Completed comprehensive spec-driven documentation: - SPEC.md (222 lines): Project scope, objectives, constraints - ARCHITECTURE.md (290 lines): System design, components, data flow - REQUIREMENTS.md (168 lines): Functional & non-functional requirements - API_SPEC.md (556 lines): 15 API endpoints with schemas - SECURITY.md (188 lines): STRIDE threat model, security controls - ROADMAP.md (203 lines): 5 phases, 8 milestones, risk register Total: 1,627 lines of specification documentation Milestone M1 complete - Ready for Phase 0 (Rust scaffolding)
8.0 KiB
Linux_Patch_API - Specification Document
Project Overview
Title: Linux_Patch_API
Description: API service for secure remote management of patching processes and software add/removal
Version: 0.0.1
Status: Draft
Scope
Primary Focus: Debian/Ubuntu (apt/dpkg)
Secondary Support: RHEL/CentOS/Fedora (dnf/yum), Alpine (apk), Arch (pacman)
In Scope:
- Remote package installation, removal, and updates
- System patch management (security and general updates)
- Multi-distribution support via pluggable package manager backend
- Secure authentication and authorization for remote operations
- Audit logging of all package/patch operations
- RESTful API design with JSON request/response
Supported Operations:
- Core Package: GET /packages (with filtering), GET /packages/{name}, POST /packages (install), PUT /packages/{name} (update), DELETE /packages/{name} (remove)
- Patch Management: GET /patches (list available), POST /patches/apply (apply all or specific)
- System Info: GET /system/info (OS version, kernel, last update time)
Operation Features:
- Version pinning support (e.g., package=1.2.3)
- Rollback capability for failed operations
- Batch operations: best-effort (not atomic)
- GET filtering: by name, version, status, upgradable
- No pagination (return all results)
Out of Scope (for now):
- GUI/frontend interface (API-only)
- Automatic scheduled patching (manual trigger only)
- Cross-distribution package compatibility
Objectives
Primary Objective: Provide secure API for remote patch/package management on individual Linux hosts
Key Goals:
- Run as systemd service on each managed machine (Option B: Agent Per Host)
- Internal network access only (no internet exposure)
- Support Debian/Ubuntu first, then expand to other distributions
- Maintain audit trail of all operations
- Minimal resource footprint
- mTLS certificate-based authentication
- IP whitelist enforcement (deny by default)
Constraints
Deployment:
- One API instance per host
- Internal network only (LAN/private network)
- No public internet exposure
- Must run as systemd service
Technical:
- Must run with elevated privileges for package management (root/sudo)
- Must support multiple Linux distributions
- API-only (no GUI required)
- mTLS required for all client connections
- IP whitelist enforcement required (block all by default, allow only listed)
- Technology: Rust with Actix-web or Axum framework
- Default API port: 12443
- API Style: Pure REST (resources as nouns, HTTP verbs for actions)
- Data Format: JSON for all requests and responses
- Response Envelope: Standard envelope with success, request_id, timestamp, data, error fields
- Request IDs: Required for all requests (tracking and auditing)
- Execution Model: Hybrid (sync for quick ops, async with job ID for long ops)
- Real-time Updates: WebSocket support for job status streaming
- Job Timeout: Maximum 30 minutes per operation
Security:
- Certificate-based authentication (mTLS)
- Network-level access control via IP/subnet whitelist
- Silent drop for non-mTLS connections (no response)
- Detailed error messages for authenticated clients only
Error Handling
-
HTTP Status Codes: Standard HTTP status codes (200, 400, 401, 403, 404, 500, etc.)
-
Error Response Format (inside envelope's
errorfield):
{
"code": "ERROR_CODE",
"message": "Human-readable description",
"details": {},
"retryable": false
}
-
Error Categories:
- Authentication failures (invalid/expired cert)
- Authorization failures (valid cert but not whitelisted IP)
- Package not found
- Package manager errors (dpkg/apt failures)
- Permission denied
- System resource errors
- Configuration errors
-
Error Message Policy:
- mTLS confirmed clients: Detailed error messages with debugging info
- Non-mTLS connections: Silent drop (no response sent)
- DEBUG mode: Include additional diagnostic information
-
Idempotency: Operations should be idempotent where possible (safe to retry)
Assumptions
- Host machines have network connectivity to internal clients
- API clients are trusted internal systems
- Host OS has Rust toolchain available (or can be installed)
- Package manager (apt/dnf/apk/pacman) is functional on target hosts
Dependencies
- Linux OS with package manager support
- systemd for service management
- Network access for API communication
- mTLS certificate infrastructure (CA, client certs)
- IP whitelist configuration
- Rust toolchain (rustc, cargo)
- Actix-web or Axum framework
- Internal CA for certificate issuance (self-hosted)
Certificate Management
- CA Type: Internal self-hosted Certificate Authority
- Distribution: Manual certificate distribution to clients
- Scope: Limited distribution (small number of authorized clients)
- Validity Period: 1 year standard expiration
- Client Identity: Unique certificate per client (no shared certs)
- Rotation: Manual renewal process before expiration
Audit Logging
-
Log Content (All Required):
- Every API request (endpoint, method, timestamp, client cert ID)
- Package operations (package name, version, action: install/remove/update)
- Authentication events (success/failure, cert validation)
- IP whitelist denials (blocked connection attempts)
- System changes made by the API
- Configuration changes (whitelist updates, cert renewals)
-
Log Storage:
- Primary: systemd journal (
journalctl) - Secondary: Optional remote syslog server
- Local file logs as fallback (
/var/log/linux_patch_api/)
- Primary: systemd journal (
-
Log Retention:
- Retention period: 30 days
- Rotation: Daily
- Compression: Enabled (gzip)
-
Log Levels: Configurable at runtime (DEBUG, INFO, WARN, ERROR)
IP Whitelist Configuration
-
Config File:
/etc/linux_patch_api/whitelist.yaml -
Format: YAML
-
Management: Static config file (edit file to change)
-
Apply Method: Instant apply on file change (no restart required)
-
Logging: All whitelist changes logged to audit log
-
Supported Entries:
- Individual IPv4 addresses (e.g.,
192.168.1.100) - CIDR subnets (e.g.,
192.168.1.0/24) - Hostnames (resolved at config load)
- IPv6: Not supported (explicitly out of scope)
- Individual IPv4 addresses (e.g.,
-
Default Behavior: Block all connections not in whitelist
API Configuration Management
-
Config File:
/etc/linux_patch_api/config.yaml -
Format: YAML
-
Reload Method: Config file watch with auto-reload on change (no restart required)
-
Configurable Settings:
- Server: port, bind address, timeout settings
- mTLS: CA cert path, server cert path, server key path
- Logging: log level, log retention, remote syslog server (optional)
- Security: job timeout, max concurrent jobs, rate limiting
-
Hard-Coded Paths (not configurable):
- Whitelist file:
/etc/linux_patch_api/whitelist.yaml - Data directory:
/var/lib/linux_patch_api/ - Job storage:
/var/lib/linux_patch_api/jobs/
- Whitelist file:
-
Hard-Coded Paths (not configurable):
- Whitelist file:
/etc/linux_patch_api/whitelist.yaml - Data directory:
/var/lib/linux_patch_api/ - Job storage:
/var/lib/linux_patch_api/jobs/ - Log directory:
/var/log/linux_patch_api/
- Whitelist file:
Testing Requirements
-
Unit Test Coverage: Minimum 95%
-
Integration Tests: API endpoint testing with mock package manager
-
Security Tests: mTLS validation, IP whitelist enforcement, authentication failures
-
End-to-End Tests: Full workflow testing on actual Ubuntu systems
-
Test Environments:
- Primary: Ubuntu (latest LTS)
- CI/CD Pipeline: Required for automated testing
- Penetration Testing: Required before release
-
Phase 1 Acceptance Criteria:
- All endpoints functional with mTLS authentication
- IP whitelist enforced correctly
- Audit logging working (journalctl + file)
- Config auto-reload working
- WebSocket status streaming functional
- Rollback mechanism tested
-
Security Audit: No formal audit planned at this time
Following kiro spec-driven development standards