ClosesDraco-Lunaris/Linux-Patch-Manager#10
The browser WebSocket endpoint at GET /api/v1/ws/jobs previously
authenticated solely via a single-use, 60-second ticket passed as a query
parameter. A leaked ticket (browser history, Referer, proxy logs, support
bundles) could be redeemed from any origin, enabling Cross-Site WebSocket
Hijacking (CSWSH).
This change adds a second gate: the Origin header must match an explicit
allowlist. The check runs BEFORE ticket validation so that rejected
cross-origin probes do not consume the legitimate users ticket.
Changes:
- pm-core: new security.allowed_origins config field; default derived
from sso_callback_url; startup warning if both are unparseable
- pm-web: ws_handler extracts HeaderMap and calls check_origin first;
returns 403 on missing/malformed/disallowed origins
- config: documented allowed_origins key in config.example.toml
- docs: security-review.md section 1.4 (WebSocket Origin Allowlist)
- tests: 40 unit tests (7 pm-core, 33 pm-web)