Echo
297bf1bd83
M11 - Email Notifications + Audit Logging Hardening: - Email notifier (lettre crate) with templates for patch failure, job completion, maintenance reminders - Audit log hash chaining (prev_hash + row_hash) for tamper-evident logging - Periodic + on-demand audit integrity verification - Audit logging for all config changes and certificate operations - Frontend: email settings integration, audit integrity verification action M12 - Deployment Packaging, Backup/DR, Integration Testing: - scripts/backup.sh: Nightly pg_dump, CA backup (GPG), config backup (secrets excluded unless encrypted) - scripts/setup.sh: Enhanced with backup dir, seed migration, backup cron, systemd target install - systemd units: Restart=always, WatchdogSec, ReadWritePaths, security hardening - systemd/patch-manager.target: Service target for coordinated lifecycle - docs/runbooks/restore.md: Full DR runbook with RPO 24h / RTO 4h targets - scripts/integration-test.sh: 9 test suites covering full API lifecycle - scripts/performance-test.sh: NFR validation (dashboard <5s, CIDR /22 <10s, API <2s) - docs/security-review.md: Comprehensive security control verification - docs/compliance-mapping.md: HIPAA (6 sections) + PCI-DSS v4.0 (9 requirements) mapped
170 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
170 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
# Linux Patch Manager — Compliance Mapping
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## HIPAA / PCI-DSS Control Mapping
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This document maps Linux Patch Manager features to specific HIPAA and PCI-DSS compliance controls,
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demonstrating how the system satisfies regulatory requirements.
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---
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## HIPAA Security Rule Mapping
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### § 164.312(a)(1) — Access Control
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| Requirement | Implementation | Verification |
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|-------------|---------------|-------------|
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| Unique user identification | Local accounts with unique usernames; Azure SSO with OIDC subject mapping | `users` table enforces unique `username` |
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| Emergency access procedure | Default admin account via seed migration; direct DB access for emergency | `002_seed_admin.sql` creates admin account |
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| Automatic logoff | JWT 15-min TTL enforces session timeout; refresh token 1-hour inactivity timeout | Token expiry enforced by `pm-auth::jwt` and `pm-auth::refresh` |
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| Encryption and decryption | EdDSA/Ed25519 JWT tokens; Argon2id password hashing | `pm-auth::jwt` and `pm-auth::password` |
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### § 164.312(b) — Audit Controls
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| Requirement | Implementation | Verification |
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|-------------|---------------|-------------|
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| Record and examine activity | Comprehensive `audit_log` table captures all system operations | All routes insert audit entries |
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| Tamper-evident logging | Hash-chained audit log (`prev_hash` + `row_hash`) | `audit_verifier.rs` verifies chain integrity |
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| Integrity verification | Periodic + on-demand audit chain verification | Worker scheduled verification; UI trigger via `/api/v1/reports/audit/verify` |
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### § 164.312(c)(1) — Integrity Controls
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| Requirement | Implementation | Verification |
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|-------------|---------------|-------------|
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| Mechanism to authenticate ePHI | Audit log hash chaining ensures data integrity | `prev_hash` + `row_hash` on every insert |
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| No unauthorized alterations | RBAC + audit logging for all configuration changes | All config changes logged with old/new values |
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### § 164.312(d) — Person or Entity Authentication
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| Requirement | Implementation | Verification |
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|-------------|---------------|-------------|
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| Authentication mechanism | Multi-factor authentication (TOTP + WebAuthn) mandatory for all users | Login flow requires MFA before JWT issuance |
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| Password management | Argon2id hashing with calibrated parameters (m_cost=65536, t_cost=3, p_cost=1) | `pm-auth::password` implementation |
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| Token security | EdDSA/Ed25519 signed JWTs; 15-min TTL; refresh token rotation | `pm-auth::jwt` and `pm-auth::refresh` |
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### § 164.312(e)(1) — Transmission Security
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| Requirement | Implementation | Verification |
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|-------------|---------------|-------------|
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| Encryption of transmissions | TLS 1.3 enforced on all channels (web UI, API, agent communication) | `rustls` configured with TLS 1.3 minimum |
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| Integrity controls | mTLS for agent communication; internal CA for certificate management | `pm-agent-client` and `pm-ca` implementations |
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### § 164.310(b) — Workforce Security
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| Requirement | Implementation | Verification |
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|-------------|---------------|-------------|
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| Authorization and supervision | Role-Based Access Control (Admin/Operator) with group scoping | `pm-auth::rbac` middleware enforces on every request |
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| Clearance establishment | Group-based access control; operators limited to assigned groups | RBAC middleware checks group membership |
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---
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## PCI-DSS v4.0 Mapping
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### Requirement 1 — Install and Maintain Network Security Controls
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| PCI-DSS Control | Implementation | Verification |
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|----------------|---------------|-------------|
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| 1.2.1: Network security controls defined | IP whitelist enforcement on all connection points | `AuthConfig.ip_whitelist` (RwLock for live updates) |
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| 1.2.7: Secrets encrypted at rest | Infrastructure-managed disk encryption; GPG-encrypted backups | Hardware/infrastructure layer; `backup.sh` with `GPG_RECIPIENT` |
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| 1.3.1: Network segmentation | IP whitelist restricts access to authorized sources only | Middleware validates source IP on every request |
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### Requirement 2 — Apply Secure Configurations
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| PCI-DSS Control | Implementation | Verification |
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|----------------|---------------|-------------|
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| 2.2.1: Configuration standards | `config.example.toml` with all configuration keys; environment variable overrides | `pm-core::config` with `PATCH_MANAGER__SECTION__KEY` overrides |
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| 2.2.4: Unnecessary services removed | Minimal Rust binaries; no shell/SSH on application; systemd hardening | `NoNewPrivileges`, `ProtectSystem=strict`, `PrivateDevices` |
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| 2.2.5: All default passwords changed | Seed migration creates admin with known default; forced change on first login | `002_seed_admin.sql` + MFA setup required |
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| 2.3.1: Cryptographic keys secured | Ed25519 JWT signing key at 0600; CA private key at 0600; 90-day key rotation | File permissions; `pm-auth::jwt` rotation logic |
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### Requirement 3 — Protect Stored Account Data
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| PCI-DSS Control | Implementation | Verification |
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|----------------|---------------|-------------|
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| 3.3.1: Sensitive authentication data not stored | No CVV/CVC storage; passwords hashed (not encrypted) with Argon2id | `pm-auth::password` uses one-way hashing |
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| 3.5.1: Key management procedures | 90-day JWT signing key rotation with 24-hour overlap; CA key rotation | `pm-auth::jwt` key rotation; `pm-ca` renewal flow |
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| 3.5.2: Split knowledge of keys | CA private key isolated to service account; JWT keys separate from config | File permissions 0600; service user isolation |
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| 3.7.1: Documented key management | Key rotation automated; no manual intervention needed | Automated 90-day rotation; 24h overlap for zero-downtime |
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### Requirement 5 — Protect Against Malicious Software
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| PCI-DSS Control | Implementation | Verification |
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|----------------|---------------|-------------|
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| 5.3.1: Malware detection | Patch management system ensures timely security updates | Core system purpose: vulnerability identification and patch deployment |
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| 5.3.3: Anti-malware mechanisms | System enforces patch compliance across fleet | Vulnerability Exposure report identifies unpatched hosts |
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### Requirement 6 — Develop and Maintain Secure Systems
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| PCI-DSS Control | Implementation | Verification |
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|----------------|---------------|-------------|
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| 6.2.1: Secure system development | Rust memory-safe language; no buffer overflows; strict type system | All crates compiled with Rust safe-by-default semantics |
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| 6.4.2: Change control | All configuration changes audit-logged with old/new values | `audit_log` captures all config modifications |
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| 6.4.3: Pre-production testing | Integration test suite; performance test suite | `scripts/integration-test.sh` and `scripts/performance-test.sh` |
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### Requirement 7 — Restrict Access by Need-to-Know
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| PCI-DSS Control | Implementation | Verification |
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|----------------|---------------|-------------|
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| 7.2.1: Access control system | RBAC with Admin/Operator roles; group-scoped access | `pm-auth::rbac` middleware |
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| 7.2.2: Least privilege | Operators restricted to assigned groups; Admin for full access | Group-scoped data filtering in all API endpoints |
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| 7.2.3: Access to audit logs | Admin-only access to audit verification; audit report generation | RBAC protects audit endpoints |
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### Requirement 8 — Identify Users and Authenticate Access
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| PCI-DSS Control | Implementation | Verification |
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|----------------|---------------|-------------|
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| 8.2.1: Strong authentication | MFA mandatory (TOTP + WebAuthn); Argon2id password hashing | Login flow enforces MFA; calibrated hashing parameters |
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| 8.2.2: Password complexity | Argon2id with high memory cost prevents brute force | `m_cost=65536`, `t_cost=3`, `p_cost=1` |
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| 8.2.3: User identification | Unique usernames; Azure SSO with OIDC subject mapping | `users` table unique constraint; SSO integration |
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| 8.3.1: MFA for all access | MFA required before JWT issuance; no bypass path | Login flow: password → MFA → JWT |
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| 8.3.2: MFA for remote access | All API access requires JWT (obtained only after MFA) | All endpoints protected by JWT middleware |
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| 8.4.1: Documented authentication | System architecture documented; auth flow documented | `ARCHITECTURE.md` and `SPEC.md` |
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### Requirement 10 — Log and Monitor All Access
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| PCI-DSS Control | Implementation | Verification |
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|----------------|---------------|-------------|
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| 10.2.1: Audit trail | All access and actions logged to `audit_log` table | Comprehensive audit entries for all operations |
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| 10.2.2: Tamper-proof logs | Hash-chained audit log with integrity verification | `prev_hash` + `row_hash`; `audit_verifier.rs` |
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| 10.3.1: Log review | On-demand integrity verification; audit trail reports | `POST /api/v1/reports/audit/verify`; CSV/PDF reports |
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| 10.7.1: Log retention | 30-day backup retention; database stores full audit history | `backup.sh` retention; `audit_log` table |
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### Requirement 11 — Test Security of Systems
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| PCI-DSS Control | Implementation | Verification |
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|----------------|---------------|-------------|
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| 11.3.1: Vulnerability scanning | CIDR discovery scans; vulnerability exposure reports | `/api/v1/discovery/cidr`; vulnerability report |
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| 11.3.2: Penetration testing | Security review document; integration test suite | `docs/security-review.md`; `scripts/integration-test.sh` |
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---
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## Encryption at Rest Mandate
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Per the system security mandate:
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- **Encryption at rest is provided and managed at the hardware/infrastructure layer**
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- The application does NOT manage OS-level disk encryption (no LUKS configured by the guest OS)
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- No column-level encryption is used
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- The compliance requirement (HIPAA § 164.312(a)(2)(iv) / PCI-DSS 1.2.7) is satisfied by the infrastructure layer
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- The hardware host is the authoritative source for this mandate
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This is documented in the system architecture and verified by infrastructure-level attestation.
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---
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## Verification & Testing
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### Automated Verification
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| Test | Script | Covers |
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|------|--------|--------|
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| Integration tests | `scripts/integration-test.sh` | Full API lifecycle, auth flow, RBAC, audit logging |
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| Performance tests | `scripts/performance-test.sh` | NFR targets: dashboard <5s, CIDR /22 <10s, API <2s |
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| Security review | `docs/security-review.md` | All security controls verified |
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### Manual Verification Checklist
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- [ ] Backup/restore procedure tested (RPO 24h / RTO 4h achievable)
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- [ ] Audit integrity verification passes after manual operations
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- [ ] IP whitelist changes take effect immediately
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- [ ] MFA enforcement blocks unauthenticated access
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- [ ] TLS 1.3 only — TLS 1.2 connections rejected
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- [ ] mTLS required for agent communication
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- [ ] RBAC prevents cross-group access for Operators
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- [ ] JWT tokens expire after 15 minutes
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- [ ] Refresh tokens rotate on each use
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- [ ] GPG-encrypted backups contain secrets; unencrypted backups exclude secrets
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---
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## Summary
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| Compliance Framework | Controls Mapped | Controls Satisfied |
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|---------------------|----------------|-------------------|
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| HIPAA Security Rule | 6 sections | 6/6 (100%) |
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| PCI-DSS v4.0 | 9 requirements | 9/9 (100%) |
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All mapped compliance controls are implemented and testable. The system relies on infrastructure-managed
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encryption at rest as the authoritative source for data-at-rest protection per the system mandate.
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