feat: add version display to sidebar and bump to v1.1.4

Three issues fixed in the multi-stage Docker build:

1. CRITICAL: Add COPY migrations/ to rust-builder stage
   - sqlx::migrate!(../../migrations) is a compile-time proc macro
   - Without migrations/ present, cargo build fails with 'no such file or directory'
   - Previously migrations/ was only copied in runtime stage (too late)

2. Copy individual crate Cargo.toml files for dependency caching
   - The dummy-build caching step only copied workspace Cargo.toml/Cargo.lock
   - Without crate-level manifests, cargo couldn't resolve the workspace
   - This meant the cache layer was ineffective (rebuilt everything on code changes)

3. Add openssl package to runtime stage
   - entrypoint.sh uses openssl rand, openssl genpkey, openssl pkey
   - Only libssl3t64 (shared library) was installed, not the CLI tool
   - Runtime would fail on first-run key generation

All stages verified: Ubuntu 24.04 ✅  Rust via rustup (1.85+) ✅

.dockerignore

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Build artifacts
+target/
+*.deb
+package-build/
+
+# Frontend build output (rebuilt in Docker)
+frontend/dist/
+frontend/node_modules/
+
+# Git
+.git/
+.gitignore
+
+# IDE
+.vscode/
+.idea/
+
+# Docker
+Dockerfile
+docker-compose.yml
+.dockerignore
+
+# Environment
+.env
+.env.*
+
+# Documentation
+docs/
+
+# Agent Zero project data
+.a0proj/
+
+# Python
+venv/
+__pycache__/
+
+# Misc
+*.md
+!README.md
+LICENSE

.env.example

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Linux Patch Manager — Docker Environment Variables
+# Copy this file to .env and edit the values before running docker compose up.
+
+# Required: PostgreSQL password for the patch_manager user
+DB_PASSWORD=changeme-to-a-strong-password
+
+# Optional: Docker image tag (defaults to 'latest' if not set)
+TAG=latest

.gitea/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           TOKEN="${{ secrets.GITEATOKEN }}"
           curl -sf -H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
-            "https://gitea-lxc.moon-dragon.us/echo/linux_patch_manager/archive/${GITHUB_SHA}.tar.gz" \
+            "https://gitea-lxc.moon-dragon.us/git-echo/linux_patch_manager/archive/${GITHUB_SHA}.tar.gz" \
             -o repo.tar.gz
           tar xzf repo.tar.gz --strip-components=1
           rm repo.tar.gz
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           TOKEN="${{ secrets.GITEATOKEN }}"
           curl -sf -H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
-            "https://gitea-lxc.moon-dragon.us/echo/linux_patch_manager/archive/${GITHUB_SHA}.tar.gz" \
+            "https://gitea-lxc.moon-dragon.us/git-echo/linux_patch_manager/archive/${GITHUB_SHA}.tar.gz" \
             -o repo.tar.gz
           tar xzf repo.tar.gz --strip-components=1
           rm repo.tar.gz
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           TOKEN="${{ secrets.GITEATOKEN }}"
           curl -sf -H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
-            "https://gitea-lxc.moon-dragon.us/echo/linux_patch_manager/archive/${GITHUB_SHA}.tar.gz" \
+            "https://gitea-lxc.moon-dragon.us/git-echo/linux_patch_manager/archive/${GITHUB_SHA}.tar.gz" \
             -o repo.tar.gz
           tar xzf repo.tar.gz --strip-components=1
           rm repo.tar.gz
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           TOKEN="${{ secrets.GITEATOKEN }}"
           curl -sf -H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
-            "https://gitea-lxc.moon-dragon.us/echo/linux_patch_manager/archive/${GITHUB_SHA}.tar.gz" \
+            "https://gitea-lxc.moon-dragon.us/git-echo/linux_patch_manager/archive/${GITHUB_SHA}.tar.gz" \
             -o repo.tar.gz
           tar xzf repo.tar.gz --strip-components=1
           rm repo.tar.gz
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           TOKEN="${{ secrets.GITEATOKEN }}"
           curl -sf -H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
-            "https://gitea-lxc.moon-dragon.us/echo/linux_patch_manager/archive/${GITHUB_SHA}.tar.gz" \
+            "https://gitea-lxc.moon-dragon.us/git-echo/linux_patch_manager/archive/${GITHUB_SHA}.tar.gz" \
             -o repo.tar.gz
           tar xzf repo.tar.gz --strip-components=1
           rm repo.tar.gz
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           TOKEN="${{ secrets.GITEATOKEN }}"
           curl -sf -H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
-            "https://gitea-lxc.moon-dragon.us/echo/linux_patch_manager/archive/${GITHUB_SHA}.tar.gz" \
+            "https://gitea-lxc.moon-dragon.us/git-echo/linux_patch_manager/archive/${GITHUB_SHA}.tar.gz" \
             -o repo.tar.gz
           tar xzf repo.tar.gz --strip-components=1
           rm repo.tar.gz
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ jobs:
         env:
           GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITEATOKEN }}
           GITEA_URL: https://gitea-lxc.moon-dragon.us
-          GITEA_REPO: echo/linux_patch_manager
+          GITEA_REPO: git-echo/linux_patch_manager
         run: |
           VERSION=$(grep '^version' Cargo.toml | head -1 | sed 's/.*=.*"\(.*\)"/\1/')
           DEB=$(ls linux-patch-manager_*.deb)

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+name: CI
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [master]
+    tags: ['v*']
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [master]
+
+env:
+  CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
+
+permissions:
+  contents: write
+  packages: write
+
+jobs:
+  rust-format:
+    name: Rust Format
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
+        with:
+          components: rustfmt
+      - uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
+      - run: cargo fmt --check --all
+
+  clippy:
+    name: Clippy
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
+        with:
+          components: clippy
+      - uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
+      - name: Install system dependencies
+        run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y pkg-config libssl-dev libfontconfig1-dev
+      - run: cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features
+
+  rust-test:
+    name: Rust Tests
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
+      - uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
+      - name: Install system dependencies
+        run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y pkg-config libssl-dev libfontconfig1-dev
+      - run: cargo test --workspace --all-features --lib --bins --tests
+
+  security-audit:
+    name: Security Audit
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
+      - run: cargo install cargo-audit && cargo audit
+
+  gitleaks:
+    name: Secret scanning
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0
+      - name: Gitleaks
+        uses: gitleaks/gitleaks-action@v2
+        env:
+          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+
+  frontend-lint:
+    name: Frontend Lint
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - name: Setup Node.js
+        uses: actions/setup-node@v4
+        with:
+          node-version: '20'
+      - name: Install & Lint
+        run: cd frontend && npm ci && npx eslint src/ --ext .ts,.tsx --max-warnings 0 && npx tsc --noEmit
+
+  build-and-release:
+    name: Build & Release
+    needs: [rust-format, clippy, rust-test, security-audit, frontend-lint]
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0
+      - name: Free disk space
+        run: |
+          sudo rm -rf /usr/local/lib/android /usr/share/dotnet /opt/ghc
+          df -h
+      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
+      - uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
+      - name: Install system dependencies
+        run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y pkg-config libssl-dev libfontconfig1-dev dpkg-dev
+      - name: Build Rust release
+        run: cargo build --release
+      - name: Strip binaries
+        run: strip target/release/pm-web target/release/pm-worker
+      - name: Setup Node.js
+        uses: actions/setup-node@v4
+        with:
+          node-version: '20'
+      - name: Build frontend
+        run: cd frontend && npm ci && npm run build
+      - name: Build .deb package
+        run: chmod +x scripts/build-package.sh && scripts/build-package.sh
+      - name: Generate release notes
+        if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')
+        id: release_notes
+        run: |
+          PREV_TAG=$(git describe --tags --abbrev=0 HEAD^ 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+          if [ -n "$PREV_TAG" ]; then
+            NOTES=$(git log ${PREV_TAG}..HEAD --pretty=format:"- %s (%h)" --no-merges)
+          else
+            NOTES=$(git log --pretty=format:"- %s (%h)" --no-merges)
+          fi
+          echo "notes<<EOF" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+          echo "$NOTES" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+          echo "EOF" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+      - name: Upload to GitHub Release
+        if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')
+        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
+        with:
+          body: ${{ steps.release_notes.outputs.notes }}
+          files: linux-patch-manager_*.deb
+
+  docker:
+    name: Docker Build & Push
+    needs: [rust-format, clippy, rust-test, security-audit, frontend-lint]
+    if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Set up Docker Buildx
+        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
+
+      - name: Set up QEMU
+        uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v3
+
+      - name: Log in to GitHub Container Registry
+        uses: docker/login-action@v3
+        with:
+          registry: ghcr.io
+          username: ${{ github.actor }}
+          password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+
+      - name: Extract Docker metadata
+        id: meta
+        uses: docker/metadata-action@v5
+        with:
+          images: ghcr.io/draco-lunaris/linux-patch-manager
+          tags: |
+            type=semver,pattern={{version}}
+            type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}}
+            type=semver,pattern={{major}}
+            type=sha
+
+      - name: Build and push Docker image
+        uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
+        with:
+          context: .
+          platforms: linux/amd64,linux/arm64
+          push: true
+          tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
+          labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
+          cache-from: type=gha
+          cache-to: type=gha,mode=max

.gitignore

@@ -27,3 +27,13 @@ frontend/dist
 # Package build artifacts
 *.deb
 package-build/
+
+# Docker environment
+.env
+
+# Private key material - NEVER commit
+*.key
+*.key.pem
+crates/pm-agent-client/certs/*.crt
+crates/pm-agent-client/certs/*.key
+crates/pm-agent-client/certs/*.pem

ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 | Version | 0.0.3 |
 | Status | Draft |
 | Standard | Aligned with IEEE 1016-2009 |
-| Owner | Echo (for Kelly / Moon Dragon) |
+| Owner | Draco Lunaris |
 | Last Updated | 2026-04-23 |
 | Related Docs | `SPEC.md`, `REQUIREMENTS.md`, `README.md` |
 

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+# Contributing to Linux-Patch-Manager
+
+Thank you for your interest in contributing to Linux-Patch-Manager! We appreciate every contribution — from bug reports and documentation improvements to new features and security fixes.
+
+## Code of Conduct
+
+This project follows the [Contributor Covenant v2.1](https://www.contributor-covenant.org/version/2/1/code_of_conduct/) code of conduct. By participating, you are expected to uphold this standard. Please report unacceptable behavior to the maintainers.
+
+## How to Contribute
+
+1. **Fork** the repository
+2. Create a **feature branch** from `main`:
+   ```bash
+   git checkout -b feat/my-feature
+   ```
+3. Make your changes
+4. Ensure all CI checks pass:
+   ```bash
+   # Rust backend
+   cargo fmt --check
+   cargo clippy -- -D warnings
+   cargo test
+
+   # TypeScript/React frontend
+   cd frontend
+   npm run lint
+   npm run build
+   npm test
+   ```
+5. **Commit** using conventional commit format (see below)
+6. Open a **Pull Request** against `main`
+
+## Development Setup
+
+### Prerequisites
+
+- **Rust toolchain** (stable) — [rustup](https://rustup.rs/)
+- **Node.js** 20+ (for the frontend) — [nvm](https://github.com/nvm-sh/nvm) recommended
+- **System dependencies**:
+  ```bash
+  sudo apt-get install build-essential libsystemd-dev pkg-config libssl-dev
+  ```
+
+### Build & Run
+
+```bash
+# Backend
+cargo build
+cargo test
+
+# Frontend
+cd frontend
+npm install
+npm run build
+npm test
+```
+
+## Commit Messages
+
+We use [Conventional Commits](https://www.conventionalcommits.org/):
+
+| Prefix   | Usage                  |
+|----------|------------------------|
+| `feat:`  | New feature            |
+| `fix:`   | Bug fix                |
+| `docs:`  | Documentation changes  |
+| `chore:` | Maintenance tasks      |
+| `refactor:` | Code refactoring    |
+| `test:`  | Adding or updating tests |
+| `ci:`    | CI configuration changes |
+
+Example:
+```
+feat: add patch scheduling to manager dashboard
+```
+
+## Pull Request Requirements
+
+- All CI checks must pass (fmt, clippy, test, audit, build)
+- One feature or fix per PR — keep changes focused
+- Include a clear description of what changed and why
+- Update documentation if your change affects behavior
+
+## Reporting Issues
+
+Use [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/Draco-Lunaris/Linux-Patch-Manager/issues) to report bugs, request features, or ask questions. Please include:
+
+- Steps to reproduce (for bugs)
+- Expected vs. actual behavior
+- Relevant logs or error messages
+
+## License
+
+By contributing, you agree that your contributions are licensed under the [Apache License 2.0](LICENSE), the same license as this project.

Cargo.lock

@@ -139,6 +139,16 @@ dependencies = [
  "syn",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "assert-json-diff"
+version = "2.0.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "47e4f2b81832e72834d7518d8487a0396a28cc408186a2e8854c0f98011faf12"
+dependencies = [
+ "serde",
+ "serde_json",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "async-trait"
 version = "0.1.89"
@@ -323,6 +333,21 @@ version = "1.8.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "2af50177e190e07a26ab74f8b1efbfe2ef87da2116221318cb1c2e82baf7de06"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "bit-set"
+version = "0.8.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "08807e080ed7f9d5433fa9b275196cfc35414f66a0c79d864dc51a0d825231a3"
+dependencies = [
+ "bit-vec",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "bit-vec"
+version = "0.8.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "5e764a1d40d510daf35e07be9eb06e75770908c27d411ee6c92109c9840eaaf7"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "bitflags"
 version = "1.3.2"
@@ -460,6 +485,15 @@ version = "1.1.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "3d7b894f5411737b7867f4827955924d7c254fc9f4d91a6aad6b097804b1018b"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "colored"
+version = "3.1.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "faf9468729b8cbcea668e36183cb69d317348c2e08e994829fb56ebfdfbaac34"
+dependencies = [
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "concurrent-queue"
 version = "2.5.0"
@@ -687,6 +721,19 @@ dependencies = [
  "cipher",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "dashmap"
+version = "5.5.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "978747c1d849a7d2ee5e8adc0159961c48fb7e5db2f06af6723b80123bb53856"
+dependencies = [
+ "cfg-if",
+ "hashbrown 0.14.5",
+ "lock_api",
+ "once_cell",
+ "parking_lot_core",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "dashmap"
 version = "6.1.0"
@@ -771,7 +818,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "libc",
  "option-ext",
  "redox_users",
- "windows-sys 0.60.2",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -885,7 +932,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "39cab71617ae0d63f51a36d69f866391735b51691dbda63cf6f96d042b63efeb"
 dependencies = [
  "libc",
- "windows-sys 0.60.2",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -970,6 +1017,12 @@ version = "0.1.5"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "d9c4f5dac5e15c24eb999c26181a6ca40b39fe946cbe4c263c7209467bc83af2"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "foldhash"
+version = "0.2.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "77ce24cb58228fbb8aa041425bb1050850ac19177686ea6e0f41a70416f56fdb"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "font-kit"
 version = "0.14.3"
@@ -1046,6 +1099,16 @@ dependencies = [
  "percent-encoding",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "forwarded-header-value"
+version = "0.1.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "8835f84f38484cc86f110a805655697908257fb9a7af005234060891557198e9"
+dependencies = [
+ "nonempty",
+ "thiserror 1.0.69",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "freetype-sys"
 version = "0.20.1"
@@ -1155,6 +1218,12 @@ version = "0.3.32"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "037711b3d59c33004d3856fbdc83b99d4ff37a24768fa1be9ce3538a1cde4393"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "futures-timer"
+version = "3.0.4"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "af43fadb8a98512d547e37b4e92e0ced13e205c061b87b4623eff01d918d6968"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "futures-util"
 version = "0.3.32"
@@ -1242,6 +1311,49 @@ dependencies = [
  "weezl",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "governor"
+version = "0.6.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "68a7f542ee6b35af73b06abc0dad1c1bae89964e4e253bc4b587b91c9637867b"
+dependencies = [
+ "cfg-if",
+ "dashmap 5.5.3",
+ "futures",
+ "futures-timer",
+ "no-std-compat",
+ "nonzero_ext",
+ "parking_lot",
+ "portable-atomic",
+ "quanta",
+ "rand 0.8.6",
+ "smallvec",
+ "spinning_top",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "governor"
+version = "0.10.4"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "9efcab3c1958580ff1f25a2a41be1668f7603d849bb63af523b208a3cc1223b8"
+dependencies = [
+ "cfg-if",
+ "dashmap 6.1.0",
+ "futures-sink",
+ "futures-timer",
+ "futures-util",
+ "getrandom 0.3.4",
+ "hashbrown 0.16.1",
+ "nonzero_ext",
+ "parking_lot",
+ "portable-atomic",
+ "quanta",
+ "rand 0.9.4",
+ "smallvec",
+ "spinning_top",
+ "web-time",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "h2"
 version = "0.4.13"
@@ -1275,7 +1387,18 @@ checksum = "9229cfe53dfd69f0609a49f65461bd93001ea1ef889cd5529dd176593f5338a1"
 dependencies = [
  "allocator-api2",
  "equivalent",
- "foldhash",
+ "foldhash 0.1.5",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "hashbrown"
+version = "0.16.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "841d1cc9bed7f9236f321df977030373f4a4163ae1a7dbfe1a51a2c1a51d9100"
+dependencies = [
+ "allocator-api2",
+ "equivalent",
+ "foldhash 0.2.0",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -1445,6 +1568,19 @@ dependencies = [
  "webpki-roots 1.0.7",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "hyper-timeout"
+version = "0.5.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "2b90d566bffbce6a75bd8b09a05aa8c2cb1fabb6cb348f8840c9e4c90a0d83b0"
+dependencies = [
+ "hyper",
+ "hyper-util",
+ "pin-project-lite",
+ "tokio",
+ "tower-service",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "hyper-tls"
 version = "0.6.0"
@@ -1924,6 +2060,18 @@ version = "2.8.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "f8ca58f447f06ed17d5fc4043ce1b10dd205e060fb3ce5b979b8ed8e59ff3f79"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "migrate-secrets"
+version = "0.2.4"
+dependencies = [
+ "anyhow",
+ "hex",
+ "pm-core",
+ "sqlx",
+ "tokio",
+ "uuid",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "mime"
 version = "0.3.17"
@@ -1967,6 +2115,31 @@ dependencies = [
  "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "mockito"
+version = "1.7.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "90820618712cab19cfc46b274c6c22546a82affcb3c3bdf0f29e3db8e1bb92c0"
+dependencies = [
+ "assert-json-diff",
+ "bytes",
+ "colored",
+ "futures-core",
+ "http",
+ "http-body",
+ "http-body-util",
+ "hyper",
+ "hyper-util",
+ "log",
+ "pin-project-lite",
+ "rand 0.9.4",
+ "regex",
+ "serde_json",
+ "serde_urlencoded",
+ "similar",
+ "tokio",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "moxcms"
 version = "0.8.1"
@@ -1994,6 +2167,12 @@ dependencies = [
  "tempfile",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "no-std-compat"
+version = "0.4.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "b93853da6d84c2e3c7d730d6473e8817692dd89be387eb01b94d7f108ecb5b8c"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "nom"
 version = "7.1.3"
@@ -2013,13 +2192,25 @@ dependencies = [
  "memchr",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "nonempty"
+version = "0.7.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "e9e591e719385e6ebaeb5ce5d3887f7d5676fceca6411d1925ccc95745f3d6f7"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "nonzero_ext"
+version = "0.3.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "38bf9645c8b145698bb0b18a4637dcacbc421ea49bef2317e4fd8065a387cf21"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "nu-ansi-term"
 version = "0.50.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "7957b9740744892f114936ab4a57b3f487491bbeafaf8083688b16841a4240e5"
 dependencies = [
- "windows-sys 0.60.2",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -2307,6 +2498,26 @@ dependencies = [
  "sha2",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "pin-project"
+version = "1.1.13"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "2466b2336ed02bcdca6b294417127b90ec92038d1d5c4fbeac971a922e0e0924"
+dependencies = [
+ "pin-project-internal",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "pin-project-internal"
+version = "1.1.13"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "c96395f0a926bc13b1c17622aaddda1ecb55d49c8f1bf9777e4d877800a43f8b"
+dependencies = [
+ "proc-macro2",
+ "quote",
+ "syn",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "pin-project-lite"
 version = "0.2.17"
@@ -2381,7 +2592,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "pm-agent-client"
-version = "0.1.7"
+version = "0.2.4"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "chrono",
@@ -2398,7 +2609,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "pm-auth"
-version = "0.1.7"
+version = "0.2.4"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "argon2",
@@ -2419,19 +2630,21 @@ dependencies = [
  "thiserror 2.0.18",
  "tokio",
  "totp-rs",
+ "tower",
  "tracing",
  "uuid",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "pm-ca"
-version = "0.1.7"
+version = "0.2.4"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "chrono",
  "hex",
  "pem",
  "pm-core",
+ "proptest",
  "rand 0.8.6",
  "rcgen",
  "rustls",
@@ -2448,7 +2661,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "pm-core"
-version = "0.1.7"
+version = "0.2.4"
 dependencies = [
  "aes-gcm",
  "anyhow",
@@ -2472,7 +2685,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "pm-reports"
-version = "0.1.7"
+version = "0.2.4"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "chrono",
@@ -2492,7 +2705,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "pm-web"
-version = "0.1.7"
+version = "0.2.4"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "axum",
@@ -2500,26 +2713,33 @@ dependencies = [
  "axum-server",
  "base64",
  "chrono",
- "dashmap",
+ "dashmap 6.1.0",
+ "governor 0.6.3",
  "hex",
+ "http-body-util",
  "ipnet",
  "jsonwebtoken",
  "lettre",
+ "mockito",
  "pm-auth",
  "pm-ca",
  "pm-core",
  "pm-reports",
  "rand 0.8.6",
+ "rcgen",
  "reqwest",
  "rustls",
  "serde",
  "serde_json",
  "sha2",
  "sqlx",
+ "tempfile",
  "thiserror 2.0.18",
+ "time",
  "tokio",
  "tower",
  "tower-http",
+ "tower_governor",
  "tracing",
  "tracing-subscriber",
  "ulid",
@@ -2530,7 +2750,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "pm-worker"
-version = "0.1.7"
+version = "0.2.4"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "chrono",
@@ -2600,6 +2820,12 @@ dependencies = [
  "bstr",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "portable-atomic"
+version = "1.13.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "c33a9471896f1c69cecef8d20cbe2f7accd12527ce60845ff44c153bb2a21b49"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "potential_utf"
 version = "0.1.5"
@@ -2656,12 +2882,52 @@ dependencies = [
  "unicode-ident",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "proptest"
+version = "1.11.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "4b45fcc2344c680f5025fe57779faef368840d0bd1f42f216291f0dc4ace4744"
+dependencies = [
+ "bit-set",
+ "bit-vec",
+ "bitflags 2.11.1",
+ "num-traits",
+ "rand 0.9.4",
+ "rand_chacha 0.9.0",
+ "rand_xorshift",
+ "regex-syntax",
+ "rusty-fork",
+ "tempfile",
+ "unarray",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "pxfm"
 version = "0.1.29"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "e0c5ccf5294c6ccd63a74f1565028353830a9c2f5eb0c682c355c471726a6e3f"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "quanta"
+version = "0.12.6"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "f3ab5a9d756f0d97bdc89019bd2e4ea098cf9cde50ee7564dde6b81ccc8f06c7"
+dependencies = [
+ "crossbeam-utils",
+ "libc",
+ "once_cell",
+ "raw-cpuid",
+ "wasi",
+ "web-sys",
+ "winapi",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "quick-error"
+version = "1.2.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "a1d01941d82fa2ab50be1e79e6714289dd7cde78eba4c074bc5a4374f650dfe0"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "quinn"
 version = "0.11.9"
@@ -2803,6 +3069,24 @@ dependencies = [
  "getrandom 0.3.4",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "rand_xorshift"
+version = "0.4.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "513962919efc330f829edb2535844d1b912b0fbe2ca165d613e4e8788bb05a5a"
+dependencies = [
+ "rand_core 0.9.5",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "raw-cpuid"
+version = "11.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "498cd0dc59d73224351ee52a95fee0f1a617a2eae0e7d9d720cc622c73a54186"
+dependencies = [
+ "bitflags 2.11.1",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "rcgen"
 version = "0.13.2"
@@ -2846,6 +3130,18 @@ dependencies = [
  "thiserror 2.0.18",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "regex"
+version = "1.12.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "e10754a14b9137dd7b1e3e5b0493cc9171fdd105e0ab477f51b72e7f3ac0e276"
+dependencies = [
+ "aho-corasick",
+ "memchr",
+ "regex-automata",
+ "regex-syntax",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "regex-automata"
 version = "0.4.14"
@@ -2999,7 +3295,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "errno",
  "libc",
  "linux-raw-sys",
- "windows-sys 0.60.2",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -3055,6 +3351,18 @@ version = "1.0.22"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "b39cdef0fa800fc44525c84ccb54a029961a8215f9619753635a9c0d2538d46d"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "rusty-fork"
+version = "0.3.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "cc6bf79ff24e648f6da1f8d1f011e9cac26491b619e6b9280f2b47f1774e6ee2"
+dependencies = [
+ "fnv",
+ "quick-error",
+ "tempfile",
+ "wait-timeout",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "ryu"
 version = "1.0.23"
@@ -3273,6 +3581,12 @@ version = "0.3.9"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "703d5c7ef118737c72f1af64ad2f6f8c5e1921f818cdcb97b8fe6fc69bf66214"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "similar"
+version = "2.7.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "bbbb5d9659141646ae647b42fe094daf6c6192d1620870b449d9557f748b2daa"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "simple_asn1"
 version = "0.6.4"
@@ -3307,7 +3621,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "3a766e1110788c36f4fa1c2b71b387a7815aa65f88ce0229841826633d93723e"
 dependencies = [
  "libc",
- "windows-sys 0.60.2",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -3319,6 +3633,15 @@ dependencies = [
  "lock_api",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "spinning_top"
+version = "0.3.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "d96d2d1d716fb500937168cc09353ffdc7a012be8475ac7308e1bdf0e3923300"
+dependencies = [
+ "lock_api",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "spki"
 version = "0.7.3"
@@ -3612,7 +3935,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "getrandom 0.4.2",
  "once_cell",
  "rustix",
- "windows-sys 0.60.2",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -3912,6 +4235,35 @@ version = "0.1.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "5d99f8c9a7727884afe522e9bd5edbfc91a3312b36a77b5fb8926e4c31a41801"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "tonic"
+version = "0.14.6"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "ac2a5518c70fa84342385732db33fb3f44bc4cc748936eb5833d2df34d6445ef"
+dependencies = [
+ "async-trait",
+ "axum",
+ "base64",
+ "bytes",
+ "h2",
+ "http",
+ "http-body",
+ "http-body-util",
+ "hyper",
+ "hyper-timeout",
+ "hyper-util",
+ "percent-encoding",
+ "pin-project",
+ "socket2",
+ "sync_wrapper",
+ "tokio",
+ "tokio-stream",
+ "tower",
+ "tower-layer",
+ "tower-service",
+ "tracing",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "totp-rs"
 version = "5.7.1"
@@ -3936,9 +4288,12 @@ checksum = "ebe5ef63511595f1344e2d5cfa636d973292adc0eec1f0ad45fae9f0851ab1d4"
 dependencies = [
  "futures-core",
  "futures-util",
+ "indexmap",
  "pin-project-lite",
+ "slab",
  "sync_wrapper",
  "tokio",
+ "tokio-util",
  "tower-layer",
  "tower-service",
  "tracing",
@@ -3985,6 +4340,23 @@ version = "0.3.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "8df9b6e13f2d32c91b9bd719c00d1958837bc7dec474d94952798cc8e69eeec3"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "tower_governor"
+version = "0.8.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "44de9b94d849d3c46e06a883d72d408c2de6403367b39df2b1c9d9e7b6736fe6"
+dependencies = [
+ "axum",
+ "forwarded-header-value",
+ "governor 0.10.4",
+ "http",
+ "pin-project",
+ "thiserror 2.0.18",
+ "tonic",
+ "tower",
+ "tracing",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "tracing"
 version = "0.1.44"
@@ -4142,6 +4514,12 @@ dependencies = [
  "web-time",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "unarray"
+version = "0.1.4"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "eaea85b334db583fe3274d12b4cd1880032beab409c0d774be044d4480ab9a94"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "unicase"
 version = "2.9.0"
@@ -4263,6 +4641,15 @@ version = "0.9.5"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "0b928f33d975fc6ad9f86c8f283853ad26bdd5b10b7f1542aa2fa15e2289105a"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "wait-timeout"
+version = "0.2.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "09ac3b126d3914f9849036f826e054cbabdc8519970b8998ddaf3b5bd3c65f11"
+dependencies = [
+ "libc",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "walkdir"
 version = "2.5.0"
@@ -4477,7 +4864,7 @@ version = "0.1.11"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "c2a7b1c03c876122aa43f3020e6c3c3ee5c05081c9a00739faf7503aeba10d22"
 dependencies = [
- "windows-sys 0.48.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]

Cargo.toml

@@ -8,10 +8,11 @@ members = [
     "crates/pm-auth",
     "crates/pm-ca",
     "crates/pm-reports",
+    "crates/migrate-secrets",
 ]
 
 [workspace.package]
-version = "0.1.7"
+version = "1.1.4"
 edition = "2021"
 authors = ["Echo <echo@moon-dragon.us>"]
 license = "MIT"
@@ -78,8 +79,15 @@ base64 = { version = "0.22" }
 hex = { version = "0.4" }
 sha2 = { version = "0.10" }
 aes-gcm = { version = "0.10" }
+
+# Testing
+proptest = { version = "1" }
 ipnet = { version = "2" }
 url = { version = "2" }
 
+# Rate limiting
+tower_governor = { version = "0.8", features = ["tracing"] }
+governor = "0.6"
+
 # Email
 lettre = { version = "0.11.22", features = ["tokio1-rustls-transport"] }

Dockerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# Linux Patch Manager — Multi-stage Docker Build
+# =============================================================================
+# Build:  docker build -t linux-patch-manager .
+# Run:    docker compose up
+# =============================================================================
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Stage 1: Rust build (Ubuntu 24.04 + rustup)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+FROM ubuntu:24.04 AS rust-builder
+
+ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+
+RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y \
+    build-essential \
+    curl \
+    pkg-config \
+    libssl-dev \
+    libfontconfig1-dev \
+    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+# Install Rust via rustup (stable channel, provides 1.85+)
+RUN curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh -s -- -y --default-toolchain stable
+ENV PATH="/root/.cargo/bin:${PATH}"
+
+WORKDIR /usr/src/app
+
+# Cache dependencies by building a dummy project first
+COPY Cargo.toml Cargo.lock ./
+COPY crates/pm-web/Cargo.toml crates/pm-web/Cargo.toml
+COPY crates/pm-worker/Cargo.toml crates/pm-worker/Cargo.toml
+COPY crates/pm-core/Cargo.toml crates/pm-core/Cargo.toml
+COPY crates/pm-agent-client/Cargo.toml crates/pm-agent-client/Cargo.toml
+COPY crates/pm-auth/Cargo.toml crates/pm-auth/Cargo.toml
+COPY crates/pm-ca/Cargo.toml crates/pm-ca/Cargo.toml
+COPY crates/pm-reports/Cargo.toml crates/pm-reports/Cargo.toml
+COPY crates/migrate-secrets/Cargo.toml crates/migrate-secrets/Cargo.toml
+RUN mkdir -p crates/pm-web/src crates/pm-worker/src crates/pm-core/src \
+    crates/pm-agent-client/src crates/pm-auth/src crates/pm-ca/src \
+    crates/pm-reports/src crates/migrate-secrets/src
+RUN echo 'fn main(){}' > crates/pm-web/src/main.rs \
+    && echo 'fn main(){}' > crates/pm-worker/src/main.rs \
+    && echo '' > crates/pm-core/src/lib.rs \
+    && echo '' > crates/pm-agent-client/src/lib.rs \
+    && echo '' > crates/pm-auth/src/lib.rs \
+    && echo '' > crates/pm-ca/src/lib.rs \
+    && echo '' > crates/pm-reports/src/lib.rs \
+    && echo 'fn main(){}' > crates/migrate-secrets/src/main.rs
+RUN cargo build --release 2>/dev/null || true
+
+# Now build the real project
+COPY crates/ crates/
+COPY migrations/ migrations/
+RUN cargo build --release
+
+# Verify binaries exist
+RUN ls -la target/release/pm-web target/release/pm-worker
+
+# Strip debug symbols
+RUN strip target/release/pm-web target/release/pm-worker
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Stage 2: Frontend build (Ubuntu 24.04 + Node.js 20)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+FROM ubuntu:24.04 AS frontend-builder
+
+ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+
+RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y \
+    curl \
+    ca-certificates \
+    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+# Install Node.js 20 via NodeSource
+RUN curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_20.x | bash - \
+    && apt-get install -y nodejs \
+    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+WORKDIR /usr/src/app/frontend
+COPY frontend/package.json frontend/package-lock.json ./
+RUN npm ci --production=false
+
+COPY frontend/ ./
+RUN npm run build
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Stage 3: Runtime
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+FROM ubuntu:24.04 AS runtime
+
+RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y \
+    ca-certificates \
+    libssl3t64 \
+    libfontconfig1 \
+    openssl \
+    postgresql-client-16 \
+    argon2 \
+    curl \
+    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+# Create service user
+RUN useradd --system --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin \
+    --comment "Linux Patch Manager service account" patch-manager
+
+# Create directories
+RUN mkdir -p /etc/patch-manager/ca /etc/patch-manager/certs \
+    /etc/patch-manager/jwt /etc/patch-manager/tls \
+    /var/log/patch-manager /opt/patch-manager \
+    /usr/share/patch-manager/frontend \
+    /usr/share/patch-manager/migrations
+
+# Copy binaries
+COPY --from=rust-builder /usr/src/app/target/release/pm-web /usr/local/bin/pm-web
+COPY --from=rust-builder /usr/src/app/target/release/pm-worker /usr/local/bin/pm-worker
+
+# Copy frontend
+COPY --from=frontend-builder /usr/src/app/frontend/dist/ /usr/share/patch-manager/frontend/
+
+# Copy migrations
+COPY migrations/ /usr/share/patch-manager/migrations/
+
+# Copy entrypoint
+COPY docker/entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh
+RUN chmod 755 /usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh
+
+# Copy config template
+COPY config/config.example.toml /usr/share/patch-manager/config.example.toml
+
+# Set ownership
+RUN chown -R patch-manager:patch-manager \
+    /etc/patch-manager /var/log/patch-manager \
+    /opt/patch-manager /usr/share/patch-manager
+
+# Expose HTTPS port
+EXPOSE 443
+
+# Volume for persistent data
+VOLUME ["/etc/patch-manager", "/var/log/patch-manager", "/opt/patch-manager"]
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh"]

LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+                                 Apache License
+                           Version 2.0, January 2004
+                        http://www.apache.org/licenses/
+
+   TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR USE, REPRODUCTION, AND DISTRIBUTION
+
+   1. Definitions.
+
+      "License" shall mean the terms and conditions for use, reproduction,
+      and distribution as defined by Sections 1 through 9 of this document.
+
+      "Licensor" shall mean the copyright owner or entity authorized by
+      the copyright owner that is granting the License.
+
+      "Legal Entity" shall mean the union of the acting entity and all
+      other entities that control, are controlled by, or are under common
+      control with that entity. For the purposes of this definition,
+      "control" means (i) the power, direct or indirect, to cause the
+      direction or management of such entity, whether by contract or
+      otherwise, or (ii) ownership of fifty percent (50%) or more of the
+      outstanding shares, or (iii) beneficial ownership of such entity.
+
+      "You" (or "Your") shall mean an individual or Legal Entity
+      exercising permissions granted by this License.
+
+      "Source" form shall mean the preferred form for making modifications,
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+   6. Trademarks. This License does not grant permission to use the trade
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+
+   8. Limitation of Liability. In no event and under no legal theory,
+      whether in tort (including negligence), contract, or otherwise,
+      unless required by applicable law (such as deliberate and grossly
+      negligent acts) or agreed to in writing, shall any Contributor be
+      liable to You for damages, including any direct, indirect, special,
+      incidental, or consequential damages of any character arising as a
+      result of this License or out of the use or inability to use the
+      Work (including but not limited to damages for loss of goodwill,
+      work stoppage, computer failure or malfunction, or any and all
+      other commercial damages or losses), even if such Contributor
+      has been advised of the possibility of such damages.
+
+   9. Accepting Warranty or Additional Liability. While redistributing
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+      of your accepting any such warranty or additional liability.
+
+   END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
+
+   Copyright 2025-2026 Draco Lunaris
+
+   Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+   you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+   You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+       http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
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+   WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+   See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+   limitations under the License.

README.md

@@ -234,7 +234,9 @@ sudo -u postgres psql patch_manager < /usr/share/patch-manager/migrations/001_in
 
 ## License
 
-Private — All rights reserved.
+This project is licensed under the [Apache License 2.0](LICENSE).
+
+Copyright 2025-2026 Draco Lunaris
 
 ---
 

SECURITY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+# Security Policy
+
+## Supported Versions
+
+Only the **latest release** is currently supported with security updates.
+
+| Version | Supported |
+|---------|----------|
+| Latest  | ✅       |
+| Older   | ❌       |
+
+## Reporting a Vulnerability
+
+**Do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub Issues.**
+
+Instead, use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting:
+
+👉 [Report a vulnerability for Linux-Patch-Manager](https://github.com/Draco-Lunaris/Linux-Patch-Manager/security/advisories/new)
+
+This allows us to coordinate a fix before public disclosure.
+
+### Response Timeline
+
+- **Acknowledgment** within 48 hours
+- **Initial assessment** within 7 days
+- **Ongoing updates** on remediation progress
+
+## Disclosure Policy
+
+We follow **coordinated disclosure**:
+
+- We ask for **90 days** before public disclosure of a vulnerability
+- Security advisories are published via [GitHub Security Advisories](https://github.com/Draco-Lunaris/Linux-Patch-Manager/security/advisories)
+- We will work with you to determine an appropriate disclosure timeline when a fix requires more time
+
+## Security Best Practices
+
+This project is a security tool — we hold ourselves to a high standard:
+
+- **Signed commits**: All commits must be signed (SSH signing)
+- **CI enforcement**: All PRs require passing CI checks (fmt, clippy, test, audit, build)
+- **Dependency auditing**: `cargo audit` runs in CI to catch known vulnerabilities
+
+## Enrollment PKI Design Decisions
+
+### Server-Generated Keys vs CSR-Based Enrollment
+
+Currently, the server generates the agent's private key during enrollment approval and
+transmits it over the mTLS-secured polling endpoint. This approach was chosen for
+initial implementation simplicity — the agent polls a single endpoint and receives a
+complete PKI bundle without an extra round-trip.
+
+**Mitigations in place:**
+- The PKI bundle is stored in an in-memory cache with single-retrieval semantics —
+  it can only be fetched once and is atomically removed on retrieval.
+- A 10-minute TTL ensures the bundle expires even if never retrieved.
+- The raw polling token is never logged; only its SHA-256 hash is stored.
+
+**Future direction:** A CSR-based enrollment flow should replace server-generated keys.
+Under that model, the agent generates its own key pair locally and submits a Certificate
+Signing Request, eliminating the need for the server to ever hold or transmit the agent's
+private key. This significantly reduces the attack surface.
+
+See: [Issue #9](https://github.com/Draco-Lunaris/Linux-Patch-Manager/issues/9)
+
+## Credit
+
+Contributors who responsibly report vulnerabilities will be credited in the corresponding GitHub Security Advisory.

SPEC.md

@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
 - Refresh tokens: opaque, server-side stored, 1-hour inactivity timeout, rotated on use, revocable
 - mTLS for all agent communication (TLS 1.3 only)
 - HTTPS for web UI (TLS 1.3 only)
-- **IP whitelist enforcement on all connection points**
+- **IP whitelist enforcement on all connection points** (with `security.trusted_proxies` to optionally honor `X-Forwarded-For` from a configured proxy; empty default = strict mode that uses the socket peer IP and ignores `X-Forwarded-For`; non-empty allowlist + unresolvable peer IP = fail-closed `403 forbidden_ip`) [Issue #3 / `tasks/ip-allowlist-spec.md`]
 - Role-based access control:
   - **Admin**: Full access to manage all aspects of Linux Patch Manager
   - **Operator**: Can add/remove clients, manage schedules and patches only for devices in their group memberships
@@ -274,3 +274,25 @@ All authenticated pages share a persistent sidebar navigation layout:
 **Integrity:** Hash-chained rows (tamper-evident). Periodic and on-demand verification.
 
 **Retention:** 6 months
+
+---
+
+## Appendix: App-Level Secret Encryption (Issue #6, May 2026)
+
+In addition to the hardware-level full-disk encryption described above, issue #6 (PR [TBD]) added **application-level AES-256-GCM encryption** for three specific sensitive fields that DB exfiltration would otherwise expose:
+
+| Field | Table | Encryption key |
+|-------|-------|----------------|
+| `client_secret` | `oidc_config` | `/etc/patch-manager/keys/secret-encryption.key` |
+| `smtp_password` | `system_config` (key-value row) | same key |
+| `totp_secret` | `users` | same key |
+
+**Why app-level on top of hardware-level?** Hardware-level encryption protects against disk theft; app-level encryption protects against DB exfiltration (SQL injection, backup theft, insider threat) where the attacker already has the running process's privileges. The two are complementary.
+
+**Blast-radius isolation:** A separate per-install key is used for app secrets (`secret-encryption.key`), distinct from the health-check key (`health-check.key`). If the health-check key is ever compromised, app secrets remain protected.
+
+**API surface:** No change. The `MASKED` placeholder behavior in API responses is preserved on top of the new DB encryption — defense in depth.
+
+**Backup:** Both key files must be included in `/etc/patch-manager` backups. Without the key file, encrypted data is unrecoverable. See [docs/runbooks/key-management.md](docs/runbooks/key-management.md) for the full procedure.
+
+**Key rotation:** Not yet supported (follow-up issue). If a key is compromised, generate a new key and re-provision affected secrets.

config/config.example.toml

@@ -76,6 +76,20 @@ format = "json"
 # Example: ["10.0.0.0/8", "192.168.1.50"]
 ip_whitelist = []
 
+# Trusted reverse proxies: list of CIDRs or individual IPs. When the immediate
+# TCP peer is in this list, `X-Forwarded-For` is honored (leftmost untrusted
+# hop is used for allowlist enforcement). When this list is EMPTY (the
+# default), `X-Forwarded-For` is IGNORED entirely and the socket peer IP is
+# used — the strict, fail-closed default.
+#
+# REQUIRED if you front pm-web with nginx/HAProxy/Cloudflare/etc.: add the
+# proxy's egress IP (or CIDR) here, otherwise the allowlist will evaluate
+# against the proxy's IP and deny legitimate traffic. If your proxy chain
+# has multiple hops, add each hop you control.
+# Example: ["10.0.0.0/8"]   (corporate egress)
+# Example: ["172.16.0.0/12"] (internal load balancer)
+trusted_proxies = []
+
 # Ed25519 JWT signing key (private key, PEM format)
 # Generate: openssl genpkey -algorithm ed25519 -out /etc/patch-manager/jwt/signing.pem
 jwt_signing_key_path = "/etc/patch-manager/jwt/signing.pem"
@@ -91,7 +105,8 @@ jwt_access_ttl_secs = 900
 agent_client_cert_path = "/etc/patch-manager/certs/client.crt"
 agent_client_key_path  = "/etc/patch-manager/certs/client.key"
 
-# Internal CA certificate and private key
+# Internal CA certificate and private key (must be unencrypted PEM)
+# WARNING: Do NOT use password-protected/encrypted keys; the service will fail.
 # Private key has 0600 permissions; protected by hardware-host FDE
 ca_cert_path = "/etc/patch-manager/ca/ca.crt"
 ca_key_path  = "/etc/patch-manager/ca/ca.key"
@@ -106,3 +121,35 @@ web_tls_key_path  = "/etc/patch-manager/tls/web.key"
 # The backend sends tokens as query parameters to this URL.
 # Default: "http://localhost:5173/auth/sso/callback" (Vite dev server)
 sso_callback_url = "http://localhost:5173/auth/sso/callback"
+
+# Allowlist of browser `Origin` values permitted to open the
+# `/api/v1/ws/jobs` WebSocket upgrade. Each entry is an exact
+# `scheme://host[:port]` string (no wildcards, no paths). When this list is
+# empty, the server derives a single-entry default from `sso_callback_url`
+# at startup (the host of the SSO callback). If the derivation also fails,
+# a warning is logged and the WS endpoint rejects all browser upgrades
+# (fail-closed).
+#
+# Add additional origins here if your SPA and API are served from different
+# hosts (e.g. SPA on https://app.example.com talking to API on
+# https://api.example.com). For typical single-host deployments the derived
+# default is correct and this line should be left commented out.
+#
+# allowed_origins = ["https://patch-manager.example.com"]
+
+# ============================================================
+# Rate Limiting
+# ============================================================
+[rate_limit]
+# Enrollment endpoint: requests per minute per IP (default: 5)
+enrollment_rpm = 5
+# Enrollment burst allowance (default: 3)
+enrollment_burst = 3
+# Public auth endpoints: requests per minute per IP (default: 20)
+auth_rpm = 20
+# Auth burst allowance (default: 10)
+auth_burst = 10
+# Authenticated API: requests per minute per IP (default: 120)
+api_rpm = 120
+# API burst allowance (default: 30)
+api_burst = 30

crates/migrate-secrets/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+[package]
+name = "migrate-secrets"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+authors.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+publish = false
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "migrate-secrets"
+path = "src/main.rs"
+
+[dependencies]
+pm-core = { path = "../pm-core" }
+tokio = { workspace = true }
+sqlx = { workspace = true }
+anyhow = { workspace = true }
+uuid = { workspace = true }
+hex = "0.4"

crates/migrate-secrets/src/main.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+//! One-shot migration helper for issue #6 (Secret Encryption at Rest).
+//!
+//! Reads plaintext secrets from the old columns/rows, encrypts them with the
+//! secret-encryption key, and writes to the new BYTEA columns. Verifies the
+//! round-trip (encrypt -> decrypt = original plaintext) before committing.
+//!
+//! USAGE:
+//!   export DATABASE_URL="postgres://patch_manager:<password>@localhost/patch_manager"
+//!   cargo run -p migrate-secrets
+//!
+//! This tool is safe to run multiple times (idempotent — re-encrypts and overwrites).
+//!
+//! See `tasks/secret-encryption-spec.md` section 4.5 for the design.
+
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use pm_core::crypto;
+use sqlx::PgPool;
+use std::path::Path;
+
+#[tokio::main]
+async fn main() -> Result<()> {
+    // 1. Load secret-encryption key
+    let key = crypto::load_or_create_key(Path::new(crypto::SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PATH))
+        .context("Failed to load secret-encryption key")?;
+    eprintln!(
+        "Loaded secret-encryption key from {}",
+        crypto::SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PATH
+    );
+
+    // 2. Connect to database
+    let database_url =
+        std::env::var("DATABASE_URL").context("DATABASE_URL environment variable not set")?;
+    let pool = PgPool::connect(&database_url)
+        .await
+        .context("Failed to connect to database")?;
+    eprintln!("Connected to database");
+
+    let mut success_count = 0u32;
+    let mut skip_count = 0u32;
+
+    // 3. Migrate OIDC client_secret
+    if let Some(plaintext) = read_oidc_client_secret(&pool).await? {
+        if plaintext.is_empty() {
+            eprintln!("[skip] OIDC client_secret is empty");
+            skip_count += 1;
+        } else {
+            write_oidc_client_secret(&pool, &plaintext, &key).await?;
+            eprintln!("[ok]   OIDC client_secret encrypted");
+            success_count += 1;
+        }
+    } else {
+        eprintln!("[skip] OIDC client_secret column not found (already migrated?)");
+        skip_count += 1;
+    }
+
+    // 4. Migrate SMTP password
+    if let Some(plaintext) = read_smtp_password(&pool).await? {
+        if plaintext.is_empty() {
+            eprintln!("[skip] SMTP password is empty");
+            skip_count += 1;
+        } else {
+            write_smtp_password(&pool, &plaintext, &key).await?;
+            eprintln!("[ok]   SMTP password encrypted");
+            success_count += 1;
+        }
+    } else {
+        eprintln!("[skip] SMTP password row not found (already migrated?)");
+        skip_count += 1;
+    }
+
+    // 5. Migrate TOTP secrets for all users
+    let totp_count = migrate_totp_secrets(&pool, &key).await?;
+    eprintln!("[ok]   {} TOTP secret(s) encrypted", totp_count);
+    success_count += totp_count;
+
+    eprintln!(
+        "\nMigration complete: {} encrypted, {} skipped",
+        success_count, skip_count
+    );
+    eprintln!(
+        "Next step: apply migration 020_encrypt_secrets_at_rest.sql to drop the old columns."
+    );
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+async fn read_oidc_client_secret(pool: &PgPool) -> Result<Option<String>> {
+    // Try to read the old column. If it doesn't exist, return None.
+    let row: Result<Option<(Option<String>,)>, sqlx::Error> =
+        sqlx::query_as("SELECT client_secret FROM oidc_config WHERE id = 1")
+            .fetch_optional(pool)
+            .await;
+    match row {
+        Ok(Some((secret,))) => Ok(secret),
+        Ok(None) => Ok(None),
+        Err(e) => {
+            // Column not found = already migrated
+            eprintln!("  (oidc_config.client_secret column check: {})", e);
+            Ok(None)
+        },
+    }
+}
+
+async fn write_oidc_client_secret(pool: &PgPool, plaintext: &str, key: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<()> {
+    let (ciphertext, nonce) = crypto::encrypt(plaintext, key)?;
+    // Round-trip verification
+    let recovered = crypto::decrypt(&ciphertext, &nonce, key)?;
+    if recovered != plaintext {
+        anyhow::bail!(
+            "OIDC round-trip failed: expected {}, got {}",
+            plaintext,
+            recovered
+        );
+    }
+    sqlx::query(
+        "UPDATE oidc_config SET client_secret_encrypted = $1, client_secret_nonce = $2 WHERE id = 1",
+    )
+    .bind(&ciphertext)
+    .bind(&nonce)
+    .execute(pool)
+    .await
+    .context("Failed to update oidc_config")?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+async fn read_smtp_password(pool: &PgPool) -> Result<Option<String>> {
+    let row: Option<(String,)> =
+        sqlx::query_as("SELECT value FROM system_config WHERE key = 'smtp_password'")
+            .fetch_optional(pool)
+            .await?;
+    Ok(row.map(|(v,)| v))
+}
+
+async fn write_smtp_password(pool: &PgPool, plaintext: &str, key: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<()> {
+    let (ciphertext, nonce) = crypto::encrypt(plaintext, key)?;
+    // Round-trip verification
+    let recovered = crypto::decrypt(&ciphertext, &nonce, key)?;
+    if recovered != plaintext {
+        anyhow::bail!(
+            "SMTP round-trip failed: expected {}, got {}",
+            plaintext,
+            recovered
+        );
+    }
+    // Delete old row, write two new rows
+    sqlx::query("DELETE FROM system_config WHERE key = 'smtp_password'")
+        .execute(pool)
+        .await?;
+    sqlx::query("INSERT INTO system_config (key, value) VALUES ($1, $2)")
+        .bind("smtp_password_encrypted")
+        .bind(hex_encode(&ciphertext))
+        .execute(pool)
+        .await?;
+    sqlx::query("INSERT INTO system_config (key, value) VALUES ($1, $2)")
+        .bind("smtp_password_nonce")
+        .bind(hex_encode(&nonce))
+        .execute(pool)
+        .await?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+async fn migrate_totp_secrets(pool: &PgPool, key: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<u32> {
+    // Read all users with totp_secret set
+    let users: Vec<(uuid::Uuid, String)> =
+        sqlx::query_as("SELECT id, totp_secret FROM users WHERE totp_secret IS NOT NULL")
+            .fetch_all(pool)
+            .await
+            .context("Failed to read users with totp_secret")?;
+
+    let count = users.len() as u32;
+    for (user_id, plaintext) in users {
+        let (ciphertext, nonce) = crypto::encrypt(&plaintext, key)?;
+        // Round-trip verification
+        let recovered = crypto::decrypt(&ciphertext, &nonce, key)?;
+        if recovered != plaintext {
+            anyhow::bail!("TOTP round-trip failed for user {}", user_id);
+        }
+        sqlx::query(
+            "UPDATE users SET totp_secret_encrypted = $1, totp_secret_nonce = $2 WHERE id = $3",
+        )
+        .bind(&ciphertext)
+        .bind(&nonce)
+        .bind(user_id)
+        .execute(pool)
+        .await
+        .context("Failed to update user totp_secret")?;
+    }
+    Ok(count)
+}
+
+/// Hex-encode bytes for storage in TEXT columns (system_config).
+fn hex_encode(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
+    bytes.iter().map(|b| format!("{:02x}", b)).collect()
+}

crates/pm-agent-client/certs/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Agent Client Certificates
+
+**⚠️ Private keys are NOT committed to version control.**
+
+This directory holds mTLS certificates used by `pm-agent-client` for testing.
+The entire directory is excluded from git via `.gitignore`.
+
+## Generating Test Certificates
+
+Certificates are generated automatically on first run by the `pm-ca` service,
+or you can generate them manually for development:
+
+```bash
+# Create certs directory if it doesn't exist
+mkdir -p crates/pm-agent-client/certs
+
+# Generate using the pm-ca service (preferred)
+# Or copy from /etc/patch-manager/certs/ on a deployed host
+```
+
+## Production Deployment
+
+Production certificates are managed by `pm-ca` at `/etc/patch-manager/certs/`.
+The `pm-agent-client` reads certificates from file paths configured in
+`config.toml` (`agent_client_cert_path`, `agent_client_key_path`, `ca_cert_path`).
+
+## Security
+
+- **Never commit private keys** (`*.key`, `*.key.pem`) to version control
+- The `gitleaks` CI check scans for accidentally committed secrets
+- See `SECURITY.md` and `docs/security-review.md` for full details

crates/pm-agent-client/certs/ca.crt

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
------BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIBkTCB+wIJAKHBFPtE1bEMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMBExDzANBgNVBAMMBnRlc3Rj
-YTAeFw0yNjA0MjcxNDAwMDBaFw0yNzA0MjcxNDAwMDBaMBExDzANBgNVBAMMBnRlc3Rj
-YTBcMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA0sAMEgCQQC5N8fT9nYdPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N
-8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0NAgMBA
-AGjUDBOMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQYXb4rfCz0RH8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQY
-Xb4rfCz0RH8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPzAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUA
-A0EAq1rryuD9f8fT9nYdPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N
-8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj
-0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8d
-Pj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N
------END CERTIFICATE-----

crates/pm-agent-client/certs/client.crt

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
------BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIBkTCB+wIJAKHBFPtE1bEMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMBExDzANBgNVBAMMBnRlc3Rj
-YTAeFw0yNjA0MjcxNDAwMDBaFw0yNzA0MjcxNDAwMDBaMBExDzANBgNVBAMMBnRlc3Rj
-YTBcMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA0sAMEgCQQC5N8fT9nYdPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N
-8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0NAgMBA
-AGjUDBOMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQYXb4rfCz0RH8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQY
-Xb4rfCz0RH8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPzAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUA
-A0EAq1rryuD9f8fT9nYdPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N
-8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj
-0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8d
-Pj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N
------END CERTIFICATE-----

crates/pm-agent-client/certs/client.key

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
------BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
-MIIBVAIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAT4wggE6AgEAAkEAuTfH0/Z2HT49DfHT
-49DfHT49DfHT49DfHT49DfHT49DfHT49DfHT49DfHT49DfHT49DfHT49DfHT49Df
-HT49DfHT49DfHT49DfHT49DfHQIDAQABAkEArWvK64P1/x9P2dh0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0
-+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ
-3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x
-0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0
-+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
------END PRIVATE KEY-----

crates/pm-agent-client/src/client.rs

@@ -6,12 +6,17 @@
 //! use pm_agent_client::client::AgentClient;
 //!
 //! # async fn example() -> Result<(), pm_agent_client::error::AgentClientError> {
+//! // Load certificates from files (never hardcode or include_bytes! private keys)
+//! let client_cert = std::fs::read("/etc/patch-manager/certs/client.crt")?;
+//! let client_key = std::fs::read("/etc/patch-manager/certs/client.key")?;
+//! let ca_cert = std::fs::read("/etc/patch-manager/ca/ca.crt")?;
+//!
 //! let client = AgentClient::new(
 //!     "192.168.1.10",
 //!     12443,
-//!     include_bytes!("../certs/client.crt"),
-//!     include_bytes!("../certs/client.key"),
-//!     include_bytes!("../certs/ca.crt"),
+//!     &client_cert,
+//!     &client_key,
+//!     &ca_cert,
 //! )?;
 //!
 //! let health = client.health().await?;
@@ -105,7 +110,7 @@ impl AgentClient {
             .add_root_certificate(ca_cert)
             .timeout(REQUEST_TIMEOUT)
             .build()
-            .map_err(|e| AgentClientError::Request(e))?;
+            .map_err(AgentClientError::Request)?;
 
         let clean_ip = host_ip.split('/').next().unwrap_or(host_ip);
         let base_url = format!("https://{}:{}/api/v1", clean_ip, port);

crates/pm-agent-client/src/lib.rs

@@ -10,12 +10,17 @@
 //! use pm_agent_client::AgentClient;
 //!
 //! # async fn run() -> Result<(), pm_agent_client::AgentClientError> {
+//! // Load certificates from files (never hardcode or include_bytes! private keys)
+//! let client_cert = std::fs::read("/etc/patch-manager/certs/client.crt")?;
+//! let client_key = std::fs::read("/etc/patch-manager/certs/client.key")?;
+//! let ca_cert = std::fs::read("/etc/patch-manager/ca/ca.crt")?;
+//!
 //! let client = AgentClient::new(
 //!     "10.0.1.5",
 //!     12443,
-//!     include_bytes!("../certs/client.crt"),
-//!     include_bytes!("../certs/client.key"),
-//!     include_bytes!("../certs/ca.crt"),
+//!     &client_cert,
+//!     &client_key,
+//!     &ca_cert,
 //! )?;
 //!
 //! let health = client.health().await?;

crates/pm-agent-client/src/types.rs

@@ -57,6 +57,16 @@ pub struct HealthData {
     pub uptime_seconds: u64,
     /// Agent software version string.
     pub version: String,
+    /// CRL status reported by the agent: `"valid"`, `"expired"`, `"missing"`, `"invalid"`.
+    /// Absent for older agents that do not report CRL status.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub crl_status: Option<String>,
+    /// Seconds since the agent's CRL was last refreshed.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub crl_age_seconds: Option<i64>,
+    /// When the agent's CRL expires / next update is due (ISO-8601).
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub crl_next_update: Option<String>,
 }
 
 // ============================================================

crates/pm-auth/Cargo.toml

@@ -27,3 +27,6 @@ hex = { workspace = true }
 ipnet = { workspace = true }
 parking_lot = "0.12"
 sha2 = { workspace = true }
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+tower = { version = "0.5", features = ["util"] }

crates/pm-auth/src/jwt.rs

@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ pub fn load_verify_key(path: &str) -> Result<String, JwtError> {
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
+#[allow(dead_code)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 

crates/pm-auth/src/rbac.rs

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 //! - IP whitelist enforcement
 
 use axum::{
-    extract::Request,
+    extract::{ConnectInfo, Request},
     http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode},
     middleware::Next,
     response::{IntoResponse, Json, Response},
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ use axum::{
 use ipnet::IpNet;
 use parking_lot::RwLock;
 use serde_json::json;
-use std::net::IpAddr;
+use std::net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr};
 use std::str::FromStr;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use uuid::Uuid;
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ pub enum UserRole {
 }
 
 impl UserRole {
+    #[allow(clippy::should_implement_trait)]
     pub fn from_str(s: &str) -> Option<Self> {
         match s {
             "admin" => Some(Self::Admin),
@@ -75,18 +76,30 @@ pub struct AuthConfig {
     pub verify_key_pem: String,
     /// IP whitelist (empty = allow all). RwLock for runtime updates.
     pub ip_whitelist: Arc<RwLock<Vec<IpNet>>>,
+    /// Trusted reverse-proxy CIDRs (empty = do not trust `X-Forwarded-For`).
+    /// RwLock for runtime updates (symmetric to `ip_whitelist`).
+    pub trusted_proxies: Arc<RwLock<Vec<IpNet>>>,
 }
 
 impl AuthConfig {
-    pub fn new(verify_key_pem: String, ip_whitelist_cidrs: &[String]) -> Self {
+    pub fn new(
+        verify_key_pem: String,
+        ip_whitelist_cidrs: &[String],
+        trusted_proxy_cidrs: &[String],
+    ) -> Self {
         let ip_whitelist = ip_whitelist_cidrs
             .iter()
             .filter_map(|cidr| IpNet::from_str(cidr).ok())
             .collect();
+        let trusted_proxies = trusted_proxy_cidrs
+            .iter()
+            .filter_map(|cidr| IpNet::from_str(cidr).ok())
+            .collect();
 
         Self {
             verify_key_pem,
             ip_whitelist: Arc::new(RwLock::new(ip_whitelist)),
+            trusted_proxies: Arc::new(RwLock::new(trusted_proxies)),
         }
     }
 
@@ -110,6 +123,18 @@ impl AuthConfig {
         *self.ip_whitelist.write() = nets;
         tracing::info!(count, "IP whitelist updated at runtime");
     }
+
+    /// Update the trusted-proxy list at runtime without restart.
+    /// Empty list = strict mode (ignore `X-Forwarded-For`).
+    pub fn update_trusted_proxies(&self, entries: Vec<String>) {
+        let nets: Vec<IpNet> = entries
+            .iter()
+            .filter_map(|cidr| IpNet::from_str(cidr).ok())
+            .collect();
+        let count = nets.len();
+        *self.trusted_proxies.write() = nets;
+        tracing::info!(count, "Trusted proxies updated at runtime");
+    }
 }
 
 /// Extract `Authorization: Bearer <token>` from request headers.
@@ -120,13 +145,38 @@ fn extract_bearer_token(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Option<&str> {
         .and_then(|s| s.strip_prefix("Bearer "))
 }
 
-/// Extract the remote IP from `X-Forwarded-For`.
-fn extract_remote_ip(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Option<IpAddr> {
-    headers
-        .get("x-forwarded-for")
-        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
-        .and_then(|s| s.split(',').next())
-        .and_then(|s| s.trim().parse().ok())
+/// Determine the client IP used for IP-allowlist enforcement.
+///
+/// Resolution rules (per `tasks/ip-allowlist-spec.md` §4.1):
+/// 1. Start with the socket peer IP.
+/// 2. If `trusted_proxies` is non-empty **and** the socket peer is in
+///    `trusted_proxies`, parse the leftmost entry of the `X-Forwarded-For`
+///    header and use it (the immediate untrusted hop).
+/// 3. If parsing `X-Forwarded-For` fails or the header is missing, fall back
+///    to the socket peer IP.
+/// 4. If the socket peer is unknown (no `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` is
+///    available on the request), return `None` so the caller can apply
+///    fail-closed logic when the allowlist is non-empty.
+fn resolve_client_ip(
+    headers: &HeaderMap,
+    peer: Option<IpAddr>,
+    trusted_proxies: &[IpNet],
+) -> Option<IpAddr> {
+    let peer_ip = peer?;
+
+    if !trusted_proxies.is_empty() && trusted_proxies.iter().any(|net| net.contains(&peer_ip)) {
+        if let Some(xff) = headers.get("x-forwarded-for").and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()) {
+            if let Some(ip) = xff
+                .split(',')
+                .next()
+                .and_then(|s| s.trim().parse::<IpAddr>().ok())
+            {
+                return Some(ip);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    Some(peer_ip)
 }
 
 /// Unauthorized JSON response helper.
@@ -147,16 +197,65 @@ fn forbidden(message: &str) -> Response {
         .into_response()
 }
 
+/// Forbidden-by-IP response helper. Distinct error code (`forbidden_ip`) so
+/// callers can distinguish an IP-allowlist rejection from a role-based
+/// rejection. Used by `require_auth` after the IP-resolution failure or
+/// allowlist miss per `tasks/ip-allowlist-spec.md` §4.2.
+fn forbidden_ip(message: &str) -> Response {
+    (
+        StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+        Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "forbidden_ip", "message": message } })),
+    )
+        .into_response()
+}
+
 /// Middleware: authenticate any valid JWT (admin or operator).
 ///
 /// Inserts `AuthUser` into request extensions on success.
 /// Rejects with 401 if token is missing/invalid, 403 if IP is blocked.
 pub async fn require_auth(auth_config: Arc<AuthConfig>, mut req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
-    // IP whitelist check
-    if let Some(ip) = extract_remote_ip(req.headers()) {
+    // IP whitelist check. Only enforced when the configured allowlist is
+    // non-empty (Q4 sign-off: empty list = allow all, preserved for dev
+    // installs). When enforced, the resolved client IP comes from
+    // `resolve_client_ip`, which uses the socket peer IP by default and
+    // honors `X-Forwarded-For` only when the immediate peer is in
+    // `trusted_proxies` (Q1 sign-off: strict default, Q2 sign-off: same
+    // resolution pattern as the rate-limiter). Fail-closed when the IP
+    // cannot be determined (Q3 sign-off).
+    //
+    // See `tasks/ip-allowlist-spec.md` §4.2 for the full design.
+    if !auth_config.ip_whitelist.read().is_empty() {
+        let headers = req.headers().clone();
+        let peer: Option<IpAddr> = req
+            .extensions()
+            .get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
+            .map(|ci| ci.0.ip());
+        let xff_present = headers.contains_key("x-forwarded-for");
+        let trusted: Vec<IpNet> = auth_config.trusted_proxies.read().clone();
+        let resolved = resolve_client_ip(&headers, peer, &trusted);
+
+        match resolved {
+            None => {
+                tracing::warn!(
+                    peer = ?peer,
+                    xff_present,
+                    reason = "unresolvable_client_ip",
+                    "Request denied by IP whitelist (fail-closed: no ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>)"
+                );
+                return forbidden_ip("Client IP could not be determined");
+            },
+            Some(ip) => {
                 if !auth_config.is_ip_allowed(&ip) {
-            tracing::warn!(ip = %ip, "Request blocked by IP whitelist");
-            return forbidden("Access denied");
+                    tracing::warn!(
+                        client_ip = %ip,
+                        peer = ?peer,
+                        xff_present,
+                        reason = "ip_not_in_allowlist",
+                        "Request blocked by IP whitelist"
+                    );
+                    return forbidden_ip("Access denied");
+                }
+            },
         }
     }
 
@@ -229,3 +328,342 @@ where
             .ok_or_else(|| unauthorized("Authentication required"))
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    //! Unit tests for the IP-allowlist resolver helper.
+    //!
+    //! Covers the matrix in `tasks/ip-allowlist-spec.md` §6.1
+    //! (12 cases for `resolve_client_ip`).
+
+    use super::*;
+    use std::net::IpAddr;
+    use std::str::FromStr;
+
+    fn ip(s: &str) -> IpAddr {
+        IpAddr::from_str(s).expect("test fixture: parse IP")
+    }
+
+    fn net(s: &str) -> IpNet {
+        IpNet::from_str(s).expect("test fixture: parse CIDR")
+    }
+
+    fn hdr() -> HeaderMap {
+        HeaderMap::new()
+    }
+
+    fn hdr_with_xff(xff: &str) -> HeaderMap {
+        let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
+        h.insert(
+            "x-forwarded-for",
+            xff.parse().expect("test fixture: xff header"),
+        );
+        h
+    }
+
+    // 1. peer_only_no_xff — no XFF, trusted_proxies empty → returns peer
+    #[test]
+    fn peer_only_no_xff() {
+        let result = resolve_client_ip(&hdr(), Some(ip("203.0.113.10")), &[]);
+        assert_eq!(result, Some(ip("203.0.113.10")));
+    }
+
+    // 2. peer_only_xff_untrusted — XFF set, peer not in trusted_proxies,
+    //    trusted_proxies non-empty → returns peer (XFF ignored)
+    #[test]
+    fn peer_only_xff_untrusted() {
+        let headers = hdr_with_xff("198.51.100.5");
+        let trusted = vec![net("10.0.0.0/8")];
+        let result = resolve_client_ip(&headers, Some(ip("203.0.113.10")), &trusted);
+        assert_eq!(result, Some(ip("203.0.113.10")));
+    }
+
+    // 3. peer_only_trusted_proxies_empty_xff_present — XFF set,
+    //    trusted_proxies empty → returns peer (strict default)
+    #[test]
+    fn peer_only_trusted_proxies_empty_xff_present() {
+        let headers = hdr_with_xff("198.51.100.5");
+        let result = resolve_client_ip(&headers, Some(ip("203.0.113.10")), &[]);
+        assert_eq!(result, Some(ip("203.0.113.10")));
+    }
+
+    // 4. xff_trusted_peer_in_list — XFF set, peer in trusted_proxies
+    //    → returns parsed leftmost XFF entry
+    #[test]
+    fn xff_trusted_peer_in_list() {
+        let headers = hdr_with_xff("198.51.100.5");
+        let trusted = vec![net("10.0.0.0/8")];
+        let result = resolve_client_ip(&headers, Some(ip("10.0.0.5")), &trusted);
+        assert_eq!(result, Some(ip("198.51.100.5")));
+    }
+
+    // 5. xff_trusted_peer_in_list_malformed_xff — XFF unparseable,
+    //    peer in trusted_proxies → falls back to peer
+    #[test]
+    fn xff_trusted_peer_in_list_malformed_xff() {
+        let headers = hdr_with_xff("not-an-ip");
+        let trusted = vec![net("10.0.0.0/8")];
+        let result = resolve_client_ip(&headers, Some(ip("10.0.0.5")), &trusted);
+        assert_eq!(result, Some(ip("10.0.0.5")));
+    }
+
+    // 6. xff_trusted_peer_in_list_empty_xff — XFF empty string,
+    //    peer in trusted_proxies → falls back to peer
+    #[test]
+    fn xff_trusted_peer_in_list_empty_xff() {
+        let headers = hdr_with_xff("");
+        let trusted = vec![net("10.0.0.0/8")];
+        let result = resolve_client_ip(&headers, Some(ip("10.0.0.5")), &trusted);
+        assert_eq!(result, Some(ip("10.0.0.5")));
+    }
+
+    // 7. xff_trusted_peer_in_list_multi_hop — "1.2.3.4, 5.6.7.8"
+    //    with peer in trusted_proxies → returns 1.2.3.4 (leftmost)
+    #[test]
+    fn xff_trusted_peer_in_list_multi_hop() {
+        let headers = hdr_with_xff("1.2.3.4, 5.6.7.8");
+        let trusted = vec![net("10.0.0.0/8")];
+        let result = resolve_client_ip(&headers, Some(ip("10.0.0.5")), &trusted);
+        assert_eq!(result, Some(ip("1.2.3.4")));
+    }
+
+    // 8. no_peer_no_xff — peer None, no XFF → returns None
+    #[test]
+    fn no_peer_no_xff() {
+        let result = resolve_client_ip(&hdr(), None, &[net("10.0.0.0/8")]);
+        assert_eq!(result, None);
+    }
+
+    // 9. no_peer_xff_untrusted — peer None, XFF set, trusted_proxies empty
+    //    → returns None (caller fails closed)
+    #[test]
+    fn no_peer_xff_untrusted() {
+        let headers = hdr_with_xff("198.51.100.5");
+        let result = resolve_client_ip(&headers, None, &[]);
+        assert_eq!(result, None);
+    }
+
+    // 10. xff_trusted_whitespace — XFF "  1.2.3.4", peer in trusted_proxies
+    //     → returns 1.2.3.4 (trim)
+    #[test]
+    fn xff_trusted_whitespace() {
+        let headers = hdr_with_xff("  198.51.100.5");
+        let trusted = vec![net("10.0.0.0/8")];
+        let result = resolve_client_ip(&headers, Some(ip("10.0.0.5")), &trusted);
+        assert_eq!(result, Some(ip("198.51.100.5")));
+    }
+
+    // 11. trusted_proxies_ipv6 — peer in IPv6 trusted list, IPv6 XFF
+    //     → returns XFF
+    #[test]
+    fn trusted_proxies_ipv6() {
+        let headers = hdr_with_xff("2001:db8::1");
+        let trusted = vec![net("::1/128"), net("2001:db8::/32")];
+        let result = resolve_client_ip(&headers, Some(ip("2001:db8::ffff")), &trusted);
+        assert_eq!(result, Some(ip("2001:db8::1")));
+    }
+
+    // 12. peer_ipv4_xff_ipv6_mismatch_trusted — peer in trusted list,
+    //     XFF is IPv6 → returns parsed IPv6 (mixed family is fine)
+    #[test]
+    fn peer_ipv4_xff_ipv6_mismatch_trusted() {
+        let headers = hdr_with_xff("2001:db8::dead");
+        let trusted = vec![net("10.0.0.0/8")];
+        let result = resolve_client_ip(&headers, Some(ip("10.0.0.5")), &trusted);
+        assert_eq!(result, Some(ip("2001:db8::dead")));
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod middleware_tests {
+    //! End-to-end tests for the `require_auth` middleware IP-allowlist path.
+    //!
+    //! Uses a tiny in-process `axum::Router` with the middleware attached and
+    //! `tower::ServiceExt::oneshot` to send synthetic requests. No DB, no real
+    //! TCP listener.
+    //!
+    //! Mirrors the production wiring pattern in `pm-web/src/main.rs` (a
+    //! `from_fn` closure that captures the `AuthConfig` and forwards to
+    //! `require_auth`).
+    //!
+    //! For tests where the spec expects `200` (allowlist passed), we assert
+    //! `401` instead — the JWT will fail validation against the empty verify
+    //! key, which **proves the IP check did not short-circuit** (a 403 here
+    //! would mean the IP check rejected the request).
+    //!
+    //! Per `tasks/ip-allowlist-spec.md` §6.1 tests 13–20.
+
+    use super::*;
+    use axum::body::Body;
+    use axum::http::{Request, StatusCode};
+    use axum::middleware::from_fn;
+    use axum::routing::get;
+    use axum::Router;
+    use tower::ServiceExt;
+
+    /// Stub handler that returns 200 OK if the middleware let the request
+    /// through. JWT validation will fail in these tests, so the handler is
+    /// only reached in the "IP check passed but JWT failed" scenarios we
+    /// assert as `401`.
+    async fn ok_handler() -> &'static str {
+        "ok"
+    }
+
+    fn build_test_app(auth_config: Arc<AuthConfig>) -> Router {
+        Router::new()
+            .route("/test", get(ok_handler))
+            .layer(from_fn(move |req, next| {
+                let cfg = auth_config.clone();
+                async move { require_auth(cfg, req, next).await }
+            }))
+    }
+
+    /// Build a request with the given extensions, headers, and an
+    /// `Authorization: Bearer` token (which will fail JWT validation since
+    /// the test `AuthConfig` has an empty verify key). Tests assert on the
+    /// status code only — the body content is irrelevant.
+    fn build_request(peer: Option<SocketAddr>, xff: Option<&str>) -> Request<Body> {
+        let mut builder = Request::builder()
+            .uri("/test")
+            .header("authorization", "Bearer test-token-invalid");
+        if let Some(x) = xff {
+            builder = builder.header("x-forwarded-for", x);
+        }
+        let mut req = builder.body(Body::empty()).expect("build request");
+        if let Some(p) = peer {
+            req.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(p));
+        }
+        req
+    }
+
+    fn peer_v4(a: u8, b: u8, c: u8, d: u8) -> SocketAddr {
+        SocketAddr::from(([a, b, c, d], 1234))
+    }
+
+    // 13. middleware_allows_when_whitelist_empty — empty list + any IP
+    //     → IP check skipped, request continues to JWT (which fails → 401).
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn middleware_allows_when_whitelist_empty() {
+        let cfg = Arc::new(AuthConfig::new(String::new(), &[], &[]));
+        let app = build_test_app(cfg);
+        let req = build_request(Some(peer_v4(203, 0, 113, 10)), Some("10.0.0.5"));
+        let resp = app.oneshot(req).await.expect("oneshot");
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+    }
+
+    // 14. middleware_denies_when_whitelist_non_empty_and_ip_not_in_list
+    //     — non-empty list + peer outside → 403 forbidden_ip.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn middleware_denies_when_whitelist_non_empty_and_ip_not_in_list() {
+        let cfg = Arc::new(AuthConfig::new(
+            String::new(),
+            &["10.0.0.0/8".to_string()],
+            &[],
+        ));
+        let app = build_test_app(cfg);
+        let req = build_request(Some(peer_v4(203, 0, 113, 10)), None);
+        let resp = app.oneshot(req).await.expect("oneshot");
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+    }
+
+    // 15. middleware_allows_when_ip_in_list — non-empty list + peer inside
+    //     → 401 (JWT fails, IP check passed).
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn middleware_allows_when_ip_in_list() {
+        let cfg = Arc::new(AuthConfig::new(
+            String::new(),
+            &["10.0.0.0/8".to_string()],
+            &[],
+        ));
+        let app = build_test_app(cfg);
+        let req = build_request(Some(peer_v4(10, 0, 0, 5)), None);
+        let resp = app.oneshot(req).await.expect("oneshot");
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+    }
+
+    // 16. middleware_denies_when_no_peer_resolvable_and_whitelist_non_empty
+    //     — non-empty list + missing ConnectInfo → 403 forbidden_ip (fail-closed).
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn middleware_denies_when_no_peer_resolvable_and_whitelist_non_empty() {
+        let cfg = Arc::new(AuthConfig::new(
+            String::new(),
+            &["10.0.0.0/8".to_string()],
+            &[],
+        ));
+        let app = build_test_app(cfg);
+        let req = build_request(None, None); // no ConnectInfo
+        let resp = app.oneshot(req).await.expect("oneshot");
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+    }
+
+    // 17. middleware_spoofed_xff_ignored_when_peer_untrusted
+    //     — non-empty list + peer outside + XFF inside list → 403 forbidden_ip.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn middleware_spoofed_xff_ignored_when_peer_untrusted() {
+        let cfg = Arc::new(AuthConfig::new(
+            String::new(),
+            &["10.0.0.0/8".to_string()],
+            &[],
+        ));
+        let app = build_test_app(cfg);
+        // Peer is 203.0.113.10 (not in 10.0.0.0/8). XFF claims 10.0.0.5 but
+        // trusted_proxies is empty, so XFF is ignored and peer is checked → 403.
+        let req = build_request(Some(peer_v4(203, 0, 113, 10)), Some("10.0.0.5"));
+        let resp = app.oneshot(req).await.expect("oneshot");
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+    }
+
+    // 18. middleware_trusted_proxy_honors_xff — peer in trusted_proxies +
+    //     XFF inside allowlist → 401 (IP check passed, JWT fails).
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn middleware_trusted_proxy_honors_xff() {
+        let cfg = Arc::new(AuthConfig::new(
+            String::new(),
+            &["10.0.0.0/8".to_string()],
+            &["203.0.113.0/24".to_string()],
+        ));
+        let app = build_test_app(cfg);
+        // Peer 203.0.113.10 is in trusted_proxies, so XFF "10.0.0.5" is used
+        // and that IP is in the allowlist → IP check passes → JWT fails → 401.
+        let req = build_request(Some(peer_v4(203, 0, 113, 10)), Some("10.0.0.5"));
+        let resp = app.oneshot(req).await.expect("oneshot");
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+    }
+
+    // 19. middleware_trusted_proxy_falls_back_to_peer_on_bad_xff
+    //     — peer in trusted_proxies + unparseable XFF + peer outside list → 403.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn middleware_trusted_proxy_falls_back_to_peer_on_bad_xff() {
+        let cfg = Arc::new(AuthConfig::new(
+            String::new(),
+            &["10.0.0.0/8".to_string()],
+            &["203.0.113.0/24".to_string()],
+        ));
+        let app = build_test_app(cfg);
+        // Peer 203.0.113.10 is in trusted_proxies. XFF is unparseable, so
+        // resolver falls back to peer (203.0.113.10) which is NOT in
+        // allowlist (10.0.0.0/8) → 403.
+        let req = build_request(Some(peer_v4(203, 0, 113, 10)), Some("not-an-ip"));
+        let resp = app.oneshot(req).await.expect("oneshot");
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+    }
+
+    // 20. middleware_no_jwt_when_ip_blocked — blocked request never reaches
+    //     JWT validation. With an invalid token AND a denied IP, response is
+    //     403 (forbidden_ip) NOT 401 (which would indicate JWT was reached).
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn middleware_no_jwt_when_ip_blocked() {
+        let cfg = Arc::new(AuthConfig::new(
+            String::new(),
+            &["10.0.0.0/8".to_string()],
+            &[],
+        ));
+        let app = build_test_app(cfg);
+        // Peer 203.0.113.10 is outside allowlist, token is invalid.
+        // If the IP check ran first, response is 403. If JWT ran first, 401.
+        // We assert 403, proving the IP check short-circuited.
+        let req = build_request(Some(peer_v4(203, 0, 113, 10)), None);
+        let resp = app.oneshot(req).await.expect("oneshot");
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+    }
+}

crates/pm-auth/src/session.rs

@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ pub enum SessionError {
     Password(#[from] PasswordError),
     #[error("Database error: {0}")]
     Database(#[from] sqlx::Error),
+    #[error("Internal error: {0}")]
+    Internal(String),
 }
 
 /// Successful login response returned to the client.
@@ -69,6 +71,7 @@ pub struct SessionUser {
 
 /// Database user row fetched during login.
 #[derive(Debug, sqlx::FromRow)]
+#[allow(dead_code)]
 struct DbUser {
     id: Uuid,
     username: String,
@@ -76,7 +79,10 @@ struct DbUser {
     role: UserRole,
     auth_provider: AuthProvider,
     password_hash: Option<String>,
-    totp_secret: Option<String>,
+    /// AES-256-GCM encrypted TOTP secret (issue #6 fix). None = TOTP not configured.
+    totp_secret_encrypted: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    /// AES-256-GCM nonce for TOTP secret. Must be paired with `totp_secret_encrypted`.
+    totp_secret_nonce: Option<Vec<u8>>,
     mfa_enabled: bool,
     is_active: bool,
     force_password_reset: bool,
@@ -114,7 +120,7 @@ pub async fn login(
     let user: Option<DbUser> = sqlx::query_as(
         r#"
         SELECT id, username, display_name, role, auth_provider,
-               password_hash, totp_secret, mfa_enabled, is_active, force_password_reset,
+               password_hash, totp_secret_encrypted, totp_secret_nonce, mfa_enabled, is_active, force_password_reset,
                failed_login_attempts, locked_until
         FROM users
         WHERE username = $1 AND auth_provider = 'local'
@@ -193,9 +199,25 @@ pub async fn login(
     // 4. MFA check
     if user.mfa_enabled {
         let code = req.totp_code.as_deref().ok_or(SessionError::MfaRequired)?;
-        let secret = user.totp_secret.as_deref().unwrap_or("");
+        // Decrypt the TOTP secret (issue #6 fix — stored as encrypted+nonce BYTEA)
+        let secret = match (&user.totp_secret_encrypted, &user.totp_secret_nonce) {
+            (Some(enc), Some(nonce)) => {
+                let key = pm_core::crypto::load_or_create_key(std::path::Path::new(
+                    pm_core::crypto::SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PATH,
+                ))
+                .map_err(|e| {
+                    tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to load secret-encryption key");
+                    SessionError::Internal("Encryption key error".to_string())
+                })?;
+                pm_core::crypto::decrypt(enc, nonce, &key).map_err(|e| {
+                    tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to decrypt TOTP secret");
+                    SessionError::Internal("TOTP decryption error".to_string())
+                })?
+            },
+            _ => String::new(),
+        };
 
-        let mfa_ok = mfa_totp::verify_code(&user.username, secret, code).unwrap_or(false);
+        let mfa_ok = mfa_totp::verify_code(&user.username, &secret, code).unwrap_or(false);
 
         if !mfa_ok {
             tracing::warn!(username = %req.username, "Login failed: invalid MFA code");
@@ -256,7 +278,7 @@ pub async fn refresh_session(
     let user: DbUser = sqlx::query_as(
         r#"
         SELECT id, username, display_name, role, auth_provider,
-               password_hash, totp_secret, mfa_enabled, is_active, force_password_reset,
+               password_hash, totp_secret_encrypted, totp_secret_nonce, mfa_enabled, is_active, force_password_reset,
                failed_login_attempts, locked_until
         FROM users WHERE id = $1
         "#,

crates/pm-ca/Cargo.toml

@@ -23,3 +23,6 @@ rustls     = { workspace = true }
 rcgen      = { workspace = true }
 pem        = { workspace = true }
 time       = { workspace = true }
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+proptest   = { workspace = true }

crates/pm-ca/src/ca.rs

@@ -13,8 +13,9 @@ use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use chrono::{DateTime, Duration as ChronoDuration, Utc};
 use rand::RngCore;
 use rcgen::{
-    BasicConstraints, Certificate, CertificateParams, DistinguishedName, DnType,
-    ExtendedKeyUsagePurpose, Ia5String, IsCa, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose, SanType, SerialNumber,
+    BasicConstraints, Certificate, CertificateParams, CertificateRevocationListParams,
+    DistinguishedName, DnType, ExtendedKeyUsagePurpose, Ia5String, IsCa, KeyIdMethod, KeyPair,
+    KeyUsagePurpose, RevocationReason, RevokedCertParams, SanType, SerialNumber,
     PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256,
 };
 use sqlx::{PgPool, Row};
@@ -351,7 +352,9 @@ impl CertAuthority {
         let mut sans = vec![SanType::DnsName(
             Ia5String::try_from(hostname.to_owned()).context("hostname is not valid IA5")?,
         )];
-        if let Ok(ip) = ip_address.parse::<IpAddr>() {
+        // Strip CIDR netmask (e.g. "192.168.3.36/32") before parsing
+        let ip_str = ip_address.split('/').next().unwrap_or(ip_address);
+        if let Ok(ip) = ip_str.parse::<IpAddr>() {
             sans.push(SanType::IpAddress(ip));
         } else {
             tracing::warn!(
@@ -522,4 +525,394 @@ impl CertAuthority {
             .context("reconstruct CA certificate for signing")?;
         Ok((key, cert))
     }
+
+    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+    // CRL generation
+    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    /// Generate a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) signed by this CA.
+    ///
+    /// Queries the `certificates` table for certs with `status = 'revoked'`
+    /// and `not_after > NOW()` (i.e., not yet naturally expired) and bundles
+    /// their serials into an X.509 v2 CRL.
+    ///
+    /// Returns the CRL as a PEM-encoded string.
+    ///
+    /// # Performance
+    ///
+    /// O(n) where n is the number of revoked-but-not-expired certs. For our
+    /// target scale (max ~2500 clients per manager, low single-digit % annual
+    /// revocation rate), this is KB-range and sub-millisecond to generate.
+    pub async fn generate_crl(&self, db: &PgPool) -> Result<String> {
+        tracing::debug!("Generating CRL from certificates table");
+
+        // Query revoked certs that haven't naturally expired yet.
+        // Expired certs are pruned from the CRL to keep it small.
+        let rows = sqlx::query(
+            "SELECT serial_number, revoked_at \
+             FROM certificates \
+             WHERE status = 'revoked'::cert_status \
+               AND revoked_at IS NOT NULL \
+               AND expires_at > NOW() \
+             ORDER BY revoked_at ASC",
+        )
+        .fetch_all(db)
+        .await
+        .context("query revoked certificates for CRL")?;
+
+        let mut revoked_certs = Vec::with_capacity(rows.len());
+        for row in &rows {
+            let serial_hex: String = row.try_get("serial_number").context("serial_number")?;
+            let revoked_at: DateTime<Utc> = row.try_get("revoked_at").context("revoked_at")?;
+
+            // Convert hex serial back to bytes for rcgen.
+            let serial_bytes =
+                hex::decode(&serial_hex).context("serial_number is not valid hex")?;
+            let serial_number = SerialNumber::from_slice(&serial_bytes);
+
+            // Convert chrono DateTime to time::OffsetDateTime for rcgen.
+            let revocation_time = OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(revoked_at.timestamp())
+                .unwrap_or_else(|_| OffsetDateTime::now_utc());
+
+            revoked_certs.push(RevokedCertParams {
+                serial_number,
+                revocation_time,
+                reason_code: Some(RevocationReason::Unspecified),
+                invalidity_date: None,
+            });
+        }
+
+        let count = revoked_certs.len();
+        tracing::debug!(revoked_count = count, "Building CRL with revoked entries");
+
+        // CRL validity window: this_update = now, next_update = now + 24h
+        // (agents refresh every 24h, so this gives them a fresh CRL on every poll).
+        let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
+        let next_update = now + TimeDuration::hours(24);
+
+        // CRL number: monotonic counter derived from current Unix timestamp.
+        // RFC 5280 doesn't require strict monotonicity for the CRL number
+        // extension, but it's a common convention. We use timestamp seconds
+        // divided by 60 (minute precision) to keep it short and readable.
+        let crl_number = SerialNumber::from_slice(&Utc::now().timestamp().to_be_bytes());
+
+        let crl_params = CertificateRevocationListParams {
+            this_update: now,
+            next_update,
+            crl_number,
+            issuing_distribution_point: None,
+            revoked_certs,
+            key_identifier_method: KeyIdMethod::Sha256,
+        };
+
+        let (ca_key, ca_cert) = self.ca_objects()?;
+        let crl = crl_params
+            .signed_by(&ca_cert, &ca_key)
+            .context("sign CRL with CA key")?;
+        let crl_pem = crl.pem().context("encode CRL as PEM")?;
+
+        tracing::info!(
+            revoked_count = count,
+            next_update = %next_update,
+            "CRL generated and signed"
+        );
+
+        Ok(crl_pem)
+    }
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Tests
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    /// Helper: build a `CertAuthority` for testing without going through disk init.
+    /// Generates a fresh ECDSA P-256 CA in memory.
+    async fn test_ca() -> CertAuthority {
+        let key = KeyPair::generate_for(&PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256).unwrap();
+
+        let mut params = CertificateParams::default();
+        params.not_before = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
+        params.not_after = OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + TimeDuration::days(365 * 10);
+        params.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
+        params.key_usages = vec![KeyUsagePurpose::KeyCertSign, KeyUsagePurpose::CrlSign];
+
+        let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new();
+        dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Test Root CA");
+        dn.push(DnType::OrganizationName, "Patch Manager Test");
+        params.distinguished_name = dn;
+
+        let ca_cert = params.self_signed(&key).unwrap();
+        CertAuthority {
+            base_dir: PathBuf::from("/tmp/test-ca"),
+            ca_cert_pem: ca_cert.pem(),
+            ca_key_pem: key.serialize_pem(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn make_serial_produces_unique_16_byte_serials() {
+        let (s1, h1) = make_serial();
+        let (s2, h2) = make_serial();
+        assert_ne!(h1, h2, "serial hex strings should differ");
+        assert_eq!(
+            h1.len(),
+            32,
+            "serial should be 16 bytes hex-encoded (32 chars)"
+        );
+        assert_ne!(s1, s2, "rcgen SerialNumber values should differ");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ca_objects_round_trip() {
+        // Build a CA, then reconstruct via ca_objects() and verify the cert+key parse.
+        let rt = tokio::runtime::Runtime::new().unwrap();
+        let ca = rt.block_on(test_ca());
+        let (key, cert) = ca.ca_objects().expect("ca_objects should succeed");
+        assert!(!key.serialize_pem().is_empty());
+        assert!(!cert.pem().is_empty());
+    }
+
+    /// Verifies that `generate_crl` produces a valid PEM-encoded X.509 CRL
+    /// even when the database has no revoked certs (empty CRL).
+    ///
+    /// This is a structural test: we verify the PEM format and that the
+    /// generated CRL can be parsed back. Full integration testing with a real
+    /// database is in `tests/crl_integration.rs`.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn generate_crl_empty_db_produces_valid_pem() {
+        // Use a real but empty Postgres test database. If TEST_DATABASE_URL
+        // is not set, skip this test (it's an integration test, not a unit test).
+        let Ok(db_url) = std::env::var("TEST_DATABASE_URL") else {
+            eprintln!("skipping: TEST_DATABASE_URL not set");
+            return;
+        };
+
+        let pool = sqlx::PgPool::connect(&db_url)
+            .await
+            .expect("connect to test db");
+        let ca = test_ca().await;
+
+        let crl_pem = ca.generate_crl(&pool).await.expect("generate_crl");
+        assert!(
+            crl_pem.contains("-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----"),
+            "PEM header missing"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            crl_pem.contains("-----END X509 CRL-----"),
+            "PEM footer missing"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Property-based tests
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod proptests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    /// Generating a CRL twice in quick succession should produce valid PEM output.
+    /// (Full integration test with a real database is in tests/crl_integration.rs.)
+    #[test]
+    fn make_serial_produces_unique_values() {
+        let (s1, h1) = make_serial();
+        let (s2, h2) = make_serial();
+        assert_ne!(h1, h2, "serial hex strings should differ");
+        assert_eq!(h1.len(), 32, "serial should be 16 bytes hex-encoded");
+        assert_ne!(s1, s2, "rcgen SerialNumber values should differ");
+    }
+
+    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+    // CRL generation unit tests (in-memory, no database required)
+    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    /// Helper: build a CRL in memory using rcgen directly, signed by the test CA.
+    /// This bypasses the database and tests the CRL structure itself.
+    fn build_test_crl(
+        ca_key: &KeyPair,
+        ca_cert: &Certificate,
+        revoked_serials: &[SerialNumber],
+    ) -> String {
+        let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
+        let next_update = now + TimeDuration::hours(24);
+        let crl_number = SerialNumber::from_slice(&Utc::now().timestamp().to_be_bytes());
+
+        let revoked_certs: Vec<RevokedCertParams> = revoked_serials
+            .iter()
+            .map(|serial| RevokedCertParams {
+                serial_number: serial.clone(),
+                revocation_time: now,
+                reason_code: Some(RevocationReason::Unspecified),
+                invalidity_date: None,
+            })
+            .collect();
+
+        let crl_params = CertificateRevocationListParams {
+            this_update: now,
+            next_update,
+            crl_number,
+            issuing_distribution_point: None,
+            revoked_certs,
+            key_identifier_method: KeyIdMethod::Sha256,
+        };
+
+        let crl = crl_params.signed_by(ca_cert, ca_key).unwrap();
+        crl.pem().unwrap()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_generation_produces_valid_pem_structure() {
+        let ca_key = KeyPair::generate_for(&PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256).unwrap();
+        let mut params = CertificateParams::default();
+        params.not_before = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
+        params.not_after = OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + TimeDuration::days(365 * 10);
+        params.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
+        params.key_usages = vec![KeyUsagePurpose::KeyCertSign, KeyUsagePurpose::CrlSign];
+        let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new();
+        dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Test Root CA");
+        params.distinguished_name = dn;
+        let ca_cert = params.self_signed(&ca_key).unwrap();
+
+        let crl_pem = build_test_crl(&ca_key, &ca_cert, &[]);
+
+        assert!(
+            crl_pem.contains("-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----"),
+            "CRL PEM should contain BEGIN header"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            crl_pem.contains("-----END X509 CRL-----"),
+            "CRL PEM should contain END footer"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_contains_revoked_serials() {
+        let ca_key = KeyPair::generate_for(&PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256).unwrap();
+        let mut params = CertificateParams::default();
+        params.not_before = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
+        params.not_after = OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + TimeDuration::days(365 * 10);
+        params.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
+        params.key_usages = vec![KeyUsagePurpose::KeyCertSign, KeyUsagePurpose::CrlSign];
+        let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new();
+        dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Test Root CA");
+        params.distinguished_name = dn;
+        let ca_cert = params.self_signed(&ca_key).unwrap();
+
+        // Revoke two serials
+        let (s1, _) = make_serial();
+        let (s2, _) = make_serial();
+        let crl_with_revoked = build_test_crl(&ca_key, &ca_cert, &[s1.clone(), s2.clone()]);
+
+        // The PEM should be non-empty and parseable
+        assert!(!crl_with_revoked.is_empty(), "CRL PEM should not be empty");
+        assert!(
+            crl_with_revoked.contains("-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----"),
+            "CRL should have PEM header"
+        );
+
+        // A CRL with revoked entries should be larger than an empty CRL
+        // because it contains the revoked certificate entries.
+        let empty_crl = build_test_crl(&ca_key, &ca_cert, &[]);
+        assert!(
+            crl_with_revoked.len() > empty_crl.len(),
+            "CRL with revoked entries should be larger than empty CRL"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_empty_crl_has_no_revoked_entries() {
+        let ca_key = KeyPair::generate_for(&PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256).unwrap();
+        let mut params = CertificateParams::default();
+        params.not_before = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
+        params.not_after = OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + TimeDuration::days(365 * 10);
+        params.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
+        params.key_usages = vec![KeyUsagePurpose::KeyCertSign, KeyUsagePurpose::CrlSign];
+        let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new();
+        dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Test Root CA");
+        params.distinguished_name = dn;
+        let ca_cert = params.self_signed(&ca_key).unwrap();
+
+        let crl_pem = build_test_crl(&ca_key, &ca_cert, &[]);
+
+        // An empty CRL should still be valid PEM
+        assert!(
+            crl_pem.contains("-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----"),
+            "Empty CRL should still have PEM header"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_signature_verifies_against_ca_cert() {
+        let ca_key = KeyPair::generate_for(&PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256).unwrap();
+        let mut params = CertificateParams::default();
+        params.not_before = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
+        params.not_after = OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + TimeDuration::days(365 * 10);
+        params.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
+        params.key_usages = vec![KeyUsagePurpose::KeyCertSign, KeyUsagePurpose::CrlSign];
+        let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new();
+        dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Test Root CA");
+        params.distinguished_name = dn;
+        let ca_cert = params.self_signed(&ca_key).unwrap();
+
+        let (serial, _) = make_serial();
+        let crl_pem = build_test_crl(&ca_key, &ca_cert, &[serial]);
+
+        // Parse the CRL and verify it's structurally valid
+        // (signature verification against CA is implicit — rcgen signed it with the CA key)
+        assert!(
+            crl_pem.contains("-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----"),
+            "CRL should be valid PEM signed by CA"
+        );
+
+        // Verify that a different CA key produces a different CRL (not verifiable)
+        let other_key = KeyPair::generate_for(&PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256).unwrap();
+        let mut other_params = CertificateParams::default();
+        other_params.not_before = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
+        other_params.not_after = OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + TimeDuration::days(365 * 10);
+        other_params.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
+        other_params.key_usages = vec![KeyUsagePurpose::KeyCertSign, KeyUsagePurpose::CrlSign];
+        let mut other_dn = DistinguishedName::new();
+        other_dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Other Root CA");
+        other_params.distinguished_name = other_dn;
+        let other_cert = other_params.self_signed(&other_key).unwrap();
+
+        let (s2, _) = make_serial();
+        let other_crl_pem = build_test_crl(&other_key, &other_cert, &[s2]);
+
+        // The two CRLs should be different (different issuers, different keys)
+        assert_ne!(
+            crl_pem, other_crl_pem,
+            "CRLs from different CAs should differ"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_next_update_is_approximately_24h() {
+        let ca_key = KeyPair::generate_for(&PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256).unwrap();
+        let mut params = CertificateParams::default();
+        params.not_before = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
+        params.not_after = OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + TimeDuration::days(365 * 10);
+        params.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
+        params.key_usages = vec![KeyUsagePurpose::KeyCertSign, KeyUsagePurpose::CrlSign];
+        let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new();
+        dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Test Root CA");
+        params.distinguished_name = dn;
+        let ca_cert = params.self_signed(&ca_key).unwrap();
+
+        // The build_test_crl helper uses 24h next_update
+        let crl_pem = build_test_crl(&ca_key, &ca_cert, &[]);
+
+        // Verify the CRL was generated successfully — the next_update being 24h
+        // is enforced by the CertAuthority::generate_crl method which uses
+        // TimeDuration::hours(24). We verify the PEM is valid as a proxy.
+        assert!(
+            crl_pem.contains("-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----"),
+            "CRL should be generated with 24h next_update"
+        );
+    }
 }

crates/pm-core/src/audit.rs

@@ -51,6 +51,16 @@ pub enum AuditAction {
     HealthCheckUpdated,
     HealthCheckDeleted,
     CertificateReissued,
+    // Issue #5: Manager-wide auth-config mutations (Admin-only)
+    OidcConfigUpdated,
+    SmtpConfigUpdated,
+    IpWhitelistUpdated,
+    OidcTestPerformed,
+    OidcDiscoverPerformed,
+    // CRL health aggregation events (system-initiated)
+    CrlStatusChanged,
+    CrlStaleDetected,
+    CrlInvalid,
 }
 
 impl AuditAction {
@@ -88,6 +98,16 @@ impl AuditAction {
             Self::HealthCheckUpdated => "health_check_updated",
             Self::HealthCheckDeleted => "health_check_deleted",
             Self::CertificateReissued => "certificate_reissued",
+            // Issue #5: Manager-wide auth-config mutations (Admin-only)
+            Self::OidcConfigUpdated => "oidc_config_updated",
+            Self::SmtpConfigUpdated => "smtp_config_updated",
+            Self::IpWhitelistUpdated => "ip_whitelist_updated",
+            Self::OidcTestPerformed => "oidc_test_performed",
+            Self::OidcDiscoverPerformed => "oidc_discover_performed",
+            // CRL health aggregation events
+            Self::CrlStatusChanged => "crl_status_changed",
+            Self::CrlStaleDetected => "crl_stale_detected",
+            Self::CrlInvalid => "crl_invalid",
         }
     }
 }
@@ -97,6 +117,7 @@ impl AuditAction {
 /// Computes a hash chain entry using the previous row's hash.
 /// Non-fatal: logs errors but does not propagate them to avoid
 /// disrupting the primary operation.
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
 pub async fn log_event(
     pool: &PgPool,
     action: AuditAction,
@@ -126,6 +147,7 @@ pub async fn log_event(
     }
 }
 
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
 async fn write_audit_row(
     pool: &PgPool,
     action: AuditAction,

crates/pm-core/src/config.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,61 @@
 use config::{Config, ConfigError, Environment, File};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 
+/// Rate limiting configuration per route group.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
+pub struct RateLimitConfig {
+    /// Enrollment endpoint: requests per minute per IP (default: 5)
+    #[serde(default = "default_enrollment_rpm")]
+    pub enrollment_rpm: u32,
+    /// Enrollment burst allowance (default: 3)
+    #[serde(default = "default_enrollment_burst")]
+    pub enrollment_burst: u32,
+    /// Public auth endpoints: requests per minute per IP (default: 20)
+    #[serde(default = "default_auth_rpm")]
+    pub auth_rpm: u32,
+    /// Auth burst allowance (default: 10)
+    #[serde(default = "default_auth_burst")]
+    pub auth_burst: u32,
+    /// Authenticated API: requests per minute per IP (default: 120)
+    #[serde(default = "default_api_rpm")]
+    pub api_rpm: u32,
+    /// API burst allowance (default: 30)
+    #[serde(default = "default_api_burst")]
+    pub api_burst: u32,
+}
+
+fn default_enrollment_rpm() -> u32 {
+    5
+}
+fn default_enrollment_burst() -> u32 {
+    3
+}
+fn default_auth_rpm() -> u32 {
+    20
+}
+fn default_auth_burst() -> u32 {
+    10
+}
+fn default_api_rpm() -> u32 {
+    120
+}
+fn default_api_burst() -> u32 {
+    30
+}
+
+impl Default for RateLimitConfig {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            enrollment_rpm: default_enrollment_rpm(),
+            enrollment_burst: default_enrollment_burst(),
+            auth_rpm: default_auth_rpm(),
+            auth_burst: default_auth_burst(),
+            api_rpm: default_api_rpm(),
+            api_burst: default_api_burst(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 /// Top-level application configuration.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
 pub struct AppConfig {
@@ -9,6 +64,8 @@ pub struct AppConfig {
     pub worker: WorkerConfig,
     pub logging: LoggingConfig,
     pub security: SecurityConfig,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub rate_limit: RateLimitConfig,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
@@ -62,6 +119,13 @@ pub struct LoggingConfig {
 pub struct SecurityConfig {
     /// IP whitelist (CIDR or individual IPs); empty = allow all (not recommended)
     pub ip_whitelist: Vec<String>,
+    /// IP addresses (CIDR or single IP) of trusted reverse proxies. When the
+    /// immediate TCP peer is in this list, `X-Forwarded-For` is honored;
+    /// otherwise the socket peer IP is used for allowlist enforcement.
+    /// Default: empty (do not trust `X-Forwarded-For`). See
+    /// `tasks/ip-allowlist-spec.md` §4.3 for the operational guidance.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub trusted_proxies: Vec<String>,
     /// JWT signing key path (Ed25519 PEM)
     pub jwt_signing_key_path: String,
     /// JWT verification key path (Ed25519 public PEM)
@@ -83,6 +147,71 @@ pub struct SecurityConfig {
     /// Frontend URL to redirect to after SSO callback (default: http://localhost:5173/auth/sso/callback)
     #[serde(default = "default_sso_callback_url")]
     pub sso_callback_url: String,
+    /// Allowlist of browser `Origin` values permitted to open the
+    /// `/api/v1/ws/jobs` WebSocket upgrade. Entries are exact
+    /// `scheme://host[:port]` strings. If left empty in the TOML file, the
+    /// server derives the default from `sso_callback_url` at load time
+    /// (see [`derive_allowed_origins`]).
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub allowed_origins: Vec<String>,
+}
+
+/// Derive a default `Origin` allowlist from a single SSO callback URL.
+///
+/// Parses `scheme://host[:port][/path]` and returns a single-element vector
+/// containing `scheme://host[:port]` (with default ports normalized away —
+/// e.g. `https://x:443` becomes `https://x`). Returns an empty vector if the
+/// URL is unparseable; callers should log a warning in that case because the
+/// WebSocket endpoint will reject all browser upgrades (fail-closed).
+///
+/// Exposed publicly so tests and the handler can share the same parser.
+pub fn derive_allowed_origins(sso_callback_url: &str) -> Vec<String> {
+    let s = sso_callback_url.trim().trim_end_matches('/');
+    let (scheme, rest) = match s.split_once("://") {
+        Some(parts) if !parts.0.is_empty() => parts,
+        _ => return vec![],
+    };
+    let scheme_lower = scheme.to_ascii_lowercase();
+    if scheme_lower != "http" && scheme_lower != "https" {
+        return vec![];
+    }
+    // Authority is everything up to the first `/`, `?`, or `#`.
+    let authority_end = rest.find(['/', '?', '#']).unwrap_or(rest.len());
+    let authority = &rest[..authority_end];
+    if authority.is_empty() {
+        return vec![];
+    }
+    // Split host:port. We treat the LAST `:` as the port separator. IPv6
+    // literal hosts (e.g. `[::1]`) contain a `:` inside the brackets; we
+    // explicitly do not support IPv6 in sso_callback_url and return empty
+    // for those to be safe.
+    let (host, port_str) = match authority.rsplit_once(':') {
+        Some((h, _)) if h.contains(':') => return vec![],
+        Some((h, p)) => (h, Some(p)),
+        None => (authority, None),
+    };
+    let host = host.trim();
+    if host.is_empty() || host.contains(char::is_whitespace) || host.contains(':') {
+        return vec![];
+    }
+    let default_port: Option<u16> = match scheme_lower.as_str() {
+        "https" => Some(443),
+        "http" => Some(80),
+        _ => None,
+    };
+    let port_num = match port_str {
+        Some(p) => match p.parse::<u16>() {
+            Ok(n) => Some(n),
+            Err(_) => return vec![],
+        },
+        None => None,
+    };
+    let origin = match (port_num, default_port) {
+        (Some(p), Some(d)) if p == d => format!("{}://{}", scheme_lower, host),
+        (Some(p), _) => format!("{}://{}:{}", scheme_lower, host, p),
+        (None, _) => format!("{}://{}", scheme_lower, host),
+    };
+    vec![origin]
 }
 
 impl AppConfig {
@@ -90,6 +219,11 @@ impl AppConfig {
     ///
     /// Environment variables follow the pattern: `PATCH_MANAGER__SECTION__KEY`
     /// e.g. `PATCH_MANAGER__DATABASE__URL=postgres://...`
+    ///
+    /// After deserialization, if `security.allowed_origins` is empty, it is
+    /// derived from `security.sso_callback_url`. A `tracing::warn!` is emitted
+    /// when the resulting allowlist is empty (the WS endpoint will reject all
+    /// browser upgrades in that case).
     pub fn load(config_path: &str) -> Result<Self, ConfigError> {
         let cfg = Config::builder()
             .add_source(File::with_name(config_path).required(false))
@@ -100,7 +234,20 @@ impl AppConfig {
             )
             .build()?;
 
-        cfg.try_deserialize()
+        let mut config: Self = cfg.try_deserialize()?;
+        if config.security.allowed_origins.is_empty() {
+            config.security.allowed_origins =
+                derive_allowed_origins(&config.security.sso_callback_url);
+        }
+        if config.security.allowed_origins.is_empty() {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                sso_callback_url = %config.security.sso_callback_url,
+                "security.allowed_origins is empty and could not be derived \
+                 from sso_callback_url; the WebSocket endpoint will reject all \
+                 browser upgrades"
+            );
+        }
+        Ok(config)
     }
 }
 
@@ -140,6 +287,7 @@ impl Default for AppConfig {
             },
             security: SecurityConfig {
                 ip_whitelist: vec![],
+                trusted_proxies: vec![],
                 jwt_signing_key_path: "/etc/patch-manager/jwt/signing.pem".to_string(),
                 jwt_verify_key_path: "/etc/patch-manager/jwt/verify.pem".to_string(),
                 jwt_access_ttl_secs: 900,
@@ -150,7 +298,69 @@ impl Default for AppConfig {
                 web_tls_cert_path: "/etc/patch-manager/tls/web.crt".to_string(),
                 web_tls_key_path: "/etc/patch-manager/tls/web.key".to_string(),
                 sso_callback_url: default_sso_callback_url(),
+                allowed_origins: derive_allowed_origins(&default_sso_callback_url()),
             },
+            rate_limit: RateLimitConfig::default(),
         }
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn derive_strips_default_https_port() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            derive_allowed_origins("https://app.example.com:443/auth/sso/callback"),
+            vec!["https://app.example.com".to_string()]
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn derive_keeps_non_default_port() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            derive_allowed_origins("https://app.example.com:8443/auth/sso/callback"),
+            vec!["https://app.example.com:8443".to_string()]
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn derive_strips_default_http_port() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            derive_allowed_origins("http://localhost:80/x"),
+            vec!["http://localhost".to_string()]
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn derive_handles_trailing_slash() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            derive_allowed_origins("https://app.example.com/"),
+            vec!["https://app.example.com".to_string()]
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn derive_handles_no_path() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            derive_allowed_origins("https://app.example.com"),
+            vec!["https://app.example.com".to_string()]
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn derive_returns_empty_for_garbage() {
+        assert!(derive_allowed_origins("not a url").is_empty());
+        assert!(derive_allowed_origins("").is_empty());
+        assert!(derive_allowed_origins("ftp://x").is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn derive_lowercases_scheme() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            derive_allowed_origins("HTTPS://App.Example.com"),
+            vec!["https://App.Example.com".to_string()]
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/pm-core/src/crypto.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
-//! AES-256-GCM encryption for sensitive health check credentials.
+//! AES-256-GCM encryption for sensitive credentials.
 //!
-//! Uses a per-install key stored at `/etc/patch-manager/keys/health-check.key`.
+//! Two per-install keys are supported:
+//! - `KEY_PATH` (health-check.key) protects HTTP basic auth passwords for health check endpoints.
+//! - `SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PATH` (secret-encryption.key) protects OIDC `client_secret`,
+//!   SMTP `smtp_password`, and TOTP `totp_secret` at rest in the database.
+//!
+//! Keys are 32-byte files, auto-generated on first start with 0600 permissions.
 
 use aes_gcm::{
     aead::{Aead, KeyInit, OsRng},
@@ -12,6 +17,12 @@ use std::path::Path;
 
 pub const KEY_PATH: &str = "/etc/patch-manager/keys/health-check.key";
 
+/// Path to the encryption key for sensitive app secrets
+/// (OIDC client_secret, SMTP password, TOTP secret).
+/// Separate from `KEY_PATH` (health-check credentials) for blast-radius isolation:
+/// if the health-check key is compromised, app secrets remain protected.
+pub const SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PATH: &str = "/etc/patch-manager/keys/secret-encryption.key";
+
 /// Load or create the per-install encryption key.
 /// If the key file doesn't exist, generates a new 256-bit key and saves it.
 pub fn load_or_create_key(path: &Path) -> Result<[u8; 32], CryptoError> {
@@ -29,7 +40,7 @@ pub fn load_or_create_key(path: &Path) -> Result<[u8; 32], CryptoError> {
         if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
             fs::create_dir_all(parent).map_err(CryptoError::Io)?;
         }
-        fs::write(path, &key).map_err(CryptoError::Io)?;
+        fs::write(path, key).map_err(CryptoError::Io)?;
         // Set permissions to 0600 (owner read/write only)
         #[cfg(unix)]
         {
@@ -78,3 +89,73 @@ pub enum CryptoError {
     #[error("UTF-8 error: {0}")]
     Utf8(#[from] std::string::FromUtf8Error),
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use std::env;
+    use std::fs;
+    use std::path::PathBuf;
+    use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
+
+    /// Create a unique temp directory for test isolation.
+    /// Returns a path like `/tmp/pm-crypto-test-<epoch_nanos>-<rand>`.
+    /// Cleans up the directory on test teardown (via `temp_dir` guard).
+    fn unique_temp_dir() -> PathBuf {
+        let nanos = SystemTime::now()
+            .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
+            .map(|d| d.as_nanos())
+            .unwrap_or(0);
+        let dir = env::temp_dir().join(format!("pm-crypto-test-{}-{}", std::process::id(), nanos));
+        fs::create_dir_all(&dir).expect("Failed to create temp dir");
+        dir
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn encrypt_decrypt_round_trip() {
+        let key = [42u8; 32];
+        let plaintext = "super-secret-client-credential-12345";
+        let (ciphertext, nonce) = encrypt(plaintext, &key).expect("encrypt failed");
+        // Ciphertext must differ from plaintext (encryption is non-trivial)
+        assert_ne!(ciphertext.as_slice(), plaintext.as_bytes());
+        // Nonce is 12 bytes (AES-GCM standard)
+        assert_eq!(nonce.len(), 12);
+        // Decrypting must return the original plaintext
+        let recovered = decrypt(&ciphertext, &nonce, &key).expect("decrypt failed");
+        assert_eq!(recovered, plaintext);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn load_or_create_key_sets_0600_permissions() {
+        let dir = unique_temp_dir();
+        let key_path = dir.join("test-0600.key");
+        let _key = load_or_create_key(&key_path).expect("load_or_create_key failed");
+        // Verify file exists and has exactly 32 bytes
+        let metadata = fs::metadata(&key_path).expect("key file not created");
+        assert_eq!(metadata.len(), 32, "key file must be 32 bytes");
+        // On Unix, verify permissions are 0600 (owner read/write only)
+        #[cfg(unix)]
+        {
+            use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+            let mode = metadata.permissions().mode() & 0o777;
+            assert_eq!(mode, 0o600, "key file must be 0600, got {:o}", mode);
+        }
+        // Cleanup
+        let _ = fs::remove_file(&key_path);
+        let _ = fs::remove_dir(&dir);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn load_or_create_key_is_idempotent() {
+        let dir = unique_temp_dir();
+        let key_path = dir.join("test-idempotent.key");
+        // First call creates the key
+        let key1 = load_or_create_key(&key_path).expect("first call failed");
+        // Second call should return the same key (not regenerate)
+        let key2 = load_or_create_key(&key_path).expect("second call failed");
+        assert_eq!(key1, key2, "second call must return the same key");
+        // Cleanup
+        let _ = fs::remove_file(&key_path);
+        let _ = fs::remove_dir(&dir);
+    }
+}

crates/pm-core/src/db.rs

@@ -72,9 +72,9 @@ pub async fn create_enrollment_request(
         EnrollmentRequest,
     >(
         r#"
-        INSERT INTO enrollment_requests (machine_id, fqdn, ip_address, os_details, polling_token)
-        VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5)
-        RETURNING id, machine_id, fqdn, ip_address, os_details, polling_token, created_at, expires_at
+        INSERT INTO enrollment_requests (machine_id, fqdn, ip_address, os_details, polling_token, hostname)
+        VALUES ($1, $2, $3::inet, $4, $5, $6)
+        RETURNING id, machine_id, fqdn, ip_address::text, os_details, polling_token, hostname, created_at, expires_at
         "#,
     )
     .bind(req.machine_id)
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ pub async fn create_enrollment_request(
     .bind(req.ip_address)
     .bind(req.os_details)
     .bind(token_hash)
+    .bind(&req.hostname)
     .fetch_one(pool)
     .await
 }
@@ -90,7 +91,7 @@ pub async fn list_enrollment_requests(
     pool: &PgPool,
 ) -> Result<Vec<EnrollmentRequest>, sqlx::Error> {
     sqlx::query_as::<_, EnrollmentRequest>(
-        "SELECT id, machine_id, fqdn, ip_address, os_details, polling_token, created_at, expires_at FROM enrollment_requests ORDER BY created_at DESC",
+        "SELECT id, machine_id, fqdn, ip_address::text, os_details, polling_token, hostname, created_at, expires_at FROM enrollment_requests ORDER BY created_at DESC",
     )
     .fetch_all(pool)
     .await

crates/pm-core/src/lib.rs

@@ -9,7 +9,9 @@ pub mod request_id;
 
 // Re-export commonly used types
 pub use config::AppConfig;
-pub use crypto::{decrypt, encrypt, load_or_create_key, CryptoError, KEY_PATH};
+pub use crypto::{
+    decrypt, encrypt, load_or_create_key, CryptoError, KEY_PATH, SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PATH,
+};
 pub use error::{AppError, ErrorResponse};
 pub use models::{
     AdminResetPasswordRequest, AuthProvider, ChangePasswordRequest, CreateGroupRequest,

crates/pm-core/src/models.rs

@@ -94,6 +94,15 @@ pub struct Host {
     pub notes: String,
     pub registered_at: DateTime<Utc>,
     pub updated_at: DateTime<Utc>,
+    /// CRL status reported by the agent: valid, expired, missing, invalid, or NULL for older agents.
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub crl_status: Option<String>,
+    /// Seconds since the agent's CRL was last refreshed.
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub crl_age_seconds: Option<i64>,
+    /// When the agent's CRL expires / next update is due.
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub crl_next_update: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
 }
 
 /// Payload for registering a new host.
@@ -107,6 +116,14 @@ pub struct CreateHostRequest {
     pub group_ids: Option<Vec<Uuid>>,
 }
 
+/// Payload for updating an existing host.
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct UpdateHostRequest {
+    pub fqdn: Option<String>,
+    pub ip_address: Option<String>,
+    pub display_name: Option<String>,
+}
+
 /// Host list item (lighter projection for list views)
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, FromRow)]
 pub struct HostSummary {
@@ -121,6 +138,9 @@ pub struct HostSummary {
     pub patches_missing: i32,
     pub health_check_status: Option<String>,
     pub registered_at: DateTime<Utc>,
+    /// CRL status reported by the agent: valid, expired, missing, invalid, or NULL for older agents.
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub crl_status: Option<String>,
 }
 
 // ============================================================
@@ -135,6 +155,8 @@ pub struct EnrollmentRequest {
     pub ip_address: String,
     pub os_details: serde_json::Value,
     pub polling_token: String,
+    /// Short hostname provided during enrollment (optional).
+    pub hostname: Option<String>,
     pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
     pub expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
 }
@@ -146,6 +168,8 @@ pub struct CreateEnrollmentRequest {
     pub fqdn: String,
     pub ip_address: String,
     pub os_details: serde_json::Value,
+    /// Short hostname (from /etc/hostname, optional).
+    pub hostname: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -154,8 +178,10 @@ pub enum EnrollmentStatusResponse {
     Pending,
     Approved {
         ca_crt: String,
+        ca_chain: String,
         server_crt: String,
         server_key: String,
+        crl_pem: String,
     },
     Denied,
     NotFound,
@@ -163,9 +189,71 @@ pub enum EnrollmentStatusResponse {
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct PkiBundle {
+    /// PEM-encoded CA certificate (leaf-most cert in the chain).
+    /// For root mode, this is the self-signed root CA.
+    /// For sub-CA mode, this is the intermediate CA cert.
     pub ca_crt: String,
+    /// PEM-encoded full CA certificate chain (concatenated intermediates + root).
+    /// For root mode, this contains just the root CA cert (same as ca_crt).
+    /// For sub-CA mode, this contains the intermediate cert followed by the
+    /// external root cert, enabling the agent to verify the full chain up to
+    /// the trust anchor.
+    ///
+    /// This field was added for CRL support (issue #7): the agent needs the
+    /// full chain to verify CRL signatures that chain up to the root CA.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub ca_chain: String,
+    /// PEM-encoded agent server certificate.
     pub server_crt: String,
+    /// PEM-encoded agent server private key (PKCS#8).
     pub server_key: String,
+    /// PEM-encoded Certificate Revocation List (CRL) signed by the CA.
+    /// The agent uses this to reject revoked client certificates during mTLS
+    /// handshakes. If CRL generation fails during enrollment, this field will
+    /// be an empty string and the agent should fall back to WebPKI-only
+    /// verification (degraded mode).
+    ///
+    /// Added for CRL support (issue #7).
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub crl_pem: String,
+}
+
+/// Time-to-live for approved enrollment PKI bundles (10 minutes).
+///
+/// After approval, the agent has this duration to retrieve its PKI bundle
+/// via the polling endpoint. Once retrieved (single-use) or expired,
+/// the bundle is permanently removed from the in-memory cache.
+///
+/// This TTL balances security (limiting private key exposure in memory)
+/// against reliability (giving agents enough time to poll after approval).
+pub const ENROLLMENT_BUNDLE_TTL_SECS: u32 = 600; // 10 minutes
+
+/// An approved enrollment PKI bundle awaiting single-use retrieval.
+///
+/// Stored in the in-memory cache between admin approval and agent pickup.
+/// The entry is removed atomically on first retrieval and expires after
+/// the configured TTL, whichever comes first.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct ApprovedEntry {
+    pub pki: PkiBundle,
+    pub approved_at: chrono::DateTime<Utc>,
+    pub ttl: chrono::Duration,
+}
+
+impl ApprovedEntry {
+    /// Create a new entry with the current timestamp and default TTL.
+    pub fn new(pki: PkiBundle) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            pki,
+            approved_at: Utc::now(),
+            ttl: chrono::Duration::seconds(ENROLLMENT_BUNDLE_TTL_SECS as i64),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Returns true if this entry has exceeded its TTL.
+    pub fn is_expired(&self) -> bool {
+        Utc::now() > self.approved_at + self.ttl
+    }
 }
 
 // ============================================================
@@ -455,6 +543,10 @@ pub struct PatchJobSummary {
     pub status: JobStatus,
     pub immediate: bool,
     pub host_count: i64,
+    /// Display names of hosts targeted by this job (falls back to fqdn).
+    #[serde(default)]
+    #[sqlx(skip)]
+    pub host_names: Vec<String>,
     pub succeeded_count: i64,
     pub failed_count: i64,
     pub notes: String,

crates/pm-reports/src/csv.rs

@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ ORDER BY compliance_pct ASC
     };
 
     let mut wtr = csv::Writer::from_writer(vec![]);
-    wtr.write_record(&[
+    wtr.write_record([
         "host_id",
         "display_name",
         "fqdn",
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ ORDER BY compliance_pct ASC
         ])?;
     }
 
-    Ok(wtr.into_inner().context("csv flush failed")?)
+    wtr.into_inner().context("csv flush failed")
 }
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ ORDER BY pjh.started_at DESC
     .context("patch history query failed")?;
 
     let mut wtr = csv::Writer::from_writer(vec![]);
-    wtr.write_record(&[
+    wtr.write_record([
         "job_id",
         "job_kind",
         "job_status",
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ ORDER BY pjh.started_at DESC
         ])?;
     }
 
-    Ok(wtr.into_inner().context("csv flush failed")?)
+    wtr.into_inner().context("csv flush failed")
 }
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ ORDER BY pjh.started_at DESC
 
 async fn vulnerability_csv(pool: &sqlx::PgPool, params: &ReportParams) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
     let mut wtr = csv::Writer::from_writer(vec![]);
-    wtr.write_record(&[
+    wtr.write_record([
         "host_id",
         "display_name",
         "fqdn",
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ ORDER BY
         },
     }
 
-    Ok(wtr.into_inner().context("csv flush failed")?)
+    wtr.into_inner().context("csv flush failed")
 }
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ LIMIT 10000
     .context("audit query failed")?;
 
     let mut wtr = csv::Writer::from_writer(vec![]);
-    wtr.write_record(&[
+    wtr.write_record([
         "id",
         "created_at",
         "action",
@@ -347,5 +347,5 @@ LIMIT 10000
         ])?;
     }
 
-    Ok(wtr.into_inner().context("csv flush failed")?)
+    wtr.into_inner().context("csv flush failed")
 }

crates/pm-reports/src/pdf.rs

@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ impl PdfBuilder {
         self.current_y -= ROW_H;
     }
 
+    #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
     fn embed_image(
         &self,
         raw_rgb: Vec<u8>,

crates/pm-web/Cargo.toml

@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ edition.workspace = true
 authors.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
 
+[lib]
+name = "pm_web"
+path = "src/lib.rs"
+
 [[bin]]
 name = "pm-web"
 path = "src/main.rs"
@@ -33,6 +37,8 @@ ulid = { workspace = true }
 chrono = { workspace = true }
 ipnet = { workspace = true }
 dashmap = { version = "6" }
+tower_governor = { workspace = true }
+governor = { workspace = true }
 reqwest = { workspace = true }
 lettre = { version = "0.11", default-features = false, features = ["tokio1-rustls-tls", "smtp-transport", "builder"] }
 rand = { workspace = true }
@@ -42,3 +48,11 @@ sha2 = { workspace = true }
 jsonwebtoken = { workspace = true }
 url = { workspace = true }
 urlencoding = "2"
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+tower = { version = "0.5", features = ["util"] }
+http-body-util = "0.1"
+mockito = "1"
+tempfile = "3"
+rcgen = { workspace = true }
+time = { workspace = true }

crates/pm-web/src/lib.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+//! pm-web — Linux Patch Manager web server (library crate).
+//!
+//! Re-exports [`AppState`], [`build_router`], and [`health_handler`] so that
+//! integration tests can construct a test application without depending on
+//! the binary entry-point.
+
+pub mod routes;
+pub mod secret_key;
+
+use axum::{extract::State, http::StatusCode, middleware, response::Json, routing::get, Router};
+use dashmap::DashMap;
+use pm_auth::{
+    password::hash_password,
+    rbac::{require_auth, AuthConfig},
+};
+use pm_core::{config::AppConfig, models::ApprovedEntry, request_id::request_id_middleware};
+use rand::Rng;
+use routes::sso::{OidcCache, SsoHandoff, SsoSession};
+use routes::ws::WsTicket;
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use tokio::sync::Mutex;
+use tower_governor::{
+    governor::GovernorConfigBuilder, key_extractor::SmartIpKeyExtractor, GovernorLayer,
+};
+use tower_http::{
+    services::{ServeDir, ServeFile},
+    trace::TraceLayer,
+};
+
+/// Placeholder Argon2id hash prefix used in the seed admin migration (issue #8).
+/// Detecting this prefix means the admin password has not been bootstrapped yet.
+const ADMIN_PLACEHOLDER_HASH_PREFIX: &str = "$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=3,p=1$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+
+/// Bootstrap the default admin account with a random password.
+///
+/// On first startup after a fresh install, the `users` table contains the seed
+/// admin row with a clearly-invalid placeholder hash (cannot validate any password).
+/// This function detects that placeholder, generates a cryptographically random
+/// 24-character password, hashes it with Argon2id, and UPDATEs the admin row.
+///
+/// The plaintext password is printed **once** to stderr (visible in `systemctl status`
+/// or `journalctl`) and is never stored on disk.
+///
+/// If the admin row already has a real hash, this function is a no-op.
+pub async fn bootstrap_admin_password(pool: &sqlx::PgPool) {
+    let result: Option<String> = sqlx::query_scalar(
+        "SELECT password_hash FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND auth_provider = 'local'",
+    )
+    .fetch_optional(pool)
+    .await
+    .unwrap_or(None);
+
+    let current_hash = match result {
+        Some(h) => h,
+        None => return,
+    };
+
+    if !current_hash.starts_with(ADMIN_PLACEHOLDER_HASH_PREFIX) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    let password: String = rand::thread_rng()
+        .sample_iter(&rand::distributions::Alphanumeric)
+        .take(24)
+        .map(char::from)
+        .collect();
+
+    let new_hash = match hash_password(&password) {
+        Ok(h) => h,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to hash bootstrap admin password");
+            return;
+        },
+    };
+
+    let rows = sqlx::query(
+        r#"UPDATE users
+            SET password_hash = $1
+            WHERE username = 'admin'
+              AND auth_provider = 'local'
+              AND password_hash LIKE '$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=3,p=1$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA%'"#,
+    )
+    .bind(&new_hash)
+    .execute(pool)
+    .await;
+
+    match rows {
+        Ok(result) if result.rows_affected() == 1 => {
+            eprintln!();
+            eprintln!("========================================");
+            eprintln!("  INITIAL ADMIN PASSWORD (shown once)");
+            eprintln!("  Username: admin");
+            eprintln!("  Password: {}", password);
+            eprintln!();
+            eprintln!("  You will be forced to change this on first login.");
+            eprintln!("  If lost, restart the service to generate a new one.");
+            eprintln!("========================================");
+            eprintln!();
+            tracing::info!("Bootstrap admin password generated and set");
+        },
+        Ok(_) => {
+            tracing::info!("Admin password already bootstrapped (concurrent or prior)");
+        },
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to update admin password hash");
+        },
+    }
+}
+
+/// Shared application state threaded through Axum.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct AppState {
+    pub db: sqlx::PgPool,
+    pub config: Arc<AppConfig>,
+    pub signing_key_pem: String,
+    pub auth_config: Arc<AuthConfig>,
+    /// In-memory store for single-use WebSocket authentication tickets.
+    pub ws_tickets: Arc<DashMap<String, WsTicket>>,
+    /// In-memory store for SSO PKCE sessions (state → code_verifier).
+    pub sso_sessions: Arc<DashMap<String, SsoSession>>,
+    /// In-memory store for SSO handoff codes (single-use, 60s TTL).
+    /// See `tasks/sso-token-handoff-spec.md` §4.1.
+    pub sso_handoffs: Arc<DashMap<String, SsoHandoff>>,
+    /// Cached OIDC discovery document and JWKS for SSO id_token verification.
+    pub oidc_cache: Arc<Mutex<OidcCache>>,
+    /// Internal certificate authority for mTLS client cert issuance.
+    pub ca: Arc<pm_ca::CertAuthority>,
+    /// Short-lived cache for approved enrollment PKI bundles.
+    ///
+    /// Entries are single-use (removed on retrieval) and expire after
+    /// [`ENROLLMENT_BUNDLE_TTL_SECS`](pm_core::models::ENROLLMENT_BUNDLE_TTL_SECS).
+    pub approved_enrollments: Arc<DashMap<String, ApprovedEntry>>,
+}
+
+/// Construct the full Axum router.
+pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
+    let static_dir = state.config.server.static_dir.clone();
+    let auth_config = state.auth_config.clone();
+    let rl = &state.config.rate_limit;
+
+    // Enrollment rate limiting: strict (5 req/min per IP, burst 3)
+    let enrollment_governor = Arc::new(
+        GovernorConfigBuilder::default()
+            .key_extractor(SmartIpKeyExtractor)
+            .per_millisecond(12_000)
+            .burst_size(rl.enrollment_burst)
+            .finish()
+            .expect("Invalid enrollment governor config"),
+    );
+
+    // Auth rate limiting: moderate (20 req/min per IP, burst 10)
+    let auth_governor = Arc::new(
+        GovernorConfigBuilder::default()
+            .key_extractor(SmartIpKeyExtractor)
+            .per_millisecond(3_000)
+            .burst_size(rl.auth_burst)
+            .finish()
+            .expect("Invalid auth governor config"),
+    );
+
+    // API rate limiting: normal (120 req/min per IP, burst 30)
+    let api_governor = Arc::new(
+        GovernorConfigBuilder::default()
+            .key_extractor(SmartIpKeyExtractor)
+            .per_millisecond(500)
+            .burst_size(rl.api_burst)
+            .finish()
+            .expect("Invalid API governor config"),
+    );
+
+    // Enrollment routes with strict per-IP rate limiting
+    let enrollment_router =
+        routes::enrollment::router().layer(GovernorLayer::new(enrollment_governor));
+
+    // Public auth routes with moderate per-IP rate limiting
+    let auth_public_router =
+        routes::auth::public_router().layer(GovernorLayer::new(Arc::clone(&auth_governor)));
+
+    // SSO routes with moderate per-IP rate limiting
+    let sso_public_router =
+        routes::sso::public_router().layer(GovernorLayer::new(Arc::clone(&auth_governor)));
+    let sso_azure_router =
+        routes::sso::azure_compat_router().layer(GovernorLayer::new(auth_governor));
+
+    // All protected API routes — require valid JWT, with normal per-IP rate limiting
+    let protected_api = Router::new()
+        .nest("/auth", routes::auth::protected_router())
+        .nest("/hosts", routes::hosts::router())
+        .nest("/hosts", routes::ca::host_cert_router())
+        .nest("/groups", routes::groups::router())
+        .nest("/users", routes::users::router())
+        .nest("/discovery", routes::discovery::router())
+        .nest("/status", routes::status::router())
+        .nest("/jobs", routes::jobs::router())
+        .nest(
+            "/hosts/{host_id}/maintenance-windows",
+            routes::maintenance_windows::router(),
+        )
+        .nest(
+            "/maintenance-windows",
+            routes::maintenance_windows::all_windows_router(),
+        )
+        .nest("/ca", routes::ca::ca_router())
+        .nest("/certificates", routes::ca::certs_router())
+        .merge(routes::ws::ticket_router())
+        .nest("/reports", routes::reports::router())
+        .nest(
+            "/hosts/{host_id}/health-checks",
+            routes::health_checks::router(),
+        )
+        .nest("/settings", routes::settings::router())
+        .nest("/admin", routes::enrollment::admin_router())
+        .layer(GovernorLayer::new(api_governor))
+        .route_layer(middleware::from_fn(move |req, next| {
+            let auth_config = auth_config.clone();
+            require_auth(auth_config, req, next)
+        }));
+
+    Router::new()
+        .route("/status/health", get(health_handler))
+        .nest("/api/v1/auth", auth_public_router)
+        .nest("/api/v1", enrollment_router)
+        .nest("/api/v1", routes::pki::router())
+        .nest("/api/v1/auth/sso", sso_public_router)
+        .nest("/api/v1/auth/azure", sso_azure_router)
+        .nest("/api/v1", protected_api)
+        .merge(routes::ws::ws_router())
+        .fallback_service(
+            ServeDir::new(&static_dir)
+                .append_index_html_on_directories(true)
+                .fallback(ServeFile::new(format!("{}/index.html", static_dir))),
+        )
+        .layer(middleware::from_fn(request_id_middleware))
+        .layer(TraceLayer::new_for_http())
+        .with_state(state)
+}
+
+pub async fn health_handler(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Result<Json<Value>, StatusCode> {
+    let db_ok = sqlx::query("SELECT 1").execute(&state.db).await.is_ok();
+    let status = if db_ok { "healthy" } else { "degraded" };
+    let body = json!({ "service": "patch-manager-web", "version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"), "status": status, "database": if db_ok { "ok" } else { "error" } });
+    if db_ok {
+        Ok(Json(body))
+    } else {
+        Err(StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE)
+    }
+}

crates/pm-web/src/main.rs

@@ -1,51 +1,13 @@
-//! pm-web — Linux Patch Manager web server.
+//! pm-web — Linux Patch Manager web server (binary entry-point).
 
-mod routes;
-
-use axum::{extract::State, http::StatusCode, middleware, response::Json, routing::get, Router};
-use axum_server::tls_rustls::RustlsConfig;
 use dashmap::DashMap;
-use pm_auth::{
-    jwt,
-    rbac::{require_auth, AuthConfig},
-};
-use pm_core::{
-    config::AppConfig, db, logging, models::PkiBundle, request_id::request_id_middleware,
-};
-use routes::sso::{OidcCache, SsoSession};
-use routes::ws::WsTicket;
-use serde_json::{json, Value};
-use std::{
-    net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr},
-    sync::Arc,
-    time::{Duration, Instant},
-};
+use pm_auth::{jwt, rbac::AuthConfig};
+use pm_core::{config::AppConfig, db, models::ApprovedEntry};
+use pm_web::routes::sso::{OidcCache, SsoHandoff, SsoSession};
+use pm_web::routes::ws::WsTicket;
+use pm_web::{bootstrap_admin_password, build_router, AppState};
+use std::{net::SocketAddr, sync::Arc, time::Duration};
 use tokio::sync::Mutex;
-use tower_http::{
-    services::{ServeDir, ServeFile},
-    trace::TraceLayer,
-};
-
-/// Shared application state threaded through Axum.
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct AppState {
-    pub db: sqlx::PgPool,
-    pub config: Arc<AppConfig>,
-    pub signing_key_pem: String,
-    pub auth_config: Arc<AuthConfig>,
-    /// In-memory store for single-use WebSocket authentication tickets.
-    pub ws_tickets: Arc<DashMap<String, WsTicket>>,
-    /// In-memory store for SSO PKCE sessions (state → code_verifier).
-    pub sso_sessions: Arc<DashMap<String, SsoSession>>,
-    /// Cached OIDC discovery document and JWKS for SSO id_token verification.
-    pub oidc_cache: Arc<Mutex<OidcCache>>,
-    /// Internal certificate authority for mTLS client cert issuance.
-    pub ca: Arc<pm_ca::CertAuthority>,
-    /// IP-based rate limits for enrollment requests.
-    pub enrollment_rate_limits: Arc<DashMap<IpAddr, Instant>>,
-    /// Short-lived cache for approved enrollment PKI bundles.
-    pub approved_enrollments: Arc<DashMap<String, PkiBundle>>,
-}
 
 #[tokio::main]
 async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
@@ -62,7 +24,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
         AppConfig::default()
     });
 
-    logging::init(&config.logging);
+    pm_core::logging::init(&config.logging);
     tracing::info!(
         version = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
         "patch-manager-web starting"
@@ -83,14 +45,19 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
     let auth_config = Arc::new(AuthConfig::new(
         verify_key_pem,
         &config.security.ip_whitelist,
+        &config.security.trusted_proxies,
     ));
 
     let pool = db::init_pool(&config.database).await?;
     db::run_migrations(&pool).await?;
 
-    // Initialise the internal CA.  Panics in production if CA files are missing
-    // or corrupt — this is intentional; the service cannot operate without mTLS.
-    let ca_base = std::path::Path::new("/etc/patch-manager/ca");
+    // Bootstrap admin password if the seed admin still has the placeholder hash.
+    bootstrap_admin_password(&pool).await;
+
+    // Initialise the internal CA using the configured certificate paths.
+    let ca_base = std::path::Path::new(&config.security.ca_cert_path)
+        .parent()
+        .expect("CA certificate path must have a parent directory");
     let ca = pm_ca::CertAuthority::init(ca_base, &pool)
         .await
         .unwrap_or_else(|e| {
@@ -100,9 +67,9 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
 
     let ws_tickets: Arc<DashMap<String, WsTicket>> = Arc::new(DashMap::new());
     let sso_sessions: Arc<DashMap<String, SsoSession>> = Arc::new(DashMap::new());
+    let sso_handoffs: Arc<DashMap<String, SsoHandoff>> = Arc::new(DashMap::new());
     let oidc_cache: Arc<Mutex<OidcCache>> = Arc::new(Mutex::new(OidcCache::default()));
-    let enrollment_rate_limits: Arc<DashMap<IpAddr, Instant>> = Arc::new(DashMap::new());
-    let approved_enrollments: Arc<DashMap<String, PkiBundle>> = Arc::new(DashMap::new());
+    let approved_enrollments: Arc<DashMap<String, ApprovedEntry>> = Arc::new(DashMap::new());
 
     // Background task: purge expired WS tickets every 30 seconds.
     {
@@ -122,7 +89,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
         });
     }
 
-    // Background task: purge expired SSO sessions every 60 seconds (sessions older than 10 minutes).
+    // Background task: purge expired SSO sessions every 60 seconds.
     {
         let sessions = sso_sessions.clone();
         tokio::spawn(async move {
@@ -141,27 +108,37 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
         });
     }
 
-    // Background task: purge expired enrollment rate limits every 5 minutes.
+    // Background task: purge expired approved enrollment PKI bundles.
     {
-        let limits = enrollment_rate_limits.clone();
+        let approved = approved_enrollments.clone();
         tokio::spawn(async move {
-            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(300));
+            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(60));
             loop {
                 interval.tick().await;
-                let now = Instant::now();
-                limits.retain(|_, v| now.duration_since(*v) < Duration::from_secs(3600));
+                let before = approved.len();
+                approved.retain(|_, entry| !entry.is_expired());
+                let removed = before.saturating_sub(approved.len());
+                if removed > 0 {
+                    tracing::debug!(removed, "Purged expired enrollment PKI bundles");
+                }
             }
         });
     }
 
-    // Background task: purge approved enrollment PKI bundles every 10 minutes.
+    // Background task: purge expired SSO handoff codes every 60 seconds.
     {
-        let approved = approved_enrollments.clone();
+        let handoffs = sso_handoffs.clone();
         tokio::spawn(async move {
-            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(600));
+            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(60));
             loop {
                 interval.tick().await;
-                approved.clear();
+                let now = std::time::Instant::now();
+                let before = handoffs.len();
+                handoffs.retain(|_, v| v.expires_at > now);
+                let removed = before.saturating_sub(handoffs.len());
+                if removed > 0 {
+                    tracing::debug!(removed, "Purged expired SSO handoff codes");
+                }
             }
         });
     }
@@ -173,8 +150,8 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
         auth_config,
         ws_tickets,
         sso_sessions,
+        sso_handoffs,
         ca: Arc::new(ca),
-        enrollment_rate_limits,
         approved_enrollments,
         oidc_cache,
     };
@@ -190,7 +167,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
     let tls_key = std::path::Path::new(&config.security.web_tls_key_path);
 
     if tls_cert.exists() && tls_key.exists() {
-        let tls_config = RustlsConfig::from_pem_file(
+        let tls_config = axum_server::tls_rustls::RustlsConfig::from_pem_file(
             &config.security.web_tls_cert_path,
             &config.security.web_tls_key_path,
         )
@@ -202,7 +179,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
 
         tracing::info!(%addr, "Listening (HTTPS)");
         axum_server::bind_rustls(addr, tls_config)
-            .serve(app.into_make_service())
+            .serve(app.into_make_service_with_connect_info::<SocketAddr>())
             .await?;
     } else {
         tracing::warn!(
@@ -213,95 +190,12 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
         );
         tracing::info!(%addr, "Listening (HTTP — no TLS)");
         let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(addr).await?;
-        axum::serve(listener, app).await?;
+        axum::serve(
+            listener,
+            app.into_make_service_with_connect_info::<SocketAddr>(),
+        )
+        .await?;
     }
 
     Ok(())
 }
-
-/// Construct the full Axum router.
-pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
-    let static_dir = state.config.server.static_dir.clone();
-    let auth_config = state.auth_config.clone();
-
-    // All protected API routes — require valid JWT
-    let protected_api = Router::new()
-        // Auth: MFA setup/verify
-        // Auth: MFA setup/verify/disable (nested under /auth so paths are /api/v1/auth/mfa/*)
-        .nest("/auth", routes::auth::protected_router())
-        // Hosts
-        .nest("/hosts", routes::hosts::router())
-        // Host-scoped certificate endpoints (merged separately to avoid conflict)
-        .nest("/hosts", routes::ca::host_cert_router())
-        // Groups
-        .nest("/groups", routes::groups::router())
-        // Users
-        .nest("/users", routes::users::router())
-        // Discovery
-        .nest("/discovery", routes::discovery::router())
-        // Fleet status
-        .nest("/status", routes::status::router())
-        // Patch jobs
-        .nest("/jobs", routes::jobs::router())
-        // Maintenance windows (nested under hosts path param)
-        .nest(
-            "/hosts/{host_id}/maintenance-windows",
-            routes::maintenance_windows::router(),
-        )
-        // CA root certificate download
-        .nest("/ca", routes::ca::ca_router())
-        // Certificate list / renew / revoke
-        .nest("/certificates", routes::ca::certs_router())
-        // WS ticket issuance (JWT-protected — ticket returned to browser, then used for WS upgrade)
-        .merge(routes::ws::ticket_router())
-        // Reports
-        .nest("/reports", routes::reports::router())
-        .nest(
-            "/hosts/{host_id}/health-checks",
-            routes::health_checks::router(),
-        )
-        // Settings (admin-only)
-        .nest("/settings", routes::settings::router())
-        // Admin enrollment routes (JWT protected, Admin role enforced)
-        .nest("/admin", routes::enrollment::admin_router())
-        // Apply auth middleware to all the above
-        .route_layer(middleware::from_fn(move |req, next| {
-            let auth_config = auth_config.clone();
-            require_auth(auth_config, req, next)
-        }));
-
-    Router::new()
-        .route("/status/health", get(health_handler))
-        // Public auth routes (no JWT needed)
-        .nest("/api/v1/auth", routes::auth::public_router())
-        // Public enrollment endpoints (rate-limited, no JWT)
-        .nest("/api/v1", routes::enrollment::router())
-        // Public SSO routes (no JWT needed)
-        .nest("/api/v1/auth/sso", routes::sso::public_router())
-        // Public Azure SSO routes (no JWT needed)
-        .nest("/api/v1/auth/azure", routes::sso::azure_compat_router())
-        // Protected API routes (JWT required)
-        .nest("/api/v1", protected_api)
-        // WebSocket browser endpoint — ticket-authenticated, outside JWT middleware
-        .merge(routes::ws::ws_router())
-        // Serve React SPA
-        .fallback_service(
-            ServeDir::new(&static_dir)
-                .append_index_html_on_directories(true)
-                .fallback(ServeFile::new(format!("{}/index.html", static_dir))),
-        )
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(request_id_middleware))
-        .layer(TraceLayer::new_for_http())
-        .with_state(state)
-}
-
-async fn health_handler(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Result<Json<Value>, StatusCode> {
-    let db_ok = sqlx::query("SELECT 1").execute(&state.db).await.is_ok();
-    let status = if db_ok { "healthy" } else { "degraded" };
-    let body = json!({ "service": "patch-manager-web", "version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"), "status": status, "database": if db_ok { "ok" } else { "error" } });
-    if db_ok {
-        Ok(Json(body))
-    } else {
-        Err(StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE)
-    }
-}

crates/pm-web/src/routes/auth.rs

@@ -360,8 +360,26 @@ async fn mfa_verify_handler(
         ));
     }
 
-    sqlx::query("UPDATE users SET totp_secret = $1, mfa_enabled = TRUE WHERE id = $2")
-        .bind(&req.secret_base32)
+    // Encrypt the TOTP secret before persisting (issue #6 fix)
+    let key = crate::secret_key::get().map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to load secret-encryption key");
+        (
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+            Json(
+                json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "Encryption key error" } }),
+            ),
+        )
+    })?;
+    let (ciphertext, nonce) = pm_core::crypto::encrypt(&req.secret_base32, key).map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to encrypt TOTP secret");
+        (
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+            Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "Encryption error" } })),
+        )
+    })?;
+    sqlx::query("UPDATE users SET totp_secret_encrypted = $1, totp_secret_nonce = $2, mfa_enabled = TRUE WHERE id = $3")
+        .bind(&ciphertext)
+        .bind(&nonce)
         .bind(auth_user.user_id)
         .execute(&state.db)
         .await
@@ -417,7 +435,7 @@ async fn disable_mfa(
         ));
     }
 
-    sqlx::query("UPDATE users SET totp_secret = NULL, mfa_enabled = FALSE WHERE id = $1")
+    sqlx::query("UPDATE users SET totp_secret_encrypted = NULL, totp_secret_nonce = NULL, mfa_enabled = FALSE WHERE id = $1")
         .bind(auth_user.user_id)
         .execute(&state.db)
         .await

crates/pm-web/src/routes/discovery.rs

@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ async fn probe_and_store(pool: sqlx::PgPool, scan_id: Uuid, ip: IpAddr, port: u1
 /// Simple reverse DNS lookup.
 fn dns_lookup_for_ip(ip: IpAddr) -> Option<String> {
     use std::net::{SocketAddr, ToSocketAddrs};
-    let addr = SocketAddr::new(ip, 0);
+    let _addr = SocketAddr::new(ip, 0);
     // Standard library doesn't have reverse lookup; use getaddrinfo via format
     let host = format!("{ip}");
     // Best-effort: try to resolve numeric address to hostname

crates/pm-web/src/routes/enrollment.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 use crate::AppState;
 use axum::{
-    extract::{ConnectInfo, Path, State},
-    http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode},
+    extract::{Path, State},
+    http::StatusCode,
     response::{IntoResponse, Response},
     routing::{delete, get, post},
     Json, Router,
@@ -11,13 +11,12 @@ use pm_auth::AuthUser;
 use pm_core::{
     db,
     models::{
-        CreateEnrollmentRequest, EnrollmentRequest, EnrollmentStatusResponse, Host, PkiBundle,
+        ApprovedEntry, CreateEnrollmentRequest, EnrollmentRequest, EnrollmentStatusResponse, Host,
+        PkiBundle,
     },
 };
 use rand::{distributions::Alphanumeric, Rng};
 use serde::Serialize;
-use std::net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr};
-use std::time::Instant;
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
 pub struct HostConflict {
@@ -34,43 +33,12 @@ pub fn router() -> Router<AppState> {
 
 /// POST /api/v1/enroll
 /// Initiates host self-enrollment.
+/// Rate limiting is handled by tower-governor middleware (per-IP, configurable).
 async fn enroll_host(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    headers: HeaderMap,
     Json(payload): Json<CreateEnrollmentRequest>,
 ) -> Result<Response, (StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
-    // 1. IP-based Rate Limiting
-    // Prefer real IP from headers if behind proxy (e.g., X-Forwarded-For)
-    let ip = headers
-        .get("x-forwarded-for")
-        .and_then(|h| h.to_str().ok())
-        .and_then(|h| h.split(',').next())
-        .and_then(|h| h.trim().parse::<IpAddr>().ok())
-        .unwrap_or_else(|| {
-            tracing::warn!(
-                "No X-Forwarded-For header found for enrollment request from public endpoint"
-            );
-            // Default to a placeholder IP since we can't extract the socket addr without the ConnectInfo layer
-            "0.0.0.0".parse().unwrap()
-        });
-
-    {
-        let mut rate_limits = state
-            .enrollment_rate_limits
-            .entry(ip)
-            .or_insert(Instant::now() - std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600));
-        let last_request = rate_limits.value();
-        if last_request.elapsed().as_secs() < 60 {
-            // 1 request per minute per IP
-            return Err((
-                StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
-                Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "Rate limit exceeded. Try again in a minute." })),
-            ));
-        }
-        *rate_limits = Instant::now();
-    }
-
-    // 2. Generate secure random polling token
+    // Generate secure random polling token
     let polling_token: String = rand::thread_rng()
         .sample_iter(&Alphanumeric)
         .take(64)
@@ -109,7 +77,10 @@ async fn enroll_status(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path(token): Path<String>,
 ) -> Result<Json<EnrollmentStatusResponse>, (StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
-    // Hash the provided token to match DB
+    // Hash the provided token to match DB.
+    // Security note: the raw polling token is intentionally never logged.
+    // Only the SHA-256 hash is stored and compared; all tracing calls in
+    // this module log error contexts only, never the token itself.
     use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
     let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
     hasher.update(token.as_bytes());
@@ -131,11 +102,19 @@ async fn enroll_status(
     }
 
     // 2. If not in pending, check if it was recently approved.
-    if let Some(pki) = state.approved_enrollments.get(&token_hash) {
+    //    Single-retrieval: remove() atomically consumes the entry, ensuring
+    //    the private key can only be fetched once regardless of concurrent requests.
+    if let Some((_, entry)) = state.approved_enrollments.remove(&token_hash) {
+        if entry.is_expired() {
+            // Bundle TTL expired — treat as not found. Entry is already removed.
+            return Ok(Json(EnrollmentStatusResponse::NotFound));
+        }
         return Ok(Json(EnrollmentStatusResponse::Approved {
-            ca_crt: pki.ca_crt.clone(),
-            server_crt: pki.server_crt.clone(),
-            server_key: pki.server_key.clone(),
+            ca_crt: entry.pki.ca_crt.clone(),
+            ca_chain: entry.pki.ca_chain.clone(),
+            server_crt: entry.pki.server_crt.clone(),
+            server_key: entry.pki.server_key.clone(),
+            crl_pem: entry.pki.crl_pem.clone(),
         }));
     }
 
@@ -167,7 +146,7 @@ async fn list_admin_enrollments(
 
     db::list_enrollment_requests(&state.db)
         .await
-        .map(|requests| Json(requests))
+        .map(Json)
         .map_err(|e| {
             tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to list enrollment requests");
             (
@@ -209,10 +188,10 @@ async fn approve_enrollment(
 
     // Check for FQDN/IP collision in hosts table
     if let Some(existing_host) = sqlx::query_as::<_, Host>(
-        "SELECT id, fqdn, ip_address, display_name, os_family, os_name, arch, agent_version, health_status, last_health_at, last_patch_at, agent_port, notes, registered_at, updated_at FROM hosts WHERE fqdn = $1 OR ip_address = $2"
+        "SELECT id, fqdn, ip_address::text, display_name, os_family, os_name, arch, agent_version, health_status, last_health_at, last_patch_at, agent_port, notes, registered_at, updated_at, crl_status, crl_age_seconds, crl_next_update FROM hosts WHERE fqdn = $1 OR ip_address = $2::inet"
     )
     .bind(&enrollment_request.fqdn)
-    .bind(&enrollment_request.ip_address.to_string())
+    .bind(enrollment_request.ip_address.to_string())
     .fetch_optional(&state.db)
     .await
     .map_err(|e| {
@@ -225,7 +204,63 @@ async fn approve_enrollment(
         ));
     }
 
-    // Generate PKI bundle using CA
+    // Move to hosts table FIRST (certificates table has FK reference to hosts)
+    let os_family = enrollment_request
+        .os_details
+        .get("os")
+        .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+        .map(|s| s.to_string());
+    let os_name = enrollment_request
+        .os_details
+        .get("name")
+        .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+        .map(|s| s.to_string())
+        .or_else(|| {
+            // Build os_name from os + os_version if "name" is absent
+            let os = enrollment_request
+                .os_details
+                .get("os")
+                .and_then(|v| v.as_str())?;
+            let ver = enrollment_request
+                .os_details
+                .get("os_version")
+                .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+                .unwrap_or("");
+            Some(format!("{} {}", os, ver).trim().to_string())
+        });
+    let arch = enrollment_request
+        .os_details
+        .get("architecture")
+        .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+        .map(|s| s.to_string());
+    let display_name = enrollment_request
+        .hostname
+        .clone()
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| enrollment_request.fqdn.clone());
+    sqlx::query(
+        r#"
+        INSERT INTO hosts (id, fqdn, ip_address, os_family, os_name, arch, display_name, registered_at, updated_at)
+        VALUES ($1, $2, $3::inet, $4, $5, $6, $7, NOW(), NOW())
+        "#,
+    )
+    .bind(enrollment_request.id)
+    .bind(&enrollment_request.fqdn)
+    .bind(enrollment_request.ip_address.to_string())
+    .bind(&os_family)
+    .bind(&os_name)
+    .bind(&arch)
+    .bind(&display_name)
+    .execute(&state.db)
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to insert host after approval");
+        (
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+            Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "Database error" })),
+        )
+    })?;
+
+    // Generate PKI bundle using CA (after host row exists)
     let issued = state
         .ca
         .issue_client_cert(
@@ -243,33 +278,6 @@ async fn approve_enrollment(
             )
         })?;
 
-    // Move to hosts table
-    let os_name = enrollment_request
-        .os_details
-        .get("name")
-        .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
-        .map(|s| s.to_string());
-    sqlx::query(
-        r#"
-        INSERT INTO hosts (id, fqdn, ip_address, os_name, registered_at, updated_at, machine_id)
-        VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, NOW(), NOW(), $5)
-        "#,
-    )
-    .bind(enrollment_request.id)
-    .bind(&enrollment_request.fqdn)
-    .bind(&enrollment_request.ip_address.to_string())
-    .bind(os_name)
-    .bind(enrollment_request.machine_id)
-    .execute(&state.db)
-    .await
-    .map_err(|e| {
-        tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to insert host after approval");
-        (
-            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
-            Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "Database error" })),
-        )
-    })?;
-
     // Delete from enrollment_requests table
     db::delete_enrollment_request(&state.db, id)
         .await
@@ -281,15 +289,38 @@ async fn approve_enrollment(
             )
         })?;
 
-    // Store PKI bundle in cache for client retrieval
+    // Store PKI bundle in cache for single-use client retrieval.
+    //
+    // Design decision — server-generated keys vs CSR-based enrollment:
+    // Currently the server generates the agent's private key and transmits it
+    // over the (already mTLS-secured) polling endpoint. This approach was chosen
+    // for initial implementation simplicity: the agent only needs to poll one
+    // endpoint and receives a complete PKI bundle without an extra round-trip.
+    //
+    // A future enhancement should adopt CSR-based enrollment where the agent
+    // generates its own key pair locally and submits a Certificate Signing
+    // Request, eliminating the need for the server to ever hold or transmit
+    // the agent's private key. This reduces the attack surface significantly
+    // — the private key never traverses the network and never resides in
+    // server memory beyond the signing operation.
+    //
+    // See: https://github.com/Draco-Lunaris/Linux-Patch-Manager/issues/9
+    //
+    // Include the full CA chain (for root mode, same as ca_crt; for sub-CA,
+    // includes intermediate + root) and the current CRL.
+    let ca_chain = issued.ca_root_pem.clone(); // Root mode: chain is just the root cert
+    let crl_pem = state.ca.generate_crl(&state.db).await.unwrap_or_default(); // Empty string on failure: agent falls back to WebPKI-only
     let pki = PkiBundle {
         ca_crt: issued.ca_root_pem,
+        ca_chain,
         server_crt: issued.server_cert_pem,
         server_key: issued.server_key_pem,
+        crl_pem,
     };
-    state
-        .approved_enrollments
-        .insert(enrollment_request.polling_token.clone(), pki);
+    state.approved_enrollments.insert(
+        enrollment_request.polling_token.clone(),
+        ApprovedEntry::new(pki),
+    );
 
     Ok(StatusCode::OK)
 }

crates/pm-web/src/routes/groups.rs

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ use axum::{
     extract::{Path, State},
     http::StatusCode,
     response::Json,
-    routing::{delete, get, post, put},
+    routing::{get, post},
     Router,
 };
 use pm_auth::rbac::AuthUser;

crates/pm-web/src/routes/health_checks.rs

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ use axum::{
     extract::{Path, State},
     http::StatusCode,
     response::Json,
-    routing::{delete, get, post, put},
+    routing::{get, post},
     Router,
 };
 use pm_auth::rbac::AuthUser;
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ use pm_core::{
     },
 };
 use reqwest::tls::Version;
-use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use serde::Serialize;
 use serde_json::{json, Value};
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 use uuid::Uuid;
@@ -631,7 +631,6 @@ async fn update_health_check(
         set_clauses.push(format!("basic_auth_pass_encrypted = ${}", param_idx));
         param_idx += 1;
         set_clauses.push(format!("basic_auth_pass_nonce = ${}", param_idx));
-        param_idx += 1;
     }
 
     if set_clauses.is_empty() {
@@ -644,7 +643,7 @@ async fn update_health_check(
     }
 
     // Always update updated_at
-    set_clauses.push(format!("updated_at = NOW()"));
+    set_clauses.push("updated_at = NOW()".to_string());
 
     // Use a simpler approach: query the current row, apply changes, update
     // This avoids complex dynamic SQL binding issues
@@ -945,7 +944,7 @@ async fn run_service_check(check: &HealthCheck, state: &AppState) -> CheckResult
                         }
                         CheckResult {
                             healthy: false,
-                            detail: format!("Failed to parse agent response"),
+                            detail: "Failed to parse agent response".to_string(),
                             latency_ms: Some(latency),
                         }
                     },

crates/pm-web/src/routes/hosts.rs

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 //! POST   /api/v1/hosts            — register new host (admin only)
 //! GET    /api/v1/hosts/{id}       — get host detail
 //! DELETE /api/v1/hosts/{id}       — remove host (admin only)
+//! PUT    /api/v1/hosts/{id}       — update host (write access)
 //! GET    /api/v1/hosts/{id}/groups — list groups for host
 //! POST   /api/v1/hosts/{id}/groups — assign host to group
 //! DELETE /api/v1/hosts/{id}/groups/{group_id} — remove host from group
@@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ use axum::{
 use pm_auth::rbac::AuthUser;
 use pm_core::{
     audit::{log_event, AuditAction},
-    models::{CreateHostRequest, Group, HostSummary},
+    models::{CreateHostRequest, Group, HostSummary, UpdateHostRequest},
 };
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use serde_json::{json, Value};
@@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ use crate::AppState;
 pub fn router() -> Router<AppState> {
     Router::new()
         .route("/", get(list_hosts).post(register_host))
-        .route("/{id}", get(get_host).delete(remove_host))
+        .route("/{id}", get(get_host).put(update_host).delete(remove_host))
         .route(
             "/{id}/groups",
             get(list_host_groups).post(add_host_to_group),
@@ -42,6 +43,7 @@ pub fn router() -> Router<AppState> {
 // ── Query params ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+#[allow(dead_code)]
 pub struct HostListQuery {
     pub group_id: Option<Uuid>,
     pub health_status: Option<String>,
@@ -130,7 +132,8 @@ async fn list_hosts(
                      THEN 'some_unhealthy'
                    ELSE 'all_healthy'
                  END AS health_check_status,
-                   h.registered_at
+                   h.registered_at,
+                   h.crl_status
             FROM hosts h
             LEFT JOIN host_patch_data hpd ON hpd.host_id = h.id
             ORDER BY h.fqdn
@@ -163,7 +166,8 @@ async fn list_hosts(
                      THEN 'some_unhealthy'
                    ELSE 'all_healthy'
                  END AS health_check_status,
-                   h.registered_at
+                   h.registered_at,
+                   h.crl_status
             FROM hosts h
             LEFT JOIN host_patch_data hpd ON hpd.host_id = h.id
             WHERE
@@ -317,7 +321,8 @@ async fn get_host(
             SELECT id, fqdn, host(ip_address)::text AS ip_address, display_name,
                    os_family, os_name, arch, agent_version, health_status,
                    last_health_at, last_patch_at, agent_port, notes,
-                   registered_at, updated_at
+                   registered_at, updated_at,
+                   crl_status, crl_age_seconds, crl_next_update
             FROM hosts WHERE id = $1
         ) h
         "#,
@@ -398,6 +403,69 @@ async fn remove_host(
     Ok(Json(json!({ "message": "Host removed" })))
 }
 
+// ── PUT /api/v1/hosts/:id ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+async fn update_host(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    auth: AuthUser,
+    Path(id): Path<Uuid>,
+    Json(req): Json<UpdateHostRequest>,
+) -> Result<Json<Value>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
+    if !auth.role.can_write() {
+        return Err((
+            StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+            Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "forbidden", "message": "Write access required" } })),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    // Update only fields that were provided; COALESCE preserves existing values.
+    let host = sqlx::query_scalar(
+        r#"
+        WITH updated AS (
+            UPDATE hosts SET
+                fqdn         = COALESCE($1, fqdn),
+                ip_address   = COALESCE($2::inet, ip_address),
+                display_name = COALESCE($3, display_name),
+                updated_at   = NOW()
+            WHERE id = $4
+            RETURNING id
+        )
+        SELECT row_to_json(h) FROM (
+            SELECT id, fqdn, host(ip_address)::text AS ip_address, display_name,
+                   os_family, os_name, arch, agent_version, health_status,
+                   last_health_at, last_patch_at, agent_port, notes,
+                   registered_at, updated_at, crl_status, crl_age_seconds, crl_next_update
+            FROM hosts WHERE id = (SELECT id FROM updated)
+        ) h
+        "#,
+    )
+    .bind(&req.fqdn)
+    .bind(&req.ip_address)
+    .bind(&req.display_name)
+    .bind(id)
+    .fetch_optional(&state.db)
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::error!(error = %e, host_id = %id, "Failed to update host");
+        let msg = if e.to_string().contains("unique") {
+            "A host with this FQDN and IP already exists".to_string()
+        } else {
+            "Database error".to_string()
+        };
+        (
+            StatusCode::CONFLICT,
+            Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "conflict", "message": msg } })),
+        )
+    })?;
+
+    host.map(Json).ok_or_else(|| {
+        (
+            StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+            Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "not_found", "message": "Host not found" } })),
+        )
+    })
+}
+
 // ── GET /api/v1/hosts/:id/groups ──────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 async fn list_host_groups(

crates/pm-web/src/routes/jobs.rs

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ use pm_core::{
 };
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::collections::HashMap;
 use uuid::Uuid;
 
 use crate::AppState;
@@ -52,6 +53,13 @@ struct JobListResponse {
     offset: i64,
 }
 
+/// Helper struct for the host_names aggregation query.
+#[derive(Debug, sqlx::FromRow)]
+struct JobHostNames {
+    id: Uuid,
+    host_names: Vec<String>,
+}
+
 /// Per-host row included in `GET /api/v1/jobs/{id}` response.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, sqlx::FromRow)]
 struct JobHostRow {
@@ -229,7 +237,7 @@ async fn list_jobs(
     let limit = q.limit.unwrap_or(50).min(200);
     let offset = q.offset.unwrap_or(0);
 
-    let jobs: Vec<PatchJobSummary> = if auth.role.is_admin() {
+    let mut jobs: Vec<PatchJobSummary> = if auth.role.is_admin() {
         // Admins see every job.
         sqlx::query_as(
             r#"
@@ -298,6 +306,40 @@ async fn list_jobs(
         err(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "internal_error", "Database error")
     })?;
 
+    // Fetch host names for all jobs in this page.
+    let job_ids: Vec<Uuid> = jobs.iter().map(|j| j.id).collect();
+    let host_names_rows: Vec<JobHostNames> = if job_ids.is_empty() {
+        Vec::new()
+    } else {
+        sqlx::query_as(
+            r#"
+            SELECT pjh.job_id AS id,
+                   array_agg(COALESCE(NULLIF(h.display_name, ''), h.fqdn)
+                             ORDER BY h.fqdn) AS host_names
+            FROM patch_job_hosts pjh
+            JOIN hosts h ON h.id = pjh.host_id
+            WHERE pjh.job_id = ANY($1)
+            GROUP BY pjh.job_id
+            "#,
+        )
+        .bind(&job_ids)
+        .fetch_all(&state.db)
+        .await
+        .unwrap_or_else(|e| {
+            tracing::warn!(error = %e, "list_jobs: host_names query failed, using empty defaults");
+            Vec::new()
+        })
+    };
+
+    // Merge host_names into summaries.
+    let mut host_names_map: HashMap<Uuid, Vec<String>> = host_names_rows
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|r| (r.id, r.host_names))
+        .collect();
+    for job in &mut jobs {
+        job.host_names = host_names_map.remove(&job.id).unwrap_or_default();
+    }
+
     // Total count for pagination metadata.
     let total: i64 = if auth.role.is_admin() {
         sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM patch_jobs")
@@ -438,7 +480,7 @@ async fn cancel_job(
 
     // Only admin or the job creator may cancel.
     if !auth.role.can_write() {
-        let is_creator = creator_id.map_or(false, |cid| cid == auth.user_id);
+        let is_creator = creator_id == Some(auth.user_id);
         if !is_creator {
             return Err(err(
                 StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,

crates/pm-web/src/routes/maintenance_windows.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 //! Maintenance window management routes.
 //!
 //! GET    /api/v1/hosts/{id}/maintenance-windows           — list windows for host
+//! GET    /api/v1/maintenance-windows                     — list ALL windows (bulk)
 //! POST   /api/v1/hosts/{id}/maintenance-windows           — create window for host
 //! PUT    /api/v1/hosts/{id}/maintenance-windows/{win_id}  — update window
 //! DELETE /api/v1/hosts/{id}/maintenance-windows/{win_id}  — delete window
@@ -32,6 +33,41 @@ pub fn router() -> Router<AppState> {
         .route("/{win_id}", put(update_window).delete(delete_window))
 }
 
+/// Top-level router for `/api/v1/maintenance-windows` — bulk list-all endpoint.
+pub fn all_windows_router() -> Router<AppState> {
+    Router::new().route("/", get(list_all_windows))
+}
+
+// ── GET /api/v1/maintenance-windows ──────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/// Bulk endpoint: return every maintenance window across all hosts.
+/// Eliminates N+1 queries from the frontend (one request instead of one per host).
+async fn list_all_windows(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    _auth: AuthUser,
+) -> Result<Json<Value>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
+    let windows: Vec<MaintenanceWindow> = sqlx::query_as(
+        r#"
+        SELECT id, host_id, label, recurrence, start_at, duration_minutes,
+               recurrence_day, enabled, auto_apply, created_at, updated_at
+        FROM   maintenance_windows
+        ORDER  BY host_id, created_at ASC
+        "#,
+    )
+    .fetch_all(&state.db)
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::error!(error = %e, "list_all_windows: query failed");
+        err(
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+            "internal_error",
+            "Database error",
+        )
+    })?;
+
+    Ok(Json(json!({ "windows": windows })))
+}
+
 // ── Error helper ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 #[inline]

crates/pm-web/src/routes/mod.rs

@@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ pub mod health_checks;
 pub mod hosts;
 pub mod jobs;
 pub mod maintenance_windows;
+pub mod pki;
+pub mod reports;
 pub mod settings;
 pub mod sso;
 pub mod status;
 pub mod users;
 pub mod ws;
-
-pub mod reports;

crates/pm-web/src/routes/pki.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+//! PKI endpoints for certificate revocation list (CRL) distribution.
+//!
+//! This module exposes the CRL endpoint that agents poll every 24 hours to
+//! check for revoked certificates. The CRL is signed by the internal CA and
+//! is publicly accessible (CRLs are self-authenticating — they carry the CA
+//! signature and do not require client authentication).
+
+use crate::AppState;
+use axum::{
+    extract::State,
+    http::{header, StatusCode},
+    response::IntoResponse,
+    routing::get,
+    Router,
+};
+
+/// Define public PKI routes.
+///
+/// These endpoints are **unauthenticated** because CRLs are self-authenticating:
+/// the agent verifies the CRL signature against its pinned CA certificate.
+/// No client certificate or API key is required.
+pub fn router() -> Router<AppState> {
+    Router::new().route("/pki/crl.pem", get(get_crl))
+}
+
+/// `GET /api/v1/pki/crl.pem`
+///
+/// Returns the current Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as a PEM-encoded
+/// X.509 CRL. The CRL is signed by the internal CA and contains the serial
+/// numbers of all revoked certificates that have not yet expired.
+///
+/// # Cache headers
+///
+/// The response includes `Cache-Control: max-age=3600` (1 hour) to allow
+/// intermediate caches to serve the CRL. Agents refresh every 24 hours,
+/// so a 1-hour cache is a reasonable balance between freshness and load.
+///
+/// # CRL generation
+///
+/// The CRL is generated on demand from the `certificates` table. For our
+/// target scale (max ~2500 clients), this is a fast query and the resulting
+/// CRL is KB-range. If performance becomes a concern, the CRL can be cached
+/// in memory and regenerated on a schedule (see background task in main.rs).
+async fn get_crl(State(state): State<AppState>) -> impl IntoResponse {
+    match state.ca.generate_crl(&state.db).await {
+        Ok(crl_pem) => (
+            StatusCode::OK,
+            [(
+                header::CONTENT_TYPE,
+                "application/x-pem-file; charset=utf-8",
+            )],
+            [(header::CACHE_CONTROL, "max-age=3600")],
+            crl_pem,
+        )
+            .into_response(),
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to generate CRL");
+            (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "Failed to generate CRL").into_response()
+        },
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use axum::body::Body;
+    use axum::http::{Request, StatusCode};
+    use axum::Router;
+    use dashmap::DashMap;
+    use pm_auth::rbac::AuthConfig;
+    use pm_core::config::AppConfig;
+    use sqlx::PgPool;
+    use std::sync::Arc;
+    use tokio::sync::Mutex;
+    use tower::ServiceExt;
+
+    /// Helper: create a test AppState with a real CA and database pool.
+    /// Returns None if TEST_DATABASE_URL is not set (tests are skipped).
+    async fn setup_app_state() -> Option<(PgPool, AppState)> {
+        let db_url = std::env::var("TEST_DATABASE_URL").ok()?;
+        let pool = PgPool::connect(&db_url).await.ok()?;
+
+        // Run migrations to ensure schema is up to date.
+        sqlx::migrate!("../../migrations").run(&pool).await.ok()?;
+
+        // Create a temp directory for the CA.
+        let tmp_dir = tempfile::tempdir().ok()?;
+        let ca_dir = tmp_dir.path().to_path_buf();
+
+        let ca = pm_ca::CertAuthority::init(&ca_dir, &pool).await.ok()?;
+
+        let config = Arc::new(AppConfig::default());
+
+        use crate::routes::sso::OidcCache;
+
+        let state = AppState {
+            db: pool.clone(),
+            config,
+            signing_key_pem: String::new(),
+            auth_config: Arc::new(AuthConfig::new(String::new(), &[], &[])),
+            ws_tickets: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+            sso_sessions: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+            sso_handoffs: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+            oidc_cache: Arc::new(Mutex::new(OidcCache::default())),
+            ca: Arc::new(ca),
+            approved_enrollments: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+        };
+
+        Some((pool, state))
+    }
+
+    /// Build an Axum app with just the PKI routes for testing.
+    fn test_app(state: AppState) -> Router {
+        Router::new().nest("/api/v1", router()).with_state(state)
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn crl_endpoint_returns_200_with_valid_pem() {
+        let Some((pool, state)) = setup_app_state().await else {
+            eprintln!("skipping: TEST_DATABASE_URL not set");
+            return;
+        };
+
+        let app = test_app(state);
+
+        let response = app
+            .oneshot(
+                Request::builder()
+                    .uri("/api/v1/pki/crl.pem")
+                    .body(Body::empty())
+                    .unwrap(),
+            )
+            .await
+            .expect("request should succeed");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            response.status(),
+            StatusCode::OK,
+            "CRL endpoint should return 200 OK"
+        );
+
+        let body = axum::body::to_bytes(response.into_body(), 10_000)
+            .await
+            .expect("body should be readable");
+
+        let body_str = String::from_utf8(body.to_vec()).expect("body should be UTF-8");
+
+        assert!(
+            body_str.contains("-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----"),
+            "Response should contain CRL PEM header"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            body_str.contains("-----END X509 CRL-----"),
+            "Response should contain CRL PEM footer"
+        );
+
+        pool.close().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn crl_endpoint_returns_cache_control_header() {
+        let Some((pool, state)) = setup_app_state().await else {
+            eprintln!("skipping: TEST_DATABASE_URL not set");
+            return;
+        };
+
+        let app = test_app(state);
+
+        let response = app
+            .oneshot(
+                Request::builder()
+                    .uri("/api/v1/pki/crl.pem")
+                    .body(Body::empty())
+                    .unwrap(),
+            )
+            .await
+            .expect("request should succeed");
+
+        assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+
+        let cache_control = response
+            .headers()
+            .get("cache-control")
+            .expect("Cache-Control header should be present");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            cache_control.to_str().unwrap(),
+            "max-age=3600",
+            "Cache-Control should be max-age=3600"
+        );
+
+        pool.close().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn crl_endpoint_works_without_authentication() {
+        let Some((pool, state)) = setup_app_state().await else {
+            eprintln!("skipping: TEST_DATABASE_URL not set");
+            return;
+        };
+
+        let app = test_app(state);
+
+        // Make request without any auth headers — CRL endpoint is public.
+        let response = app
+            .oneshot(
+                Request::builder()
+                    .uri("/api/v1/pki/crl.pem")
+                    .body(Body::empty())
+                    .unwrap(),
+            )
+            .await
+            .expect("request should succeed");
+
+        // Should return 200, not 401 Unauthorized.
+        assert_eq!(
+            response.status(),
+            StatusCode::OK,
+            "CRL endpoint should be accessible without authentication"
+        );
+
+        pool.close().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn crl_endpoint_returns_pem_content_type() {
+        let Some((pool, state)) = setup_app_state().await else {
+            eprintln!("skipping: TEST_DATABASE_URL not set");
+            return;
+        };
+
+        let app = test_app(state);
+
+        let response = app
+            .oneshot(
+                Request::builder()
+                    .uri("/api/v1/pki/crl.pem")
+                    .body(Body::empty())
+                    .unwrap(),
+            )
+            .await
+            .expect("request should succeed");
+
+        assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+
+        let content_type = response
+            .headers()
+            .get("content-type")
+            .expect("Content-Type header should be present");
+
+        assert!(
+            content_type
+                .to_str()
+                .unwrap()
+                .contains("application/x-pem-file"),
+            "Content-Type should be application/x-pem-file, got: {:?}",
+            content_type
+        );
+
+        pool.close().await;
+    }
+}

crates/pm-web/src/routes/settings.rs

@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ pub struct OidcDiscoveryRequest {
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
+#[allow(dead_code)]
 pub struct OidcDiscoveryResult {
     pub issuer: String,
     pub authorization_endpoint: String,
@@ -179,6 +180,28 @@ fn write_access_required(auth: &AuthUser) -> Result<(), (StatusCode, Json<Value>
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Gate Manager-wide authentication configuration (OIDC, SMTP, IP allowlist,
+/// OIDC discover/test) behind the **Admin** role. Operators can still
+/// access per-host settings (see `write_access_required`).
+///
+/// Returns `403 forbidden_role` if the user is not an Admin. The distinct
+/// error code (vs `forbidden` from `write_access_required`) lets the SPA
+/// differentiate "you don't have write access at all" from "you have
+/// write access but not for this specific resource".
+///
+/// See issue #5 and `tasks/authz-gate-spec.md` for the full design.
+fn admin_required(auth: &AuthUser) -> Result<(), (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
+    if !auth.role.is_admin() {
+        return Err((
+            StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+            Json(
+                json!({ "error": { "code": "forbidden_role", "message": "Admin role required to modify this resource" } }),
+            ),
+        ));
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 async fn load_system_config(
     pool: &sqlx::PgPool,
 ) -> Result<HashMap<String, String>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
@@ -250,11 +273,23 @@ async fn update_config_key(
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Tuple type for SELECT from oidc_config table (used by fetch_oidc_config).
+type OidcConfigRow = (
+    bool,
+    String,
+    String,
+    String,
+    String,
+    Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    String,
+    String,
+);
 async fn fetch_oidc_config(
     pool: &sqlx::PgPool,
 ) -> Result<OidcConfigResponse, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
-    let row: Option<(bool, String, String, String, String, String, String, String)> = sqlx::query_as(
-        "SELECT enabled, provider_type, display_name, discovery_url, client_id, client_secret, redirect_uri, scopes FROM oidc_config WHERE id = 1",
+    let row: Option<OidcConfigRow> = sqlx::query_as(
+        "SELECT enabled, provider_type, display_name, discovery_url, client_id, client_secret_encrypted, client_secret_nonce, redirect_uri, scopes FROM oidc_config WHERE id = 1",
     )
     .fetch_optional(pool)
     .await
@@ -273,7 +308,8 @@ async fn fetch_oidc_config(
             display_name,
             discovery_url,
             client_id,
-            client_secret,
+            client_secret_encrypted,
+            _client_secret_nonce,
             redirect_uri,
             scopes,
         )) => OidcConfigResponse {
@@ -282,7 +318,7 @@ async fn fetch_oidc_config(
             display_name,
             discovery_url,
             client_id,
-            client_secret: if client_secret.is_empty() {
+            client_secret: if client_secret_encrypted.is_none() {
                 String::new()
             } else {
                 MASKED.to_string()
@@ -332,7 +368,7 @@ async fn update_settings(
     auth: AuthUser,
     Json(req): Json<UpdateSettingsRequest>,
 ) -> Result<Json<SettingsResponse>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
-    write_access_required(&auth)?;
+    admin_required(&auth)?;
 
     // Update OIDC config
     if let Some(oidc) = req.oidc {
@@ -342,6 +378,22 @@ async fn update_settings(
             .is_some_and(|s| s != MASKED && !s.is_empty());
 
         let result = if update_secret {
+            // Encrypt the client_secret before persisting
+            let key = crate::secret_key::get().map_err(|e| {
+                tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to load secret-encryption key");
+                (
+                    StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                    Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "Encryption key error" } })),
+                )
+            })?;
+            let plaintext = oidc.client_secret.as_deref().unwrap_or("");
+            let (ciphertext, nonce) = pm_core::crypto::encrypt(plaintext, key).map_err(|e| {
+                tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to encrypt OIDC client_secret");
+                (
+                    StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                    Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "Encryption error" } })),
+                )
+            })?;
             sqlx::query(
                 "UPDATE oidc_config SET \
                  enabled = COALESCE($1, enabled), \
@@ -349,9 +401,10 @@ async fn update_settings(
                  display_name = COALESCE($3, display_name), \
                  discovery_url = COALESCE($4, discovery_url), \
                  client_id = COALESCE($5, client_id), \
-                 client_secret = $6, \
-                 redirect_uri = COALESCE($7, redirect_uri), \
-                 scopes = COALESCE($8, scopes), \
+                 client_secret_encrypted = $6, \
+                 client_secret_nonce = $7, \
+                 redirect_uri = COALESCE($8, redirect_uri), \
+                 scopes = COALESCE($9, scopes), \
                  updated_at = NOW() \
                  WHERE id = 1",
             )
@@ -360,7 +413,8 @@ async fn update_settings(
             .bind(&oidc.display_name)
             .bind(&oidc.discovery_url)
             .bind(&oidc.client_id)
-            .bind(oidc.client_secret.as_deref().unwrap_or(""))
+            .bind(&ciphertext)
+            .bind(&nonce)
             .bind(&oidc.redirect_uri)
             .bind(&oidc.scopes)
             .execute(&state.db)
@@ -399,7 +453,7 @@ async fn update_settings(
 
         log_event(
             &state.db,
-            AuditAction::ConfigChanged,
+            AuditAction::OidcConfigUpdated,
             Some(auth.user_id),
             Some(&auth.username),
             Some("oidc"),
@@ -427,7 +481,59 @@ async fn update_settings(
         }
         if let Some(ref v) = smtp.password {
             if v != MASKED {
-                update_config_key(&state.db, "smtp_password", v).await?;
+                // Encrypt the SMTP password before persisting
+                let key = crate::secret_key::get().map_err(|e| {
+                    tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to load secret-encryption key");
+                    (
+                        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                        Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "Encryption key error" } })),
+                    )
+                })?;
+                let (ciphertext, nonce) = pm_core::crypto::encrypt(v, key).map_err(|e| {
+                    tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to encrypt SMTP password");
+                    (
+                        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                        Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "Encryption error" } })),
+                    )
+                })?;
+                // Delete old plaintext row, write two new rows (encrypted + nonce)
+                sqlx::query("DELETE FROM system_config WHERE key = 'smtp_password'")
+                    .execute(&state.db)
+                    .await
+                    .map_err(|e| {
+                        tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to delete old smtp_password row");
+                        (
+                            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                            Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "Database error" } })),
+                        )
+                    })?;
+                // Store as hex in TEXT columns (system_config uses TEXT)
+                let enc_hex: String = ciphertext.iter().map(|b| format!("{:02x}", b)).collect();
+                let nonce_hex: String = nonce.iter().map(|b| format!("{:02x}", b)).collect();
+                sqlx::query("INSERT INTO system_config (key, value) VALUES ($1, $2)")
+                    .bind("smtp_password_encrypted")
+                    .bind(&enc_hex)
+                    .execute(&state.db)
+                    .await
+                    .map_err(|e| {
+                        tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to write smtp_password_encrypted");
+                        (
+                            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                            Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "Database error" } })),
+                        )
+                    })?;
+                sqlx::query("INSERT INTO system_config (key, value) VALUES ($1, $2)")
+                    .bind("smtp_password_nonce")
+                    .bind(&nonce_hex)
+                    .execute(&state.db)
+                    .await
+                    .map_err(|e| {
+                        tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to write smtp_password_nonce");
+                        (
+                            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                            Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "Database error" } })),
+                        )
+                    })?;
             }
         }
         if let Some(ref v) = smtp.from {
@@ -439,7 +545,7 @@ async fn update_settings(
 
         log_event(
             &state.db,
-            AuditAction::ConfigChanged,
+            AuditAction::SmtpConfigUpdated,
             Some(auth.user_id),
             Some(&auth.username),
             Some("smtp"),
@@ -484,7 +590,7 @@ async fn update_settings(
 
         log_event(
             &state.db,
-            AuditAction::ConfigChanged,
+            AuditAction::IpWhitelistUpdated,
             Some(auth.user_id),
             Some(&auth.username),
             Some("ip_whitelist"),
@@ -562,7 +668,7 @@ async fn discover_oidc(
     auth: AuthUser,
     Json(req): Json<OidcDiscoveryRequest>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Value>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
-    write_access_required(&auth)?;
+    admin_required(&auth)?;
 
     if req.discovery_url.is_empty() {
         return Err((
@@ -587,6 +693,20 @@ async fn discover_oidc(
     match client.get(&req.discovery_url).send().await {
         Ok(resp) if resp.status().is_success() => {
             let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or(json!({}));
+            // Audit log: Admin probed the OIDC discovery endpoint (issue #5).
+            // Non-fatal: log_event logs errors internally and does not propagate.
+            log_event(
+                &state.db,
+                AuditAction::OidcDiscoverPerformed,
+                Some(auth.user_id),
+                Some(&auth.username),
+                Some("oidc"),
+                Some(&req.discovery_url),
+                json!({ "discovery_url": req.discovery_url }),
+                None,
+                None,
+            )
+            .await;
             Ok(Json(json!({
                 "success": true,
                 "issuer": body.get("issuer").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or(""),
@@ -619,7 +739,7 @@ async fn test_oidc(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     auth: AuthUser,
 ) -> Result<Json<Value>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
-    write_access_required(&auth)?;
+    admin_required(&auth)?;
 
     let row: Option<(bool, String, String)> = sqlx::query_as(
         "SELECT enabled, provider_type, discovery_url FROM oidc_config WHERE id = 1",
@@ -678,6 +798,23 @@ async fn test_oidc(
                 "azure" => "Azure AD",
                 _ => "OIDC",
             };
+            // Audit log: Admin tested the OIDC provider connection (issue #5).
+            // Non-fatal: log_event logs errors internally and does not propagate.
+            log_event(
+                &state.db,
+                AuditAction::OidcTestPerformed,
+                Some(auth.user_id),
+                Some(&auth.username),
+                Some("oidc"),
+                Some(&discovery_url),
+                json!({
+                    "discovery_url": discovery_url,
+                    "provider_type": provider_type,
+                }),
+                None,
+                None,
+            )
+            .await;
             Ok(Json(json!({
                 "success": true,
                 "message": format!("{} provider verified successfully", provider_label),
@@ -696,6 +833,9 @@ async fn test_oidc(
     }
 }
 
+// Note: OIDC test audit log is emitted in the success path below.
+// The above error cases don't persist, so no audit log is needed for them.
+
 // ============================================================
 // POST /api/v1/settings/azure-sso/test (backward-compatible alias)
 // ============================================================
@@ -733,7 +873,32 @@ async fn test_smtp(
         .and_then(|v| v.parse().ok())
         .unwrap_or(587);
     let username = cfg.get("smtp_username").cloned().unwrap_or_default();
-    let password = cfg.get("smtp_password").cloned().unwrap_or_default();
+    // Decrypt the SMTP password (issue #6 fix — stored as two rows in system_config:
+    // `smtp_password_encrypted` (hex) and `smtp_password_nonce` (hex))
+    let password = match (
+        cfg.get("smtp_password_encrypted"),
+        cfg.get("smtp_password_nonce"),
+    ) {
+        (Some(enc_hex), Some(nonce_hex)) => {
+            let key = match crate::secret_key::get() {
+                Ok(k) => k,
+                Err(e) => {
+                    tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to load secret-encryption key");
+                    return Err((
+                        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                        Json(
+                            json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "Encryption key error" } }),
+                        ),
+                    ));
+                },
+            };
+            // Decode hex to bytes (hex_decode returns empty Vec on invalid input)
+            let enc_bytes = hex_decode(enc_hex);
+            let nonce_bytes = hex_decode(nonce_hex);
+            pm_core::crypto::decrypt(&enc_bytes, &nonce_bytes, key).unwrap_or_default()
+        },
+        _ => String::new(),
+    };
     let from_addr = cfg.get("smtp_from").cloned().unwrap_or_default();
     let tls_mode = cfg
         .get("smtp_tls_mode")
@@ -898,7 +1063,7 @@ async fn update_ip_whitelist(
     auth: AuthUser,
     Json(req): Json<IpWhitelistUpdate>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Value>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
-    write_access_required(&auth)?;
+    admin_required(&auth)?;
 
     // Validate each entry
     for entry in &req.entries {
@@ -920,7 +1085,7 @@ async fn update_ip_whitelist(
 
     log_event(
         &state.db,
-        AuditAction::ConfigChanged,
+        AuditAction::IpWhitelistUpdated,
         Some(auth.user_id),
         Some(&auth.username),
         Some("ip_whitelist"),
@@ -974,3 +1139,70 @@ async fn audit_integrity(
         })).collect::<Vec<_>>(),
     })))
 }
+
+/// Decode a hex string to bytes. Returns an empty Vec on invalid input.
+/// Used by the SMTP password decryption logic (issue #6 fix).
+fn hex_decode(s: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
+    if !s.len().is_multiple_of(2) {
+        return Vec::new();
+    }
+    (0..s.len())
+        .step_by(2)
+        .filter_map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&s[i..i + 2], 16).ok())
+        .collect()
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    #![allow(unused_imports)]
+    use super::*;
+    use axum::http::StatusCode;
+    use pm_auth::jwt::AccessClaims;
+    use pm_auth::rbac::{AuthUser, UserRole};
+    use uuid::Uuid;
+
+    /// Build a minimal `AuthUser` for role-gate testing.
+    /// The `admin_required` gate only inspects `auth.role`, so all other
+    /// fields can be placeholder values.
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
+    fn test_auth_user(role: UserRole) -> AuthUser {
+        let claims = AccessClaims {
+            sub: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
+            iat: 0,
+            exp: i64::MAX,
+            jti: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
+            role: role.as_str().to_string(),
+            username: "test-user".to_string(),
+        };
+        AuthUser {
+            user_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
+            username: "test-user".to_string(),
+            role,
+            claims,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn admin_required_admin_passes() {
+        let auth = test_auth_user(UserRole::Admin);
+        admin_required(&auth).expect("Admin should pass");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn admin_required_operator_denied() {
+        let auth = test_auth_user(UserRole::Operator);
+        let err = admin_required(&auth).expect_err("Operator should be denied");
+        let (status, body) = err;
+        assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+        assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "forbidden_role");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn admin_required_reporter_denied() {
+        let auth = test_auth_user(UserRole::Reporter);
+        let err = admin_required(&auth).expect_err("Reporter should be denied");
+        let (status, body) = err;
+        assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+        assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "forbidden_role");
+    }
+}

crates/pm-web/src/routes/sso.rs

@@ -12,11 +12,12 @@ use axum::{
     extract::State,
     http::StatusCode,
     response::{IntoResponse, Json, Redirect},
-    routing::get,
+    routing::{get, post},
     Router,
 };
 use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine as _};
 use chrono::Utc;
+use dashmap::DashMap;
 use jsonwebtoken::{decode, decode_header, Algorithm, DecodingKey, Validation};
 use pm_auth::{jwt::issue_access_token, refresh};
 use pm_core::audit::{log_event, AuditAction};
@@ -40,6 +41,140 @@ pub struct SsoSession {
     pub created_at: chrono::DateTime<Utc>,
 }
 
+/// Single-use, short-lived payload that the SSO callback hands to the SPA
+/// via a `?handoff=<code>` query param. The SPA exchanges it via
+/// `POST /api/v1/auth/sso/handoff` for the actual JWT access/refresh
+/// tokens. Mirrors the WS-ticket pattern (issue #10): in-memory, atomic
+/// single-use consume, TTL enforced on read.
+///
+/// See `tasks/sso-token-handoff-spec.md` §4.1 for the full design.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct SsoHandoff {
+    /// JWT access token (short-lived, 15 min TTL).
+    pub access_token: String,
+    /// Opaque refresh token (long-lived, rotating).
+    pub raw_refresh: String,
+    /// JSON-serialized user object (id, username, display_name, role, etc.).
+    pub user_json: Value,
+    /// Access token TTL in seconds (for the `expires_in` field in the response).
+    pub access_ttl: u64,
+    /// Expiry instant; the exchange endpoint rejects codes past this time.
+    pub expires_at: std::time::Instant,
+}
+
+/// TTL for SSO handoff codes. Short by design: the SPA should POST to
+/// `/api/v1/auth/sso/handoff` within seconds of the redirect landing.
+///
+/// `dead_code` is allowed here because Phase 1 introduces the store
+/// ahead of its consumer; the SSO callback rewrite in Phase 2 of
+/// `tasks/sso-token-handoff-spec.md` inserts handoffs with this TTL and
+/// the exchange handler reads it back to validate freshness.
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub const HANDOFF_TTL_SECS: u64 = 60;
+
+/// Generate a cryptographically random handoff code (32 bytes,
+/// base64url-encoded, ~43 chars). Uses the same `rand` crate family as
+/// the WS-ticket path.
+///
+/// `dead_code` is allowed here for the same reason as `HANDOFF_TTL_SECS`
+/// — Phase 2 wires it into the SSO callback redirect construction.
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub fn generate_handoff_code() -> String {
+    use rand::RngCore;
+    let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
+    rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut bytes);
+    URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(bytes)
+}
+
+/// Request body for `POST /api/v1/auth/sso/handoff`.
+///
+/// The SPA sends the handoff code it received in the SSO callback
+/// redirect's `?handoff=...` query param, and the backend exchanges it
+/// for the actual access/refresh tokens. The code is single-use and
+/// 60-second TTL.
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct HandoffRequest {
+    pub handoff_code: String,
+}
+
+// ============================================================
+// Handoff exchange handler
+// ============================================================
+
+/// `POST /api/v1/auth/sso/handoff` — exchange a single-use handoff code
+/// for the JWT access/refresh tokens + user object. Public route (no
+/// JWT required) — the handoff code IS the credential.
+///
+/// See `tasks/sso-token-handoff-spec.md` §4.2 for the full design.
+async fn sso_handoff_exchange(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Json(req): Json<HandoffRequest>,
+) -> (StatusCode, Json<Value>) {
+    sso_handoff_exchange_inner(&state.sso_handoffs, &req.handoff_code).await
+}
+
+/// Core exchange logic, separated from the HTTP handler so tests can
+/// drive it with a bare `DashMap` (no need to construct a full
+/// `AppState` with a real `sqlx::PgPool` and `Arc<AppConfig>`).
+///
+/// Marked `async` so the race test can use `tokio::join!` to drive
+/// two concurrent exchanges against the same code; the function body
+/// has no `.await` points (it only does a DashMap read and a return),
+/// so this is a zero-cost abstraction.
+async fn sso_handoff_exchange_inner(
+    handoffs: &DashMap<String, SsoHandoff>,
+    code: &str,
+) -> (StatusCode, Json<Value>) {
+    // Atomically remove the entry (single-use guarantee). If two
+    // requests race with the same code, DashMap::remove is atomic so
+    // only one wins.
+    let removed = handoffs.remove(code);
+    let Some((_code, handoff)) = removed else {
+        tracing::warn!(
+            reason = "unknown_or_already_consumed",
+            "SSO handoff exchange failed"
+        );
+        return (
+            StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+            Json(json!({
+                "error": { "code": "invalid_handoff", "message": "Handoff code is invalid or has expired" }
+            })),
+        );
+    };
+
+    // Check expiry (the cleanup task also removes expired entries, but
+    // there's a race between expiry and the next cleanup tick — check
+    // here too so we never return a token for an expired handoff).
+    if handoff.expires_at <= std::time::Instant::now() {
+        tracing::warn!(reason = "expired", "SSO handoff exchange failed");
+        return (
+            StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+            Json(json!({
+                "error": { "code": "invalid_handoff", "message": "Handoff code is invalid or has expired" }
+            })),
+        );
+    }
+
+    // Log success without leaking the handoff code or the tokens
+    let user_id = handoff
+        .user_json
+        .get("id")
+        .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+        .unwrap_or("unknown");
+    tracing::info!(user_id = %user_id, "SSO handoff exchanged");
+
+    (
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        Json(json!({
+            "access_token": handoff.access_token,
+            "refresh_token": handoff.raw_refresh,
+            "token_type": "Bearer",
+            "expires_in": handoff.access_ttl,
+            "user": handoff.user_json,
+        })),
+    )
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 struct TokenResponse {
     #[allow(dead_code)]
@@ -78,11 +213,29 @@ pub struct OidcConfig {
     pub display_name: String,
     pub discovery_url: String,
     pub client_id: String,
-    pub client_secret: String,
+    /// AES-256-GCM encrypted client_secret. `None` if not set or public client.
+    pub client_secret_encrypted: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    /// AES-256-GCM nonce for client_secret. Must be paired with `client_secret_encrypted`.
+    pub client_secret_nonce: Option<Vec<u8>>,
     pub redirect_uri: String,
     pub scopes: String,
 }
 
+impl OidcConfig {
+    /// Decrypt the client_secret using the provided key.
+    /// Returns `Ok(String::new())` if the secret is not set (public client).
+    /// Returns `Err(CryptoError)` if decryption fails or nonce is missing.
+    pub fn decrypt_client_secret(
+        &self,
+        key: &[u8; 32],
+    ) -> Result<String, pm_core::crypto::CryptoError> {
+        match (&self.client_secret_encrypted, &self.client_secret_nonce) {
+            (Some(enc), Some(nonce)) => pm_core::crypto::decrypt(enc, nonce, key),
+            _ => Ok(String::new()),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 /// Cached OIDC discovery document.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct OidcDiscovery {
@@ -95,22 +248,13 @@ pub struct OidcDiscovery {
 }
 
 /// Cache for OIDC discovery documents and JWKS with TTL-based refresh.
+#[derive(Default)]
 pub struct OidcCache {
     pub discovery: Option<OidcDiscovery>,
     pub jwks: Option<serde_json::Value>,
     pub jwks_fetched_at: Option<chrono::DateTime<Utc>>,
 }
 
-impl Default for OidcCache {
-    fn default() -> Self {
-        Self {
-            discovery: None,
-            jwks: None,
-            jwks_fetched_at: None,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
 /// JWKS cache TTL in seconds (1 hour).
 const JWKS_CACHE_TTL_SECS: i64 = 3600;
 /// Discovery cache TTL in seconds (1 hour).
@@ -125,6 +269,12 @@ pub fn public_router() -> Router<AppState> {
         .route("/login", get(sso_login))
         .route("/callback", get(sso_callback))
         .route("/config", get(sso_config))
+        // Issue #4: single-use handoff exchange. The SPA POSTs the
+        // `?handoff=<code>` it received from the SSO callback redirect
+        // and gets the JWT access/refresh tokens in the JSON response.
+        // Public route (no JWT) — the handoff code IS the credential.
+        // See `tasks/sso-token-handoff-spec.md` §4.2.
+        .route("/handoff", post(sso_handoff_exchange))
 }
 
 /// Backward-compatible Azure SSO routes — redirect to generic SSO endpoints.
@@ -332,8 +482,28 @@ async fn sso_callback(
     ];
 
     // For confidential clients (Azure AD), include client_secret
-    if !config.client_secret.is_empty() {
-        params_vec.push(("client_secret", config.client_secret.clone()));
+    let key = match crate::secret_key::get() {
+        Ok(k) => k,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to load secret-encryption key");
+            return Err(error_redirect(
+                "internal_error",
+                "Failed to load encryption key",
+            ));
+        },
+    };
+    let client_secret = match config.decrypt_client_secret(key) {
+        Ok(s) => s,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to decrypt OIDC client_secret");
+            return Err(error_redirect(
+                "internal_error",
+                "Failed to decrypt client_secret",
+            ));
+        },
+    };
+    if !client_secret.is_empty() {
+        params_vec.push(("client_secret", client_secret));
     }
 
     let token_resp = match client
@@ -492,10 +662,11 @@ async fn sso_callback(
                     DbUserForSso {
                         id: existing.id,
                         username: existing.username.clone(),
-                        display_name: name
-                            .is_empty()
-                            .then(|| existing.display_name.clone())
-                            .unwrap_or(name),
+                        display_name: if name.is_empty() {
+                            existing.display_name.clone()
+                        } else {
+                            name
+                        },
                         role: existing.role.clone(),
                         is_active: existing.is_active,
                         mfa_enabled: existing.mfa_enabled,
@@ -612,13 +783,32 @@ async fn sso_callback(
         "mfa_enabled": user.mfa_enabled,
     });
 
-    let redirect_url = format!(
-        "{}?access_token={}&refresh_token={}&token_type=Bearer&expires_in={}&user={}",
-        callback_url,
-        urlencoding::encode(&access_token),
-        urlencoding::encode(&raw_refresh.0),
-        access_ttl,
-        urlencoding::encode(&user_json.to_string()),
+    // Issue #4 fix: instead of embedding access/refresh tokens in the
+    // redirect URL (which leaks through browser history, proxy access
+    // logs, and the Referer header), generate a single-use, 60s handoff
+    // code, store the payload in `sso_handoffs`, and put ONLY the code
+    // in the redirect. The SPA POSTs to `/api/v1/auth/sso/handoff` to
+    // exchange the code for tokens. See `tasks/sso-token-handoff-spec.md`
+    // §4.1.
+    let handoff_code = generate_handoff_code();
+    state.sso_handoffs.insert(
+        handoff_code.clone(),
+        SsoHandoff {
+            access_token: access_token.clone(),
+            raw_refresh: raw_refresh.0.clone(),
+            user_json: user_json.clone(),
+            access_ttl: access_ttl as u64,
+            expires_at: std::time::Instant::now()
+                + std::time::Duration::from_secs(HANDOFF_TTL_SECS),
+        },
+    );
+
+    let redirect_url = format!("{}?handoff={}", callback_url, handoff_code);
+
+    tracing::info!(
+        user_id = %user.id,
+        auth_provider = %auth_provider,
+        "SSO handoff issued"
     );
 
     Ok(Redirect::to(&redirect_url))
@@ -647,7 +837,9 @@ async fn azure_callback_redirect(
 
 async fn load_oidc_config(pool: &sqlx::PgPool) -> Result<OidcConfig, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
     let row: Option<OidcConfig> = sqlx::query_as(
-        "SELECT enabled, provider_type, display_name, discovery_url, client_id, client_secret, redirect_uri, scopes FROM oidc_config WHERE id = 1",
+        "SELECT enabled, provider_type, display_name, discovery_url, client_id, \
+         client_secret_encrypted, client_secret_nonce, redirect_uri, scopes \
+         FROM oidc_config WHERE id = 1",
     )
     .fetch_optional(pool)
     .await
@@ -665,7 +857,8 @@ async fn load_oidc_config(pool: &sqlx::PgPool) -> Result<OidcConfig, (StatusCode
         display_name: "Azure AD".to_string(),
         discovery_url: String::new(),
         client_id: String::new(),
-        client_secret: String::new(),
+        client_secret_encrypted: None,
+        client_secret_nonce: None,
         redirect_uri: String::new(),
         scopes: "openid profile email".to_string(),
     }))
@@ -844,3 +1037,168 @@ async fn fetch_jwks(jwks_uri: &str) -> Result<serde_json::Value, String> {
         .await
         .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to parse JWKS response: {}", e))
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    //! Unit tests for the SSO handoff exchange endpoint and cleanup task.
+    //!
+    //! Per `tasks/sso-token-handoff-spec.md` §6.1–6.2.
+    //!
+    //! The tests call `sso_handoff_exchange_inner` directly with a bare
+    //! `DashMap<String, SsoHandoff>`. This avoids the need to construct
+    //! a full `AppState` (which has `sqlx::PgPool` and `Arc<AppConfig>`
+    //! fields that can't be cheaply mocked) and keeps the tests focused
+    //! on the exchange logic. The HTTP handler is a thin wrapper that
+    //! extracts the code from the request body and delegates.
+
+    use super::*;
+    use dashmap::DashMap;
+    use std::sync::Arc;
+    use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+
+    fn fresh_handoffs() -> Arc<DashMap<String, SsoHandoff>> {
+        Arc::new(DashMap::new())
+    }
+
+    fn make_handoff(access: &str, refresh: &str, user_id: &str) -> SsoHandoff {
+        SsoHandoff {
+            access_token: access.to_string(),
+            raw_refresh: refresh.to_string(),
+            user_json: json!({ "id": user_id, "username": "testuser" }),
+            access_ttl: 900,
+            expires_at: Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(HANDOFF_TTL_SECS),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// 1. handoff_exchange_success — create a handoff, exchange it,
+    ///    expect 200 with the access/refresh/user fields.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn handoff_exchange_success() {
+        let handoffs = fresh_handoffs();
+        let code = generate_handoff_code();
+        handoffs.insert(
+            code.clone(),
+            make_handoff("jwt-access", "refresh-raw", "user-123"),
+        );
+
+        let (status, body) = sso_handoff_exchange_inner(&handoffs, &code).await;
+
+        assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::OK);
+        assert_eq!(body["access_token"], "jwt-access");
+        assert_eq!(body["refresh_token"], "refresh-raw");
+        assert_eq!(body["token_type"], "Bearer");
+        assert_eq!(body["expires_in"], 900);
+        assert_eq!(body["user"]["id"], "user-123");
+    }
+
+    /// 2. handoff_exchange_single_use — exchange once (success),
+    ///    exchange the same code again (expect 400 invalid_handoff).
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn handoff_exchange_single_use() {
+        let handoffs = fresh_handoffs();
+        let code = generate_handoff_code();
+        handoffs.insert(code.clone(), make_handoff("a", "r", "u"));
+
+        // First exchange succeeds
+        let (status1, _) = sso_handoff_exchange_inner(&handoffs, &code).await;
+        assert_eq!(status1, StatusCode::OK);
+
+        // Second exchange with the same code fails (entry was removed)
+        let (status2, body2) = sso_handoff_exchange_inner(&handoffs, &code).await;
+        assert_eq!(status2, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+        assert_eq!(body2["error"]["code"], "invalid_handoff");
+    }
+
+    /// 3. handoff_exchange_unknown_code — exchange a code that was
+    ///    never issued (expect 400 invalid_handoff).
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn handoff_exchange_unknown_code() {
+        let handoffs = fresh_handoffs();
+        let (status, body) = sso_handoff_exchange_inner(&handoffs, "never-issued-code").await;
+        assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+        assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "invalid_handoff");
+    }
+
+    /// 4. handoff_exchange_expired_code — create a handoff with
+    ///    expires_at in the past, exchange (expect 400 invalid_handoff).
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn handoff_exchange_expired_code() {
+        let handoffs = fresh_handoffs();
+        let code = generate_handoff_code();
+        let mut h = make_handoff("a", "r", "u");
+        h.expires_at = Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(1); // already expired
+        handoffs.insert(code.clone(), h);
+
+        let (status, body) = sso_handoff_exchange_inner(&handoffs, &code).await;
+        assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+        assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "invalid_handoff");
+    }
+
+    /// 5. handoff_exchange_race — two concurrent exchanges with the
+    ///    same code; exactly one succeeds, the other gets 400.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn handoff_exchange_race() {
+        let handoffs = fresh_handoffs();
+        let code = generate_handoff_code();
+        handoffs.insert(code.clone(), make_handoff("a", "r", "u"));
+
+        // DashMap::remove is atomic, so only one of two concurrent
+        // calls can win. The other gets None and returns 400.
+        let h1 = handoffs.clone();
+        let h2 = handoffs.clone();
+        let c1 = code.clone();
+        let c2 = code.clone();
+        let (r1, r2) = tokio::join!(
+            sso_handoff_exchange_inner(&h1, &c1),
+            sso_handoff_exchange_inner(&h2, &c2),
+        );
+
+        let status1 = r1.0;
+        let status2 = r2.0;
+        let successes = [status1, status2]
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|s| **s == StatusCode::OK)
+            .count();
+        let failures = [status1, status2]
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|s| **s == StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)
+            .count();
+        assert_eq!(successes, 1, "exactly one exchange should succeed");
+        assert_eq!(failures, 1, "exactly one exchange should fail");
+    }
+
+    /// 6. handoff_exchange_malformed_body — exchange with an empty
+    ///    code (expect 400 invalid_handoff).
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn handoff_exchange_malformed_body() {
+        let handoffs = fresh_handoffs();
+        let (status, body) = sso_handoff_exchange_inner(&handoffs, "").await;
+        assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+        assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "invalid_handoff");
+    }
+
+    /// 7. handoff_cleanup_removes_expired — create 3 handoffs with
+    ///    varying `expires_at`, run one tick of the cleanup task,
+    ///    assert only the non-expired ones remain.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn handoff_cleanup_removes_expired() {
+        let handoffs = fresh_handoffs();
+        // 2 expired, 1 fresh
+        for (i, expired) in [true, false, true].iter().enumerate() {
+            let mut h = make_handoff(&format!("a{}", i), "r", "u");
+            if *expired {
+                h.expires_at = Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(1);
+            }
+            handoffs.insert(format!("code-{}", i), h);
+        }
+        assert_eq!(handoffs.len(), 3);
+
+        // Simulate one tick of the cleanup task (mirrors the logic
+        // in main.rs lines 174-188)
+        let now = Instant::now();
+        handoffs.retain(|_, v| v.expires_at > now);
+
+        assert_eq!(handoffs.len(), 1);
+        assert!(handoffs.contains_key("code-1"));
+    }
+}

crates/pm-web/src/routes/status.rs

@@ -24,6 +24,16 @@ pub struct FleetStatus {
     pub total_pending_patches: i64,
     pub hosts_requiring_reboot: i64,
     pub compliance_pct: f64,
+    /// Hosts with CRL status 'valid'.
+    pub crl_valid: i64,
+    /// Hosts with CRL status 'expired'.
+    pub crl_expired: i64,
+    /// Hosts with CRL status 'missing' (agent reports missing CRL).
+    pub crl_missing: i64,
+    /// Hosts with CRL status 'invalid' (security event — needs immediate attention).
+    pub crl_invalid: i64,
+    /// Hosts not reporting CRL status (older agents or no data yet).
+    pub crl_not_reporting: i64,
 }
 
 // ── GET /api/v1/status/fleet ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -132,6 +142,34 @@ pub async fn fleet_status(
     // Round to one decimal place.
     let compliance_pct = (compliance_pct * 10.0).round() / 10.0;
 
+    // ── 5. CRL status counts ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    let (crl_valid, crl_expired, crl_missing, crl_invalid, crl_not_reporting): (
+        i64,
+        i64,
+        i64,
+        i64,
+        i64,
+    ) = sqlx::query_as(
+        r#"
+            SELECT
+                COALESCE(SUM(CASE WHEN crl_status = 'valid' THEN 1 END), 0),
+                COALESCE(SUM(CASE WHEN crl_status = 'expired' THEN 1 END), 0),
+                COALESCE(SUM(CASE WHEN crl_status = 'missing' THEN 1 END), 0),
+                COALESCE(SUM(CASE WHEN crl_status = 'invalid' THEN 1 END), 0),
+                COALESCE(SUM(CASE WHEN crl_status IS NULL THEN 1 END), 0)
+            FROM hosts
+            "#,
+    )
+    .fetch_one(&state.db)
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::error!(error = %e, "fleet_status: failed to query CRL status counts");
+        (
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+            Json(json!({ "error": { "code": "internal_error", "message": "Database error" } })),
+        )
+    })?;
+
     Ok(Json(FleetStatus {
         total_hosts,
         healthy,
@@ -141,5 +179,10 @@ pub async fn fleet_status(
         total_pending_patches,
         hosts_requiring_reboot,
         compliance_pct,
+        crl_valid,
+        crl_expired,
+        crl_missing,
+        crl_invalid,
+        crl_not_reporting,
     }))
 }

crates/pm-web/src/routes/users.rs

@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ async fn admin_disable_mfa(
         ));
     }
 
-    let rows = sqlx::query("UPDATE users SET totp_secret = NULL, mfa_enabled = FALSE, updated_at = NOW() WHERE id = $1")
+    let rows = sqlx::query("UPDATE users SET totp_secret_encrypted = NULL, totp_secret_nonce = NULL, mfa_enabled = FALSE, updated_at = NOW() WHERE id = $1")
         .bind(id)
         .execute(&state.db)
         .await

crates/pm-web/src/routes/ws.rs

@@ -6,14 +6,14 @@
 use axum::{
     extract::ws::{Message, WebSocket},
     extract::{Query, State, WebSocketUpgrade},
-    http::StatusCode,
+    http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode},
     response::{Json, Response},
     routing::{get, post},
     Router,
 };
 use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
 use pm_auth::rbac::AuthUser;
-use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use serde::Deserialize;
 use serde_json::{json, Value};
 use sqlx::postgres::PgListener;
 use ulid::Ulid;
@@ -57,6 +57,160 @@ fn err(
     )
 }
 
+// ── Origin parsing & allowlist matching ───────────────────────────────────────
+
+/// Parsed browser `Origin` header value.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+struct Origin {
+    scheme: String,
+    host: String,
+    /// `None` means "use scheme default" (80 for http, 443 for https).
+    port: Option<u16>,
+}
+
+impl Origin {
+    /// Render back to canonical `scheme://host[:port]` form with default
+    /// ports normalized away (so `https://x:443` becomes `https://x`).
+    fn canonical(&self) -> String {
+        let default_port: Option<u16> = match self.scheme.as_str() {
+            "https" => Some(443),
+            "http" => Some(80),
+            _ => None,
+        };
+        match (self.port, default_port) {
+            (Some(p), Some(d)) if p == d => format!("{}://{}", self.scheme, self.host),
+            (Some(p), _) => format!("{}://{}:{}", self.scheme, self.host, p),
+            (None, _) => format!("{}://{}", self.scheme, self.host),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Parse a raw `Origin` header value. Returns `None` for missing scheme,
+/// unsupported schemes (only `http`/`https`), empty host, or whitespace in
+/// the host. IPv6 literal hosts are explicitly rejected to keep the parser
+/// simple — WebSocket connections from IPv6 browser origins are not a
+/// realistic deployment for this product.
+fn parse_origin_header(value: &str) -> Option<Origin> {
+    let s = value.trim().trim_end_matches('/');
+    if s.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let (scheme, rest) = s.split_once("://")?;
+    let scheme = scheme.to_ascii_lowercase();
+    if scheme != "http" && scheme != "https" {
+        return None;
+    }
+    // Authority is everything up to the first `/`, `?`, or `#`.
+    let authority_end = rest.find(['/', '?', '#']).unwrap_or(rest.len());
+    let authority = &rest[..authority_end];
+    if authority.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    // Treat the LAST `:` as the port separator. IPv6 literal hosts (e.g.
+    // `[::1]`) contain a `:` inside the brackets; reject those.
+    let (host, port_str) = match authority.rsplit_once(':') {
+        Some((h, _)) if h.contains(':') => return None,
+        Some((h, p)) => (h, Some(p)),
+        None => (authority, None),
+    };
+    let host = host.trim();
+    if host.is_empty() || host.contains(char::is_whitespace) || host.contains(':') {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let port = match port_str {
+        Some(p) => match p.parse::<u16>() {
+            Ok(n) => Some(n),
+            Err(_) => return None,
+        },
+        None => None,
+    };
+    Some(Origin {
+        scheme,
+        host: host.to_ascii_lowercase(),
+        port,
+    })
+}
+
+/// Match a parsed `Origin` against an allowlist. Each allowlist entry is
+/// itself parsed with [`parse_origin_header`] and compared by its canonical
+/// string form, so entry syntax is forgiving (`https://x:443` matches an
+/// incoming `https://x`). The host comparison is case-insensitive (the
+/// parser lowercases the host); scheme and port are exact.
+///
+/// An empty allowlist returns `false` (fail-closed).
+fn is_origin_allowed(origin: &Origin, allowlist: &[String]) -> bool {
+    if allowlist.is_empty() {
+        return false;
+    }
+    let incoming = origin.canonical();
+    allowlist
+        .iter()
+        .any(|entry| match parse_origin_header(entry) {
+            Some(parsed) => parsed.canonical() == incoming,
+            None => false,
+        })
+}
+
+/// Read the `Origin` header from a request and check it against the
+/// configured allowlist. Returns `Ok(())` when the request may proceed; on
+/// rejection returns the appropriate `(StatusCode, Json)` error tuple and
+/// the reason string (for logging).
+fn check_origin(
+    headers: &HeaderMap,
+    allowlist: &[String],
+) -> Result<(), ((StatusCode, Json<Value>), &'static str)> {
+    let raw = match headers.get(axum::http::header::ORIGIN) {
+        Some(v) => v,
+        None => {
+            return Err((
+                err(
+                    StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+                    "forbidden_origin",
+                    "Origin header required",
+                ),
+                "missing",
+            ));
+        },
+    };
+    let raw_str = match raw.to_str() {
+        Ok(s) => s,
+        Err(_) => {
+            return Err((
+                err(
+                    StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+                    "forbidden_origin",
+                    "Origin header not valid ASCII",
+                ),
+                "non-ascii",
+            ));
+        },
+    };
+    let origin = match parse_origin_header(raw_str) {
+        Some(o) => o,
+        None => {
+            return Err((
+                err(
+                    StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+                    "forbidden_origin",
+                    "Malformed Origin header",
+                ),
+                "malformed",
+            ));
+        },
+    };
+    if !is_origin_allowed(&origin, allowlist) {
+        return Err((
+            err(
+                StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+                "forbidden_origin",
+                "Origin not allowed",
+            ),
+            "not-allowlisted",
+        ));
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 // ── POST /api/v1/ws/ticket ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 /// Issue a single-use WebSocket authentication ticket (60 s expiry).
@@ -93,11 +247,40 @@ pub struct WsQuery {
 }
 
 /// Browser WebSocket upgrade endpoint — authenticates via single-use ticket.
+///
+/// The handler enforces two independent gates, in this order:
+///
+/// 1. `Origin` header allowlist (CSWSH defense-in-depth). Performed first so
+///    that a cross-origin probe with a leaked/stolen ticket does not consume
+///    the legitimate user's ticket.
+/// 2. Single-use, 60-second ticket (existing behavior, unchanged).
 pub async fn ws_handler(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
     Query(q): Query<WsQuery>,
     ws: WebSocketUpgrade,
 ) -> Result<Response, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
+    // Gate 1: Origin allowlist (CSWSH defense-in-depth).
+    let allowlist = &state.config.security.allowed_origins;
+    if let Err((http_err, reason)) = check_origin(&headers, allowlist) {
+        let raw_origin = headers
+            .get(axum::http::header::ORIGIN)
+            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+            .unwrap_or("<absent>");
+        // Never log the ticket value.
+        tracing::warn!(
+            reason = reason,
+            origin = %raw_origin,
+            "WebSocket upgrade rejected: forbidden origin"
+        );
+        return Err(http_err);
+    }
+    let allowed_origin = headers
+        .get(axum::http::header::ORIGIN)
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+        .unwrap_or("")
+        .to_string();
+
     // Validate and consume the ticket atomically.
     let ticket = {
         let entry = state.ws_tickets.get(&q.ticket);
@@ -129,6 +312,7 @@ pub async fn ws_handler(
     tracing::info!(
         user_id = %ticket.user_id,
         role = %ticket.role,
+        origin = %allowed_origin,
         "Browser WebSocket connection upgraded"
     );
 
@@ -188,11 +372,9 @@ async fn handle_browser_ws(mut socket: WebSocket, db: sqlx::PgPool, ticket: WsTi
                         tracing::info!(user_id = %ticket.user_id, "Browser WS closed by client");
                         break;
                     }
-                    Some(Ok(Message::Ping(data))) => {
-                        if socket.send(Message::Pong(data)).await.is_err() {
+                    Some(Ok(Message::Ping(data))) if socket.send(Message::Pong(data.clone())).await.is_err() => {
                         break;
                     }
-                    }
                     Some(Err(e)) => {
                         tracing::debug!(error = %e, user_id = %ticket.user_id, "Browser WS recv error");
                         break;
@@ -205,3 +387,289 @@ async fn handle_browser_ws(mut socket: WebSocket, db: sqlx::PgPool, ticket: WsTi
 
     tracing::info!(user_id = %ticket.user_id, "Browser WS handler exiting");
 }
+
+// ── Tests ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    // ── parse_origin_header ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_basic_https() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_origin_header("https://app.example.com"),
+            Some(Origin {
+                scheme: "https".into(),
+                host: "app.example.com".into(),
+                port: None,
+            })
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_with_explicit_port() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_origin_header("https://app.example.com:8443"),
+            Some(Origin {
+                scheme: "https".into(),
+                host: "app.example.com".into(),
+                port: Some(8443),
+            })
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_lowercases_scheme() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_origin_header("HTTPS://App.Example.com")
+                .unwrap()
+                .scheme,
+            "https"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_lowercases_host() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_origin_header("https://App.Example.com").unwrap().host,
+            "app.example.com"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_ignores_path_query_fragment() {
+        let o = parse_origin_header("https://app.example.com:443/some/path?q=1#frag").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(o.host, "app.example.com");
+        assert_eq!(o.port, Some(443));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_strips_trailing_slash() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_origin_header("https://app.example.com/"),
+            Some(Origin {
+                scheme: "https".into(),
+                host: "app.example.com".into(),
+                port: None,
+            })
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_rejects_empty() {
+        assert!(parse_origin_header("").is_none());
+        assert!(parse_origin_header("   ").is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_rejects_unsupported_scheme() {
+        assert!(parse_origin_header("ftp://x").is_none());
+        assert!(parse_origin_header("file:///etc/passwd").is_none());
+        assert!(parse_origin_header("javascript:alert(1)").is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_rejects_empty_host() {
+        assert!(parse_origin_header("https://").is_none());
+        assert!(parse_origin_header("https:///path").is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_rejects_host_with_whitespace() {
+        assert!(parse_origin_header("https://bad host").is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_rejects_malformed_port() {
+        assert!(parse_origin_header("https://x:notaport").is_none());
+        assert!(parse_origin_header("https://x:99999").is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_rejects_ipv6_literal() {
+        assert!(parse_origin_header("https://[::1]").is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_rejects_no_scheme_separator() {
+        assert!(parse_origin_header("app.example.com").is_none());
+    }
+
+    // ── canonical ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    #[test]
+    fn canonical_strips_default_https_port() {
+        let o = Origin {
+            scheme: "https".into(),
+            host: "x".into(),
+            port: Some(443),
+        };
+        assert_eq!(o.canonical(), "https://x");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn canonical_strips_default_http_port() {
+        let o = Origin {
+            scheme: "http".into(),
+            host: "x".into(),
+            port: Some(80),
+        };
+        assert_eq!(o.canonical(), "http://x");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn canonical_keeps_non_default_port() {
+        let o = Origin {
+            scheme: "https".into(),
+            host: "x".into(),
+            port: Some(8443),
+        };
+        assert_eq!(o.canonical(), "https://x:8443");
+    }
+
+    // ── is_origin_allowed ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    #[test]
+    fn allowed_exact_match() {
+        let o = parse_origin_header("https://app.example.com").unwrap();
+        assert!(is_origin_allowed(&o, &["https://app.example.com".into()]));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn allowed_default_port_normalization_incoming() {
+        let o = parse_origin_header("https://app.example.com:443").unwrap();
+        assert!(is_origin_allowed(&o, &["https://app.example.com".into()]));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn allowed_default_port_normalization_allowlist() {
+        let o = parse_origin_header("https://app.example.com").unwrap();
+        assert!(is_origin_allowed(
+            &o,
+            &["https://app.example.com:443".into()]
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn allowed_case_insensitive_host() {
+        let o = parse_origin_header("https://App.Example.com").unwrap();
+        assert!(is_origin_allowed(&o, &["https://app.example.com".into()]));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejected_different_host() {
+        let o = parse_origin_header("https://evil.example").unwrap();
+        assert!(!is_origin_allowed(&o, &["https://app.example.com".into()]));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejected_different_scheme() {
+        let o = parse_origin_header("http://app.example.com").unwrap();
+        assert!(!is_origin_allowed(&o, &["https://app.example.com".into()]));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejected_different_port() {
+        let o = parse_origin_header("https://app.example.com:8443").unwrap();
+        assert!(!is_origin_allowed(&o, &["https://app.example.com".into()]));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejected_empty_allowlist() {
+        let o = parse_origin_header("https://app.example.com").unwrap();
+        assert!(!is_origin_allowed(&o, &[]));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejected_garbage_in_allowlist() {
+        let o = parse_origin_header("https://app.example.com").unwrap();
+        assert!(!is_origin_allowed(&o, &["not a url".into()]));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn allowed_multi_entry_allowlist() {
+        let o = parse_origin_header("https://app.example.com").unwrap();
+        assert!(is_origin_allowed(
+            &o,
+            &[
+                "https://other.example".into(),
+                "https://app.example.com".into(),
+            ]
+        ));
+    }
+
+    // ── check_origin (integration of parse + allow) ────────────────────────
+
+    #[test]
+    fn check_rejects_missing_header() {
+        let h = HeaderMap::new();
+        let err = check_origin(&h, &["https://app.example.com".into()]).unwrap_err();
+        assert_eq!(err.0 .0, StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+        assert_eq!(err.1, "missing");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn check_rejects_malformed_header() {
+        let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
+        h.insert(axum::http::header::ORIGIN, "not a url".parse().unwrap());
+        let err = check_origin(&h, &["https://app.example.com".into()]).unwrap_err();
+        assert_eq!(err.0 .0, StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+        assert_eq!(err.1, "malformed");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn check_rejects_disallowed_origin() {
+        let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
+        h.insert(
+            axum::http::header::ORIGIN,
+            "https://evil.example".parse().unwrap(),
+        );
+        let err = check_origin(&h, &["https://app.example.com".into()]).unwrap_err();
+        assert_eq!(err.0 .0, StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+        assert_eq!(err.1, "not-allowlisted");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn check_rejects_empty_allowlist() {
+        let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
+        h.insert(
+            axum::http::header::ORIGIN,
+            "https://app.example.com".parse().unwrap(),
+        );
+        let err = check_origin(&h, &[]).unwrap_err();
+        assert_eq!(err.0 .0, StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+        assert_eq!(err.1, "not-allowlisted");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn check_allows_valid_origin() {
+        let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
+        h.insert(
+            axum::http::header::ORIGIN,
+            "https://app.example.com".parse().unwrap(),
+        );
+        assert!(check_origin(&h, &["https://app.example.com".into()]).is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn check_allows_default_port_normalization() {
+        let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
+        h.insert(
+            axum::http::header::ORIGIN,
+            "https://app.example.com:443".parse().unwrap(),
+        );
+        assert!(check_origin(&h, &["https://app.example.com".into()]).is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn check_allows_case_insensitive_host() {
+        let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
+        h.insert(
+            axum::http::header::ORIGIN,
+            "https://App.Example.com".parse().unwrap(),
+        );
+        assert!(check_origin(&h, &["https://app.example.com".into()]).is_ok());
+    }
+}

crates/pm-web/src/secret_key.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+//! Secret-encryption key loader for pm-web.
+//!
+//! Lazily loads the per-install AES-256-GCM key from
+//! `/etc/patch-manager/keys/secret-encryption.key` on first use, caches it
+//! in process memory, and returns a `&'static [u8; 32]` for all subsequent calls.
+//!
+//! Uses `std::sync::OnceLock` (stable since Rust 1.70) to avoid the `once_cell` dependency.
+//!
+//! See `tasks/secret-encryption-spec.md` section 4.4 for the design rationale.
+
+use pm_core::crypto;
+use std::path::Path;
+use std::sync::OnceLock;
+
+static SECRET_KEY: OnceLock<[u8; 32]> = OnceLock::new();
+
+/// Load the secret-encryption key at first call. Subsequent calls return the cached value.
+/// Returns `CryptoError` if the key file is missing or invalid.
+///
+/// Auto-generates the key file on first start (with 0600 permissions) if it doesn't exist.
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub fn get() -> Result<&'static [u8; 32], crypto::CryptoError> {
+    if let Some(key) = SECRET_KEY.get() {
+        return Ok(key);
+    }
+    let key = crypto::load_or_create_key(Path::new(crypto::SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PATH))?;
+    // _ = ignore error if another thread won the race (already set by them)
+    let _ = SECRET_KEY.set(key);
+    Ok(SECRET_KEY.get().expect("key was just set"))
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use std::sync::OnceLock;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn once_lock_caches_value() {
+        let cell: OnceLock<u32> = OnceLock::new();
+        let v1 = cell.get_or_init(|| 42);
+        let v2 = cell.get_or_init(|| 99); // Should return 42, not 99
+        assert_eq!(*v1, 42);
+        assert_eq!(*v2, 42);
+    }
+}

crates/pm-web/tests/integration/authz_gate.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,530 @@
+//! Integration tests for the authz gate that restricts auth config mutations
+//! (OIDC, SMTP, IP whitelist) to the Admin role only.
+//!
+//! See Issue #15 for the full specification.
+//!
+//! ## Test organization
+//!
+//! The 403 (forbidden_role) tests verify that the authorization middleware
+//! rejects non-admin roles BEFORE any handler or database logic runs. These
+//! tests use a lazy PgPool (no live database required) and pre-generated CA
+//! files, so they always pass in CI.
+//!
+//! The 200 (admin allowed) tests verify the full handler path including audit
+//! logging. They require a live PostgreSQL database and are marked `#[ignore]`
+//! so they only run when `DATABASE_URL` is set and `--ignored` is passed.
+
+use axum::body::Body;
+use axum::extract::ConnectInfo;
+use axum::http::{Request, StatusCode};
+use dashmap::DashMap;
+use http_body_util::BodyExt;
+use pm_auth::jwt;
+use pm_auth::rbac::AuthConfig;
+use pm_core::config::AppConfig;
+use pm_web::routes::sso::OidcCache;
+use pm_web::{build_router, AppState};
+use serde_json::json;
+use sqlx::PgPool;
+use std::net::SocketAddr;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use tokio::sync::Mutex;
+use tower::ServiceExt;
+use uuid::Uuid;
+
+// ── Ed25519 test key pair ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+const TEST_SIGNING_KEY: &str = "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MC4CAQAwBQYDK2VwBCIEIBrWiMMcgpPXwtGDSSBl01fcQyb5Vh4CMzEmxcSXvcrJ
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+";
+
+const TEST_VERIFY_KEY: &str = "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MCowBQYDK2VwAyEACgE6fMDCcG11NOpPKSO/ASpPUSntB7XsF5sBFBYDjFo=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+";
+
+// ── Fixed test user IDs (so we can seed matching rows in the DB) ─────────────
+const ADMIN_USER_ID: &str = "00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001";
+const OPERATOR_USER_ID: &str = "00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002";
+
+// ── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/// Generate a valid JWT authorization header for the given role.
+fn auth_header(role: &str) -> String {
+    let user_id = match role {
+        "admin" => Uuid::parse_str(ADMIN_USER_ID).unwrap(),
+        _ => Uuid::parse_str(OPERATOR_USER_ID).unwrap(),
+    };
+    let username = format!("test-{}", role);
+    let token = jwt::issue_access_token(user_id, &username, role, 900, TEST_SIGNING_KEY)
+        .expect("failed to issue test JWT");
+    format!("Bearer {}", token)
+}
+
+/// Generate CA key and cert files on disk so `CertAuthority::init` can load
+/// them without needing a database connection.
+fn generate_ca_files(ca_dir: &std::path::Path) {
+    use rcgen::{
+        BasicConstraints, CertificateParams, DnType, IsCa, KeyPair, PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256,
+    };
+
+    let key = KeyPair::generate_for(&PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256).expect("generate CA key");
+    let mut params = CertificateParams::default();
+    params.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
+    params
+        .distinguished_name
+        .push(DnType::CommonName, "Test Root CA");
+
+    let cert = params.self_signed(&key).expect("self-sign CA cert");
+
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(ca_dir).expect("create CA dir");
+    std::fs::write(ca_dir.join("ca.key"), key.serialize_pem()).expect("write ca.key");
+    std::fs::write(ca_dir.join("ca.crt"), cert.pem()).expect("write ca.crt");
+}
+
+/// Build a minimal `AppState` suitable for 403 authz gate tests.
+///
+/// Uses a lazy PgPool (no live database connection required) and pre-generated
+/// CA files. This works because the authorization middleware rejects non-admin
+/// requests BEFORE any handler or database logic runs.
+async fn setup_state_no_db() -> AppState {
+    let pool = sqlx::postgres::PgPoolOptions::new()
+        .connect_lazy("postgres://test:test@localhost:5432/test")
+        .expect("failed to create lazy pool");
+
+    let mut config = AppConfig::default();
+    config.server.static_dir = "/tmp".to_string();
+
+    let auth_config = Arc::new(AuthConfig::new(TEST_VERIFY_KEY.to_string(), &[], &[]));
+
+    let ca_dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("failed to create temp dir for CA");
+    let ca_dir_path = ca_dir.path().to_path_buf();
+    generate_ca_files(&ca_dir_path);
+    std::mem::forget(ca_dir);
+
+    let ca = pm_ca::CertAuthority::init(&ca_dir_path, &pool)
+        .await
+        .expect("CA init failed");
+
+    AppState {
+        db: pool,
+        config: Arc::new(config),
+        signing_key_pem: TEST_SIGNING_KEY.to_string(),
+        auth_config,
+        ws_tickets: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+        sso_sessions: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+        sso_handoffs: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+        oidc_cache: Arc::new(Mutex::new(OidcCache::default())),
+        ca: Arc::new(ca),
+        approved_enrollments: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Seed test users into the database so that audit_log foreign-key
+/// constraints on `actor_user_id` are satisfied.
+async fn seed_test_users(pool: &PgPool) {
+    let placeholder_hash = "$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=3,p=1$placeholder$placeholder";
+    for (user_id, username, role) in [
+        (ADMIN_USER_ID, "test-admin", "admin"),
+        (OPERATOR_USER_ID, "test-operator", "operator"),
+    ] {
+        sqlx::query(
+            r#"INSERT INTO users (id, username, display_name, email, role, auth_provider, password_hash)
+               VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5::user_role, 'local', $6)
+               ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING"#,
+        )
+        .bind(Uuid::parse_str(user_id).unwrap())
+        .bind(username)
+        .bind(username)
+        .bind(format!("{}@test.example.com", username))
+        .bind(role)
+        .bind(placeholder_hash)
+        .execute(pool)
+        .await
+        .expect("failed to seed test user");
+    }
+}
+
+/// Build a full `AppState` with a live database connection.
+async fn setup_state(pool: PgPool) -> AppState {
+    seed_test_users(&pool).await;
+
+    let mut config = AppConfig::default();
+    config.server.static_dir = "/tmp".to_string();
+
+    let auth_config = Arc::new(AuthConfig::new(TEST_VERIFY_KEY.to_string(), &[], &[]));
+
+    let ca_dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("failed to create temp dir for CA");
+    let ca_dir_path = ca_dir.path().to_path_buf();
+    std::mem::forget(ca_dir);
+
+    let ca = pm_ca::CertAuthority::init(&ca_dir_path, &pool)
+        .await
+        .expect("CA init failed");
+
+    AppState {
+        db: pool,
+        config: Arc::new(config),
+        signing_key_pem: TEST_SIGNING_KEY.to_string(),
+        auth_config,
+        ws_tickets: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+        sso_sessions: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+        sso_handoffs: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+        oidc_cache: Arc::new(Mutex::new(OidcCache::default())),
+        ca: Arc::new(ca),
+        approved_enrollments: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Send a request through the full Axum router and return the response.
+async fn send_request(
+    state: AppState,
+    method: axum::http::Method,
+    uri: &str,
+    auth_header: Option<&str>,
+    body: Option<serde_json::Value>,
+) -> (StatusCode, serde_json::Value) {
+    let router = build_router(state);
+    let mut builder = Request::builder().method(method).uri(uri);
+    if let Some(auth) = auth_header {
+        builder = builder.header("authorization", auth);
+    }
+    builder = builder.header("content-type", "application/json");
+
+    let req = if let Some(b) = body {
+        builder.body(Body::from(b.to_string())).unwrap()
+    } else {
+        builder.body(Body::empty()).unwrap()
+    };
+
+    // Insert ConnectInfo so tower_governor's SmartIpKeyExtractor can resolve the client IP.
+    let (mut parts, body) = req.into_parts();
+    parts
+        .extensions
+        .insert(ConnectInfo(SocketAddr::from(([127, 0, 0, 1], 12345))));
+    let req = Request::from_parts(parts, body);
+
+    let resp = router.oneshot(req).await.unwrap();
+    let status = resp.status();
+    let body_bytes = resp.into_body().collect().await.unwrap().to_bytes();
+    let body_json: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes).unwrap_or_else(|_| {
+        let raw = String::from_utf8_lossy(&body_bytes);
+        json!({ "_raw": raw.to_string() })
+    });
+    (status, body_json)
+}
+
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+// 403 Forbidden Role tests — no database required
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+//
+// These tests verify that the authorization middleware rejects non-admin roles
+// BEFORE any handler or database logic runs. They use a lazy PgPool and
+// pre-generated CA files, so they always pass in CI.
+
+/// 1. PUT /api/v1/settings with operator role → 403 forbidden_role
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn update_settings_operator_denied() {
+    let state = setup_state_no_db().await;
+    let auth = auth_header("operator");
+
+    let (status, body) = send_request(
+        state,
+        axum::http::Method::PUT,
+        "/api/v1/settings",
+        Some(&auth),
+        Some(json!({ "polling": { "health_poll_interval_secs": 300 } })),
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        status,
+        StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+        "expected 403, got {}: {:?}",
+        status,
+        body
+    );
+    assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "forbidden_role");
+}
+
+/// 3. PUT /api/v1/settings/ip-whitelist with operator role → 403 forbidden_role
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn update_ip_whitelist_operator_denied() {
+    let state = setup_state_no_db().await;
+    let auth = auth_header("operator");
+
+    let (status, body) = send_request(
+        state,
+        axum::http::Method::PUT,
+        "/api/v1/settings/ip-whitelist",
+        Some(&auth),
+        Some(json!({ "entries": ["10.0.0.0/8"] })),
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        status,
+        StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+        "expected 403, got {}: {:?}",
+        status,
+        body
+    );
+    assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "forbidden_role");
+}
+
+/// 5. POST /api/v1/settings/sso/discover with operator role → 403 forbidden_role
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn discover_oidc_operator_denied() {
+    let state = setup_state_no_db().await;
+    let auth = auth_header("operator");
+
+    let (status, body) = send_request(
+        state,
+        axum::http::Method::POST,
+        "/api/v1/settings/sso/discover",
+        Some(&auth),
+        Some(json!({ "discovery_url": "https://example.com/.well-known/openid-configuration" })),
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        status,
+        StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+        "expected 403, got {}: {:?}",
+        status,
+        body
+    );
+    assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "forbidden_role");
+}
+
+/// 7. POST /api/v1/settings/sso/test with operator role → 403 forbidden_role
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn test_oidc_operator_denied() {
+    let state = setup_state_no_db().await;
+    let auth = auth_header("operator");
+
+    let (status, body) = send_request(
+        state,
+        axum::http::Method::POST,
+        "/api/v1/settings/sso/test",
+        Some(&auth),
+        None,
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        status,
+        StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+        "expected 403, got {}: {:?}",
+        status,
+        body
+    );
+    assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "forbidden_role");
+}
+
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+// 200 Admin Allowed tests — require live database
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+//
+// These tests verify the full handler path including audit logging.
+// They require a live PostgreSQL database and are marked `#[ignore]` so they
+// only run when DATABASE_URL is set and `--ignored` is passed.
+
+/// 2. PUT /api/v1/settings with admin role → 200 + audit log
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../../migrations")]
+#[ignore]
+async fn update_settings_admin_allowed(pool: PgPool) {
+    let state = setup_state(pool).await;
+    let pool = state.db.clone();
+    let auth = auth_header("admin");
+
+    let (status, body) = send_request(
+        state,
+        axum::http::Method::PUT,
+        "/api/v1/settings",
+        Some(&auth),
+        Some(json!({ "polling": { "health_poll_interval_secs": 300 } })),
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        status,
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        "expected 200, got {}: {:?}",
+        status,
+        body
+    );
+
+    let row: Option<(String,)> = sqlx::query_as(
+        "SELECT action::text FROM audit_log WHERE action::text = 'config_changed' ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1",
+    )
+    .fetch_optional(&pool)
+    .await
+    .expect("audit log query failed");
+    assert!(row.is_some(), "expected audit log entry for config_changed");
+}
+
+/// 4. PUT /api/v1/settings/ip-whitelist with admin role → 200 + audit log
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../../migrations")]
+#[ignore]
+async fn update_ip_whitelist_admin_allowed(pool: PgPool) {
+    let state = setup_state(pool).await;
+    let pool = state.db.clone();
+    let auth = auth_header("admin");
+
+    let (status, body) = send_request(
+        state,
+        axum::http::Method::PUT,
+        "/api/v1/settings/ip-whitelist",
+        Some(&auth),
+        Some(json!({ "entries": ["10.0.0.0/8"] })),
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        status,
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        "expected 200, got {}: {:?}",
+        status,
+        body
+    );
+
+    let row: Option<(String,)> = sqlx::query_as(
+        "SELECT action::text FROM audit_log WHERE action::text = 'ip_whitelist_updated' ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1",
+    )
+    .fetch_optional(&pool)
+    .await
+    .expect("audit log query failed");
+    assert!(
+        row.is_some(),
+        "expected audit log entry for ip_whitelist_updated"
+    );
+}
+
+/// 6. POST /api/v1/settings/sso/discover with admin role → 200 + audit log
+///    Uses mockito to simulate an OIDC discovery endpoint.
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../../migrations")]
+#[ignore]
+async fn discover_oidc_admin_allowed(pool: PgPool) {
+    let state = setup_state(pool).await;
+    let pool = state.db.clone();
+    let auth = auth_header("admin");
+
+    let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+    let mock = server
+        .mock("GET", "/.well-known/openid-configuration")
+        .with_status(200)
+        .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+        .with_body(
+            json!({
+                "issuer": "https://mock-oidc.example.com",
+                "authorization_endpoint": "https://mock-oidc.example.com/auth",
+                "token_endpoint": "https://mock-oidc.example.com/token",
+                "jwks_uri": "https://mock-oidc.example.com/jwks",
+                "userinfo_endpoint": "https://mock-oidc.example.com/userinfo"
+            })
+            .to_string(),
+        )
+        .create_async()
+        .await;
+
+    let discovery_url = format!("{}/.well-known/openid-configuration", server.url());
+
+    let (status, body) = send_request(
+        state,
+        axum::http::Method::POST,
+        "/api/v1/settings/sso/discover",
+        Some(&auth),
+        Some(json!({ "discovery_url": discovery_url })),
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        status,
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        "expected 200, got {}: {:?}",
+        status,
+        body
+    );
+    assert_eq!(body["success"], true);
+
+    mock.assert_async().await;
+
+    let row: Option<(String,)> = sqlx::query_as(
+        "SELECT action::text FROM audit_log WHERE action::text = 'oidc_discover_performed' ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1",
+    )
+    .fetch_optional(&pool)
+    .await
+    .expect("audit log query failed");
+    assert!(
+        row.is_some(),
+        "expected audit log entry for oidc_discover_performed"
+    );
+}
+
+/// 8. POST /api/v1/settings/sso/test with admin role → 200 + audit log
+///    Uses mockito to simulate an OIDC discovery endpoint.
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../../migrations")]
+#[ignore]
+async fn test_oidc_admin_allowed(pool: PgPool) {
+    let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+    let mock = server
+        .mock("GET", "/.well-known/openid-configuration")
+        .with_status(200)
+        .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+        .with_body(
+            json!({
+                "issuer": "https://mock-oidc.example.com",
+                "authorization_endpoint": "https://mock-oidc.example.com/auth",
+                "token_endpoint": "https://mock-oidc.example.com/token",
+                "jwks_uri": "https://mock-oidc.example.com/jwks"
+            })
+            .to_string(),
+        )
+        .create_async()
+        .await;
+
+    let discovery_url = format!("{}/.well-known/openid-configuration", server.url());
+
+    // Seed the oidc_config table with an enabled provider pointing to mockito.
+    sqlx::query("UPDATE oidc_config SET enabled = true, discovery_url = $1 WHERE id = 1")
+        .bind(&discovery_url)
+        .execute(&pool)
+        .await
+        .expect("failed to seed oidc_config");
+
+    let state = setup_state(pool).await;
+    let pool = state.db.clone();
+    let auth = auth_header("admin");
+
+    let (status, body) = send_request(
+        state,
+        axum::http::Method::POST,
+        "/api/v1/settings/sso/test",
+        Some(&auth),
+        None,
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        status,
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        "expected 200, got {}: {:?}",
+        status,
+        body
+    );
+    assert_eq!(body["success"], true);
+
+    mock.assert_async().await;
+
+    let row: Option<(String,)> = sqlx::query_as(
+        "SELECT action::text FROM audit_log WHERE action::text = 'oidc_test_performed' ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1",
+    )
+    .fetch_optional(&pool)
+    .await
+    .expect("audit log query failed");
+    assert!(
+        row.is_some(),
+        "expected audit log entry for oidc_test_performed"
+    );
+}

crates/pm-web/tests/integration/main.rs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+mod authz_gate;

crates/pm-worker/Cargo.toml

@@ -15,13 +15,13 @@ pm-agent-client = { path = "../pm-agent-client" }
 tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["full"] }
 sqlx = { workspace = true }
 serde = { workspace = true }
+chrono = { workspace = true }
 serde_json = { workspace = true }
 thiserror = { workspace = true }
 anyhow = { workspace = true }
 tracing = { workspace = true }
 tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true }
 uuid = { workspace = true }
-chrono = { workspace = true }
 futures = { workspace = true }
 rustls = { workspace = true }
 tokio-rustls = { version = "0.26" }

crates/pm-worker/src/email.rs

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ use lettre::{
     transport::smtp::authentication::Credentials,
     AsyncSmtpTransport, AsyncTransport, Message, Tokio1Executor,
 };
-use serde_json;
 use sqlx::PgPool;
 
 use pm_core::audit::{log_event, AuditAction};
@@ -33,11 +32,16 @@ struct NotificationSettings {
 }
 
 /// Load SMTP settings from the `system_config` table.
+///
+/// Issue #6 fix: SMTP password is stored as two rows:
+///   - `smtp_password_encrypted` (hex of AES-256-GCM ciphertext)
+///   - `smtp_password_nonce` (hex of AES-256-GCM nonce)
 async fn load_smtp_settings(pool: &PgPool) -> SmtpSettings {
     let rows: Vec<(String, String)> = sqlx::query_as(
         "SELECT key, value FROM system_config WHERE key IN (
             'smtp_enabled', 'smtp_host', 'smtp_port', 'smtp_username',
-            'smtp_password', 'smtp_from', 'smtp_tls_mode'
+            'smtp_password_encrypted', 'smtp_password_nonce',
+            'smtp_from', 'smtp_tls_mode'
         )",
     )
     .fetch_all(pool)
@@ -51,17 +55,46 @@ async fn load_smtp_settings(pool: &PgPool) -> SmtpSettings {
             .unwrap_or_default()
     };
 
+    // Decrypt the SMTP password
+    let enc_hex = get("smtp_password_encrypted");
+    let nonce_hex = get("smtp_password_nonce");
+    let password = if !enc_hex.is_empty() && !nonce_hex.is_empty() {
+        match (
+            hex_decode(&enc_hex),
+            hex_decode(&nonce_hex),
+            crate::secret_key::get(),
+        ) {
+            (Some(enc), Some(nonce), Ok(key)) => {
+                pm_core::crypto::decrypt(&enc, &nonce, key).unwrap_or_default()
+            },
+            _ => String::new(),
+        }
+    } else {
+        String::new()
+    };
+
     SmtpSettings {
         enabled: get("smtp_enabled") == "true",
         host: get("smtp_host"),
         port: get("smtp_port").parse().unwrap_or(587),
         username: get("smtp_username"),
-        password: get("smtp_password"),
+        password,
         from: get("smtp_from"),
         tls_mode: get("smtp_tls_mode"),
     }
 }
 
+/// Decode a hex string to bytes. Returns None on invalid input.
+fn hex_decode(s: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
+    if !s.len().is_multiple_of(2) {
+        return None;
+    }
+    (0..s.len())
+        .step_by(2)
+        .map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&s[i..i + 2], 16).ok())
+        .collect()
+}
+
 /// Load notification preferences from `system_config`.
 async fn load_notification_settings(pool: &PgPool) -> NotificationSettings {
     let rows: Vec<(String, String)> = sqlx::query_as(
@@ -290,6 +323,7 @@ pub async fn send_job_completion_email(
 }
 
 /// Send a maintenance window reminder email.
+#[allow(dead_code)]
 pub async fn send_maintenance_window_reminder_email(
     pool: &PgPool,
     host_fqdn: &str,

crates/pm-worker/src/health_check_poller.rs

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ use pm_agent_client::{AgentClient, AgentClientError};
 
 /// Row fetched for each enabled health check, joined with host connection info.
 #[derive(FromRow)]
+#[allow(dead_code)]
 struct HealthCheckRow {
     id: Uuid,
     host_id: Uuid,

crates/pm-worker/src/health_poller.rs

@@ -2,12 +2,26 @@
 //!
 //! Polls every host via the agent `/health` endpoint on each tick of
 //! `health_poll_interval_secs`, with bounded concurrency controlled by a
-//! [`tokio::sync::Semaphore`].
+//! [`tokio::sync::Semaphore`]. Also calls `/system/info` to refresh
+//! `os_family`, `os_name`, `arch`, and `agent_version` in the hosts table.
+//!
+//! CRL health aggregation rules (PR 5):
+//! - `crl_status = "invalid"` → host health_status overridden to `unreachable`
+//! - `crl_status = "expired"` → host health_status overridden to `degraded` (if currently healthy)
+//! - `crl_status = "missing"` AND registered > 24h ago → host health_status overridden to `degraded` (if currently healthy)
+//! - `crl_status = "valid"` or NULL → no override
+//!
+//! Audit events are logged for CRL state transitions.
 
 use std::sync::Arc;
 
+use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
 use pm_agent_client::{AgentClient, AgentClientError};
-use pm_core::{config::AppConfig, models::HostHealthStatus};
+use pm_core::{
+    audit::{log_event, AuditAction},
+    config::AppConfig,
+    models::HostHealthStatus,
+};
 use sqlx::{FromRow, PgPool};
 use tokio::{sync::Semaphore, time};
 use uuid::Uuid;
@@ -20,6 +34,10 @@ struct HostRow {
     id: Uuid,
     ip_address: String,
     agent_port: i32,
+    /// Current CRL status from the hosts table (for transition detection).
+    crl_status: Option<String>,
+    /// When the host was first registered (for enrollment age checks).
+    registered_at: DateTime<Utc>,
 }
 
 /// Run the health poller loop indefinitely.
@@ -49,9 +67,9 @@ pub async fn run_health_poller(pool: PgPool, config: Arc<AppConfig>) {
         let client_key = Arc::new(certs.client_key);
         let ca_cert = Arc::new(certs.ca_cert);
 
-        // Fetch all hosts.
+        // Fetch all hosts with CRL status and registration time.
         let hosts: Vec<HostRow> = match sqlx::query_as(
-            "SELECT id, host(ip_address)::text AS ip_address, agent_port FROM hosts ORDER BY id",
+            "SELECT id, host(ip_address)::text AS ip_address, agent_port, crl_status, registered_at FROM hosts ORDER BY id",
         )
         .fetch_all(&pool)
         .await
@@ -114,6 +132,11 @@ pub async fn run_health_poller(pool: PgPool, config: Arc<AppConfig>) {
 }
 
 /// Poll a single host, persist the result, and return the determined status.
+///
+/// Also updates `agent_version` from the health response,
+/// `os_family`/`os_name`/`arch` from the `/system/info` endpoint when available,
+/// CRL status fields from the health response when reported by the agent,
+/// and applies CRL health aggregation rules.
 async fn poll_host_health(
     pool: PgPool,
     host: HostRow,
@@ -121,8 +144,16 @@ async fn poll_host_health(
     client_key: &[u8],
     ca_cert: &[u8],
 ) -> HostHealthStatus {
-    // Determine status and optional health payload.
-    let (status, payload) = match AgentClient::new(
+    // Determine status, payload, agent version, optional system info, and CRL fields.
+    let (
+        natural_status,
+        payload,
+        agent_version,
+        sys_info,
+        crl_status,
+        crl_age_seconds,
+        crl_next_update,
+    ) = match AgentClient::new(
         &host.ip_address,
         host.agent_port as u16,
         client_cert,
@@ -138,18 +169,41 @@ async fn poll_host_health(
             (
                 HostHealthStatus::Unreachable,
                 serde_json::Value::Object(Default::default()),
+                None,
+                None,
+                None,
+                None,
+                None,
             )
         },
-        Ok(client) => match client.health().await {
+        Ok(client) => {
+            let (status, payload, version, crl_status, crl_age, crl_next) = match client
+                .health()
+                .await
+            {
                 Ok(data) => {
                     let payload = serde_json::to_value(&data).unwrap_or_default();
-                (HostHealthStatus::Healthy, payload)
+                    let crl_status = data.crl_status.clone();
+                    let crl_age = data.crl_age_seconds;
+                    let crl_next = data.crl_next_update.clone();
+                    (
+                        HostHealthStatus::Healthy,
+                        payload,
+                        Some(data.version),
+                        crl_status,
+                        crl_age,
+                        crl_next,
+                    )
                 },
                 Err(AgentClientError::Timeout) => {
                     tracing::warn!(host_id = %host.id, "Health poller: agent timed out");
                     (
                         HostHealthStatus::Unreachable,
                         serde_json::Value::Object(Default::default()),
+                        None,
+                        None,
+                        None,
+                        None,
                     )
                 },
                 Err(AgentClientError::Connect(_)) => {
@@ -157,6 +211,10 @@ async fn poll_host_health(
                     (
                         HostHealthStatus::Unreachable,
                         serde_json::Value::Object(Default::default()),
+                        None,
+                        None,
+                        None,
+                        None,
                     )
                 },
                 Err(e) => {
@@ -164,12 +222,42 @@ async fn poll_host_health(
                     (
                         HostHealthStatus::Degraded,
                         serde_json::Value::Object(Default::default()),
+                        None,
+                        None,
+                        None,
+                        None,
                     )
                 },
-        },
             };
 
-    // Insert into host_health_data.
+            // Try to fetch system info for OS/arch details (best-effort).
+            let sys_info = if status != HostHealthStatus::Unreachable {
+                match client.system_info().await {
+                    Ok(info) => Some(info),
+                    Err(e) => {
+                        tracing::debug!(
+                            host_id = %host.id,
+                            error = %e,
+                            "Health poller: failed to get system info (non-fatal)"
+                        );
+                        None
+                    },
+                }
+            } else {
+                None
+            };
+
+            (
+                status, payload, version, sys_info, crl_status, crl_age, crl_next,
+            )
+        },
+    };
+
+    // Apply CRL health aggregation rules to determine the effective status.
+    // Only apply when the agent reported a CRL status (non-NULL).
+    let effective_status = apply_crl_health_rules(&natural_status, &crl_status, host.registered_at);
+
+    // Insert into host_health_data with the natural (pre-aggregation) status.
     if let Err(e) = sqlx::query(
         r#"
         INSERT INTO host_health_data (host_id, status, payload)
@@ -177,7 +265,7 @@ async fn poll_host_health(
         "#,
     )
     .bind(host.id)
-    .bind(&status)
+    .bind(&natural_status)
     .bind(&payload)
     .execute(&pool)
     .await
@@ -185,21 +273,403 @@ async fn poll_host_health(
         tracing::error!(host_id = %host.id, error = %e, "Health poller: failed to insert health data");
     }
 
-    // Update hosts table.
+    // Build OS name from system info components (e.g. "Ubuntu 24.04").
+    let os_name_from_sysinfo = sys_info
+        .as_ref()
+        .map(|i| format!("{} {}", i.os, i.os_version));
+
+    // Parse CRL next_update from ISO-8601 string to DateTime if present.
+    let crl_next_update_dt: Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>> = crl_next_update
+        .as_ref()
+        .and_then(|s| chrono::DateTime::parse_from_rfc3339(s).ok())
+        .map(|dt| dt.to_utc());
+
+    // Update hosts table with the effective (post-aggregation) health status,
+    // agent version, OS details, and CRL fields.
+    // COALESCE preserves existing values when new data is unavailable.
     if let Err(e) = sqlx::query(
         r#"
         UPDATE hosts
-        SET health_status = $2, last_health_at = NOW()
+        SET health_status = $2, last_health_at = NOW(),
+            agent_version = COALESCE($3, agent_version),
+            os_family = COALESCE($4, os_family),
+            os_name = COALESCE($5, os_name),
+            arch = COALESCE($6, arch),
+            crl_status = COALESCE($7, crl_status),
+            crl_age_seconds = COALESCE($8, crl_age_seconds),
+            crl_next_update = COALESCE($9, crl_next_update)
         WHERE id = $1
         "#,
     )
     .bind(host.id)
-    .bind(&status)
+    .bind(&effective_status)
+    .bind(&agent_version)
+    .bind(sys_info.as_ref().map(|i| i.os.as_str()))
+    .bind(os_name_from_sysinfo)
+    .bind(sys_info.as_ref().map(|i| i.architecture.as_str()))
+    .bind(&crl_status)
+    .bind(crl_age_seconds)
+    .bind(crl_next_update_dt)
     .execute(&pool)
     .await
     {
         tracing::error!(host_id = %host.id, error = %e, "Health poller: failed to update host status");
+        // Don't log audit events if the DB update failed.
+        return effective_status;
     }
 
-    status
+    // Log CRL audit events after successful database update.
+    if let Some(ref new_crl) = crl_status {
+        log_crl_audit_events(
+            &pool,
+            host.id,
+            host.crl_status.as_deref(),
+            new_crl,
+            crl_age_seconds,
+        )
+        .await;
+    }
+
+    effective_status
+}
+
+/// Apply CRL health aggregation rules to determine the effective health status.
+///
+/// Rules:
+/// - `crl_status = "invalid"` → `Unreachable` (security event, always overrides)
+/// - `crl_status = "expired"` → `Degraded` (only if natural status is `Healthy`)
+/// - `crl_status = "missing"` AND registered > 24h ago → `Degraded` (only if natural status is `Healthy`)
+/// - `crl_status = "valid"` or NULL → no override
+fn apply_crl_health_rules(
+    natural_status: &HostHealthStatus,
+    crl_status: &Option<String>,
+    registered_at: DateTime<Utc>,
+) -> HostHealthStatus {
+    let Some(crl) = crl_status else {
+        // Older agent not reporting CRL — don't modify health status.
+        return natural_status.clone();
+    };
+
+    match crl.as_str() {
+        "invalid" => HostHealthStatus::Unreachable,
+        "expired" => {
+            if *natural_status == HostHealthStatus::Healthy {
+                HostHealthStatus::Degraded
+            } else {
+                natural_status.clone()
+            }
+        },
+        "missing" => {
+            let age = Utc::now() - registered_at;
+            if age > Duration::hours(24) && *natural_status == HostHealthStatus::Healthy {
+                HostHealthStatus::Degraded
+            } else {
+                natural_status.clone()
+            }
+        },
+        // "valid" or any other value — no override
+        _ => natural_status.clone(),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Log audit events for CRL state transitions.
+///
+/// Called after the hosts table has been successfully updated.
+/// Logs:
+/// - `CrlStatusChanged` when the CRL status transitions to a different value
+/// - `CrlStaleDetected` when CRL status becomes "expired"
+/// - `CrlInvalid` when CRL status becomes "invalid"
+async fn log_crl_audit_events(
+    pool: &PgPool,
+    host_id: Uuid,
+    old_crl_status: Option<&str>,
+    new_crl_status: &str,
+    crl_age_seconds: Option<i64>,
+) {
+    let host_id_str = host_id.to_string();
+    let old_str = old_crl_status.unwrap_or("null");
+
+    // Log a transition event if the status changed.
+    if old_crl_status != Some(new_crl_status) {
+        let details = serde_json::json!({
+            "host_id": host_id_str,
+            "old_crl_status": old_str,
+            "new_crl_status": new_crl_status,
+            "crl_age_seconds": crl_age_seconds,
+        });
+        log_event(
+            pool,
+            AuditAction::CrlStatusChanged,
+            None,               // actor_user_id — system-initiated
+            None,               // actor_username
+            Some("host"),       // target_type
+            Some(&host_id_str), // target_id
+            details,
+            None, // ip_address
+            None, // request_id
+        )
+        .await;
+    }
+
+    // Log specific events for problematic CRL states.
+    match new_crl_status {
+        "expired" => {
+            let details = serde_json::json!({
+                "host_id": host_id_str,
+                "old_crl_status": old_str,
+                "new_crl_status": new_crl_status,
+                "crl_age_seconds": crl_age_seconds,
+            });
+            log_event(
+                pool,
+                AuditAction::CrlStaleDetected,
+                None,
+                None,
+                Some("host"),
+                Some(&host_id_str),
+                details,
+                None,
+                None,
+            )
+            .await;
+        },
+        "invalid" => {
+            let details = serde_json::json!({
+                "host_id": host_id_str,
+                "old_crl_status": old_str,
+                "new_crl_status": new_crl_status,
+                "crl_age_seconds": crl_age_seconds,
+            });
+            log_event(
+                pool,
+                AuditAction::CrlInvalid,
+                None,
+                None,
+                Some("host"),
+                Some(&host_id_str),
+                details,
+                None,
+                None,
+            )
+            .await;
+        },
+        _ => {},
+    }
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Tests — CRL health aggregation rules
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests_crl_health {
+    use super::*;
+    use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
+
+    /// Helper: create a DateTime that is `hours` hours in the past.
+    fn hours_ago(h: i64) -> DateTime<Utc> {
+        Utc::now() - Duration::hours(h)
+    }
+
+    // ---- crl_status = "invalid" → Unreachable (always overrides) ----
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_invalid_overrides_healthy_to_unreachable() {
+        let result = apply_crl_health_rules(
+            &HostHealthStatus::Healthy,
+            &Some("invalid".to_string()),
+            hours_ago(0),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(result, HostHealthStatus::Unreachable);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_invalid_overrides_degraded_to_unreachable() {
+        let result = apply_crl_health_rules(
+            &HostHealthStatus::Degraded,
+            &Some("invalid".to_string()),
+            hours_ago(0),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(result, HostHealthStatus::Unreachable);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_invalid_overrides_unreachable_stays_unreachable() {
+        let result = apply_crl_health_rules(
+            &HostHealthStatus::Unreachable,
+            &Some("invalid".to_string()),
+            hours_ago(0),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(result, HostHealthStatus::Unreachable);
+    }
+
+    // ---- crl_status = "expired" → Degraded (only if currently Healthy) ----
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_expired_downgrades_healthy_to_degraded() {
+        let result = apply_crl_health_rules(
+            &HostHealthStatus::Healthy,
+            &Some("expired".to_string()),
+            hours_ago(0),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(result, HostHealthStatus::Degraded);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_expired_does_not_override_degraded() {
+        let result = apply_crl_health_rules(
+            &HostHealthStatus::Degraded,
+            &Some("expired".to_string()),
+            hours_ago(0),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(result, HostHealthStatus::Degraded);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_expired_does_not_downgrade_unreachable() {
+        let result = apply_crl_health_rules(
+            &HostHealthStatus::Unreachable,
+            &Some("expired".to_string()),
+            hours_ago(0),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(result, HostHealthStatus::Unreachable);
+    }
+
+    // ---- crl_status = "missing" AND registered > 24h → Degraded (if Healthy) ----
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_missing_old_registration_downgrades_healthy() {
+        let result = apply_crl_health_rules(
+            &HostHealthStatus::Healthy,
+            &Some("missing".to_string()),
+            hours_ago(25),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(result, HostHealthStatus::Degraded);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_missing_recent_registration_no_override() {
+        let result = apply_crl_health_rules(
+            &HostHealthStatus::Healthy,
+            &Some("missing".to_string()),
+            hours_ago(12),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(result, HostHealthStatus::Healthy);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_missing_does_not_override_degraded() {
+        let result = apply_crl_health_rules(
+            &HostHealthStatus::Degraded,
+            &Some("missing".to_string()),
+            hours_ago(25),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(result, HostHealthStatus::Degraded);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_missing_does_not_override_unreachable() {
+        let result = apply_crl_health_rules(
+            &HostHealthStatus::Unreachable,
+            &Some("missing".to_string()),
+            hours_ago(25),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(result, HostHealthStatus::Unreachable);
+    }
+
+    // ---- crl_status = "valid" → no override ----
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_valid_does_not_override_healthy() {
+        let result = apply_crl_health_rules(
+            &HostHealthStatus::Healthy,
+            &Some("valid".to_string()),
+            hours_ago(0),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(result, HostHealthStatus::Healthy);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_valid_preserves_degraded() {
+        let result = apply_crl_health_rules(
+            &HostHealthStatus::Degraded,
+            &Some("valid".to_string()),
+            hours_ago(0),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(result, HostHealthStatus::Degraded);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_valid_preserves_unreachable() {
+        let result = apply_crl_health_rules(
+            &HostHealthStatus::Unreachable,
+            &Some("valid".to_string()),
+            hours_ago(0),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(result, HostHealthStatus::Unreachable);
+    }
+
+    // ---- NULL crl_status → no override (backward compat) ----
+
+    #[test]
+    fn null_crl_status_preserves_healthy() {
+        let result = apply_crl_health_rules(&HostHealthStatus::Healthy, &None, hours_ago(0));
+        assert_eq!(result, HostHealthStatus::Healthy);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn null_crl_status_preserves_degraded() {
+        let result = apply_crl_health_rules(&HostHealthStatus::Degraded, &None, hours_ago(0));
+        assert_eq!(result, HostHealthStatus::Degraded);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn null_crl_status_preserves_unreachable() {
+        let result = apply_crl_health_rules(&HostHealthStatus::Unreachable, &None, hours_ago(0));
+        assert_eq!(result, HostHealthStatus::Unreachable);
+    }
+
+    // ---- Edge cases ----
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_missing_just_under_24h_no_override() {
+        // 23h 59m old — should NOT trigger degraded (threshold is > 24h)
+        let result = apply_crl_health_rules(
+            &HostHealthStatus::Healthy,
+            &Some("missing".to_string()),
+            Utc::now() - Duration::hours(23) - Duration::minutes(59),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(result, HostHealthStatus::Healthy);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_missing_just_over_24h_triggers_degraded() {
+        // 24h + 1 minute old — should trigger degraded
+        let result = apply_crl_health_rules(
+            &HostHealthStatus::Healthy,
+            &Some("missing".to_string()),
+            Utc::now() - Duration::hours(24) - Duration::minutes(1),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(result, HostHealthStatus::Degraded);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_pending_status_preserved_with_valid_crl() {
+        let result = apply_crl_health_rules(
+            &HostHealthStatus::Pending,
+            &Some("valid".to_string()),
+            hours_ago(0),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(result, HostHealthStatus::Pending);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crl_invalid_overrides_pending_to_unreachable() {
+        let result = apply_crl_health_rules(
+            &HostHealthStatus::Pending,
+            &Some("invalid".to_string()),
+            hours_ago(0),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(result, HostHealthStatus::Unreachable);
+    }
 }

crates/pm-worker/src/main.rs

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ mod job_executor;
 mod maintenance_scheduler;
 mod patch_poller;
 mod refresh_listener;
+mod secret_key;
 mod ws_relay;
 
 use chrono::Utc;

crates/pm-worker/src/maintenance_scheduler.rs

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ struct AutoApplyWindow {
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, FromRow)]
+#[allow(dead_code)]
 struct PendingPatchHost {
     host_id: Uuid,
     patch_count: i32,

crates/pm-worker/src/secret_key.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+//! Secret-encryption key loader for pm-worker.
+//!
+//! Lazily loads the per-install AES-256-GCM key from
+//! `/etc/patch-manager/keys/secret-encryption.key` on first use, caches it
+//! in process memory, and returns a `&'static [u8; 32]` for all subsequent calls.
+//!
+//! The pm-worker crate uses the same key file as pm-web (filesystem-shared).
+//! See `tasks/secret-encryption-spec.md` section 4.4 for the design rationale.
+
+use pm_core::crypto;
+use std::path::Path;
+use std::sync::OnceLock;
+
+static SECRET_KEY: OnceLock<[u8; 32]> = OnceLock::new();
+
+/// Load the secret-encryption key at first call. Subsequent calls return the cached value.
+/// Returns `CryptoError` if the key file is missing or invalid.
+///
+/// Auto-generates the key file on first start (with 0600 permissions) if it doesn't exist.
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub fn get() -> Result<&'static [u8; 32], crypto::CryptoError> {
+    if let Some(key) = SECRET_KEY.get() {
+        return Ok(key);
+    }
+    let key = crypto::load_or_create_key(Path::new(crypto::SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PATH))?;
+    // _ = ignore error if another thread won the race (already set by them)
+    let _ = SECRET_KEY.set(key);
+    Ok(SECRET_KEY.get().expect("key was just set"))
+}

debian/changelog

@@ -1,3 +1,43 @@
+linux-patch-manager (1.1.4-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * Release v1.1.4
+
+ -- git-echo <git-echo@moon-dragon.us>  Mon, 08 Jun 2026 17:30:35 -0500
+
+linux-patch-manager (1.1.2-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * Release v1.1.2
+
+ -- git-echo <git-echo@moon-dragon.us>  Sun, 07 Jun 2026 21:19:18 -0500
+
+linux-patch-manager (1.1.1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * Release v1.1.1
+
+ -- git-echo <git-echo@moon-dragon.us>  Sun, 07 Jun 2026 18:55:59 -0500
+
+linux-patch-manager (1.1.0-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * Release v1.1.0
+
+ -- git-echo <git-echo@moon-dragon.us>  Sun, 07 Jun 2026 16:47:03 -0500
+
+linux-patch-manager (1.0.0-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * Release v1.0.0
+
+ -- git-echo <git-echo@moon-dragon.us>  Sun, 07 Jun 2026 12:58:46 -0500
+
+linux-patch-manager (0.1.9-1) noble; urgency=medium
+
+  * Fix: Replace broken DashMap rate limiting with tower-governor middleware
+  * Fix: Enrollment rate limiting was global (0.0.0.0 fallback) instead of per-IP
+  * Fix: Use SmartIpKeyExtractor for proper X-Forwarded-For support behind HAProxy
+  * Add: Configurable rate limit tiers via [rate_limit] in config.toml
+  * Add: Standard X-RateLimit-* and Retry-After headers on 429 responses
+
+ -- Echo <echo@moon-dragon.us>  Wed, 21 May 2026 02:38:00 +0000
+
 linux-patch-manager (0.1.7-1) noble; urgency=medium
 
   * Host Self-Enrollment: Added REST API and UI for automated agent enrollment

debian/control

@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
 Package: linux-patch-manager
-Version: 1.0.0-1
+Version: 1.1.4-1
 Architecture: amd64
 Maintainer: Moon Dragon <echo@moon-dragon.us>
 Installed-Size: 45000
-Depends: postgresql-16, libssl3, libc6 (>= 2.39), libfontconfig1
+Pre-Depends: postgresql-16
+Depends: postgresql-16, argon2, libssl3, libc6 (>= 2.39), libfontconfig1
 Recommends: postgresql-client-16, fonts-dejavu-core
 Suggests: gpg
 Section: admin

debian/postinst

@@ -4,91 +4,348 @@ set -e
 # =============================================================================
 # Linux Patch Manager — Post-install script
 # =============================================================================
+# Fully automated: apt install ./linux-patch-manager_X.X.X-1_amd64.deb
+# results in a running service with a printed admin password.
+# All steps are idempotent (safe to re-run on upgrade).
+# =============================================================================
 
-case "$1" in
-    configure)
-        # Create service user if not exists
+RED='\033[0;31m'
+GREEN='\033[0;32m'
+YELLOW='\033[1;33m'
+CYAN='\033[0;36m'
+NC='\033[0m'
+
+info()  { echo -e "${GREEN}[INFO]${NC}  $*"; }
+warn()  { echo -e "${YELLOW}[WARN]${NC} $*"; }
+error() { echo -e "${RED}[ERROR]${NC} $*" >&2; }
+
+DB_NAME="patch_manager"
+DB_USER="patch_manager"
+CONFIG_DIR="/etc/patch-manager"
+MIGRATION_DIR="/usr/share/patch-manager/migrations"
+ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE="/etc/patch-manager/admin-password.txt"
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# PostgreSQL helpers
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+psql_run() {
+    # Run SQL as the postgres superuser
+    sudo -u postgres psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 "$@" 2>/dev/null
+}
+
+psql_run_db() {
+    # Run SQL against the patch_manager database
+    sudo -u postgres psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -d "${DB_NAME}" "$@" 2>/dev/null
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# 1. Create service user (idempotent)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+create_service_user() {
     if ! id patch-manager &>/dev/null; then
         useradd --system --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin \
             --comment "Linux Patch Manager service account" patch-manager
+        info "Service user 'patch-manager' created."
+    else
+        info "Service user 'patch-manager' already exists."
     fi
+}
 
-        # Create required directories
-        mkdir -p /etc/patch-manager/ca /etc/patch-manager/certs \
-                 /etc/patch-manager/jwt /etc/patch-manager/tls \
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# 2. Create required directories (idempotent)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+create_directories() {
+    mkdir -p "${CONFIG_DIR}/ca" "${CONFIG_DIR}/certs" \
+             "${CONFIG_DIR}/jwt" "${CONFIG_DIR}/tls" \
              /var/log/patch-manager /opt/patch-manager \
              /var/backups/patch-manager
 
     chown -R patch-manager:patch-manager \
-            /etc/patch-manager /var/log/patch-manager \
+        "${CONFIG_DIR}" /var/log/patch-manager \
         /opt/patch-manager /usr/share/patch-manager/frontend
 
-        chmod 750 /etc/patch-manager/ca /etc/patch-manager/jwt
+    chmod 750 "${CONFIG_DIR}/ca" "${CONFIG_DIR}/jwt"
     chmod 700 /var/backups/patch-manager
+}
 
-        # Generate JWT signing key if not present
-        if [[ ! -f /etc/patch-manager/jwt/signing.pem ]]; then
-            openssl genpkey -algorithm ed25519 -out /etc/patch-manager/jwt/signing.pem 2>/dev/null
-            openssl pkey -in /etc/patch-manager/jwt/signing.pem -pubout -out /etc/patch-manager/jwt/verify.pem 2>/dev/null
-            chown patch-manager:patch-manager /etc/patch-manager/jwt/signing.pem /etc/patch-manager/jwt/verify.pem
-            chmod 600 /etc/patch-manager/jwt/signing.pem
-            chmod 644 /etc/patch-manager/jwt/verify.pem
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# 3. Wait for PostgreSQL to be ready
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+wait_for_postgresql() {
+    info "Waiting for PostgreSQL to be ready..."
+    local retries=30
+    local delay=2
+    local i
+    for ((i = 1; i <= retries; i++)); do
+        if pg_isready -q 2>/dev/null; then
+            info "PostgreSQL is ready."
+            return 0
+        fi
+        warn "PostgreSQL not ready yet (attempt ${i}/${retries}), waiting ${delay}s..."
+        sleep "${delay}"
+    done
+    error "PostgreSQL did not become ready after $((retries * delay)) seconds."
+    return 1
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# 4. Create PostgreSQL user and database (idempotent)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+setup_database() {
+    info "Setting up PostgreSQL database and user..."
+
+    # Generate a random password for the DB user
+    local db_password
+    db_password=$(openssl rand -base64 32 | tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9' | head -c 32)
+
+    # Create role if not exists
+    local role_exists
+    role_exists=$(psql_run -t -A -c "SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname='${DB_USER}'" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+    if [[ "${role_exists}" != "1" ]]; then
+        psql_run -c "CREATE ROLE ${DB_USER} LOGIN PASSWORD '${db_password}';"
+        info "PostgreSQL user '${DB_USER}' created."
+        # Store password for config generation
+        echo "${db_password}" > /tmp/.pm-db-password-new
+    else
+        info "PostgreSQL user '${DB_USER}' already exists, skipping creation."
     fi
 
-        # Write default config if not present
-        if [[ ! -f /etc/patch-manager/config.toml ]]; then
-            cp /usr/share/patch-manager/config.example.toml /etc/patch-manager/config.toml
-            chown patch-manager:patch-manager /etc/patch-manager/config.toml
-            chmod 640 /etc/patch-manager/config.toml
+    # Create database if not exists
+    local db_exists
+    db_exists=$(psql_run -t -A -c "SELECT 1 FROM pg_database WHERE datname='${DB_NAME}'" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+    if [[ "${db_exists}" != "1" ]]; then
+        psql_run -c "CREATE DATABASE ${DB_NAME} OWNER ${DB_USER};"
+        info "Database '${DB_NAME}' created."
+    else
+        info "Database '${DB_NAME}' already exists, skipping creation."
     fi
 
-        # Install backup cron if not present
-        if ! crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -qF "backup.sh"; then
-            (crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "0 2 * * * /usr/local/bin/backup.sh >> /var/log/patch-manager/backup.log 2>&1") | crontab -
+    # Grant permissions (idempotent)
+    psql_run_db -c "GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA public TO ${DB_USER};" 2>/dev/null || true
+    psql_run_db -c "GRANT CREATE ON SCHEMA public TO ${DB_USER};" 2>/dev/null || true
+    psql_run_db -c "GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES ON DATABASE ${DB_NAME} TO ${DB_USER};" 2>/dev/null || true
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# 5. Apply database migrations (idempotent)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+apply_migrations() {
+    info "Applying database migrations..."
+
+    # Ensure pgcrypto extension is available
+    psql_run_db -c "CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pgcrypto;" 2>/dev/null || true
+
+    # Create migration tracking table if not exists
+    psql_run_db <<'MIGSQL'
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS _migrations (
+    id          SERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
+    filename    TEXT    NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+    applied_at  TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
+);
+MIGSQL
+
+    # Handle upgrade from pre-migration-tracking versions:
+    # If tables exist but _migrations is empty, mark all existing migrations as applied.
+    local migration_count
+    migration_count=$(psql_run_db -t -A -c "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM _migrations;" 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
+    migration_count="${migration_count// /}"
+
+    local tables_exist
+    tables_exist=$(psql_run_db -t -A -c "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM information_schema.tables WHERE table_schema='public' AND table_name='users';" 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
+    tables_exist="${tables_exist// /}"
+
+    if [[ "${migration_count}" == "0" && "${tables_exist}" -gt 0 ]]; then
+        info "Existing database detected — marking all shipped migrations as already applied."
+        for sql_file in $(ls "${MIGRATION_DIR}"/*.sql 2>/dev/null | sort); do
+            local fname
+            fname=$(basename "${sql_file}")
+            psql_run_db -c "INSERT INTO _migrations (filename) VALUES ('${fname}') ON CONFLICT (filename) DO NOTHING;" 2>/dev/null || true
+        done
     fi
 
-        # Reload systemd
+    # Apply each migration in sorted order, skipping already-applied ones
+    local applied=0
+    local skipped=0
+    for sql_file in $(ls "${MIGRATION_DIR}"/*.sql 2>/dev/null | sort); do
+        local fname
+        fname=$(basename "${sql_file}")
+
+        local already_applied
+        already_applied=$(psql_run_db -t -A -c "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM _migrations WHERE filename='${fname}';" 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
+        already_applied="${already_applied// /}"
+
+        if [[ "${already_applied}" -gt 0 ]]; then
+            skipped=$((skipped + 1))
+            continue
+        fi
+
+        info "  Applying migration: ${fname}"
+        if psql_run_db -f "${sql_file}"; then
+            psql_run_db -c "INSERT INTO _migrations (filename) VALUES ('${fname}');" 2>/dev/null || true
+            applied=$((applied + 1))
+        else
+            error "  Failed to apply migration: ${fname}"
+            return 1
+        fi
+    done
+
+    if [[ "${applied}" -gt 0 ]]; then
+        info "Applied ${applied} new migration(s), skipped ${skipped} already applied."
+    else
+        info "All migrations up to date (${skipped} already applied)."
+    fi
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# 6. Generate admin password and update database
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+generate_admin_password() {
+    info "Generating admin password..."
+
+    # Generate a random 24-character password
+    local admin_password
+    admin_password=$(openssl rand -base64 32 | tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9!@#%^&*' | head -c 24)
+
+    # Hash with argon2 (PHC format, compatible with the application)
+    local password_hash
+    password_hash=$(echo -n "${admin_password}" | argon2 salt -id -t 3 -m 65536 -p 1 -l 32 -e)
+
+    # Update admin user password in database
+    # Only update if the placeholder hash is still present
+    # The placeholder starts with: $argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=3,p=1$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
+    # Using single-quoted variable to preserve $ signs in SQL LIKE pattern
+    local placeholder_pattern
+    placeholder_pattern='$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=3,p=1$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA%'
+
+    local updated
+    updated=$(psql_run_db -t -A -c \
+        "UPDATE users SET password_hash = '${password_hash}', force_password_reset = TRUE \
+         WHERE username = 'admin' AND password_hash LIKE '${placeholder_pattern}' \
+         RETURNING id;" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+
+    if [[ -n "${updated}" ]]; then
+        # Write admin password to file (mode 600, owned by root)
+        echo "${admin_password}" > "${ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE}"
+        chmod 600 "${ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE}"
+        chown root:root "${ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE}"
+
+        echo ""
+        echo -e "${CYAN}=============================================${NC}"
+        echo -e "${CYAN}  Linux Patch Manager — Admin Credentials${NC}"
+        echo -e "${CYAN}=============================================${NC}"
+        echo -e "  Username: ${GREEN}admin${NC}"
+        echo -e "  Password: ${GREEN}${admin_password}${NC}"
+        echo ""
+        echo -e "  ${YELLOW}IMPORTANT: Save this password! It will not be shown again.${NC}"
+        echo -e "  Password also saved to: ${ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE}"
+        echo -e "${CYAN}=============================================${NC}"
+        echo ""
+    else
+        info "Admin password already set (not a fresh install). Password file not regenerated."
+    fi
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# 7. Write config.toml with DB URL (only if file doesn't exist)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+write_config() {
+    local config_file="${CONFIG_DIR}/config.toml"
+
+    if [[ -f "${config_file}" ]]; then
+        info "Config file ${config_file} already exists, not overwriting."
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    info "Writing configuration file..."
+
+    # Get the DB password — use the one we just generated if we created the user
+    local db_password=""
+    if [[ -f /tmp/.pm-db-password-new ]]; then
+        db_password=$(cat /tmp/.pm-db-password-new)
+    fi
+
+    # If we don't have a password (user already existed), generate a new one
+    # and update the PostgreSQL user so we can connect
+    if [[ -z "${db_password}" ]]; then
+        db_password=$(openssl rand -base64 32 | tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9' | head -c 32)
+        psql_run -c "ALTER ROLE ${DB_USER} WITH PASSWORD '${db_password}';" 2>/dev/null || true
+    fi
+
+    # Copy example config and set the DB URL
+    cp /usr/share/patch-manager/config.example.toml "${config_file}"
+    sed -i "s|postgres://patch_manager:CHANGEME@localhost/patch_manager|postgres://${DB_USER}:${db_password}@localhost/${DB_NAME}|" "${config_file}"
+    chown patch-manager:patch-manager "${config_file}"
+    chmod 640 "${config_file}"
+
+    info "Configuration written to ${config_file}"
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# 8. Generate JWT keys (idempotent)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+generate_jwt_keys() {
+    if [[ ! -f "${CONFIG_DIR}/jwt/signing.pem" ]]; then
+        info "Generating Ed25519 JWT signing key..."
+        openssl genpkey -algorithm ed25519 -out "${CONFIG_DIR}/jwt/signing.pem" 2>/dev/null
+        openssl pkey -in "${CONFIG_DIR}/jwt/signing.pem" -pubout -out "${CONFIG_DIR}/jwt/verify.pem" 2>/dev/null
+        chown patch-manager:patch-manager "${CONFIG_DIR}/jwt/signing.pem" "${CONFIG_DIR}/jwt/verify.pem"
+        chmod 600 "${CONFIG_DIR}/jwt/signing.pem"
+        chmod 644 "${CONFIG_DIR}/jwt/verify.pem"
+        info "JWT keys generated."
+    else
+        info "JWT signing key already exists, skipping."
+    fi
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# 9. Enable and start services
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+enable_and_start_services() {
     systemctl daemon-reload
 
-        # Restart services if this is an upgrade (not a fresh install)
-        if systemctl is-active --quiet patch-manager-web 2>/dev/null; then
-            systemctl restart patch-manager-web || true
-        fi
-        if systemctl is-active --quiet patch-manager-worker 2>/dev/null; then
-            systemctl restart patch-manager-worker || true
-        fi
+    # Enable the target (which pulls in web + worker)
+    systemctl enable patch-manager.target 2>/dev/null || true
 
-        # Run pending database migrations
-        MIGRATION_DIR="/usr/share/patch-manager/migrations"
-        if [[ -d "$MIGRATION_DIR" ]]; then
-            echo "Applying database migrations..."
-            for sql_file in $(ls "$MIGRATION_DIR"/*.sql 2>/dev/null | sort); do
-                echo "  Applying: $(basename "$sql_file")"
-            done
-            echo "Note: Migrations must be applied manually: sudo -u patch_manager psql -d patch_manager -f <migration_file>"
+    # Start or restart services
+    if systemctl is-active --quiet patch-manager.target 2>/dev/null; then
+        info "Restarting patch-manager services (upgrade)..."
+        systemctl restart patch-manager.target 2>/dev/null || true
+    else
+        info "Starting patch-manager services..."
+        systemctl start patch-manager.target 2>/dev/null || true
     fi
+}
 
-        echo ""
-        echo "Linux Patch Manager installed successfully!"
-        echo "==========================================="
-        echo ""
-        echo "Next steps:"
-        echo "  1. Install and configure PostgreSQL:"
-        echo "       apt install postgresql-16"
-        echo "  2. Create the database:"
-        echo "       sudo -u postgres createdb -O patch_manager patch_manager"
-        echo "  3. Edit /etc/patch-manager/config.toml with your database URL"
-        echo "  4. Enable and start services:"
-        echo "       systemctl enable --now patch-manager.target"
-        echo "  5. Access the web UI at https://localhost"
-        echo "     Default admin credentials are set via the seed migration."
-        echo ""
-        echo "IMPORTANT: Change the default admin password immediately after first login!"
-        echo ""
-        echo "If this is an upgrade, services have been restarted automatically."
-        echo "Apply any new database migrations:"
-        echo "  sudo -u patch_manager psql -d patch_manager -f /usr/share/patch-manager/migrations/<NNN_migration>.sql"
-        echo ""
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# 10. Install backup cron (idempotent)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+install_backup_cron() {
+    if ! crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -qF "backup.sh"; then
+        (crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "0 2 * * * /usr/local/bin/backup.sh >> /var/log/patch-manager/backup.log 2>&1") | crontab -
+        info "Nightly backup cron installed."
+    fi
+}
+
+# =============================================================================
+# Main
+# =============================================================================
+case "$1" in
+    configure)
+        create_service_user
+        create_directories
+        wait_for_postgresql
+        setup_database
+        apply_migrations
+        generate_admin_password
+        write_config
+        generate_jwt_keys
+        enable_and_start_services
+        install_backup_cron
+
+        # Clean up temp file
+        rm -f /tmp/.pm-db-password-new
+
+        info "Linux Patch Manager installation complete."
         ;;
 
     abort-upgrade|abort-remove|abort-deconfigure)

docker-compose.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# Linux Patch Manager — Docker Compose Deployment
+# =============================================================================
+# Usage:
+#   cp .env.example .env   # Edit DB_PASSWORD
+#   docker compose up -d
+# =============================================================================
+
+services:
+  db:
+    image: postgres:16
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    environment:
+      POSTGRES_USER: patch_manager
+      POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${DB_PASSWORD}
+      POSTGRES_DB: patch_manager
+    volumes:
+      - pgdata:/var/lib/postgresql/data
+    healthcheck:
+      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U patch_manager -d patch_manager"]
+      interval: 5s
+      timeout: 5s
+      retries: 10
+      start_period: 10s
+    networks:
+      - patch-manager-net
+
+  app:
+    image: ghcr.io/draco-lunaris/linux-patch-manager:${TAG:-latest}
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    depends_on:
+      db:
+        condition: service_healthy
+    ports:
+      - "443:443"
+    environment:
+      DATABASE_URL: postgres://patch_manager:${DB_PASSWORD}@db:5432/patch_manager
+      PATCH_MANAGER_CONFIG: /etc/patch-manager/config.toml
+    volumes:
+      - pm-config:/etc/patch-manager
+      - pm-logs:/var/log/patch-manager
+      - pm-data:/opt/patch-manager
+    networks:
+      - patch-manager-net
+
+volumes:
+  pgdata:
+    driver: local
+  pm-config:
+    driver: local
+  pm-logs:
+    driver: local
+  pm-data:
+    driver: local
+
+networks:
+  patch-manager-net:
+    driver: bridge

docker/entrypoint.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+set -e
+
+# =============================================================================
+# Linux Patch Manager — Docker Entrypoint
+# =============================================================================
+# Handles first-run: wait for DB, run migrations, generate admin password,
+# start pm-web and pm-worker services.
+# =============================================================================
+
+MIGRATION_DIR="/usr/share/patch-manager/migrations"
+CONFIG_DIR="/etc/patch-manager"
+ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE="/etc/patch-manager/admin-password.txt"
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Parse DATABASE_URL into PG* env vars for psql compatibility
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+parse_database_url() {
+    # DATABASE_URL format: postgres://user:password@host:port/dbname
+    local url="${DATABASE_URL}"
+
+    # Extract components
+    DB_PASS=$(echo "$url" | sed -n 's|postgres://[^:]*:\([^@]*\)@.*|\1|p')
+    DB_HOST=$(echo "$url" | sed -n 's|.*@\([^:/]*\).*|\1|p')
+    DB_PORT=$(echo "$url" | sed -n 's|.*:\([0-9]*\)/.*|\1|p')
+    DB_USER=$(echo "$url" | sed -n 's|postgres://\([^:]*\):.*|\1|p')
+    DB_NAME=$(echo "$url" | sed -n 's|.*/\([^?]*\).*|\1|p')
+
+    # Default port
+    DB_PORT="${DB_PORT:-5432}"
+
+    export PGHOST="${DB_HOST}"
+    export PGPORT="${DB_PORT}"
+    export PGUSER="${DB_USER}"
+    export PGPASSWORD="${DB_PASS}"
+    export PGDATABASE="${DB_NAME}"
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Wait for PostgreSQL to be ready
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+wait_for_db() {
+    echo "[entrypoint] Waiting for PostgreSQL at ${PGHOST}:${DB_PORT}..."
+    local retries=60
+    local delay=2
+    local i
+    for ((i = 1; i <= retries; i++)); do
+        if pg_isready -q -h "${PGHOST}" -p "${DB_PORT}" -U "${DB_USER}" 2>/dev/null; then
+            echo "[entrypoint] PostgreSQL is ready."
+            return 0
+        fi
+        echo "[entrypoint] PostgreSQL not ready (attempt ${i}/${retries}), waiting ${delay}s..."
+        sleep "${delay}"
+    done
+    echo "[entrypoint] ERROR: PostgreSQL did not become ready after $((retries * delay)) seconds." >&2
+    return 1
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Run database migrations (idempotent)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+run_migrations() {
+    echo "[entrypoint] Applying database migrations..."
+
+    # Ensure pgcrypto extension
+    psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -c "CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pgcrypto;" 2>/dev/null || true
+
+    # Create migration tracking table
+    psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 <<'EOSQL'
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS _migrations (
+    id          SERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
+    filename    TEXT    NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+    applied_at  TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
+);
+EOSQL
+
+    # Handle upgrade from pre-migration-tracking versions
+    local migration_count
+    migration_count=$(psql -t -A -c "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM _migrations;" 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
+    migration_count="${migration_count// /}"
+
+    local tables_exist
+    tables_exist=$(psql -t -A -c "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM information_schema.tables WHERE table_schema='public' AND table_name='users';" 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
+    tables_exist="${tables_exist// /}"
+
+    if [[ "${migration_count}" == "0" && "${tables_exist}" -gt 0 ]]; then
+        echo "[entrypoint] Existing database detected — marking all shipped migrations as already applied."
+        for sql_file in $(ls "${MIGRATION_DIR}"/*.sql 2>/dev/null | sort); do
+            local fname
+            fname=$(basename "${sql_file}")
+            psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -c "INSERT INTO _migrations (filename) VALUES ('${fname}') ON CONFLICT (filename) DO NOTHING;" 2>/dev/null || true
+        done
+    fi
+
+    # Apply each migration in sorted order
+    local applied=0
+    local skipped=0
+    for sql_file in $(ls "${MIGRATION_DIR}"/*.sql 2>/dev/null | sort); do
+        local fname
+        fname=$(basename "${sql_file}")
+
+        local already_applied
+        already_applied=$(psql -t -A -c "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM _migrations WHERE filename='${fname}';" 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
+        already_applied="${already_applied// /}"
+
+        if [[ "${already_applied}" -gt 0 ]]; then
+            skipped=$((skipped + 1))
+            continue
+        fi
+
+        echo "[entrypoint]   Applying migration: ${fname}"
+        if psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -f "${sql_file}"; then
+            psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -c "INSERT INTO _migrations (filename) VALUES ('${fname}');" 2>/dev/null || true
+            applied=$((applied + 1))
+        else
+            echo "[entrypoint] ERROR: Failed to apply migration: ${fname}" >&2
+            return 1
+        fi
+    done
+
+    if [[ "${applied}" -gt 0 ]]; then
+        echo "[entrypoint] Applied ${applied} new migration(s), skipped ${skipped}."
+    else
+        echo "[entrypoint] All migrations up to date (${skipped} already applied)."
+    fi
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Generate admin password on first run
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+generate_admin_password() {
+    echo "[entrypoint] Checking admin password status..."
+
+    # Generate a random 24-character password
+    local admin_password
+    admin_password=$(openssl rand -base64 32 | tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9!@#%^&*' | head -c 24)
+
+    # Hash with argon2 (PHC format)
+    local password_hash
+    password_hash=$(echo -n "${admin_password}" | argon2 salt -id -t 3 -m 65536 -p 1 -l 32 -e)
+
+    # Update admin user — only if placeholder hash is still present
+    # The placeholder starts with: $argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=3,p=1$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
+    # Using single-quoted variable to preserve $ signs in the SQL LIKE pattern
+    local placeholder_pattern
+    placeholder_pattern='$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=3,p=1$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA%'
+
+    local updated
+    updated=$(psql -t -A -c \
+        "UPDATE users SET password_hash = '${password_hash}', force_password_reset = TRUE \
+         WHERE username = 'admin' AND password_hash LIKE '${placeholder_pattern}' \
+         RETURNING id;" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+
+    if [[ -n "${updated}" ]]; then
+        echo "${admin_password}" > "${ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE}"
+        chmod 600 "${ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE}"
+        chown root:root "${ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE}"
+
+        echo ""
+        echo "============================================="
+        echo "  Linux Patch Manager — Admin Credentials"
+        echo "============================================="
+        echo "  Username: admin"
+        echo "  Password: ${admin_password}"
+        echo ""
+        echo "  IMPORTANT: Save this password! It will not be shown again."
+        echo "  Password also saved to: ${ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE}"
+        echo "============================================="
+        echo ""
+    else
+        echo "[entrypoint] Admin password already set (not a fresh install)."
+    fi
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Generate JWT keys if not present
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+generate_jwt_keys() {
+    if [[ ! -f "${CONFIG_DIR}/jwt/signing.pem" ]]; then
+        echo "[entrypoint] Generating Ed25519 JWT signing key..."
+        openssl genpkey -algorithm ed25519 -out "${CONFIG_DIR}/jwt/signing.pem" 2>/dev/null
+        openssl pkey -in "${CONFIG_DIR}/jwt/signing.pem" -pubout -out "${CONFIG_DIR}/jwt/verify.pem" 2>/dev/null
+        chown patch-manager:patch-manager "${CONFIG_DIR}/jwt/signing.pem" "${CONFIG_DIR}/jwt/verify.pem"
+        chmod 600 "${CONFIG_DIR}/jwt/signing.pem"
+        chmod 644 "${CONFIG_DIR}/jwt/verify.pem"
+        echo "[entrypoint] JWT keys generated."
+    else
+        echo "[entrypoint] JWT signing key already exists."
+    fi
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Write config.toml if not present
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+write_config() {
+    local config_file="${CONFIG_DIR}/config.toml"
+
+    if [[ -f "${config_file}" ]]; then
+        echo "[entrypoint] Config file already exists, not overwriting."
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    echo "[entrypoint] Writing configuration file..."
+    cp /usr/share/patch-manager/config.example.toml "${config_file}"
+    sed -i "s|postgres://patch_manager:CHANGEME@localhost/patch_manager|${DATABASE_URL}|" "${config_file}"
+    chown patch-manager:patch-manager "${config_file}"
+    chmod 640 "${config_file}"
+    echo "[entrypoint] Configuration written."
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Main
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+echo "[entrypoint] Linux Patch Manager Docker entrypoint starting..."
+
+parse_database_url
+wait_for_db
+run_migrations
+generate_admin_password
+generate_jwt_keys
+write_config
+
+echo "[entrypoint] Starting pm-web and pm-worker..."
+
+# Start pm-worker in background
+pm-worker &
+WORKER_PID=$!
+
+# Start pm-web in foreground (main process)
+export PATCH_MANAGER_CONFIG="${CONFIG_DIR}/config.toml"
+
+exec pm-web

docs/REST_API.md

@@ -14,6 +14,16 @@ Security: JWT Bearer Token (except Public Endpoints)
 | POST | `/auth/mfa/verify` | Verify MFA code |
 | DELETE | `/auth/mfa` | Disable MFA for user |
 
+## 1b. SSO (Single Sign-On)
+*No authentication required.* These endpoints implement the OIDC Authorization Code + PKCE flow. See `tasks/sso-token-handoff-spec.md` for the full design.
+
+| Method | Endpoint | Description |
+|--------|----------|-------------|
+| GET | `/auth/sso/login` | Initiate OIDC login: redirects browser to the configured IdP's authorization URL |
+| GET | `/auth/sso/callback` | OIDC redirect URI: handles the IdP response, issues a single-use 60s `handoff_code`, stores the JWT access/refresh tokens in memory, and 302-redirects to the SPA with `?handoff=<code>` in the URL (no tokens in the URL — see issue #4) |
+| GET | `/auth/sso/config` | Returns minimal SSO configuration for the login page (`enabled`, `display_name`, `auth_url`). No secrets exposed |
+| POST | `/auth/sso/handoff` | **(new in issue #4)** Exchange a single-use `handoff_code` for the JWT access/refresh tokens. The SPA calls this from `SsoCallbackPage` after the OIDC callback redirect. Returns `{ access_token, refresh_token, token_type, expires_in, user }`. The code is single-use, 60s TTL, and atomically removed on exchange (concurrent attempts: exactly one wins). `400 invalid_handoff` on unknown/expired/already-consumed codes |
+
 ## 2. Public Endpoints (Self-Enrollment)
 *No authentication required.*
 | Method | Endpoint | Description |
@@ -60,12 +70,16 @@ Security: JWT Bearer Token (except Public Endpoints)
 ## 7. Jobs & Patch Deployment
 | Method | Endpoint | Description |
 |--------|----------|-------------|
-| GET | `/jobs` | List patch jobs |
+| GET | `/jobs` | List patch jobs (includes `host_names` per job) |
 | POST | `/jobs` | Create new patch job |
 | GET | `/jobs/{id}` | Get job status/details |
 | POST | `/jobs/{id}/cancel` | Cancel running job |
 | POST | `/jobs/{id}/rollback` | Rollback completed job |
 
+### GET /jobs Response Fields
+Each job summary object includes:
+- `host_names`: Array of display names for hosts targeted by this job. Falls back to `fqdn` when `display_name` is empty. Single-host jobs show one name; multi-host jobs show all names sorted alphabetically.
+
 ## 8. Maintenance Windows
 *Scoped to host.*
 | Method | Endpoint | Description |
@@ -102,13 +116,15 @@ Security: JWT Bearer Token (except Public Endpoints)
 | Method | Endpoint | Description |
 |--------|----------|-------------|
 | GET | `/settings` | Get system settings |
-| PUT | `/settings` | Update system settings |
+| PUT | `/settings` | Update system settings **(Admin only — Operators receive `403 forbidden_role`)** |
 | POST | `/settings/smtp/test` | Test SMTP configuration |
-| POST | `/settings/sso/discover` | Discover OIDC provider config |
-| POST | `/settings/sso/test` | Test SSO connection |
+| POST | `/settings/sso/discover` | Discover OIDC provider config **(Admin only — Operators receive `403 forbidden_role`)** |
+| POST | `/settings/sso/test` | Test SSO connection **(Admin only — Operators receive `403 forbidden_role`)** |
 | POST | `/settings/azure-sso/test` | Test Azure SSO compatibility |
 | POST | `/settings/audit-integrity` | Verify audit log integrity |
 
+> **Note (issue #6):** As of May 2026, sensitive fields (`oidc.client_secret`, `smtp.password`) are encrypted at rest in the database (AES-256-GCM). The `MASKED` placeholder behavior in API responses is **preserved** — clients never see plaintext secrets in GET responses. See [docs/runbooks/key-management.md](runbooks/key-management.md) for key management procedures.
+
 ## 12. Single Sign-On (SSO)
 | Method | Endpoint | Description |
 |--------|----------|-------------|
@@ -125,6 +141,53 @@ Security: JWT Bearer Token (except Public Endpoints)
 | GET | `/reports/vulnerability` | Generate vulnerability exposure report |
 | GET | `/reports/audit` | Generate audit trail report |
 
+### CRL Status Fields
+
+Host list and detail responses include CRL (Certificate Revocation List) status fields:
+
+| Field | Type | Description |
+|-------|------|-------------|
+| `crl_status` | `string?` | CRL status: `valid`, `expired`, `missing`, `invalid`, or `null` (older agents) |
+| `crl_age_seconds` | `integer?` | Seconds since the agent's CRL was last refreshed |
+| `crl_next_update` | `datetime?` | When the agent's CRL expires (ISO-8601) |
+
+Fleet status response includes CRL counts:
+
+| Field | Type | Description |
+|-------|------|-------------|
+| `crl_valid` | `integer` | Hosts with CRL status `valid` |
+| `crl_expired` | `integer` | Hosts with CRL status `expired` |
+| `crl_missing` | `integer` | Hosts with CRL status `missing` |
+| `crl_invalid` | `integer` | Hosts with CRL status `invalid` (security event) |
+| `crl_not_reporting` | `integer` | Hosts not reporting CRL status (older agents) |
+
+### CRL Audit Events
+
+The health poller logs the following system-initiated audit events when a host's CRL status changes:
+
+| Audit Action | Trigger | Details Fields |
+|---|---|---|
+| `crl_status_changed` | Any CRL status transition | `host_id`, `old_crl_status`, `new_crl_status`, `crl_age_seconds` |
+| `crl_stale_detected` | CRL status becomes `expired` | `host_id`, `old_crl_status`, `new_crl_status`, `crl_age_seconds` |
+| `crl_invalid` | CRL status becomes `invalid` | `host_id`, `old_crl_status`, `new_crl_status`, `crl_age_seconds` |
+
+All CRL audit events use `target_type = "host"` and `target_id = <host_id>`. Actor fields (`actor_user_id`, `actor_username`) are `null` because these are system-initiated events.
+
+### CRL Health Aggregation Rules
+
+The health poller applies the following rules to determine a host's effective health status based on CRL state:
+
+| CRL Status | Condition | Effective Health Status |
+|---|---|---|
+| `invalid` | Always | `unreachable` (security event) |
+| `expired` | If natural status is `healthy` | `degraded` |
+| `missing` | Registered > 24h ago AND natural status is `healthy` | `degraded` |
+| `missing` | Registered ≤ 24h ago | Natural status (new agent enrollment) |
+| `valid` | Any | Natural status (no override) |
+| `null` | Any | Natural status (older agent, not reporting CRL) |
+
+When CRL status transitions from `invalid`/`expired`/`missing` back to `valid`, the next health poll cycle restores the host to its natural health status based on the agent's health response.
+
 ## 14. Real-Time Updates (WebSocket)
 | Method | Endpoint | Description |
 |--------|----------|-------------|

docs/runbooks/key-management.md

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+# Key Management Runbook
+
+**Applies to:** Linux Patch Manager production deployments (issue #6 — secret encryption at rest)
+**Last updated:** 2026-06-03
+**Owner:** SRE / Security
+
+---
+
+## Overview
+
+Linux Patch Manager uses two per-install AES-256-GCM encryption keys for protecting sensitive data at rest. Both keys are auto-generated on first start of the service, stored as 32-byte files with `0600` permissions (owner read/write only).
+
+| Key file | Path | Protects | Used by |
+|----------|------|----------|---------|
+| `health-check.key` | `/etc/patch-manager/keys/health-check.key` | HTTP basic-auth passwords for health check endpoints | `pm-web`, `pm-worker` |
+| `secret-encryption.key` | `/etc/patch-manager/keys/secret-encryption.key` | OIDC `client_secret`, SMTP `smtp_password`, TOTP `totp_secret` | `pm-web`, `pm-auth`, `pm-worker` |
+
+The two keys are separate by design (blast-radius isolation): if the health-check key is ever compromised, the app secrets remain protected by a different key.
+
+---
+
+## Key Generation (First Start)
+
+On first start of `pm-web` or `pm-worker`, the `crypto::load_or_create_key()` function checks for each key file. If missing, it:
+
+1. Creates the `/etc/patch-manager/keys/` directory (mode `0700`)
+2. Generates 32 cryptographically random bytes via `OsRng` (the OS CSPRNG)
+3. Writes the key to disk
+4. Sets permissions to `0600` (owner read/write only)
+5. Returns the key to the calling code
+
+The key files are created in the order they are first accessed. If `pm-worker` starts before `pm-web`, it creates the same key file (filesystem-shared). Both processes can read the same key.
+
+---
+
+## Backup
+
+**Both key files MUST be included in `/etc/patch-manager` backups.** Without the key files, encrypted data is unrecoverable. Recommended backup procedure:
+
+```bash
+# Include the keys directory in the backup archive
+tar -czf /backup/patch-manager-$(date +%F).tar.gz \
+    /etc/patch-manager/config.toml \
+    /etc/patch-manager/keys/ \
+    /var/lib/patch-manager/  # if used
+
+# Verify the keys are in the backup
+tar -tzf /backup/patch-manager-*.tar.gz | grep -E 'keys/.*\.key$'
+```
+
+The existing `scripts/backup.sh` already excludes secrets from unencrypted backups and supports GPG encryption for the archive. Ensure the backup includes the keys directory.
+
+---
+
+## Verification (Production)
+
+To verify both keys exist and have correct permissions on a running deployment:
+
+```bash
+# Check both key files exist with 0600 permissions
+for key in health-check.key secret-encryption.key; do
+    path="/etc/patch-manager/keys/${key}"
+    if [ -f "$path" ]; then
+        mode=$(stat -c '%a' "$path")
+        size=$(stat -c '%s' "$path")
+        echo "[OK]   $path  mode=$mode  size=$size"
+    else
+        echo "[FAIL] $path  missing"
+    fi
+done
+```
+
+Expected output:
+```
+[OK]   /etc/patch-manager/keys/health-check.key  mode=600  size=32
+[OK]   /etc/patch-manager/keys/secret-encryption.key  mode=600  size=32
+```
+
+---
+
+## Recovery (Disaster Scenario)
+
+If a key file is lost (disk failure, accidental deletion):
+
+1. **All encrypted data becomes unrecoverable.** This includes:
+   - HTTP basic-auth passwords for health check endpoints (health-check.key)
+   - OIDC `client_secret` (secret-encryption.key)
+   - SMTP `smtp_password` (secret-encryption.key)
+   - TOTP `totp_secret` for all users (secret-encryption.key)
+
+2. **If you have a backup** of the key files: restore them to `/etc/patch-manager/keys/` with `0600` permissions. The service will read the restored keys on next start.
+
+3. **If you do NOT have a backup**: re-provision the affected secrets:
+   - For OIDC: re-enter the `client_secret` from the IdP's app registration
+   - For SMTP: re-enter the SMTP password
+   - For TOTP: all users must re-enroll MFA (their existing TOTP secrets are unrecoverable)
+   - For health-check basic auth: re-enter the password in each health check configuration
+
+---
+
+## Key Rotation
+
+Key rotation is **not yet supported** (tracked as a follow-up issue). If a key is compromised:
+
+1. Generate a new key: `rm /etc/patch-manager/keys/secret-encryption.key` (service will auto-generate on next start)
+2. Re-encrypt all secrets in the database using the `migrate-secrets` binary (see [README of the helper](../../crates/migrate-secrets/src/main.rs))
+3. Update any external systems that depended on the old secrets (e.g., IdP app registration)
+
+For a planned rotation (without compromise), the procedure is the same but coordinated with a maintenance window.
+
+---
+
+## Security Notes
+
+- **Never** log the key bytes or include them in error messages. The `crypto::load_or_create_key()` function returns the key but callers should never `tracing::error!` the value.
+- **Never** commit key files to git. The `/etc/patch-manager/keys/` directory should be in `.gitignore` or outside the repo entirely (recommended).
+- **Never** copy key files between machines (e.g., for "easy migration"). Each deployment must generate its own key.
+- **The `MASKED` placeholder in API responses** (e.g., for `client_secret` in OIDC settings) continues to apply on top of DB encryption — it's a separate defense-in-depth layer.
+
+---
+
+## Related
+
+- [Secret encryption spec](../../tasks/secret-encryption-spec.md) — full design rationale and migration plan
+- [Security review](../security-review.md) §4.1 — control matrix entry
+- [Migration 020](../../migrations/020_encrypt_secrets_at_rest.sql) — schema changes for the new encrypted columns
+- `crates/pm-core/src/crypto.rs` — implementation of `load_or_create_key`, `encrypt`, `decrypt`
+- `crates/migrate-secrets/src/main.rs` — one-shot helper for migrating plaintext → encrypted

docs/runbooks/reverse-proxy-deployment.md

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+# Reverse Proxy Deployment Runbook
+
+**Audience:** Operators deploying `pm-web` behind a reverse proxy (nginx,
+HAProxy, Cloudflare, AWS ALB, etc.).
+
+**Related:**
+- `docs/security-review.md` §1.3 (IP Whitelist Enforcement)
+- `tasks/ip-allowlist-spec.md` §7 (Risk Analysis)
+- Issue [#3](https://github.com/Draco-Lunaris/Linux-Patch-Manager/issues/3)
+
+---
+
+## TL;DR
+
+If you front `pm-web` with a reverse proxy, you **MUST** add the proxy's
+IP address (or CIDR) to `security.trusted_proxies` in
+`/etc/patch-manager/config.toml`. If you do not, the IP allowlist will
+evaluate against the proxy's IP (not the real client) and will return
+`403 forbidden_ip` for legitimate traffic.
+
+## Why
+
+Starting with the IP-allowlist hardening in issue #3, `pm-web` no longer
+trusts `X-Forwarded-For` by default. The default behavior is **strict**:
+
+1. The server reads the socket peer IP from `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>`.
+2. The server checks that IP against `security.ip_whitelist`.
+3. `X-Forwarded-For` is **ignored** unless the socket peer is in
+   `security.trusted_proxies`.
+
+When you put a reverse proxy in front, every connection's socket peer IP
+is the proxy's address. Without `trusted_proxies` set, the proxy's IP is
+checked against your allowlist — and unless your allowlist happens to
+include the proxy (which would defeat the purpose of the allowlist),
+the request is denied.
+
+## How to Fix
+
+1. Identify the **egress IP** of your reverse proxy (the IP `pm-web`
+   sees as the immediate TCP peer). This is typically:
+   - nginx: the IP nginx binds to internally, or the host's IP if nginx
+     runs on the same host as `pm-web` (port forward).
+   - Cloudflare: see
+     [Cloudflare IP ranges](https://www.cloudflare.com/ips/).
+   - AWS ALB / NLB: the ALB/NLB's private IP from the VPC.
+   - HAProxy: the bind address.
+
+2. Add the IP (or CIDR for multiple hops) to `trusted_proxies` in
+   `/etc/patch-manager/config.toml`:
+
+   ```toml
+   [security]
+   ip_whitelist = ["10.0.0.0/8"]            # example: corporate clients
+   trusted_proxies = ["172.16.5.10/32"]     # example: reverse proxy egress
+   ```
+
+3. **Restart `pm-web`** for the config to take effect. The
+   `trusted_proxies` field is read at startup; runtime updates are
+   supported via `AuthConfig::update_trusted_proxies` but not yet
+   exposed through a settings endpoint.
+
+4. Verify by tailing the logs and confirming that requests with
+   `X-Forwarded-For: <allowed-client-ip>` succeed (status 200/401, NOT
+   403) when the request comes through the proxy.
+
+## Multi-hop Proxy Chains
+
+If you have multiple proxies in front of `pm-web` (e.g., Cloudflare →
+nginx → pm-web), add **each hop you control** to `trusted_proxies`:
+
+```toml
+trusted_proxies = [
+    "172.16.5.10/32",   # nginx egress (immediate peer)
+    "10.0.0.0/8",       # internal network (in case nginx runs on a different host)
+]
+```
+
+The resolver picks the leftmost entry of `X-Forwarded-For` when the
+immediate peer is in `trusted_proxies`. With two trusted hops, the
+resolver will pick the leftmost untrusted IP (the real client).
+
+## Reverse Proxy Headers (recommended)
+
+In addition to the `trusted_proxies` config, configure your reverse
+proxy to:
+
+- **Append** to `X-Forwarded-For` (not replace) so the chain is
+  preserved through multiple hops.
+- Set `X-Real-IP` (optional, informational; pm-web currently uses
+  `X-Forwarded-For`).
+- Forward the original `Host` header so SAML/OIDC redirects work
+  correctly.
+- Do **not** strip the `Authorization` header.
+
+### nginx example
+
+```nginx
+location /api/ {
+    proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:12443;
+    proxy_set_header Host              $host;
+    proxy_set_header X-Real-IP         $remote_addr;
+    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For   $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
+    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
+}
+```
+
+The `proxy_add_x_forwarded_for` directive appends, which is what you want.
+
+## Troubleshooting
+
+### All requests return 403 forbidden_ip
+
+- Check that `trusted_proxies` is set and contains the proxy's IP.
+- Check that the proxy's IP is correct (run `ss -tnp` on the pm-web
+  host to see the actual peer address).
+- Check `tracing` logs for `reason = "unresolvable_client_ip"` — this
+  means the `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` extension is missing (the
+  listener wasn't built with `into_make_service_with_connect_info`).
+
+### XFF is being ignored
+
+- Check that the immediate peer's IP is in `trusted_proxies`. If the
+  immediate peer is NOT in `trusted_proxies`, XFF is ignored (correct
+  behavior).
+- Check the XFF format: pm-web parses the leftmost entry, trimmed of
+  whitespace. A malformed leftmost entry falls back to the socket peer.
+
+### Multiple IPs in XFF and only the last hop is trusted
+
+- If you have one trusted proxy and one untrusted, the resolver will
+  only use XFF when the immediate peer (the trusted one) is in the
+  list. The XFF is parsed leftmost-first, so the real client IP (leftmost
+  untrusted hop) is used.
+- If neither hop is in `trusted_proxies`, XFF is ignored and the
+  socket peer IP (the immediate proxy) is used. Add the immediate
+  proxy to `trusted_proxies` to fix.
+
+## See Also
+
+- `config/config.example.toml` — inline documentation on `trusted_proxies`.
+- `tasks/ip-allowlist-spec.md` §3 (Design Decisions) for the rationale.
+- `crates/pm-auth/src/rbac.rs` — the resolver implementation.

docs/security-review.md

@@ -31,9 +31,25 @@ verifying that all mandated security controls are implemented and operational.
 ### 1.3 IP Whitelist Enforcement
 | Control | Status | Evidence |
 |---------|--------|----------|
-| IP whitelist on all connection points | ✅ Verified | Middleware extracts `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Real-IP`; checks against `AuthConfig.ip_whitelist` (RwLock for live updates) |
+| IP whitelist on all connection points | ✅ Verified | `require_auth` middleware in `crates/pm-auth/src/rbac.rs` resolves the client IP via `resolve_client_ip` (socket peer by default, `X-Forwarded-For` only when the peer is in `trusted_proxies`) and checks against `AuthConfig.ip_whitelist` (RwLock for live updates) |
 | Live whitelist management | ✅ Verified | Settings page UI + `PUT /api/v1/settings` endpoint updates whitelist; changes take effect immediately via `RwLock` |
 | Whitelist change audit | ✅ Verified | Every whitelist modification triggers an `audit_log` entry with old/new values |
+| Trusted-proxy allowlist (`security.trusted_proxies`) | ✅ Verified | New `trusted_proxies: Vec<String>` field on `SecurityConfig` (default empty = strict). When non-empty and the immediate TCP peer is in the list, `X-Forwarded-For` is honored (leftmost untrusted hop). Documented in `config/config.example.toml`. `AuthConfig::update_trusted_proxies` setter allows runtime updates |
+| Fail-closed on unresolvable client IP | ✅ Verified | When a non-empty allowlist is configured and the client IP cannot be determined (no `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` extension), the request is rejected with `403 forbidden_ip`. `tracing::warn!` includes `peer`, `xff_present`, and `reason = "unresolvable_client_ip"` |
+| Allowlist bypass via missing `X-Forwarded-For` | ✅ Mitigated | Resolver no longer relies on the presence of `X-Forwarded-For`; falls back to the socket peer IP. Verified by `peer_only_no_xff` and `peer_only_trusted_proxies_empty_xff_present` unit tests |
+| Allowlist spoofing via attacker-controlled `X-Forwarded-For` | ✅ Mitigated | When `trusted_proxies` is empty (the secure default) or the peer is not in `trusted_proxies`, `X-Forwarded-For` is ignored. Verified by `peer_only_xff_untrusted` and `middleware_spoofed_xff_ignored_when_peer_untrusted` tests |
+| Distinct error code for IP rejection | ✅ Verified | `403 forbidden_ip` (new) is distinct from the role-based `403 forbidden` so monitoring can separate IP-allowlist rejections from RBAC denials. Documented in `tasks/ip-allowlist-spec.md` §4.5 |
+
+### 1.4 WebSocket Origin Allowlist (CSWSH Defense-in-Depth)
+| Control | Status | Evidence |
+|---------|--------|----------|
+| `Origin` header allowlist on browser WS upgrade | ✅ Verified | `crates/pm-web/src/routes/ws.rs` `ws_handler` — `HeaderMap` extractor + `check_origin` enforced before ticket validation |
+| Allowlist configurable via `security.allowed_origins` | ✅ Verified | `crates/pm-core/src/config.rs` `SecurityConfig::allowed_origins`; documented in `config/config.example.toml` |
+| Secure-by-default derivation from `sso_callback_url` | ✅ Verified | `derive_allowed_origins` parses the SSO callback URL into a single `scheme://host[:port]` entry when the operator leaves `allowed_origins` empty; `AppConfig::load` runs the derivation and emits a `tracing::warn!` if the result is empty (fail-closed) |
+| Order: Origin check before ticket consumption | ✅ Verified | Rejected cross-origin probes do not burn the user's ticket; documented in the handler doc-comment and verified by `check_rejects_disallowed_origin` test |
+| Rejected upgrades logged with `origin` and `reason` | ✅ Verified | `tracing::warn!` in `ws_handler`; ticket value is never logged |
+
+**Note:** The browser WebSocket endpoint (`GET /api/v1/ws/jobs`) is the only browser-reachable WS server in the codebase. The `pm-worker` `ws_relay` module is an outbound mTLS WS *client* to on-host agents and is not subject to CSWSH.
 
 ---
 
@@ -69,6 +85,7 @@ verifying that all mandated security controls are implemented and operational.
 | Admin: full rights | ✅ Verified | Admin role bypasses group scoping; access to all resources |
 | Operator: group-scoped | ✅ Verified | Operators can only manage hosts in their assigned groups; middleware enforces on every request |
 | RBAC middleware | ✅ Verified | Axum middleware extracts role from JWT; enforces before route handler execution |
+| **Manager-wide auth config is Admin-only (issue #5 fix)** | ✅ Verified | `admin_required` gate in `crates/pm-web/src/routes/settings.rs` restricts `update_settings` (OIDC/SMTP), `discover_oidc`, `test_oidc`, and `update_ip_whitelist` to Admin role. Operators receive `403 forbidden_role`. All mutations write audit events (`OidcConfigUpdated`, `SmtpConfigUpdated`, `IpWhitelistUpdated`, `OidcTestPerformed`, `OidcDiscoverPerformed`) via `log_event` in `crates/pm-core/src/audit.rs`. SPA shows friendly error: "Only Admins can modify authentication configuration. Contact an Admin to make this change." Verified by 3 `admin_required` unit tests (Admin passes, Operator denied, Reporter denied) and manual code review of 4 gate changes. Full integration tests deferred to [issue #15](https://github.com/Draco-Lunaris/Linux-Patch-Manager/issues/15). |
 
 ### 2.5 Azure SSO
 | Control | Status | Evidence |
@@ -76,6 +93,9 @@ verifying that all mandated security controls are implemented and operational.
 | OAuth2/OIDC Authorization Code + PKCE | ✅ Verified | Public routes `/api/v1/auth/azure/login` and `/api/v1/auth/azure/callback` implement PKCE flow |
 | Test connection without enabling | ✅ Verified | `POST /api/v1/settings/azure-sso/test` validates configuration without persisting |
 | MFA still required after SSO | ✅ Verified | SSO login follows same MFA verification path as local login |
+| **No tokens in redirect URL (issue #4 fix)** | ✅ Verified | SSO callback (`crates/pm-web/src/routes/sso.rs` `sso_callback`) now issues a single-use, 60s `handoff_code` and stores the JWT access/refresh tokens in the in-memory `sso_handoffs: Arc<DashMap<String, SsoHandoff>>`. The redirect URL contains only `?handoff=<code>`. No `access_token`, `refresh_token`, or `user` parameters are ever placed in the URL. The SPA exchanges the code via `POST /api/v1/auth/sso/handoff`. See `tasks/sso-token-handoff-spec.md` for the full design. |
+| **Handoff code is single-use + 60s TTL** | ✅ Verified | `DashMap::remove` in `sso_handoff_exchange_inner` is atomic — concurrent exchange attempts result in exactly one success and one 400. Expired codes (`expires_at < Instant::now()`) are rejected with `400 invalid_handoff`. A background cleanup task removes expired entries every 60s. Verified by `handoff_exchange_single_use`, `handoff_exchange_race`, and `handoff_exchange_expired_code` tests in `crates/pm-web/src/routes/sso.rs`. |
+| **Handoff code cleared from browser history** | ✅ Verified | SPA calls `window.history.replaceState({}, '', '/auth/sso/callback')` after a successful exchange, removing the `?handoff=` param from the address bar. Verified by `clears_handoff_code_from_url_after_success` test in `frontend/src/pages/__tests__/SsoCallbackPage.test.tsx`. |
 
 ---
 
@@ -105,7 +125,8 @@ verifying that all mandated security controls are implemented and operational.
 | Control | Status | Evidence |
 |---------|--------|----------|
 | Infrastructure-managed disk encryption | ✅ Verified | Hardware/infrastructure layer provides encryption at rest; no LUKS in guest OS |
-| No column-level encryption needed | ✅ Verified | Compliance requirement satisfied by infrastructure layer per system mandate |
+| **App secrets encrypted at rest (issue #6 fix)** | ✅ Verified | OIDC `client_secret`, SMTP `smtp_password`, and TOTP `totp_secret` are encrypted with AES-256-GCM using a dedicated per-install key at `/etc/patch-manager/keys/secret-encryption.key` (auto-generated on first start, 0600 permissions). Separate from the health-check key for blast-radius isolation. Encryption/decryption via `pm-core::crypto::encrypt`/`decrypt`. Schema migration `020_encrypt_secrets_at_rest.sql` replaces plaintext TEXT columns with BYTEA `_encrypted` + `_nonce` columns. All 6 read/write sites updated: `sso.rs`, `settings.rs` (OIDC + SMTP), `session.rs` (TOTP read), `auth.rs` (TOTP write), `users.rs` (TOTP NULL), `pm-worker/email.rs` (SMTP read). The `MASKED` placeholder behavior in API responses is preserved. |
+| No column-level encryption needed | ❌ Superseded | Issue #6 (May 2026) introduced column-level encryption for app secrets. Updated to add app-secrets row above; other sensitive data continues to rely on the infrastructure layer. |
 
 ### 4.2 Secret Management
 | Control | Status | Evidence |
@@ -139,9 +160,30 @@ verifying that all mandated security controls are implemented and operational.
 
 ## 6. Findings & Recommendations
 
-### No Critical or High Findings
+### 🔴 CRITICAL: Committed Private Key Material (Issue #12) — RESOLVED
 
-All security controls are implemented as specified in the system requirements.
+**Description:**
+Private key file `client.key` and public certificates (`client.crt`, `ca.crt`) were committed
+to version control in `crates/pm-agent-client/certs/`. Committed private keys are a critical
+security risk: anyone with repository access can impersonate agents or decrypt captured TLS traffic.
+
+**Status:** ✅ RESOLVED
+
+**Remediation Applied:**
+1. Removed all cert files from git tracking (`git rm --cached`)
+2. Added `*.key`, `*.key.pem` and `crates/pm-agent-client/certs/` to `.gitignore`
+3. Updated `pm-agent-client` doc examples to use `std::fs::read()` instead of `include_bytes!`
+4. Added `gitleaks` secret scanning to CI pipeline
+5. Added README to `crates/pm-agent-client/certs/` explaining runtime cert generation
+6. Git history will be purged with `git filter-repo` after PR merge
+
+**Key Rotation:**
+These keys were dev/test only. No production key rotation is needed. All committed keys
+should be considered compromised and must not be used in production.
+
+### No Other Critical or High Findings
+
+All other security controls are implemented as specified in the system requirements.
 
 ### Recommendations (Low Priority)
 
@@ -171,3 +213,4 @@ All security controls are implemented as specified in the system requirements.
 - [x] Backup encryption supported (GPG)
 - [x] Azure SSO with PKCE flow
 - [x] No plaintext credential storage
+- [x] Committed private key material removed from repository (Issue #12)

frontend/package.json

@@ -1,14 +1,16 @@
 {
   "name": "patch-manager-ui",
   "private": true,
-  "version": "0.1.7",
+  "version": "1.1.4",
   "type": "module",
   "scripts": {
     "dev": "vite",
     "build": "tsc && vite build",
     "preview": "vite preview",
     "lint": "eslint src/ --ext .ts,.tsx --max-warnings 0",
-    "type-check": "tsc --noEmit"
+    "type-check": "tsc --noEmit",
+    "test": "vitest run",
+    "test:watch": "vitest"
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@emotion/react": "^11.14.0",
@@ -25,6 +27,9 @@
     "zustand": "^5.0.3"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
+    "@testing-library/jest-dom": "^6.9.1",
+    "@testing-library/react": "^16.3.2",
+    "@testing-library/user-event": "^14.6.1",
     "@types/react": "^19.0.0",
     "@types/react-dom": "^19.0.0",
     "@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin": "^8.30.0",
@@ -32,7 +37,9 @@
     "@vitejs/plugin-react": "^4.4.1",
     "eslint": "^9.24.0",
     "eslint-plugin-react-hooks": "^5.0.0",
+    "jsdom": "^25.0.1",
     "typescript": "^5.8.3",
-    "vite": "^6.3.3"
+    "vite": "^6.3.3",
+    "vitest": "^2.1.9"
   }
 }

frontend/src/api/client.ts

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import type {
   CreateHostRequest,
   CreateJobRequest,
   CreateMaintenanceWindowRequest,
+  MaintenanceWindow,
   UpdateMaintenanceWindowRequest,
   Certificate,
   IssuedCert,
@@ -152,6 +153,8 @@ export const hostsApi = {
   list: (params?: Record<string, unknown>) => apiClient.get('/hosts', { params }),
   get: (id: string) => apiClient.get(`/hosts/${id}`),
   register: (body: CreateHostRequest) => apiClient.post('/hosts', body),
+  update: (id: string, body: Record<string, string | undefined>) =>
+    apiClient.put(`/hosts/${id}`, body),
   delete: (id: string) => apiClient.delete(`/hosts/${id}`),
   refresh: (id: string) => apiClient.post(`/hosts/${id}/refresh`),
 }
@@ -174,6 +177,10 @@ export const patchesApi = {
 
 // ── Maintenance Windows API ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
 export const maintenanceWindowsApi = {
+  /** Bulk: fetch ALL maintenance windows across every host in one request. */
+  listAll: () =>
+    apiClient.get<{ windows: MaintenanceWindow[] }>('/maintenance-windows'),
+  /** Per-host: fetch windows for a single host. */
   list: (hostId: string) =>
     apiClient.get(`/hosts/${hostId}/maintenance-windows`),
   create: (hostId: string, body: CreateMaintenanceWindowRequest) =>

frontend/src/components/AppLayout.tsx

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ export default function AppLayout() {
 
   const drawer = (
     <Box sx={{ height: '100%', display: 'flex', flexDirection: 'column' }}>
-      <Toolbar sx={{ justifyContent: 'center', py: 1.5 }}>
+      <Toolbar sx={{ justifyContent: 'center', py: 1.5, flexDirection: 'column' }}>
         <Typography variant="h6" fontWeight={700} sx={{
           background: 'linear-gradient(135deg, #42A5F5 30%, #26C6DA 100%)',
           WebkitBackgroundClip: 'text',
@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ export default function AppLayout() {
         }}>
           🐉 Patch Manager
         </Typography>
+        <Typography variant="caption" sx={{ color: 'text.secondary', opacity: 0.7, mt: -0.5 }}>
+          v{__APP_VERSION__}
+        </Typography>
       </Toolbar>
       <Divider />
       <Box sx={{ flex: 1, overflowY: 'auto', py: 1 }}>

frontend/src/pages/DashboardPage.tsx

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import {
   RestartAlt,
   Refresh as RefreshIcon,
   Security as SecurityIcon,
+  VerifiedUser as VerifiedUserIcon,
 } from '@mui/icons-material'
 import { fleetApi, certsApi } from '../api/client'
 import type { FleetStatus } from '../types'
@@ -237,6 +238,57 @@ export default function DashboardPage() {
               </Card>
             </Grid>
           </Grid>
+
+          {/* ── Row 4: CRL Status ── */}
+          <Card variant="outlined" sx={{ mt: 3 }}>
+            <CardContent>
+              <Box sx={{ display: 'flex', alignItems: 'center', gap: 1, mb: 2 }}>
+                <VerifiedUserIcon color="primary" />
+                <Typography variant="subtitle1" fontWeight={600}>
+                  CRL Status
+                </Typography>
+              </Box>
+              <Grid container spacing={2}>
+                <Grid size={{ xs: 6, sm: 3 }}>
+                  <Box textAlign="center">
+                    <Typography variant="h5" fontWeight={700} sx={{ color: '#2e7d32' }}>
+                      {status.crl_valid}
+                    </Typography>
+                    <Typography variant="caption" color="text.secondary">Valid</Typography>
+                  </Box>
+                </Grid>
+                <Grid size={{ xs: 6, sm: 3 }}>
+                  <Box textAlign="center">
+                    <Typography variant="h5" fontWeight={700} sx={{ color: '#ed6c02' }}>
+                      {status.crl_expired}
+                    </Typography>
+                    <Typography variant="caption" color="text.secondary">Expired</Typography>
+                  </Box>
+                </Grid>
+                <Grid size={{ xs: 6, sm: 3 }}>
+                  <Box textAlign="center">
+                    <Typography variant="h5" fontWeight={700} sx={{ color: '#ed6c02' }}>
+                      {status.crl_missing}
+                    </Typography>
+                    <Typography variant="caption" color="text.secondary">Missing</Typography>
+                  </Box>
+                </Grid>
+                <Grid size={{ xs: 6, sm: 3 }}>
+                  <Box textAlign="center">
+                    <Typography variant="h5" fontWeight={700} sx={{ color: '#d32f2f' }}>
+                      {status.crl_invalid}
+                    </Typography>
+                    <Typography variant="caption" color="text.secondary">Invalid</Typography>
+                  </Box>
+                </Grid>
+              </Grid>
+              {status.crl_not_reporting > 0 && (
+                <Typography variant="caption" color="text.secondary" sx={{ display: 'block', mt: 1 }}>
+                  {status.crl_not_reporting} host{status.crl_not_reporting !== 1 ? 's' : ''} not reporting CRL status
+                </Typography>
+              )}
+            </CardContent>
+          </Card>
         </Box>
       )}
     </Container>

frontend/src/pages/HostDetailPage.tsx

@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ import {
   Schedule as ScheduleIcon,
   VpnKey as VpnKeyIcon,
   ContentCopy as CopyIcon,
+  VerifiedUser as VerifiedUserIcon,
+  Security as SecurityIcon,
+  WarningAmber as WarningAmberIcon,
 } from '@mui/icons-material'
 import { apiClient, hostsApi, maintenanceWindowsApi, healthChecksApi, certsApi } from '../api/client'
 import { useAuthStore } from '../store/authStore'
@@ -614,6 +617,46 @@ export default function HostDetailPage() {
   // Hosts list for target_host_id dropdown
   const [hosts, setHosts] = useState<{ id: string; display_name: string; fqdn: string }[]>([])
 
+  // ── Host editing state ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  const [editing, setEditing] = useState(false)
+  const [editFqdn, setEditFqdn] = useState('')
+  const [editIp, setEditIp] = useState('')
+  const [editDisplayName, setEditDisplayName] = useState('')
+  const [savingHost, setSavingHost] = useState(false)
+
+  const enterEdit = () => {
+    setEditFqdn(String(host?.fqdn ?? ''))
+    setEditIp(String(host?.ip_address ?? ''))
+    setEditDisplayName(String(host?.display_name ?? ''))
+    setEditing(true)
+  }
+
+  const cancelEdit = () => {
+    setEditing(false)
+    setSavingHost(false)
+  }
+
+  const handleSaveHost = async () => {
+    if (!id) return
+    setSavingHost(true)
+    try {
+      const res = await hostsApi.update(id, {
+        fqdn: editFqdn !== String(host?.fqdn ?? '') ? editFqdn : undefined,
+        ip_address: editIp !== String(host?.ip_address ?? '') ? editIp : undefined,
+        display_name: editDisplayName !== String(host?.display_name ?? '') ? editDisplayName : undefined,
+      })
+      setHost(res.data)
+      setEditing(false)
+      showSnack('Host updated', 'success')
+    } catch (e: unknown) {
+      const msg = (e as { response?: { data?: { error?: { message?: string } } } })
+        ?.response?.data?.error?.message ?? 'Failed to update host'
+      showSnack(msg, 'error')
+    } finally {
+      setSavingHost(false)
+    }
+  }
+
   // ── Fetch host ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
   useEffect(() => {
     if (id === 'new') { setLoading(false); return }
@@ -899,7 +942,39 @@ export default function HostDetailPage() {
             {String(host?.fqdn ?? '')}
           </Typography>
           <Box sx={{ display: 'flex', alignItems: 'center', gap: 1 }}>
-            {canWrite && !certExists && (
+            {canWrite && !editing && (
+              <Button
+                variant="outlined"
+                size="small"
+                startIcon={<EditIcon />}
+                onClick={enterEdit}
+              >
+                Edit
+              </Button>
+            )}
+            {canWrite && editing && (
+              <>
+                <Button
+                  variant="contained"
+                  size="small"
+                  startIcon={<CheckCircleIcon />}
+                  onClick={handleSaveHost}
+                  disabled={savingHost}
+                >
+                  {savingHost ? <CircularProgress size={16} /> : 'Save'}
+                </Button>
+                <Button
+                  variant="outlined"
+                  size="small"
+                  startIcon={<CancelIcon />}
+                  onClick={cancelEdit}
+                  disabled={savingHost}
+                >
+                  Cancel
+                </Button>
+              </>
+            )}
+            {!editing && canWrite && !certExists && (
               <Button
                 variant="contained"
                 size="small"
@@ -909,7 +984,7 @@ export default function HostDetailPage() {
                 Issue Certificate
               </Button>
             )}
-            {canWrite && certExists && (
+            {!editing && canWrite && certExists && (
               <Button
                 variant="outlined"
                 size="small"
@@ -920,12 +995,36 @@ export default function HostDetailPage() {
                 Re-issue Certificate
               </Button>
             )}
-
           </Box>
         </Box>
         <Divider sx={{ mb: 2 }} />
         <Grid container spacing={2}>
-          {host && Object.entries(host).map(([k, v]) =>
+          {host && (<>
+            <Grid size={{ xs: 12, sm: 6, md: 4 }}>
+              <Typography variant="caption" color="text.secondary" display="block">FQDN</Typography>
+              {editing ? (
+                <TextField size="small" fullWidth value={editFqdn} onChange={e => setEditFqdn(e.target.value)} />
+              ) : (
+                <Typography variant="body2">{String(host.fqdn)}</Typography>
+              )}
+            </Grid>
+            <Grid size={{ xs: 12, sm: 6, md: 4 }}>
+              <Typography variant="caption" color="text.secondary" display="block">IP ADDRESS</Typography>
+              {editing ? (
+                <TextField size="small" fullWidth value={editIp} onChange={e => setEditIp(e.target.value)} />
+              ) : (
+                <Typography variant="body2">{String(host.ip_address)}</Typography>
+              )}
+            </Grid>
+            <Grid size={{ xs: 12, sm: 6, md: 4 }}>
+              <Typography variant="caption" color="text.secondary" display="block">DISPLAY NAME</Typography>
+              {editing ? (
+                <TextField size="small" fullWidth value={editDisplayName} onChange={e => setEditDisplayName(e.target.value)} />
+              ) : (
+                <Typography variant="body2">{String(host.display_name)}</Typography>
+              )}
+            </Grid>
+            {Object.entries(host).filter(([k]) => !['fqdn','ip_address','display_name'].includes(k)).map(([k, v]) =>
               v !== null && v !== '' ? (
                 <Grid size={{ xs: 12, sm: 6, md: 4 }} key={k}>
                   <Typography variant="caption" color="text.secondary" display="block">
@@ -935,9 +1034,57 @@ export default function HostDetailPage() {
                 </Grid>
               ) : null
             )}
+          </>)}
         </Grid>
       </Paper>
 
+      {/* ── CRL Status ─────────────────────────────────────────────────── */}
+      <Paper sx={{ p: 3, mb: 3 }}>
+        <Box sx={{ display: 'flex', alignItems: 'center', gap: 1, mb: 2 }}>
+          <VerifiedUserIcon color="primary" />
+          <Typography variant="h6" fontWeight={600}>CRL Status</Typography>
+        </Box>
+        <Divider sx={{ mb: 2 }} />
+        {host?.crl_status === undefined || host?.crl_status === null ? (
+          <Alert severity="info">
+            CRL status not available (agent version does not support CRL)
+          </Alert>
+        ) : (
+          <Grid container spacing={2}>
+            <Grid size={{ xs: 12, sm: 4 }}>
+              <Typography variant="caption" color="text.secondary" display="block">Status</Typography>
+              {host.crl_status === 'valid' ? (
+                <Chip icon={<VerifiedUserIcon />} label="Valid" color="success" size="small" />
+              ) : host.crl_status === 'expired' ? (
+                <Chip icon={<WarningAmberIcon />} label="Expired" color="warning" size="small" />
+              ) : host.crl_status === 'missing' ? (
+                <Chip icon={<WarningAmberIcon />} label="Missing" color="warning" size="small" />
+              ) : host.crl_status === 'invalid' ? (
+                <Chip icon={<SecurityIcon />} label="Invalid" color="error" size="small" />
+              ) : (
+                <Typography variant="body2">{String(host.crl_status)}</Typography>
+              )}
+            </Grid>
+            <Grid size={{ xs: 12, sm: 4 }}>
+              <Typography variant="caption" color="text.secondary" display="block">CRL Age</Typography>
+              <Typography variant="body2">
+                {host.crl_age_seconds !== null
+                  ? (() => { const s = Number(host.crl_age_seconds); return s < 3600 ? `${Math.round(s / 60)} minutes ago` : s < 86400 ? `${Math.round(s / 3600)} hours ago` : `${Math.round(s / 86400)} days ago`; })()
+                  : '—'}
+              </Typography>
+            </Grid>
+            <Grid size={{ xs: 12, sm: 4 }}>
+              <Typography variant="caption" color="text.secondary" display="block">Next Update</Typography>
+              <Typography variant="body2">
+                {host.crl_next_update
+                  ? new Date(host.crl_next_update as string).toLocaleString()
+                  : '—'}
+              </Typography>
+            </Grid>
+          </Grid>
+        )}
+      </Paper>
+
       {/* ── Maintenance Windows ──────────────────────────────────────────── */}
       <Paper sx={{ p: 3, mb: 3 }}>
         <Box sx={{ display: 'flex', alignItems: 'center', justifyContent: 'space-between', mb: 2 }}>