fix: BusyBox-compatible timing and set -e safety in shell scripts

chore: bump version to 1.0.0
fix: remove committed private keys and add gitleaks CI
2026-06-07 13:01:58 -05:00 · 2026-06-07 12:58:53 -05:00 · 2026-06-06 13:20:52 -05:00 · 2026-06-06 11:18:11 -05:00 · 2026-06-06 00:04:08 -05:00 · 2026-06-05 23:57:23 -05:00
26 changed files with 1011 additions and 389 deletions
--- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
@ -57,6 +57,18 @@ jobs:
      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
      - run: cargo install cargo-audit && cargo audit

+  gitleaks:
+    name: Secret scanning
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0
+      - name: Gitleaks
+        uses: gitleaks/gitleaks-action@v2
+        env:
+          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+
  frontend-lint:
    name: Frontend Lint
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -28,5 +28,9 @@ frontend/dist
 *.deb
 package-build/

-# TLS certificates - generated on first run
-crates/pm-agent-client/certs/
+# Private key material - NEVER commit
+*.key
+*.key.pem
+crates/pm-agent-client/certs/*.crt
+crates/pm-agent-client/certs/*.key
+crates/pm-agent-client/certs/*.pem
--- a/Cargo.lock
+++ b/Cargo.lock
@ -139,6 +139,16 @@ dependencies = [
 "syn",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "assert-json-diff"
+version = "2.0.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "47e4f2b81832e72834d7518d8487a0396a28cc408186a2e8854c0f98011faf12"
+dependencies = [
+ "serde",
+ "serde_json",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "async-trait"
 version = "0.1.89"
@ -475,6 +485,15 @@ version = "1.1.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "3d7b894f5411737b7867f4827955924d7c254fc9f4d91a6aad6b097804b1018b"

+[[package]]
+name = "colored"
+version = "3.1.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "faf9468729b8cbcea668e36183cb69d317348c2e08e994829fb56ebfdfbaac34"
+dependencies = [
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "concurrent-queue"
 version = "2.5.0"
@ -2043,7 +2062,7 @@ checksum = "f8ca58f447f06ed17d5fc4043ce1b10dd205e060fb3ce5b979b8ed8e59ff3f79"

 [[package]]
 name = "migrate-secrets"
-version = "0.1.9"
+version = "0.2.4"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
 "hex",
@ -2096,6 +2115,31 @@ dependencies = [
 "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "mockito"
+version = "1.7.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "90820618712cab19cfc46b274c6c22546a82affcb3c3bdf0f29e3db8e1bb92c0"
+dependencies = [
+ "assert-json-diff",
+ "bytes",
+ "colored",
+ "futures-core",
+ "http",
+ "http-body",
+ "http-body-util",
+ "hyper",
+ "hyper-util",
+ "log",
+ "pin-project-lite",
+ "rand 0.9.4",
+ "regex",
+ "serde_json",
+ "serde_urlencoded",
+ "similar",
+ "tokio",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "moxcms"
 version = "0.8.1"
@ -2548,7 +2592,7 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "pm-agent-client"
-version = "0.1.9"
+version = "0.2.4"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
 "chrono",
@ -2565,7 +2609,7 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "pm-auth"
-version = "0.1.9"
+version = "0.2.4"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
 "argon2",
@ -2593,7 +2637,7 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "pm-ca"
-version = "0.1.9"
+version = "0.2.4"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
 "chrono",
@ -2617,7 +2661,7 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "pm-core"
-version = "0.1.9"
+version = "0.2.4"
 dependencies = [
 "aes-gcm",
 "anyhow",
@ -2641,7 +2685,7 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "pm-reports"
-version = "0.1.9"
+version = "0.2.4"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
 "chrono",
@ -2661,7 +2705,7 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "pm-web"
-version = "0.1.9"
+version = "0.2.4"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
 "axum",
@ -2672,14 +2716,17 @@ dependencies = [
 "dashmap 6.1.0",
 "governor 0.6.3",
 "hex",
+ "http-body-util",
 "ipnet",
 "jsonwebtoken",
 "lettre",
+ "mockito",
 "pm-auth",
 "pm-ca",
 "pm-core",
 "pm-reports",
 "rand 0.8.6",
+ "rcgen",
 "reqwest",
 "rustls",
 "serde",
@ -2688,6 +2735,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "sqlx",
 "tempfile",
 "thiserror 2.0.18",
+ "time",
 "tokio",
 "tower",
 "tower-http",
@ -2702,7 +2750,7 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "pm-worker"
-version = "0.1.9"
+version = "0.2.4"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
 "chrono",
@ -3082,6 +3130,18 @@ dependencies = [
 "thiserror 2.0.18",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "regex"
+version = "1.12.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "e10754a14b9137dd7b1e3e5b0493cc9171fdd105e0ab477f51b72e7f3ac0e276"
+dependencies = [
+ "aho-corasick",
+ "memchr",
+ "regex-automata",
+ "regex-syntax",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "regex-automata"
 version = "0.4.14"
@ -3521,6 +3581,12 @@ version = "0.3.9"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "703d5c7ef118737c72f1af64ad2f6f8c5e1921f818cdcb97b8fe6fc69bf66214"

+[[package]]
+name = "similar"
+version = "2.7.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "bbbb5d9659141646ae647b42fe094daf6c6192d1620870b449d9557f748b2daa"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "simple_asn1"
 version = "0.6.4"
--- a/Cargo.toml
+++ b/Cargo.toml
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ members = [
 ]

 [workspace.package]
-version = "0.2.1"
+version = "1.0.0"
 edition = "2021"
 authors = ["Echo <echo@moon-dragon.us>"]
 license = "MIT"
--- a/crates/pm-agent-client/certs/README.md
+++ b/crates/pm-agent-client/certs/README.md
@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Agent Client Certificates
+
+**⚠️ Private keys are NOT committed to version control.**
+
+This directory holds mTLS certificates used by `pm-agent-client` for testing.
+The entire directory is excluded from git via `.gitignore`.
+
+## Generating Test Certificates
+
+Certificates are generated automatically on first run by the `pm-ca` service,
+or you can generate them manually for development:
+
+```bash
+# Create certs directory if it doesn't exist
+mkdir -p crates/pm-agent-client/certs
+
+# Generate using the pm-ca service (preferred)
+# Or copy from /etc/patch-manager/certs/ on a deployed host
+```
+
+## Production Deployment
+
+Production certificates are managed by `pm-ca` at `/etc/patch-manager/certs/`.
+The `pm-agent-client` reads certificates from file paths configured in
+`config.toml` (`agent_client_cert_path`, `agent_client_key_path`, `ca_cert_path`).
+
+## Security
+
+- **Never commit private keys** (`*.key`, `*.key.pem`) to version control
+- The `gitleaks` CI check scans for accidentally committed secrets
+- See `SECURITY.md` and `docs/security-review.md` for full details
--- a/crates/pm-agent-client/certs/ca.crt
+++ b/crates/pm-agent-client/certs/ca.crt
@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIBkTCB+wIJAKHBFPtE1bEMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMBExDzANBgNVBAMMBnRlc3Rj
-YTAeFw0yNjA0MjcxNDAwMDBaFw0yNzA0MjcxNDAwMDBaMBExDzANBgNVBAMMBnRlc3Rj
-YTBcMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA0sAMEgCQQC5N8fT9nYdPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N
-8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0NAgMBA
-AGjUDBOMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQYXb4rfCz0RH8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQY
-Xb4rfCz0RH8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPzAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUA
-A0EAq1rryuD9f8fT9nYdPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N
-8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj
-0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8d
-Pj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
--- a/crates/pm-agent-client/certs/client.crt
+++ b/crates/pm-agent-client/certs/client.crt
@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIBkTCB+wIJAKHBFPtE1bEMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMBExDzANBgNVBAMMBnRlc3Rj
-YTAeFw0yNjA0MjcxNDAwMDBaFw0yNzA0MjcxNDAwMDBaMBExDzANBgNVBAMMBnRlc3Rj
-YTBcMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA0sAMEgCQQC5N8fT9nYdPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N
-8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0NAgMBA
-AGjUDBOMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQYXb4rfCz0RH8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQY
-Xb4rfCz0RH8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPzAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUA
-A0EAq1rryuD9f8fT9nYdPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N
-8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj
-0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8d
-Pj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N8dPj0N
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
--- a/crates/pm-agent-client/certs/client.key
+++ b/crates/pm-agent-client/certs/client.key
@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
-MIIBVAIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAT4wggE6AgEAAkEAuTfH0/Z2HT49DfHT
-49DfHT49DfHT49DfHT49DfHT49DfHT49DfHT49DfHT49DfHT49DfHT49DfHT49Df
-HT49DfHT49DfHT49DfHT49DfHQIDAQABAkEArWvK64P1/x9P2dh0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0
-+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ
-3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x
-0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0
-+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+PQ3x0+
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
--- a/crates/pm-agent-client/src/client.rs
+++ b/crates/pm-agent-client/src/client.rs
@ -6,12 +6,17 @@
 //! use pm_agent_client::client::AgentClient;
 //!
 //! # async fn example() -> Result<(), pm_agent_client::error::AgentClientError> {
+//! // Load certificates from files (never hardcode or include_bytes! private keys)
+//! let client_cert = std::fs::read("/etc/patch-manager/certs/client.crt")?;
+//! let client_key = std::fs::read("/etc/patch-manager/certs/client.key")?;
+//! let ca_cert = std::fs::read("/etc/patch-manager/ca/ca.crt")?;
+//!
 //! let client = AgentClient::new(
 //!     "192.168.1.10",
 //!     12443,
-//!     include_bytes!("../certs/client.crt"),
-//!     include_bytes!("../certs/client.key"),
-//!     include_bytes!("../certs/ca.crt"),
+//!     &client_cert,
+//!     &client_key,
+//!     &ca_cert,
 //! )?;
 //!
 //! let health = client.health().await?;
--- a/crates/pm-agent-client/src/lib.rs
+++ b/crates/pm-agent-client/src/lib.rs
@ -10,12 +10,17 @@
 //! use pm_agent_client::AgentClient;
 //!
 //! # async fn run() -> Result<(), pm_agent_client::AgentClientError> {
+//! // Load certificates from files (never hardcode or include_bytes! private keys)
+//! let client_cert = std::fs::read("/etc/patch-manager/certs/client.crt")?;
+//! let client_key = std::fs::read("/etc/patch-manager/certs/client.key")?;
+//! let ca_cert = std::fs::read("/etc/patch-manager/ca/ca.crt")?;
+//!
 //! let client = AgentClient::new(
 //!     "10.0.1.5",
 //!     12443,
-//!     include_bytes!("../certs/client.crt"),
-//!     include_bytes!("../certs/client.key"),
-//!     include_bytes!("../certs/ca.crt"),
+//!     &client_cert,
+//!     &client_key,
+//!     &ca_cert,
 //! )?;
 //!
 //! let health = client.health().await?;
--- a/crates/pm-auth/src/session.rs
+++ b/crates/pm-auth/src/session.rs
@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ pub async fn login(
    let user: Option<DbUser> = sqlx::query_as(
        r#"
        SELECT id, username, display_name, role, auth_provider,
-               password_hash, totp_secret, mfa_enabled, is_active, force_password_reset,
+               password_hash, totp_secret_encrypted, totp_secret_nonce, mfa_enabled, is_active, force_password_reset,
               failed_login_attempts, locked_until
        FROM users
        WHERE username = $1 AND auth_provider = 'local'
@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ pub async fn refresh_session(
    let user: DbUser = sqlx::query_as(
        r#"
        SELECT id, username, display_name, role, auth_provider,
-               password_hash, totp_secret, mfa_enabled, is_active, force_password_reset,
+               password_hash, totp_secret_encrypted, totp_secret_nonce, mfa_enabled, is_active, force_password_reset,
               failed_login_attempts, locked_until
        FROM users WHERE id = $1
        "#,
--- a/crates/pm-core/src/models.rs
+++ b/crates/pm-core/src/models.rs
@ -178,8 +178,10 @@ pub enum EnrollmentStatusResponse {
    Pending,
    Approved {
        ca_crt: String,
+        ca_chain: String,
        server_crt: String,
        server_key: String,
+        crl_pem: String,
    },
    Denied,
    NotFound,
--- a/crates/pm-web/Cargo.toml
+++ b/crates/pm-web/Cargo.toml
@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ edition.workspace = true
 authors.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true

+[lib]
+name = "pm_web"
+path = "src/lib.rs"
+
 [[bin]]
 name = "pm-web"
 path = "src/main.rs"
@ -46,4 +50,9 @@ url = { workspace = true }
 urlencoding = "2"

 [dev-dependencies]
+tower = { version = "0.5", features = ["util"] }
+http-body-util = "0.1"
+mockito = "1"
 tempfile = "3"
+rcgen = { workspace = true }
+time = { workspace = true }
--- a/crates/pm-web/src/lib.rs
+++ b/crates/pm-web/src/lib.rs
@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+//! pm-web — Linux Patch Manager web server (library crate).
+//!
+//! Re-exports [`AppState`], [`build_router`], and [`health_handler`] so that
+//! integration tests can construct a test application without depending on
+//! the binary entry-point.
+
+pub mod routes;
+pub mod secret_key;
+
+use axum::{extract::State, http::StatusCode, middleware, response::Json, routing::get, Router};
+use dashmap::DashMap;
+use pm_auth::{
+    password::hash_password,
+    rbac::{require_auth, AuthConfig},
+};
+use pm_core::{config::AppConfig, models::ApprovedEntry, request_id::request_id_middleware};
+use rand::Rng;
+use routes::sso::{OidcCache, SsoHandoff, SsoSession};
+use routes::ws::WsTicket;
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use tokio::sync::Mutex;
+use tower_governor::{
+    governor::GovernorConfigBuilder, key_extractor::SmartIpKeyExtractor, GovernorLayer,
+};
+use tower_http::{
+    services::{ServeDir, ServeFile},
+    trace::TraceLayer,
+};
+
+/// Placeholder Argon2id hash prefix used in the seed admin migration (issue #8).
+/// Detecting this prefix means the admin password has not been bootstrapped yet.
+const ADMIN_PLACEHOLDER_HASH_PREFIX: &str = "$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=3,p=1$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+
+/// Bootstrap the default admin account with a random password.
+///
+/// On first startup after a fresh install, the `users` table contains the seed
+/// admin row with a clearly-invalid placeholder hash (cannot validate any password).
+/// This function detects that placeholder, generates a cryptographically random
+/// 24-character password, hashes it with Argon2id, and UPDATEs the admin row.
+///
+/// The plaintext password is printed **once** to stderr (visible in `systemctl status`
+/// or `journalctl`) and is never stored on disk.
+///
+/// If the admin row already has a real hash, this function is a no-op.
+pub async fn bootstrap_admin_password(pool: &sqlx::PgPool) {
+    let result: Option<String> = sqlx::query_scalar(
+        "SELECT password_hash FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND auth_provider = 'local'",
+    )
+    .fetch_optional(pool)
+    .await
+    .unwrap_or(None);
+
+    let current_hash = match result {
+        Some(h) => h,
+        None => return,
+    };
+
+    if !current_hash.starts_with(ADMIN_PLACEHOLDER_HASH_PREFIX) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    let password: String = rand::thread_rng()
+        .sample_iter(&rand::distributions::Alphanumeric)
+        .take(24)
+        .map(char::from)
+        .collect();
+
+    let new_hash = match hash_password(&password) {
+        Ok(h) => h,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to hash bootstrap admin password");
+            return;
+        },
+    };
+
+    let rows = sqlx::query(
+        r#"UPDATE users
+            SET password_hash = $1
+            WHERE username = 'admin'
+              AND auth_provider = 'local'
+              AND password_hash LIKE '$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=3,p=1$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA%'"#,
+    )
+    .bind(&new_hash)
+    .execute(pool)
+    .await;
+
+    match rows {
+        Ok(result) if result.rows_affected() == 1 => {
+            eprintln!();
+            eprintln!("========================================");
+            eprintln!("  INITIAL ADMIN PASSWORD (shown once)");
+            eprintln!("  Username: admin");
+            eprintln!("  Password: {}", password);
+            eprintln!();
+            eprintln!("  You will be forced to change this on first login.");
+            eprintln!("  If lost, restart the service to generate a new one.");
+            eprintln!("========================================");
+            eprintln!();
+            tracing::info!("Bootstrap admin password generated and set");
+        },
+        Ok(_) => {
+            tracing::info!("Admin password already bootstrapped (concurrent or prior)");
+        },
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to update admin password hash");
+        },
+    }
+}
+
+/// Shared application state threaded through Axum.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct AppState {
+    pub db: sqlx::PgPool,
+    pub config: Arc<AppConfig>,
+    pub signing_key_pem: String,
+    pub auth_config: Arc<AuthConfig>,
+    /// In-memory store for single-use WebSocket authentication tickets.
+    pub ws_tickets: Arc<DashMap<String, WsTicket>>,
+    /// In-memory store for SSO PKCE sessions (state → code_verifier).
+    pub sso_sessions: Arc<DashMap<String, SsoSession>>,
+    /// In-memory store for SSO handoff codes (single-use, 60s TTL).
+    /// See `tasks/sso-token-handoff-spec.md` §4.1.
+    pub sso_handoffs: Arc<DashMap<String, SsoHandoff>>,
+    /// Cached OIDC discovery document and JWKS for SSO id_token verification.
+    pub oidc_cache: Arc<Mutex<OidcCache>>,
+    /// Internal certificate authority for mTLS client cert issuance.
+    pub ca: Arc<pm_ca::CertAuthority>,
+    /// Short-lived cache for approved enrollment PKI bundles.
+    ///
+    /// Entries are single-use (removed on retrieval) and expire after
+    /// [`ENROLLMENT_BUNDLE_TTL_SECS`](pm_core::models::ENROLLMENT_BUNDLE_TTL_SECS).
+    pub approved_enrollments: Arc<DashMap<String, ApprovedEntry>>,
+}
+
+/// Construct the full Axum router.
+pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
+    let static_dir = state.config.server.static_dir.clone();
+    let auth_config = state.auth_config.clone();
+    let rl = &state.config.rate_limit;
+
+    // Enrollment rate limiting: strict (5 req/min per IP, burst 3)
+    let enrollment_governor = Arc::new(
+        GovernorConfigBuilder::default()
+            .key_extractor(SmartIpKeyExtractor)
+            .per_millisecond(12_000)
+            .burst_size(rl.enrollment_burst)
+            .finish()
+            .expect("Invalid enrollment governor config"),
+    );
+
+    // Auth rate limiting: moderate (20 req/min per IP, burst 10)
+    let auth_governor = Arc::new(
+        GovernorConfigBuilder::default()
+            .key_extractor(SmartIpKeyExtractor)
+            .per_millisecond(3_000)
+            .burst_size(rl.auth_burst)
+            .finish()
+            .expect("Invalid auth governor config"),
+    );
+
+    // API rate limiting: normal (120 req/min per IP, burst 30)
+    let api_governor = Arc::new(
+        GovernorConfigBuilder::default()
+            .key_extractor(SmartIpKeyExtractor)
+            .per_millisecond(500)
+            .burst_size(rl.api_burst)
+            .finish()
+            .expect("Invalid API governor config"),
+    );
+
+    // Enrollment routes with strict per-IP rate limiting
+    let enrollment_router =
+        routes::enrollment::router().layer(GovernorLayer::new(enrollment_governor));
+
+    // Public auth routes with moderate per-IP rate limiting
+    let auth_public_router =
+        routes::auth::public_router().layer(GovernorLayer::new(Arc::clone(&auth_governor)));
+
+    // SSO routes with moderate per-IP rate limiting
+    let sso_public_router =
+        routes::sso::public_router().layer(GovernorLayer::new(Arc::clone(&auth_governor)));
+    let sso_azure_router =
+        routes::sso::azure_compat_router().layer(GovernorLayer::new(auth_governor));
+
+    // All protected API routes — require valid JWT, with normal per-IP rate limiting
+    let protected_api = Router::new()
+        .nest("/auth", routes::auth::protected_router())
+        .nest("/hosts", routes::hosts::router())
+        .nest("/hosts", routes::ca::host_cert_router())
+        .nest("/groups", routes::groups::router())
+        .nest("/users", routes::users::router())
+        .nest("/discovery", routes::discovery::router())
+        .nest("/status", routes::status::router())
+        .nest("/jobs", routes::jobs::router())
+        .nest(
+            "/hosts/{host_id}/maintenance-windows",
+            routes::maintenance_windows::router(),
+        )
+        .nest(
+            "/maintenance-windows",
+            routes::maintenance_windows::all_windows_router(),
+        )
+        .nest("/ca", routes::ca::ca_router())
+        .nest("/certificates", routes::ca::certs_router())
+        .merge(routes::ws::ticket_router())
+        .nest("/reports", routes::reports::router())
+        .nest(
+            "/hosts/{host_id}/health-checks",
+            routes::health_checks::router(),
+        )
+        .nest("/settings", routes::settings::router())
+        .nest("/admin", routes::enrollment::admin_router())
+        .layer(GovernorLayer::new(api_governor))
+        .route_layer(middleware::from_fn(move |req, next| {
+            let auth_config = auth_config.clone();
+            require_auth(auth_config, req, next)
+        }));
+
+    Router::new()
+        .route("/status/health", get(health_handler))
+        .nest("/api/v1/auth", auth_public_router)
+        .nest("/api/v1", enrollment_router)
+        .nest("/api/v1", routes::pki::router())
+        .nest("/api/v1/auth/sso", sso_public_router)
+        .nest("/api/v1/auth/azure", sso_azure_router)
+        .nest("/api/v1", protected_api)
+        .merge(routes::ws::ws_router())
+        .fallback_service(
+            ServeDir::new(&static_dir)
+                .append_index_html_on_directories(true)
+                .fallback(ServeFile::new(format!("{}/index.html", static_dir))),
+        )
+        .layer(middleware::from_fn(request_id_middleware))
+        .layer(TraceLayer::new_for_http())
+        .with_state(state)
+}
+
+pub async fn health_handler(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Result<Json<Value>, StatusCode> {
+    let db_ok = sqlx::query("SELECT 1").execute(&state.db).await.is_ok();
+    let status = if db_ok { "healthy" } else { "degraded" };
+    let body = json!({ "service": "patch-manager-web", "version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"), "status": status, "database": if db_ok { "ok" } else { "error" } });
+    if db_ok {
+        Ok(Json(body))
+    } else {
+        Err(StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE)
+    }
+}
--- a/crates/pm-web/src/main.rs
+++ b/crates/pm-web/src/main.rs
@ -1,145 +1,13 @@
-//! pm-web — Linux Patch Manager web server.
+//! pm-web — Linux Patch Manager web server (binary entry-point).

-mod routes;
-
-mod secret_key;
-
-use axum::{extract::State, http::StatusCode, middleware, response::Json, routing::get, Router};
-use axum_server::tls_rustls::RustlsConfig;
 use dashmap::DashMap;
-use pm_auth::{
-    jwt,
-    password::hash_password,
-    rbac::{require_auth, AuthConfig},
-};
-use pm_core::{
-    config::AppConfig, db, logging, models::ApprovedEntry, request_id::request_id_middleware,
-};
-use rand::Rng;
-use routes::sso::{OidcCache, SsoHandoff, SsoSession};
-use routes::ws::WsTicket;
-use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use pm_auth::{jwt, rbac::AuthConfig};
+use pm_core::{config::AppConfig, db, models::ApprovedEntry};
+use pm_web::routes::sso::{OidcCache, SsoHandoff, SsoSession};
+use pm_web::routes::ws::WsTicket;
+use pm_web::{bootstrap_admin_password, build_router, AppState};
 use std::{net::SocketAddr, sync::Arc, time::Duration};
 use tokio::sync::Mutex;
-use tower_governor::{
-    governor::GovernorConfigBuilder, key_extractor::SmartIpKeyExtractor, GovernorLayer,
-};
-use tower_http::{
-    services::{ServeDir, ServeFile},
-    trace::TraceLayer,
-};
-
-/// Placeholder Argon2id hash prefix used in the seed admin migration (issue #8).
-/// Detecting this prefix means the admin password has not been bootstrapped yet.
-const ADMIN_PLACEHOLDER_HASH_PREFIX: &str = "$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=3,p=1$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
-
-/// Bootstrap the default admin account with a random password.
-///
-/// On first startup after a fresh install, the `users` table contains the seed
-/// admin row with a clearly-invalid placeholder hash (cannot validate any password).
-/// This function detects that placeholder, generates a cryptographically random
-/// 24-character password, hashes it with Argon2id, and UPDATEs the admin row.
-///
-/// The plaintext password is printed **once** to stderr (visible in `systemctl status`
-/// or `journalctl`) and is never stored on disk.
-///
-/// If the admin row already has a real hash, this function is a no-op.
-async fn bootstrap_admin_password(pool: &sqlx::PgPool) {
-    // Check if the admin account still has the placeholder hash.
-    let result: Option<String> = sqlx::query_scalar(
-        "SELECT password_hash FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND auth_provider = 'local'",
-    )
-    .fetch_optional(pool)
-    .await
-    .unwrap_or(None);
-
-    let current_hash = match result {
-        Some(h) => h,
-        None => return, // No admin row — nothing to bootstrap.
-    };
-
-    if !current_hash.starts_with(ADMIN_PLACEHOLDER_HASH_PREFIX) {
-        // Admin already has a real password — nothing to do.
-        return;
-    }
-
-    // Generate a 24-character random alphanumeric password.
-    let password: String = rand::thread_rng()
-        .sample_iter(&rand::distributions::Alphanumeric)
-        .take(24)
-        .map(char::from)
-        .collect();
-
-    // Hash it with the application's Argon2id parameters.
-    let new_hash = match hash_password(&password) {
-        Ok(h) => h,
-        Err(e) => {
-            tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to hash bootstrap admin password");
-            return;
-        },
-    };
-
-    // Replace the placeholder hash with the real one.
-    // The WHERE clause matches the placeholder prefix to ensure idempotency.
-    let rows = sqlx::query(
-        r#"UPDATE users
-            SET password_hash = $1
-            WHERE username = 'admin'
-              AND auth_provider = 'local'
-              AND password_hash LIKE '$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=3,p=1$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA%'"#,
-    )
-    .bind(&new_hash)
-    .execute(pool)
-    .await;
-
-    match rows {
-        Ok(result) if result.rows_affected() == 1 => {
-            eprintln!();
-            eprintln!("========================================");
-            eprintln!("  INITIAL ADMIN PASSWORD (shown once)");
-            eprintln!("  Username: admin");
-            eprintln!("  Password: {}", password);
-            eprintln!();
-            eprintln!("  You will be forced to change this on first login.");
-            eprintln!("  If lost, restart the service to generate a new one.");
-            eprintln!("========================================");
-            eprintln!();
-            tracing::info!("Bootstrap admin password generated and set");
-        },
-        Ok(_) => {
-            // Rows affected != 1 — concurrent bootstrap or already replaced.
-            tracing::info!("Admin password already bootstrapped (concurrent or prior)");
-        },
-        Err(e) => {
-            tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to update admin password hash");
-        },
-    }
-}
-
-/// Shared application state threaded through Axum.
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct AppState {
-    pub db: sqlx::PgPool,
-    pub config: Arc<AppConfig>,
-    pub signing_key_pem: String,
-    pub auth_config: Arc<AuthConfig>,
-    /// In-memory store for single-use WebSocket authentication tickets.
-    pub ws_tickets: Arc<DashMap<String, WsTicket>>,
-    /// In-memory store for SSO PKCE sessions (state → code_verifier).
-    pub sso_sessions: Arc<DashMap<String, SsoSession>>,
-    /// In-memory store for SSO handoff codes (single-use, 60s TTL).
-    /// See `tasks/sso-token-handoff-spec.md` §4.1.
-    pub sso_handoffs: Arc<DashMap<String, SsoHandoff>>,
-    /// Cached OIDC discovery document and JWKS for SSO id_token verification.
-    pub oidc_cache: Arc<Mutex<OidcCache>>,
-    /// Internal certificate authority for mTLS client cert issuance.
-    pub ca: Arc<pm_ca::CertAuthority>,
-    /// Short-lived cache for approved enrollment PKI bundles.
-    ///
-    /// Entries are single-use (removed on retrieval) and expire after
-    /// [`ENROLLMENT_BUNDLE_TTL_SECS`](pm_core::models::ENROLLMENT_BUNDLE_TTL_SECS).
-    pub approved_enrollments: Arc<DashMap<String, ApprovedEntry>>,
-}

 #[tokio::main]
 async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
@ -156,7 +24,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        AppConfig::default()
    });

-    logging::init(&config.logging);
+    pm_core::logging::init(&config.logging);
    tracing::info!(
        version = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
        "patch-manager-web starting"
@ -183,12 +51,10 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    let pool = db::init_pool(&config.database).await?;
    db::run_migrations(&pool).await?;

-    // Bootstrap admin password if the seed admin still has the placeholder hash (issue #8).
+    // Bootstrap admin password if the seed admin still has the placeholder hash.
    bootstrap_admin_password(&pool).await;

    // Initialise the internal CA using the configured certificate paths.
-    // The CA certificate and key must exist at the configured locations and be
-    // unencrypted PEM. If absent, a new CA is generated in that directory.
    let ca_base = std::path::Path::new(&config.security.ca_cert_path)
        .parent()
        .expect("CA certificate path must have a parent directory");
@ -223,7 +89,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        });
    }

-    // Background task: purge expired SSO sessions every 60 seconds (sessions older than 10 minutes).
+    // Background task: purge expired SSO sessions every 60 seconds.
    {
        let sessions = sso_sessions.clone();
        tokio::spawn(async move {
@ -243,8 +109,6 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    }

    // Background task: purge expired approved enrollment PKI bundles.
-    // Entries are also removed on first retrieval (single-use), so this
-    // task only cleans up bundles that were never picked up by the agent.
    {
        let approved = approved_enrollments.clone();
        tokio::spawn(async move {
@ -262,9 +126,6 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    }

    // Background task: purge expired SSO handoff codes every 60 seconds.
-    // See `tasks/sso-token-handoff-spec.md` §4.3. Handoffs are also
-    // atomically removed on exchange (single-use), so this task only
-    // cleans up codes that the SPA never POSTed back for.
    {
        let handoffs = sso_handoffs.clone();
        tokio::spawn(async move {
@ -306,7 +167,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    let tls_key = std::path::Path::new(&config.security.web_tls_key_path);

    if tls_cert.exists() && tls_key.exists() {
-        let tls_config = RustlsConfig::from_pem_file(
+        let tls_config = axum_server::tls_rustls::RustlsConfig::from_pem_file(
            &config.security.web_tls_cert_path,
            &config.security.web_tls_key_path,
        )
@ -338,149 +199,3 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {

    Ok(())
 }
-
-/// Construct the full Axum router.
-pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
-    let static_dir = state.config.server.static_dir.clone();
-    let auth_config = state.auth_config.clone();
-    let rl = &state.config.rate_limit;
-
-    // Enrollment rate limiting: strict (5 req/min per IP, burst 3)
-    // Uses SmartIpKeyExtractor to respect X-Forwarded-For behind reverse proxy.
-    // governor quota: 1 request per 12_000ms = ~5/min sustained
-    let enrollment_governor = Arc::new(
-        GovernorConfigBuilder::default()
-            .key_extractor(SmartIpKeyExtractor)
-            .per_millisecond(12_000)
-            .burst_size(rl.enrollment_burst)
-            .finish()
-            .expect("Invalid enrollment governor config"),
-    );
-
-    // Auth rate limiting: moderate (20 req/min per IP, burst 10)
-    // Uses SmartIpKeyExtractor to respect X-Forwarded-For behind reverse proxy.
-    // governor quota: 1 request per 3_000ms = ~20/min sustained
-    let auth_governor = Arc::new(
-        GovernorConfigBuilder::default()
-            .key_extractor(SmartIpKeyExtractor)
-            .per_millisecond(3_000)
-            .burst_size(rl.auth_burst)
-            .finish()
-            .expect("Invalid auth governor config"),
-    );
-
-    // API rate limiting: normal (120 req/min per IP, burst 30)
-    // Uses SmartIpKeyExtractor to respect X-Forwarded-For behind reverse proxy.
-    // governor quota: 1 request per 500ms = ~120/min sustained
-    let api_governor = Arc::new(
-        GovernorConfigBuilder::default()
-            .key_extractor(SmartIpKeyExtractor)
-            .per_millisecond(500)
-            .burst_size(rl.api_burst)
-            .finish()
-            .expect("Invalid API governor config"),
-    );
-
-    // Enrollment routes with strict per-IP rate limiting
-    let enrollment_router =
-        routes::enrollment::router().layer(GovernorLayer::new(enrollment_governor));
-
-    // Public auth routes with moderate per-IP rate limiting
-    let auth_public_router =
-        routes::auth::public_router().layer(GovernorLayer::new(Arc::clone(&auth_governor)));
-
-    // SSO routes with moderate per-IP rate limiting
-    let sso_public_router =
-        routes::sso::public_router().layer(GovernorLayer::new(Arc::clone(&auth_governor)));
-    let sso_azure_router =
-        routes::sso::azure_compat_router().layer(GovernorLayer::new(auth_governor));
-
-    // All protected API routes — require valid JWT, with normal per-IP rate limiting
-    let protected_api = Router::new()
-        // Auth: MFA setup/verify
-        // Auth: MFA setup/verify/disable (nested under /auth so paths are /api/v1/auth/mfa/*)
-        .nest("/auth", routes::auth::protected_router())
-        // Hosts
-        .nest("/hosts", routes::hosts::router())
-        // Host-scoped certificate endpoints (merged separately to avoid conflict)
-        .nest("/hosts", routes::ca::host_cert_router())
-        // Groups
-        .nest("/groups", routes::groups::router())
-        // Users
-        .nest("/users", routes::users::router())
-        // Discovery
-        .nest("/discovery", routes::discovery::router())
-        // Fleet status
-        .nest("/status", routes::status::router())
-        // Patch jobs
-        .nest("/jobs", routes::jobs::router())
-        // Maintenance windows (nested under hosts path param)
-        .nest(
-            "/hosts/{host_id}/maintenance-windows",
-            routes::maintenance_windows::router(),
-        )
-        // Maintenance windows — bulk list-all endpoint
-        .nest(
-            "/maintenance-windows",
-            routes::maintenance_windows::all_windows_router(),
-        )
-        // CA root certificate download
-        .nest("/ca", routes::ca::ca_router())
-        // Certificate list / renew / revoke
-        .nest("/certificates", routes::ca::certs_router())
-        // WS ticket issuance (JWT-protected — ticket returned to browser, then used for WS upgrade)
-        .merge(routes::ws::ticket_router())
-        // Reports
-        .nest("/reports", routes::reports::router())
-        .nest(
-            "/hosts/{host_id}/health-checks",
-            routes::health_checks::router(),
-        )
-        // Settings (admin-only)
-        .nest("/settings", routes::settings::router())
-        // Admin enrollment routes (JWT protected, Admin role enforced)
-        .nest("/admin", routes::enrollment::admin_router())
-        // Apply rate limiting then auth middleware
-        .layer(GovernorLayer::new(api_governor))
-        .route_layer(middleware::from_fn(move |req, next| {
-            let auth_config = auth_config.clone();
-            require_auth(auth_config, req, next)
-        }));
-
-    Router::new()
-        .route("/status/health", get(health_handler))
-        // Public auth routes (rate-limited, no JWT)
-        .nest("/api/v1/auth", auth_public_router)
-        // Public enrollment endpoints (rate-limited, no JWT)
-        .nest("/api/v1", enrollment_router)
-        // Public PKI endpoints (CRL distribution, no JWT — CRLs are self-authenticating)
-        .nest("/api/v1", routes::pki::router())
-        // Public SSO routes (rate-limited, no JWT)
-        .nest("/api/v1/auth/sso", sso_public_router)
-        // Public Azure SSO routes (rate-limited, no JWT)
-        .nest("/api/v1/auth/azure", sso_azure_router)
-        // Protected API routes (JWT required, rate-limited)
-        .nest("/api/v1", protected_api)
-        // WebSocket browser endpoint — ticket-authenticated, outside JWT middleware
-        .merge(routes::ws::ws_router())
-        // Serve React SPA
-        .fallback_service(
-            ServeDir::new(&static_dir)
-                .append_index_html_on_directories(true)
-                .fallback(ServeFile::new(format!("{}/index.html", static_dir))),
-        )
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(request_id_middleware))
-        .layer(TraceLayer::new_for_http())
-        .with_state(state)
-}
-
-async fn health_handler(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Result<Json<Value>, StatusCode> {
-    let db_ok = sqlx::query("SELECT 1").execute(&state.db).await.is_ok();
-    let status = if db_ok { "healthy" } else { "degraded" };
-    let body = json!({ "service": "patch-manager-web", "version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"), "status": status, "database": if db_ok { "ok" } else { "error" } });
-    if db_ok {
-        Ok(Json(body))
-    } else {
-        Err(StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE)
-    }
-}
--- a/crates/pm-web/src/routes/auth.rs
+++ b/crates/pm-web/src/routes/auth.rs
@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ async fn disable_mfa(
        ));
    }

-    sqlx::query("UPDATE users SET totp_secret = NULL, mfa_enabled = FALSE WHERE id = $1")
+    sqlx::query("UPDATE users SET totp_secret_encrypted = NULL, totp_secret_nonce = NULL, mfa_enabled = FALSE WHERE id = $1")
        .bind(auth_user.user_id)
        .execute(&state.db)
        .await
--- a/crates/pm-web/src/routes/enrollment.rs
+++ b/crates/pm-web/src/routes/enrollment.rs
@ -111,8 +111,10 @@ async fn enroll_status(
        }
        return Ok(Json(EnrollmentStatusResponse::Approved {
            ca_crt: entry.pki.ca_crt.clone(),
+            ca_chain: entry.pki.ca_chain.clone(),
            server_crt: entry.pki.server_crt.clone(),
            server_key: entry.pki.server_key.clone(),
+            crl_pem: entry.pki.crl_pem.clone(),
        }));
    }

@ -186,7 +188,7 @@ async fn approve_enrollment(

    // Check for FQDN/IP collision in hosts table
    if let Some(existing_host) = sqlx::query_as::<_, Host>(
-        "SELECT id, fqdn, ip_address::text, display_name, os_family, os_name, arch, agent_version, health_status, last_health_at, last_patch_at, agent_port, notes, registered_at, updated_at FROM hosts WHERE fqdn = $1 OR ip_address = $2::inet"
+        "SELECT id, fqdn, ip_address::text, display_name, os_family, os_name, arch, agent_version, health_status, last_health_at, last_patch_at, agent_port, notes, registered_at, updated_at, crl_status, crl_age_seconds, crl_next_update FROM hosts WHERE fqdn = $1 OR ip_address = $2::inet"
    )
    .bind(&enrollment_request.fqdn)
    .bind(enrollment_request.ip_address.to_string())
--- a/crates/pm-web/src/routes/hosts.rs
+++ b/crates/pm-web/src/routes/hosts.rs
@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ async fn list_hosts(
                     THEN 'some_unhealthy'
                   ELSE 'all_healthy'
                 END AS health_check_status,
-                   h.registered_at
+                   h.registered_at,
                   h.crl_status
            FROM hosts h
            LEFT JOIN host_patch_data hpd ON hpd.host_id = h.id
@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ async fn list_hosts(
                     THEN 'some_unhealthy'
                   ELSE 'all_healthy'
                 END AS health_check_status,
-                   h.registered_at
+                   h.registered_at,
                   h.crl_status
            FROM hosts h
            LEFT JOIN host_patch_data hpd ON hpd.host_id = h.id
@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ async fn update_host(
            SELECT id, fqdn, host(ip_address)::text AS ip_address, display_name,
                   os_family, os_name, arch, agent_version, health_status,
                   last_health_at, last_patch_at, agent_port, notes,
-                   registered_at, updated_at
+                   registered_at, updated_at, crl_status, crl_age_seconds, crl_next_update
            FROM hosts WHERE id = (SELECT id FROM updated)
        ) h
        "#,
--- a/crates/pm-web/tests/integration/authz_gate.rs
+++ b/crates/pm-web/tests/integration/authz_gate.rs
@ -0,0 +1,530 @@
+//! Integration tests for the authz gate that restricts auth config mutations
+//! (OIDC, SMTP, IP whitelist) to the Admin role only.
+//!
+//! See Issue #15 for the full specification.
+//!
+//! ## Test organization
+//!
+//! The 403 (forbidden_role) tests verify that the authorization middleware
+//! rejects non-admin roles BEFORE any handler or database logic runs. These
+//! tests use a lazy PgPool (no live database required) and pre-generated CA
+//! files, so they always pass in CI.
+//!
+//! The 200 (admin allowed) tests verify the full handler path including audit
+//! logging. They require a live PostgreSQL database and are marked `#[ignore]`
+//! so they only run when `DATABASE_URL` is set and `--ignored` is passed.
+
+use axum::body::Body;
+use axum::extract::ConnectInfo;
+use axum::http::{Request, StatusCode};
+use dashmap::DashMap;
+use http_body_util::BodyExt;
+use pm_auth::jwt;
+use pm_auth::rbac::AuthConfig;
+use pm_core::config::AppConfig;
+use pm_web::routes::sso::OidcCache;
+use pm_web::{build_router, AppState};
+use serde_json::json;
+use sqlx::PgPool;
+use std::net::SocketAddr;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use tokio::sync::Mutex;
+use tower::ServiceExt;
+use uuid::Uuid;
+
+// ── Ed25519 test key pair ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+const TEST_SIGNING_KEY: &str = "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MC4CAQAwBQYDK2VwBCIEIBrWiMMcgpPXwtGDSSBl01fcQyb5Vh4CMzEmxcSXvcrJ
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+";
+
+const TEST_VERIFY_KEY: &str = "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MCowBQYDK2VwAyEACgE6fMDCcG11NOpPKSO/ASpPUSntB7XsF5sBFBYDjFo=
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+";
+
+// ── Fixed test user IDs (so we can seed matching rows in the DB) ─────────────
+const ADMIN_USER_ID: &str = "00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001";
+const OPERATOR_USER_ID: &str = "00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002";
+
+// ── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/// Generate a valid JWT authorization header for the given role.
+fn auth_header(role: &str) -> String {
+    let user_id = match role {
+        "admin" => Uuid::parse_str(ADMIN_USER_ID).unwrap(),
+        _ => Uuid::parse_str(OPERATOR_USER_ID).unwrap(),
+    };
+    let username = format!("test-{}", role);
+    let token = jwt::issue_access_token(user_id, &username, role, 900, TEST_SIGNING_KEY)
+        .expect("failed to issue test JWT");
+    format!("Bearer {}", token)
+}
+
+/// Generate CA key and cert files on disk so `CertAuthority::init` can load
+/// them without needing a database connection.
+fn generate_ca_files(ca_dir: &std::path::Path) {
+    use rcgen::{
+        BasicConstraints, CertificateParams, DnType, IsCa, KeyPair, PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256,
+    };
+
+    let key = KeyPair::generate_for(&PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256).expect("generate CA key");
+    let mut params = CertificateParams::default();
+    params.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
+    params
+        .distinguished_name
+        .push(DnType::CommonName, "Test Root CA");
+
+    let cert = params.self_signed(&key).expect("self-sign CA cert");
+
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(ca_dir).expect("create CA dir");
+    std::fs::write(ca_dir.join("ca.key"), key.serialize_pem()).expect("write ca.key");
+    std::fs::write(ca_dir.join("ca.crt"), cert.pem()).expect("write ca.crt");
+}
+
+/// Build a minimal `AppState` suitable for 403 authz gate tests.
+///
+/// Uses a lazy PgPool (no live database connection required) and pre-generated
+/// CA files. This works because the authorization middleware rejects non-admin
+/// requests BEFORE any handler or database logic runs.
+async fn setup_state_no_db() -> AppState {
+    let pool = sqlx::postgres::PgPoolOptions::new()
+        .connect_lazy("postgres://test:test@localhost:5432/test")
+        .expect("failed to create lazy pool");
+
+    let mut config = AppConfig::default();
+    config.server.static_dir = "/tmp".to_string();
+
+    let auth_config = Arc::new(AuthConfig::new(TEST_VERIFY_KEY.to_string(), &[], &[]));
+
+    let ca_dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("failed to create temp dir for CA");
+    let ca_dir_path = ca_dir.path().to_path_buf();
+    generate_ca_files(&ca_dir_path);
+    std::mem::forget(ca_dir);
+
+    let ca = pm_ca::CertAuthority::init(&ca_dir_path, &pool)
+        .await
+        .expect("CA init failed");
+
+    AppState {
+        db: pool,
+        config: Arc::new(config),
+        signing_key_pem: TEST_SIGNING_KEY.to_string(),
+        auth_config,
+        ws_tickets: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+        sso_sessions: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+        sso_handoffs: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+        oidc_cache: Arc::new(Mutex::new(OidcCache::default())),
+        ca: Arc::new(ca),
+        approved_enrollments: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Seed test users into the database so that audit_log foreign-key
+/// constraints on `actor_user_id` are satisfied.
+async fn seed_test_users(pool: &PgPool) {
+    let placeholder_hash = "$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=3,p=1$placeholder$placeholder";
+    for (user_id, username, role) in [
+        (ADMIN_USER_ID, "test-admin", "admin"),
+        (OPERATOR_USER_ID, "test-operator", "operator"),
+    ] {
+        sqlx::query(
+            r#"INSERT INTO users (id, username, display_name, email, role, auth_provider, password_hash)
+               VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5::user_role, 'local', $6)
+               ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING"#,
+        )
+        .bind(Uuid::parse_str(user_id).unwrap())
+        .bind(username)
+        .bind(username)
+        .bind(format!("{}@test.example.com", username))
+        .bind(role)
+        .bind(placeholder_hash)
+        .execute(pool)
+        .await
+        .expect("failed to seed test user");
+    }
+}
+
+/// Build a full `AppState` with a live database connection.
+async fn setup_state(pool: PgPool) -> AppState {
+    seed_test_users(&pool).await;
+
+    let mut config = AppConfig::default();
+    config.server.static_dir = "/tmp".to_string();
+
+    let auth_config = Arc::new(AuthConfig::new(TEST_VERIFY_KEY.to_string(), &[], &[]));
+
+    let ca_dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("failed to create temp dir for CA");
+    let ca_dir_path = ca_dir.path().to_path_buf();
+    std::mem::forget(ca_dir);
+
+    let ca = pm_ca::CertAuthority::init(&ca_dir_path, &pool)
+        .await
+        .expect("CA init failed");
+
+    AppState {
+        db: pool,
+        config: Arc::new(config),
+        signing_key_pem: TEST_SIGNING_KEY.to_string(),
+        auth_config,
+        ws_tickets: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+        sso_sessions: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+        sso_handoffs: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+        oidc_cache: Arc::new(Mutex::new(OidcCache::default())),
+        ca: Arc::new(ca),
+        approved_enrollments: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Send a request through the full Axum router and return the response.
+async fn send_request(
+    state: AppState,
+    method: axum::http::Method,
+    uri: &str,
+    auth_header: Option<&str>,
+    body: Option<serde_json::Value>,
+) -> (StatusCode, serde_json::Value) {
+    let router = build_router(state);
+    let mut builder = Request::builder().method(method).uri(uri);
+    if let Some(auth) = auth_header {
+        builder = builder.header("authorization", auth);
+    }
+    builder = builder.header("content-type", "application/json");
+
+    let req = if let Some(b) = body {
+        builder.body(Body::from(b.to_string())).unwrap()
+    } else {
+        builder.body(Body::empty()).unwrap()
+    };
+
+    // Insert ConnectInfo so tower_governor's SmartIpKeyExtractor can resolve the client IP.
+    let (mut parts, body) = req.into_parts();
+    parts
+        .extensions
+        .insert(ConnectInfo(SocketAddr::from(([127, 0, 0, 1], 12345))));
+    let req = Request::from_parts(parts, body);
+
+    let resp = router.oneshot(req).await.unwrap();
+    let status = resp.status();
+    let body_bytes = resp.into_body().collect().await.unwrap().to_bytes();
+    let body_json: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes).unwrap_or_else(|_| {
+        let raw = String::from_utf8_lossy(&body_bytes);
+        json!({ "_raw": raw.to_string() })
+    });
+    (status, body_json)
+}
+
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+// 403 Forbidden Role tests — no database required
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+//
+// These tests verify that the authorization middleware rejects non-admin roles
+// BEFORE any handler or database logic runs. They use a lazy PgPool and
+// pre-generated CA files, so they always pass in CI.
+
+/// 1. PUT /api/v1/settings with operator role → 403 forbidden_role
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn update_settings_operator_denied() {
+    let state = setup_state_no_db().await;
+    let auth = auth_header("operator");
+
+    let (status, body) = send_request(
+        state,
+        axum::http::Method::PUT,
+        "/api/v1/settings",
+        Some(&auth),
+        Some(json!({ "polling": { "health_poll_interval_secs": 300 } })),
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        status,
+        StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+        "expected 403, got {}: {:?}",
+        status,
+        body
+    );
+    assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "forbidden_role");
+}
+
+/// 3. PUT /api/v1/settings/ip-whitelist with operator role → 403 forbidden_role
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn update_ip_whitelist_operator_denied() {
+    let state = setup_state_no_db().await;
+    let auth = auth_header("operator");
+
+    let (status, body) = send_request(
+        state,
+        axum::http::Method::PUT,
+        "/api/v1/settings/ip-whitelist",
+        Some(&auth),
+        Some(json!({ "entries": ["10.0.0.0/8"] })),
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        status,
+        StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+        "expected 403, got {}: {:?}",
+        status,
+        body
+    );
+    assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "forbidden_role");
+}
+
+/// 5. POST /api/v1/settings/sso/discover with operator role → 403 forbidden_role
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn discover_oidc_operator_denied() {
+    let state = setup_state_no_db().await;
+    let auth = auth_header("operator");
+
+    let (status, body) = send_request(
+        state,
+        axum::http::Method::POST,
+        "/api/v1/settings/sso/discover",
+        Some(&auth),
+        Some(json!({ "discovery_url": "https://example.com/.well-known/openid-configuration" })),
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        status,
+        StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+        "expected 403, got {}: {:?}",
+        status,
+        body
+    );
+    assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "forbidden_role");
+}
+
+/// 7. POST /api/v1/settings/sso/test with operator role → 403 forbidden_role
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn test_oidc_operator_denied() {
+    let state = setup_state_no_db().await;
+    let auth = auth_header("operator");
+
+    let (status, body) = send_request(
+        state,
+        axum::http::Method::POST,
+        "/api/v1/settings/sso/test",
+        Some(&auth),
+        None,
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        status,
+        StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+        "expected 403, got {}: {:?}",
+        status,
+        body
+    );
+    assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "forbidden_role");
+}
+
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+// 200 Admin Allowed tests — require live database
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+//
+// These tests verify the full handler path including audit logging.
+// They require a live PostgreSQL database and are marked `#[ignore]` so they
+// only run when DATABASE_URL is set and `--ignored` is passed.
+
+/// 2. PUT /api/v1/settings with admin role → 200 + audit log
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../../migrations")]
+#[ignore]
+async fn update_settings_admin_allowed(pool: PgPool) {
+    let state = setup_state(pool).await;
+    let pool = state.db.clone();
+    let auth = auth_header("admin");
+
+    let (status, body) = send_request(
+        state,
+        axum::http::Method::PUT,
+        "/api/v1/settings",
+        Some(&auth),
+        Some(json!({ "polling": { "health_poll_interval_secs": 300 } })),
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        status,
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        "expected 200, got {}: {:?}",
+        status,
+        body
+    );
+
+    let row: Option<(String,)> = sqlx::query_as(
+        "SELECT action::text FROM audit_log WHERE action::text = 'config_changed' ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1",
+    )
+    .fetch_optional(&pool)
+    .await
+    .expect("audit log query failed");
+    assert!(row.is_some(), "expected audit log entry for config_changed");
+}
+
+/// 4. PUT /api/v1/settings/ip-whitelist with admin role → 200 + audit log
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../../migrations")]
+#[ignore]
+async fn update_ip_whitelist_admin_allowed(pool: PgPool) {
+    let state = setup_state(pool).await;
+    let pool = state.db.clone();
+    let auth = auth_header("admin");
+
+    let (status, body) = send_request(
+        state,
+        axum::http::Method::PUT,
+        "/api/v1/settings/ip-whitelist",
+        Some(&auth),
+        Some(json!({ "entries": ["10.0.0.0/8"] })),
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        status,
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        "expected 200, got {}: {:?}",
+        status,
+        body
+    );
+
+    let row: Option<(String,)> = sqlx::query_as(
+        "SELECT action::text FROM audit_log WHERE action::text = 'ip_whitelist_updated' ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1",
+    )
+    .fetch_optional(&pool)
+    .await
+    .expect("audit log query failed");
+    assert!(
+        row.is_some(),
+        "expected audit log entry for ip_whitelist_updated"
+    );
+}
+
+/// 6. POST /api/v1/settings/sso/discover with admin role → 200 + audit log
+///    Uses mockito to simulate an OIDC discovery endpoint.
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../../migrations")]
+#[ignore]
+async fn discover_oidc_admin_allowed(pool: PgPool) {
+    let state = setup_state(pool).await;
+    let pool = state.db.clone();
+    let auth = auth_header("admin");
+
+    let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+    let mock = server
+        .mock("GET", "/.well-known/openid-configuration")
+        .with_status(200)
+        .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+        .with_body(
+            json!({
+                "issuer": "https://mock-oidc.example.com",
+                "authorization_endpoint": "https://mock-oidc.example.com/auth",
+                "token_endpoint": "https://mock-oidc.example.com/token",
+                "jwks_uri": "https://mock-oidc.example.com/jwks",
+                "userinfo_endpoint": "https://mock-oidc.example.com/userinfo"
+            })
+            .to_string(),
+        )
+        .create_async()
+        .await;
+
+    let discovery_url = format!("{}/.well-known/openid-configuration", server.url());
+
+    let (status, body) = send_request(
+        state,
+        axum::http::Method::POST,
+        "/api/v1/settings/sso/discover",
+        Some(&auth),
+        Some(json!({ "discovery_url": discovery_url })),
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        status,
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        "expected 200, got {}: {:?}",
+        status,
+        body
+    );
+    assert_eq!(body["success"], true);
+
+    mock.assert_async().await;
+
+    let row: Option<(String,)> = sqlx::query_as(
+        "SELECT action::text FROM audit_log WHERE action::text = 'oidc_discover_performed' ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1",
+    )
+    .fetch_optional(&pool)
+    .await
+    .expect("audit log query failed");
+    assert!(
+        row.is_some(),
+        "expected audit log entry for oidc_discover_performed"
+    );
+}
+
+/// 8. POST /api/v1/settings/sso/test with admin role → 200 + audit log
+///    Uses mockito to simulate an OIDC discovery endpoint.
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../../migrations")]
+#[ignore]
+async fn test_oidc_admin_allowed(pool: PgPool) {
+    let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+    let mock = server
+        .mock("GET", "/.well-known/openid-configuration")
+        .with_status(200)
+        .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+        .with_body(
+            json!({
+                "issuer": "https://mock-oidc.example.com",
+                "authorization_endpoint": "https://mock-oidc.example.com/auth",
+                "token_endpoint": "https://mock-oidc.example.com/token",
+                "jwks_uri": "https://mock-oidc.example.com/jwks"
+            })
+            .to_string(),
+        )
+        .create_async()
+        .await;
+
+    let discovery_url = format!("{}/.well-known/openid-configuration", server.url());
+
+    // Seed the oidc_config table with an enabled provider pointing to mockito.
+    sqlx::query("UPDATE oidc_config SET enabled = true, discovery_url = $1 WHERE id = 1")
+        .bind(&discovery_url)
+        .execute(&pool)
+        .await
+        .expect("failed to seed oidc_config");
+
+    let state = setup_state(pool).await;
+    let pool = state.db.clone();
+    let auth = auth_header("admin");
+
+    let (status, body) = send_request(
+        state,
+        axum::http::Method::POST,
+        "/api/v1/settings/sso/test",
+        Some(&auth),
+        None,
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        status,
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        "expected 200, got {}: {:?}",
+        status,
+        body
+    );
+    assert_eq!(body["success"], true);
+
+    mock.assert_async().await;
+
+    let row: Option<(String,)> = sqlx::query_as(
+        "SELECT action::text FROM audit_log WHERE action::text = 'oidc_test_performed' ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1",
+    )
+    .fetch_optional(&pool)
+    .await
+    .expect("audit log query failed");
+    assert!(
+        row.is_some(),
+        "expected audit log entry for oidc_test_performed"
+    );
+}
--- a/crates/pm-web/tests/integration/main.rs
+++ b/crates/pm-web/tests/integration/main.rs
@ -0,0 +1 @@
+mod authz_gate;
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+linux-patch-manager (1.0.0-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * Release v1.0.0
+
+ -- git-echo <git-echo@moon-dragon.us>  Sun, 07 Jun 2026 12:58:46 -0500
+
 linux-patch-manager (0.1.9-1) noble; urgency=medium

  * Fix: Replace broken DashMap rate limiting with tower-governor middleware
--- a/docs/security-review.md
+++ b/docs/security-review.md
@ -160,9 +160,30 @@ verifying that all mandated security controls are implemented and operational.

 ## 6. Findings & Recommendations

-### No Critical or High Findings
+### 🔴 CRITICAL: Committed Private Key Material (Issue #12) — RESOLVED

-All security controls are implemented as specified in the system requirements.
+**Description:**
+Private key file `client.key` and public certificates (`client.crt`, `ca.crt`) were committed
+to version control in `crates/pm-agent-client/certs/`. Committed private keys are a critical
+security risk: anyone with repository access can impersonate agents or decrypt captured TLS traffic.
+
+**Status:** ✅ RESOLVED
+
+**Remediation Applied:**
+1. Removed all cert files from git tracking (`git rm --cached`)
+2. Added `*.key`, `*.key.pem` and `crates/pm-agent-client/certs/` to `.gitignore`
+3. Updated `pm-agent-client` doc examples to use `std::fs::read()` instead of `include_bytes!`
+4. Added `gitleaks` secret scanning to CI pipeline
+5. Added README to `crates/pm-agent-client/certs/` explaining runtime cert generation
+6. Git history will be purged with `git filter-repo` after PR merge
+
+**Key Rotation:**
+These keys were dev/test only. No production key rotation is needed. All committed keys
+should be considered compromised and must not be used in production.
+
+### No Other Critical or High Findings
+
+All other security controls are implemented as specified in the system requirements.

 ### Recommendations (Low Priority)

@ -192,3 +213,4 @@ All security controls are implemented as specified in the system requirements.
 - [x] Backup encryption supported (GPG)
 - [x] Azure SSO with PKCE flow
 - [x] No plaintext credential storage
+- [x] Committed private key material removed from repository (Issue #12)
--- a/frontend/package.json
+++ b/frontend/package.json
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
  "name": "patch-manager-ui",
  "private": true,
-  "version": "0.1.7",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
  "type": "module",
  "scripts": {
    "dev": "vite",
--- a/scripts/build-package.sh
+++ b/scripts/build-package.sh
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ warn()  { echo -e "${YELLOW}[WARN]${NC}  $*"; }
 error() { echo -e "${RED}[ERROR]${NC} $*" >&2; exit 1; }

 PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
-VERSION="0.1.9"
+VERSION="1.0.0"
 RELEASE="1"
 PKG_NAME="linux-patch-manager"
 DEB_NAME="${PKG_NAME}_${VERSION}-${RELEASE}_amd64.deb"
--- a/scripts/bump-version.sh
+++ b/scripts/bump-version.sh
@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ mv "$TEMP_CHANGELOG" debian/changelog
 echo "[2/5] debian/changelog: Added entry for $NEW_VERSION"

 # 3. debian/control - Update Version field
-if grep -q "^Version:" debian/control 2>/dev/null; then
+if grep -q "^Version:" debian/control 2>/dev/null || true; then
    sed -i "s/^Version: .*/Version: $NEW_VERSION-1/" debian/control
    echo "[3/5] debian/control: -> $NEW_VERSION-1"
 else
@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ fi

 echo ""
 echo "Stale references check:"
-grep -r "$OLD_VERSION" --include='*.toml' --include='*.sh' --include='*.json' --include='control' . 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'target/' | grep -v '.git/' | grep -v 'node_modules/' | grep -v 'bump-version.sh' || echo "  No stale references found"
+grep -r "$OLD_VERSION" --include='*.toml' --include='*.sh' --include='*.json' --include='control' . 2>/dev/null || true | grep -v 'target/' | grep -v '.git/' | grep -v 'node_modules/' | grep -v 'bump-version.sh' || echo "  No stale references found"

 echo ""
 echo "Next steps:"
--- a/scripts/performance-test.sh
+++ b/scripts/performance-test.sh
@ -15,6 +15,13 @@

 set -euo pipefail

+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# BusyBox-compatible millisecond timing (_now_ms not available)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+_now_ms() {
+    python3 -c "import time; print(int(time.time()*1000))"
+}
+
 RED='\033[0;31m'
 GREEN='\033[0;32m'
 YELLOW='\033[1;33m'
@ -72,10 +79,10 @@ api_call() {
 time_api_call() {
    local method="$1" endpoint="$2" shift; shift
    local start end elapsed
-    start=$(date +%s%N)
+    start=$(_now_ms)
    api_call "${method}" "${endpoint}" -o /dev/null "$@" 2>/dev/null || true
-    end=$(date +%s%N)
-    elapsed=$(( (end - start) / 1000000 ))  # milliseconds
+    end=$(_now_ms)
+    elapsed=$(( end - start ))  # milliseconds
    echo "$(echo "scale=3; ${elapsed}/1000" | bc)"
 }

@ -97,10 +104,10 @@ test_dashboard_load() {

    # Also measure frontend static asset load
    info "Measuring frontend index.html load time..."
-    start=$(date +%s%N)
+    start=$(_now_ms)
    curl -sk -o /dev/null "${BASE_URL}/" 2>/dev/null || true
-    end=$(date +%s%N)
-    elapsed=$(( (end - start) / 1000000 ))
+    end=$(_now_ms)
+    elapsed=$(( end - start ))
    FRONTEND_TIME=$(echo "scale=3; ${elapsed}/1000" | bc)
    info "Frontend load time: ${FRONTEND_TIME}s"
    pass "Frontend static load: ${FRONTEND_TIME}s"
@ -169,14 +176,14 @@ test_bulk_host_operations() {

    # 4.2 Sequential host creation (measure throughput)
    info "4.2 Sequential host creation (10 hosts)"
-    local start=$(date +%s%N)
+    local start=$(_now_ms)
    for i in $(seq 1 10); do
        api_call POST /api/v1/hosts \
            -d "{\"fqdn\": \"perf-test-${i}.example.com\", \"ip_address\": \"10.99.0.${i}\"}" \
            -o /dev/null 2>/dev/null || true
    done
-    local end=$(date +%s%N)
-    local total_ms=$(( (end - start) / 1000000 ))
+    local end=$(_now_ms)
+    local total_ms=$(( end - start ))
    local total_s=$(echo "scale=3; ${total_ms}/1000" | bc)
    local per_host=$(echo "scale=3; ${total_s}/10" | bc)
    info "10 hosts created in ${total_s}s (${per_host}s per host)"
@ -199,11 +206,11 @@ test_cidr_scan() {
    # Note: This test initiates a real CIDR scan which may not complete quickly
    # without reachable hosts. We measure the API response time for initiating.
    info "5.1 CIDR scan initiation time"
-    local start=$(date +%s%N)
+    local start=$(_now_ms)
    SCAN_RESP=$(api_call POST /api/v1/discovery/cidr \
        -d '{"cidr": "10.0.0.0/30", "timeout": 1.5}' 2>/dev/null || true)
-    local end=$(date +%s%N)
-    local elapsed_ms=$(( (end - start) / 1000000 ))
+    local end=$(_now_ms)
+    local elapsed_ms=$(( end - start ))
    local elapsed_s=$(echo "scale=3; ${elapsed_ms}/1000" | bc)

    info "CIDR scan initiation: ${elapsed_s}s"
@ -240,13 +247,13 @@ test_concurrent_load() {

    # Fire 20 concurrent requests and measure total time
    info "6.1 20 concurrent fleet status requests"
-    local start=$(date +%s%N)
+    local start=$(_now_ms)
    for i in $(seq 1 20); do
        api_call GET /api/v1/status/fleet -o /dev/null 2>/dev/null &
    done
    wait
-    local end=$(date +%s%N)
-    local total_ms=$(( (end - start) / 1000000 ))
+    local end=$(_now_ms)
+    local total_ms=$(( end - start ))
    local total_s=$(echo "scale=3; ${total_ms}/1000" | bc)
    local per_req=$(echo "scale=3; ${total_s}/20" | bc)

@ -259,7 +266,7 @@ test_concurrent_load() {

    # 6.2 Mixed endpoint concurrent load
    info "6.2 20 concurrent mixed-endpoint requests"
-    start=$(date +%s%N)
+    start=$(_now_ms)
    for i in $(seq 1 5); do
        api_call GET /api/v1/hosts -o /dev/null 2>/dev/null &
        api_call GET /api/v1/groups -o /dev/null 2>/dev/null &
@ -267,8 +274,8 @@ test_concurrent_load() {
        api_call GET /api/v1/status/fleet -o /dev/null 2>/dev/null &
    done
    wait
-    end=$(date +%s%N)
-    total_ms=$(( (end - start) / 1000000 ))
+    end=$(_now_ms)
+    total_ms=$(( end - start ))
    total_s=$(echo "scale=3; ${total_ms}/1000" | bc)
    per_req=$(echo "scale=3; ${total_s}/20" | bc)
    info "Mixed concurrent: ${total_s}s total, ${per_req}s avg"
@ -282,12 +289,12 @@ test_ws_ticket_performance() {
    echo -e "\n${CYAN}=== Test 7: WebSocket Ticket Issuance ===${NC}"

    info "7.1 Sequential ticket creation (10 tickets)"
-    local start=$(date +%s%N)
+    local start=$(_now_ms)
    for i in $(seq 1 10); do
        api_call POST /api/v1/ws/ticket -o /dev/null 2>/dev/null || true
    done
-    local end=$(date +%s%N)
-    local total_ms=$(( (end - start) / 1000000 ))
+    local end=$(_now_ms)
+    local total_ms=$(( end - start ))
    local total_s=$(echo "scale=3; ${total_ms}/1000" | bc)
    local per_ticket=$(echo "scale=3; ${total_s}/10" | bc)
    info "10 tickets in ${total_s}s (${per_ticket}s per ticket)"
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Draco-Lunaris-Echo	d6f0c23dd8	fix: BusyBox-compatible timing and set -e safety in shell scripts	2026-06-07 13:01:58 -05:00
Draco-Lunaris-Echo	ae15404496	chore: bump version to 1.0.0	2026-06-07 12:58:53 -05:00
Draco-Lunaris-Echo	5fa1fef6c8	fix: remove committed private keys and add gitleaks CI Some checks failed CI Pipeline / Rust Format Check (push) Successful in 5s CI Pipeline / Clippy Lints (push) Successful in 51s CI Pipeline / Rust Unit Tests (push) Failing after 1m31s CI Pipeline / Security Audit (push) Successful in 5s CI Pipeline / Frontend Lint & Type Check (push) Successful in 14s CI Pipeline / Build .deb & Release (push) Has been skipped - Remove all cert files from git tracking (git rm --cached) - crates/pm-agent-client/certs/client.key (private key) - crates/pm-agent-client/certs/client.crt (public cert) - crates/pm-agent-client/certs/ca.crt (public cert) - Add .gitignore patterns for .key, .key.pem, certs/.crt, certs/.pem - Update pm-agent-client doc examples to use std::fs::read() instead of include_bytes! - Add gitleaks secret scanning job to CI workflow - Update security-review.md with critical finding for Issue #12 - Add README.md to crates/pm-agent-client/certs/ explaining runtime cert generation Private keys were dev/test only - no production key rotation needed. Git history purge with filter-repo will follow after PR merge. Co-authored-by: Draco Lunaris <331325+Draco-Lunaris@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-06-06 13:20:52 -05:00
Draco-Lunaris-Echo	e6dd1b8489	test: add authz gate integration tests (closes #15 ) All checks were successful CI Pipeline / Rust Format Check (push) Successful in 4s CI Pipeline / Clippy Lints (push) Successful in 51s CI Pipeline / Rust Unit Tests (push) Successful in 1m56s CI Pipeline / Security Audit (push) Successful in 4s CI Pipeline / Frontend Lint & Type Check (push) Successful in 15s CI Pipeline / Build .deb & Release (push) Has been skipped * test: add authz gate integration tests (closes #15) * fix: separate authz gate 403 tests from DB-dependent tests --------- Co-authored-by: Draco Lunaris <331325+Draco-Lunaris@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-06-06 11:18:11 -05:00
Draco-Lunaris-Echo	dd6961265d	chore: bump version to 0.2.4 All checks were successful CI Pipeline / Rust Format Check (push) Successful in 3s CI Pipeline / Clippy Lints (push) Successful in 51s CI Pipeline / Rust Unit Tests (push) Successful in 1m10s CI Pipeline / Frontend Lint & Type Check (push) Successful in 19s CI Pipeline / Build .deb & Release (push) Successful in 3m41s CI Pipeline / Security Audit (push) Successful in 5s Co-authored-by: Draco Lunaris <331325+Draco-Lunaris@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-06-06 00:04:08 -05:00
Draco-Lunaris-Echo	40ba483d35	fix: add ca_chain and crl_pem to EnrollmentStatusResponse Co-authored-by: Draco Lunaris <331325+Draco-Lunaris@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-06-05 23:57:23 -05:00
Draco-Lunaris-Echo	192ebbd47f	chore: bump version to 0.2.3 All checks were successful CI Pipeline / Rust Format Check (push) Successful in 3s CI Pipeline / Clippy Lints (push) Successful in 52s CI Pipeline / Rust Unit Tests (push) Successful in 1m10s CI Pipeline / Security Audit (push) Successful in 9s CI Pipeline / Frontend Lint & Type Check (push) Successful in 14s CI Pipeline / Build .deb & Release (push) Successful in 3m44s Co-authored-by: Draco Lunaris <331325+Draco-Lunaris@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-06-05 23:05:41 -05:00
Draco-Lunaris-Echo	050439ee14	fix: add missing CRL columns to Host SQL queries and fix comma syntax Co-authored-by: Draco Lunaris <331325+Draco-Lunaris@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-06-05 22:52:59 -05:00
Draco-Lunaris-Echo	0b12ded1cf	chore: bump version to 0.2.2 All checks were successful CI Pipeline / Rust Format Check (push) Successful in 5s CI Pipeline / Clippy Lints (push) Successful in 52s CI Pipeline / Rust Unit Tests (push) Successful in 1m9s CI Pipeline / Security Audit (push) Successful in 5s CI Pipeline / Frontend Lint & Type Check (push) Successful in 16s CI Pipeline / Build .deb & Release (push) Successful in 3m41s Co-authored-by: Draco Lunaris <331325+Draco-Lunaris@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-06-05 21:23:55 -05:00
Draco-Lunaris-Echo	0296cf9c51	fix(auth): update SQL queries to use totp_secret_encrypted instead of dropped totp_secret column Co-authored-by: Draco Lunaris <331325+Draco-Lunaris@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-06-05 21:08:00 -05:00