wheels decompiling .pyc, manual API auth, searching chat history — instead of checking the gitea repo.
5. Didn't notice SSH key was missing from ~/.ssh/ until connection failed.
6. Stated uncertainty as fact ("credentials may be stale") when the real issue was my own technical failure.
**Root cause:** Violating the Verification Principle — asserting conclusions without verification.
**Rule:** ALWAYS verify before asserting. If I haven't checked, say "I haven't verified this" — never state it as fact.
**Rule:** When a tool/skill is broken, FIX IT FIRST before attempting manual workarounds.
**Rule:** Check the obvious source (gitea repo, Vaultwarden store) before spinning wheels on complex alternatives.
**Status:** Active
## 2026-05-08: Vaultwarden Is the Source of Truth for All Credentials
**Pattern:** SSH keys in ~/.ssh/ are ephemeral — lost on every container recreation. Local copies are unreliable.
**Rule:** ALWAYS pull credentials (SSH keys, API tokens, passwords) from Vaultwarden when needed. Do NOT rely on local copies in ~/.ssh/ or /a0/usr/storage/ as they may be stale or missing after container recreation.
**Rule:** At the start of each session, verify critical credentials by pulling them from Vaultwarden using `python3 /a0/skills/vaultwarden-secrets/scripts/vw_client.py`.
**Rule:** /a0/usr/storage/echo-ssh-setup/ is NOT the primary source — Vaultwarden is. Local copies are convenience only.
**Status:** Active
## 2026-04-24: CI/CD First, Not Manual Builds ## 2026-04-24: CI/CD First, Not Manual Builds
**Pattern:** When creating release packages, set up CI/CD pipeline (Gitea Actions) FIRST before manually building. **Pattern:** When creating release packages, set up CI/CD pipeline (Gitea Actions) FIRST before manually building.
**Why:** Manual builds are one-off and not reproducible. CI/CD ensures every push/tag produces a fresh, consistent package built on the correct target OS (Ubuntu 24.04), with proper glibc compatibility. **Why:** Manual builds are one-off and not reproducible. CI/CD ensures every push/tag produces a fresh, consistent package built on the correct target OS (Ubuntu 24.04), with proper glibc compatibility.
@ -95,3 +117,12 @@ The Docker container intercepted some jobs and ran them in its Alpine environmen
**Pattern:** The debian/control file has a hardcoded `Version: 1.0.0-1` that doesn't match the Cargo.toml version. **Pattern:** The debian/control file has a hardcoded `Version: 1.0.0-1` that doesn't match the Cargo.toml version.
**Why:** When dpkg sees the same version number (1.0.0-1) for both old and new packages, it may not properly replace files. The build-package.sh script updates the version in the control file during build, but this needs to be verified. **Why:** When dpkg sees the same version number (1.0.0-1) for both old and new packages, it may not properly replace files. The build-package.sh script updates the version in the control file during build, but this needs to be verified.
**Action:** Ensure build-package.sh always updates debian/control Version to match Cargo.toml version before building the .deb. **Action:** Ensure build-package.sh always updates debian/control Version to match Cargo.toml version before building the .deb.
## 2026-05-08: CSP img-src Must Include data: for QR Codes and Dynamic Images
**Pattern:** Content Security Policy default-src 'self' blocks data: URIs, preventing base64-encoded images (like QR codes) from displaying.
**Mistake:** Spent extensive time investigating infrastructure (HAProxy, caching, deployment, auth tokens) when Kelly said 'it's just a display issue.' The actual cause was a missing `img-src 'self' data:;` in the CSP meta tag.
**Root cause:** The CSP in index.html only had `default-src 'self'` which blocks `data:` image sources. The QR code library generates `data:image/png;base64,...` URIs which were silently blocked by the browser.
**Fix:** Added `img-src 'self' data:;` to the CSP directive.
**Rule:** When someone says 'it's just a display issue,' focus on the code (CSP, CSS, rendering) — not infrastructure (caching, proxies, deployment).
**Rule:** For any image that uses data: URIs (QR codes, inline SVGs, base64 images), ensure CSP includes `img-src 'self' data:;` or equivalent.
**Status:** Active

View File

@ -1,61 +1,45 @@
# Target Host for Service Health Checks # SSO Implementation Fix Plan
## Overview ## Issues Identified
Add `target_host_id` field to service health checks, allowing a check configured on Host A to query a service on Host B's agent. Useful for redundant services running on multiple machines. 1. **No SSO Login Button** — LoginPage.tsx missing "Sign in with Azure" button
2. **No SSO Callback Route** — App.tsx missing frontend route to handle SSO callback
3. **authStore No SSO Support** — authStore.ts has no method to store SSO tokens
4. **Backend Returns JSON Not Redirect** — azure_sso.rs callback returns JSON tokens instead of redirecting to frontend
5. **No SSO Session Cleanup** — sso_sessions DashMap has no expiry/cleanup task (memory leak)
6. **No JWT Signature Verification** — id_token decoded without verifying Azure AD signature
**Design:** `target_host_id` is nullable. When NULL (default), behavior unchanged — check queries its own host's agent. When set, the service check queries the target host's agent instead. Only applies to service checks; HTTP checks already specify a full URL. ## Phases
## Implementation Checklist ### Phase 1: Backend SSO Fixes (Issues 4, 5) — COMPLETE ✅
- [x] 1a: Add SSO session cleanup task in main.rs (purge sessions older than 10 minutes)
- [x] 1b: Modify azure_sso.rs callback to redirect to frontend with tokens instead of returning JSON
- [x] 1c: Add `sso_callback_url` to SecurityConfig in config.rs with serde default
- [x] 1d: Update settings.rs to include sso_callback_url in settings response
- [x] 1e: Verify backend compiles with `cargo check`
### 1. Database Migration ### Phase 2: Frontend SSO Integration (Issues 1, 2, 3) — COMPLETE ✅
- [ ] Create `migrations/011_health_check_target_host.sql` - [x] 2a: Add SSO callback page component (SsoCallbackPage.tsx)
- [ ] Add `target_host_id UUID REFERENCES hosts(id) ON DELETE SET NULL` column - [x] 2b: Add SSO callback route to App.tsx (public route, no auth required)
- [ ] Add partial index on `target_host_id` where NOT NULL - [x] 2c: Add "Sign in with Microsoft Azure" button to LoginPage.tsx
- [x] 2d: Add SSO-related types and API methods to frontend
- [x] 2e: Verify frontend builds with TypeScript compilation
### 2. Backend Models (`crates/pm-core/src/models.rs`) ### Phase 3: JWT Signature Verification (Issue 6) — COMPLETE ✅
- [ ] Add `target_host_id: Option<Uuid>` to `HealthCheck` struct - [x] 3a: Add JWKS client dependency to pm-web/Cargo.toml
- [ ] Add `target_host_id: Option<Uuid>` to `CreateHealthCheckRequest` - [x] 3b: Implement id_token signature verification in azure_sso.rs
- [ ] Add `target_host_id: Option<Uuid>` to `UpdateHealthCheckRequest` - [x] 3c: Verify backend compiles with `cargo check`
- [ ] Add `target_host_id` to all HealthCheck SELECT queries
### 3. API Routes (`crates/pm-web/src/routes/health_checks.rs`) ### Phase 4: Integration Testing and Verification — COMPLETE ✅
- [ ] Create: add `target_host_id` to INSERT, validate target host exists + is healthy - [x] 4a: Backend code review — all changes verified manually
- [ ] Update: add `target_host_id` to COALESCE UPDATE - [x] 4b: Frontend TypeScript compilation — passes cleanly
- [ ] List/Get: add `target_host_id` to SELECT columns - [x] 4c: SSO login flow reviewed end-to-end (backend redirect → frontend callback → auth store)
- [ ] Test endpoint (`run_service_check`): when `target_host_id` is Some, query that host's IP/port - [x] 4d: SSO session cleanup verified (10-minute expiry, 60-second purge interval)
- [ ] Audit log: include `target_host_id` in audit JSON - [x] 4e: Settings page SSO config unchanged (sso_callback_url added as read-only)
- [x] 4f: Lessons captured below
### 4. Health Check Poller (`crates/pm-worker/src/health_check_poller.rs`) ## Lessons Learned
- [ ] Add `target_host_id: Option<Uuid>` to `HealthCheckRow` - **SSO callback must redirect, not return JSON** — Browser OAuth2 flows require the backend to redirect to the frontend SPA, not return JSON tokens. The frontend must parse tokens from URL query parameters.
- [ ] Modify SQL: LEFT JOIN hosts th ON th.id = hc.target_host_id, use COALESCE(th.ip_address, h.ip_address) and COALESCE(th.agent_port, h.agent_port) - **URLSearchParams.get() already decodes** — Don't double-decode with decodeURIComponent() when using URLSearchParams.
- [ ] Add `target_ip_address` and `target_agent_port` fields to HealthCheckRow - **JWKS caching prevents rate-limiting** — Azure AD JWKS endpoint should be cached with TTL (1 hour) to avoid fetching on every SSO login.
- [ ] `run_service_check`: use target host IP/port when available - **tokio::sync::Mutex over std::sync::Mutex** — Axum handlers must be Send; std::sync::MutexGuard is not Send across await points.
- [ ] `check_host_health_checks`: no change needed (results count toward owning host) - **DashMap session cleanup** — In-memory session stores (DashMap) need periodic cleanup tasks to prevent memory leaks. Pattern: tokio::spawn with interval + retain with time-based cutoff.
### 5. Frontend Types (`frontend/src/types/index.ts`)
- [ ] Add `target_host_id?: string` to `HealthCheck`
- [ ] Add `target_host_id?: string` to `CreateHealthCheckRequest`
- [ ] Add `target_host_id?: string` to `UpdateHealthCheckRequest`
### 6. Frontend Form (`frontend/src/pages/HostDetailPage.tsx`)
- [ ] Add `target_host_id: string` to `HealthCheckFormValues`
- [ ] Add `target_host_id: ''` to `defaultHealthCheckForm`
- [ ] Add host selector dropdown in `HealthCheckFormDialog` (visible when check_type === 'service')
- [ ] Fetch hosts list for dropdown (use hostsApi.list or a dedicated endpoint)
- [ ] `handleHcCreateSubmit`: include `target_host_id: values.target_host_id || undefined`
- [ ] `handleHcEditClick`: map `check.target_host_id ?? ''` to form
- [ ] `handleHcEditSubmit`: include `target_host_id` in UpdateHealthCheckRequest
- [ ] Display target host in health checks table Target column
### 7. Build, Test, Deploy
- [ ] Run `cargo fmt --all` + `cargo clippy` + `cargo test`
- [ ] Run frontend build + ESLint + tsc
- [ ] Commit and push through CI pipeline
- [ ] Tag release, build .deb, deploy to dev
## Design Decisions
- `target_host_id` is nullable — NULL = check own host (backward compatible)
- FK with ON DELETE SET NULL — if target host deleted, revert to default
- Only applies to service checks (HTTP checks already have full URL)
- Health gate: results count toward the owning host, not the target host
- No RBAC required for target host — only requirement: target host exists in manager and is currently healthy