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* feat: add CRL health status schema and UI (PR 3 of 6)
* fix(lint): strict equality for crl_age_seconds
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Co-authored-by: Draco Lunaris <331325+Draco-Lunaris@users.noreply.github.com>
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* feat(security): replace hardcoded admin password with in-app bootstrap (issue #8)
Replace the publicly-known Argon2id hash in 002_seed_admin.sql with a
clearly-invalid placeholder that cannot validate any password (fail-closed).
On first startup, pm-web detects the placeholder and generates a random
24-character alphanumeric password, hashes it with Argon2id, and UPDATEs
the admin row. The plaintext password is printed once to stderr (visible
in systemd journal).
This eliminates the need for a separate hash_password binary, shell
script SQL injection risk, and password leakage in shell variables.
Closes#8
* fix(security): rustfmt compliance for bootstrap function
* fix(security): add trailing commas to match arms per rustfmt
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Encrypt three sensitive secrets that were stored in plaintext: OIDC client_secret, SMTP smtp_password, TOTP totp_secret. AES-256-GCM via pm-core::crypto helper. New per-install key at /etc/patch-manager/keys/secret-encryption.key, separate from health-check.key for blast-radius isolation. MASKED placeholder behavior in API responses is preserved.
23 files changed, +1248 / -28. Closes#6.
- Refactored azure_sso.rs to sso.rs with generic OIDC provider support
- Added OIDC discovery URL lookup with 1hr TTL caching
- Added PKCE for all providers, client_secret optional for public clients
- Added /api/v1/auth/sso/login and /api/v1/auth/sso/callback routes
- Added /api/v1/auth/azure/* backward-compatible routes
- Added POST /settings/sso/discover and POST /settings/sso/test endpoints
- Frontend: Provider dropdown (Keycloak/Azure AD/Custom OIDC)
- Frontend: Auto-fill discovery URL for Keycloak
- Frontend: Discover Endpoints and Test Connection buttons
- Frontend: Dynamic SSO button based on provider display name
- Made migration 014 idempotent with DO blocks and IF NOT EXISTS
- Fixed debian/install to use /usr/local/bin/ for binaries
- Fixed frontend file path in .deb package
- Reset admin password on dev server
- Fixed database permissions for oidc_config table
- Add target_host_id column to host_health_checks table (nullable UUID FK)
- Allow service checks to query a different host agent
- Backend models, API routes, and poller updated
- Frontend: host selector dropdown for service checks
- Validation: target host must exist and be healthy
- FK ON DELETE SET NULL: revert to own host if target deleted
- Added health_check_poller.rs: periodic service/HTTP health checks
- Added pre-patch health gate in job_executor.rs
- Added waiting_health_check job status (migration 008)
- Added health_check_status to HostSummary and hosts API
- Added health check types and API functions to frontend
- Added health check UI section to HostDetailPage
- Added health check status indicators to HostsPage and PatchDeploymentPage
- Added serde default for health_check_poll_interval_secs
- Fixed missing AgentClient import in health_check_poller.rs
- Fixed missing ws_relay import in main.rs
- Fixed missing closing paren in retry_pending_jobs SQL
- Added ReadWritePaths for /etc/patch-manager/keys in systemd services
BUG-14: Patch poller was INSERT-ing a new row every poll cycle instead of
UPSERT-ing, creating 51 duplicate rows in host_patch_data for a single host.
Changes:
- patch_poller.rs: Changed INSERT to INSERT...ON CONFLICT (host_id) DO UPDATE
so each host only has one row that gets updated on each poll
- Migration 006: Added UNIQUE constraint on host_id, cleaned up 50 duplicate
rows keeping only the latest polled_at per host
The dashboard showing 174 pending patches and 0% compliance is expected
behavior - the patch data was collected before the job ran and the poller
runs every 30 minutes. The next poll cycle will refresh the data.
BUG-6: Add TLS support via axum-server + rustls
- Added axum-server with tls-rustls feature to workspace and pm-web
- pm-web now serves HTTPS when TLS certs exist, falls back to HTTP with warning
- setup.sh generates self-signed ECDSA P-256 TLS cert with SANs
- Config already had web_tls_cert_path/web_tls_key_path fields
BUG-7: Fix audit chain integrity errors
- Migration 005 now TRUNCATEs audit_log after adding prev_hash column
- Existing rows had broken hash chains (inserted before prev_hash existed)
BUG-8: Disable WatchdogSec in patch-manager-web.service
- pm-web does not implement sd_notify, causing systemd to kill the service
BUG-9: Disable WatchdogSec in patch-manager-worker.service
- Same issue as BUG-8, worker does not implement sd_notify
Previous fixes (BUG-1 through BUG-5) also included:
- setup.sh: PostgreSQL 15+ schema GRANTs
- Axum route syntax :param → {param} (19 routes)
- DbUser struct role: String → UserRole enum mapping
- UserRole/AuthProvider Display trait implementations
- Seed admin password hash (Argon2id)
