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linux_patch_manager/crates/pm-core/src/crypto.rs
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fix(security): encrypt app secrets at rest with AES-256-GCM (#6)
Encrypt three sensitive secrets that were stored in plaintext: OIDC client_secret, SMTP smtp_password, TOTP totp_secret. AES-256-GCM via pm-core::crypto helper. New per-install key at /etc/patch-manager/keys/secret-encryption.key, separate from health-check.key for blast-radius isolation. MASKED placeholder behavior in API responses is preserved.

23 files changed, +1248 / -28. Closes #6.
2026-06-03 15:08:25 -05:00

162 lines
6.2 KiB
Rust

//! AES-256-GCM encryption for sensitive credentials.
//!
//! Two per-install keys are supported:
//! - `KEY_PATH` (health-check.key) protects HTTP basic auth passwords for health check endpoints.
//! - `SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PATH` (secret-encryption.key) protects OIDC `client_secret`,
//! SMTP `smtp_password`, and TOTP `totp_secret` at rest in the database.
//!
//! Keys are 32-byte files, auto-generated on first start with 0600 permissions.
use aes_gcm::{
aead::{Aead, KeyInit, OsRng},
Aes256Gcm, Nonce,
};
use rand::RngCore;
use std::fs;
use std::path::Path;
pub const KEY_PATH: &str = "/etc/patch-manager/keys/health-check.key";
/// Path to the encryption key for sensitive app secrets
/// (OIDC client_secret, SMTP password, TOTP secret).
/// Separate from `KEY_PATH` (health-check credentials) for blast-radius isolation:
/// if the health-check key is compromised, app secrets remain protected.
pub const SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PATH: &str = "/etc/patch-manager/keys/secret-encryption.key";
/// Load or create the per-install encryption key.
/// If the key file doesn't exist, generates a new 256-bit key and saves it.
pub fn load_or_create_key(path: &Path) -> Result<[u8; 32], CryptoError> {
if path.exists() {
let key_bytes = fs::read(path).map_err(CryptoError::Io)?;
if key_bytes.len() != 32 {
return Err(CryptoError::InvalidKeyLength(key_bytes.len()));
}
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
key.copy_from_slice(&key_bytes);
Ok(key)
} else {
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut key);
if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
fs::create_dir_all(parent).map_err(CryptoError::Io)?;
}
fs::write(path, key).map_err(CryptoError::Io)?;
// Set permissions to 0600 (owner read/write only)
#[cfg(unix)]
{
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
fs::set_permissions(path, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))
.map_err(CryptoError::Io)?;
}
Ok(key)
}
}
/// Encrypt plaintext with AES-256-GCM. Returns (ciphertext, nonce).
pub fn encrypt(plaintext: &str, key: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>), CryptoError> {
let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new_from_slice(key).map_err(|e| CryptoError::KeyInit(e.to_string()))?;
let mut nonce_bytes = [0u8; 12];
OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce_bytes);
let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
let ciphertext = cipher
.encrypt(nonce, plaintext.as_bytes())
.map_err(|_| CryptoError::EncryptionFailed)?;
Ok((ciphertext, nonce_bytes.to_vec()))
}
/// Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext with the given nonce.
pub fn decrypt(ciphertext: &[u8], nonce: &[u8], key: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<String, CryptoError> {
let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new_from_slice(key).map_err(|e| CryptoError::KeyInit(e.to_string()))?;
let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(nonce);
let plaintext = cipher
.decrypt(nonce, ciphertext)
.map_err(|_| CryptoError::DecryptionFailed)?;
String::from_utf8(plaintext).map_err(CryptoError::Utf8)
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum CryptoError {
#[error("IO error: {0}")]
Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
#[error("Invalid key length: expected 32 bytes, got {0}")]
InvalidKeyLength(usize),
#[error("Key init error: {0}")]
KeyInit(String),
#[error("Encryption failed")]
EncryptionFailed,
#[error("Decryption failed")]
DecryptionFailed,
#[error("UTF-8 error: {0}")]
Utf8(#[from] std::string::FromUtf8Error),
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use std::env;
use std::fs;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
/// Create a unique temp directory for test isolation.
/// Returns a path like `/tmp/pm-crypto-test-<epoch_nanos>-<rand>`.
/// Cleans up the directory on test teardown (via `temp_dir` guard).
fn unique_temp_dir() -> PathBuf {
let nanos = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.map(|d| d.as_nanos())
.unwrap_or(0);
let dir = env::temp_dir().join(format!("pm-crypto-test-{}-{}", std::process::id(), nanos));
fs::create_dir_all(&dir).expect("Failed to create temp dir");
dir
}
#[test]
fn encrypt_decrypt_round_trip() {
let key = [42u8; 32];
let plaintext = "super-secret-client-credential-12345";
let (ciphertext, nonce) = encrypt(plaintext, &key).expect("encrypt failed");
// Ciphertext must differ from plaintext (encryption is non-trivial)
assert_ne!(ciphertext.as_slice(), plaintext.as_bytes());
// Nonce is 12 bytes (AES-GCM standard)
assert_eq!(nonce.len(), 12);
// Decrypting must return the original plaintext
let recovered = decrypt(&ciphertext, &nonce, &key).expect("decrypt failed");
assert_eq!(recovered, plaintext);
}
#[test]
fn load_or_create_key_sets_0600_permissions() {
let dir = unique_temp_dir();
let key_path = dir.join("test-0600.key");
let _key = load_or_create_key(&key_path).expect("load_or_create_key failed");
// Verify file exists and has exactly 32 bytes
let metadata = fs::metadata(&key_path).expect("key file not created");
assert_eq!(metadata.len(), 32, "key file must be 32 bytes");
// On Unix, verify permissions are 0600 (owner read/write only)
#[cfg(unix)]
{
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
let mode = metadata.permissions().mode() & 0o777;
assert_eq!(mode, 0o600, "key file must be 0600, got {:o}", mode);
}
// Cleanup
let _ = fs::remove_file(&key_path);
let _ = fs::remove_dir(&dir);
}
#[test]
fn load_or_create_key_is_idempotent() {
let dir = unique_temp_dir();
let key_path = dir.join("test-idempotent.key");
// First call creates the key
let key1 = load_or_create_key(&key_path).expect("first call failed");
// Second call should return the same key (not regenerate)
let key2 = load_or_create_key(&key_path).expect("second call failed");
assert_eq!(key1, key2, "second call must return the same key");
// Cleanup
let _ = fs::remove_file(&key_path);
let _ = fs::remove_dir(&dir);
}
}