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fix(ws): add Origin allowlist to browser WebSocket upgrade (CSWSH hardening)

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Closes Draco-Lunaris/Linux-Patch-Manager#10

The browser WebSocket endpoint at GET /api/v1/ws/jobs previously
authenticated solely via a single-use, 60-second ticket passed as a query
parameter. A leaked ticket (browser history, Referer, proxy logs, support
bundles) could be redeemed from any origin, enabling Cross-Site WebSocket
Hijacking (CSWSH).

This change adds a second gate: the Origin header must match an explicit
allowlist. The check runs BEFORE ticket validation so that rejected
cross-origin probes do not consume the legitimate users ticket.

Changes:
- pm-core: new security.allowed_origins config field; default derived
  from sso_callback_url; startup warning if both are unparseable
- pm-web: ws_handler extracts HeaderMap and calls check_origin first;
  returns 403 on missing/malformed/disallowed origins
- config: documented allowed_origins key in config.example.toml
- docs: security-review.md section 1.4 (WebSocket Origin Allowlist)
- tests: 40 unit tests (7 pm-core, 33 pm-web)
This commit is contained in:
Draco Lunaris
2026-06-02 10:45:38 -05:00
parent 80709d48a7
commit ed5df26140
8 changed files with 925 additions and 12 deletions
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11
docs/security-review.md
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@ -35,6 +35,17 @@ verifying that all mandated security controls are implemented and operational.
| Live whitelist management | ✅ Verified | Settings page UI + `PUT /api/v1/settings` endpoint updates whitelist; changes take effect immediately via `RwLock` |
| Whitelist change audit | ✅ Verified | Every whitelist modification triggers an `audit_log` entry with old/new values |
### 1.4 WebSocket Origin Allowlist (CSWSH Defense-in-Depth)
| Control | Status | Evidence |
|---------|--------|----------|
| `Origin` header allowlist on browser WS upgrade | ✅ Verified | `crates/pm-web/src/routes/ws.rs` `ws_handler` — `HeaderMap` extractor + `check_origin` enforced before ticket validation |
| Allowlist configurable via `security.allowed_origins` | ✅ Verified | `crates/pm-core/src/config.rs` `SecurityConfig::allowed_origins`; documented in `config/config.example.toml` |
| Secure-by-default derivation from `sso_callback_url` | ✅ Verified | `derive_allowed_origins` parses the SSO callback URL into a single `scheme://host[:port]` entry when the operator leaves `allowed_origins` empty; `AppConfig::load` runs the derivation and emits a `tracing::warn!` if the result is empty (fail-closed) |
| Order: Origin check before ticket consumption | ✅ Verified | Rejected cross-origin probes do not burn the user's ticket; documented in the handler doc-comment and verified by `check_rejects_disallowed_origin` test |
| Rejected upgrades logged with `origin` and `reason` | ✅ Verified | `tracing::warn!` in `ws_handler`; ticket value is never logged |
**Note:** The browser WebSocket endpoint (`GET /api/v1/ws/jobs`) is the only browser-reachable WS server in the codebase. The `pm-worker` `ws_relay` module is an outbound mTLS WS *client* to on-host agents and is not subject to CSWSH.
---
## 2. Authentication & Authorization