Closes Draco-Lunaris/Linux-Patch-Manager#10 The browser WebSocket endpoint at GET /api/v1/ws/jobs previously authenticated solely via a single-use, 60-second ticket passed as a query parameter. A leaked ticket (browser history, Referer, proxy logs, support bundles) could be redeemed from any origin, enabling Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH). This change adds a second gate: the Origin header must match an explicit allowlist. The check runs BEFORE ticket validation so that rejected cross-origin probes do not consume the legitimate users ticket. Changes: - pm-core: new security.allowed_origins config field; default derived from sso_callback_url; startup warning if both are unparseable - pm-web: ws_handler extracts HeaderMap and calls check_origin first; returns 403 on missing/malformed/disallowed origins - config: documented allowed_origins key in config.example.toml - docs: security-review.md section 1.4 (WebSocket Origin Allowlist) - tests: 40 unit tests (7 pm-core, 33 pm-web)
7.2 KiB
7.2 KiB
SSO Implementation Fix Plan
Issues Identified
- No SSO Login Button — LoginPage.tsx missing "Sign in with Azure" button
- No SSO Callback Route — App.tsx missing frontend route to handle SSO callback
- authStore No SSO Support — authStore.ts has no method to store SSO tokens
- Backend Returns JSON Not Redirect — azure_sso.rs callback returns JSON tokens instead of redirecting to frontend
- No SSO Session Cleanup — sso_sessions DashMap has no expiry/cleanup task (memory leak)
- No JWT Signature Verification — id_token decoded without verifying Azure AD signature
Phases
Phase 1: Backend SSO Fixes (Issues 4, 5) — COMPLETE ✅
- 1a: Add SSO session cleanup task in main.rs (purge sessions older than 10 minutes)
- 1b: Modify azure_sso.rs callback to redirect to frontend with tokens instead of returning JSON
- 1c: Add
sso_callback_urlto SecurityConfig in config.rs with serde default - 1d: Update settings.rs to include sso_callback_url in settings response
- 1e: Verify backend compiles with
cargo check
Phase 2: Frontend SSO Integration (Issues 1, 2, 3) — COMPLETE ✅
- 2a: Add SSO callback page component (SsoCallbackPage.tsx)
- 2b: Add SSO callback route to App.tsx (public route, no auth required)
- 2c: Add "Sign in with Microsoft Azure" button to LoginPage.tsx
- 2d: Add SSO-related types and API methods to frontend
- 2e: Verify frontend builds with TypeScript compilation
Phase 3: JWT Signature Verification (Issue 6) — COMPLETE ✅
- 3a: Add JWKS client dependency to pm-web/Cargo.toml
- 3b: Implement id_token signature verification in azure_sso.rs
- 3c: Verify backend compiles with
cargo check
Phase 4: Integration Testing and Verification — COMPLETE ✅
- 4a: Backend code review — all changes verified manually
- 4b: Frontend TypeScript compilation — passes cleanly
- 4c: SSO login flow reviewed end-to-end (backend redirect → frontend callback → auth store)
- 4d: SSO session cleanup verified (10-minute expiry, 60-second purge interval)
- 4e: Settings page SSO config unchanged (sso_callback_url added as read-only)
- 4f: Lessons captured below
Lessons Learned
WS Origin Allowlist — Implementation Plan (Issue #10)
Spec: tasks/ws-origin-check-spec.md (v0.1.0, awaiting sign-off)
Issues Identified
- No Origin check on WS upgrade —
crates/pm-web/src/routes/ws.rsws_handlerdoes not inspect theOriginheader, leaving the/api/v1/ws/jobsendpoint exposed to Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) if a ticket ever leaks via logs /Referer/ browser history / support bundles. - No
allowed_originsconfig field —SecurityConfighas no way to express the allowlist; defaults need to be derived fromsso_callback_urlto stay secure out of the box. - No integration tests for ws.rs — there is no
crates/pm-web/tests/directory today, so the new behavior would land without automated coverage.
Phases
Phase 1: Config schema (Issue 2)
- 1a: Add
allowed_origins: Vec<String>toSecurityConfigincrates/pm-core/src/config.rs - 1b: Implement
default_allowed_origins()that parsessso_callback_urltoscheme://host[:port] - 1c: Emit
tracing::warn!at startup if the derived allowlist ends up empty - 1d: Update
Default for AppConfigto include the new field - 1e: Update
config/config.example.tomlwith documentedallowed_originskey
Phase 2: Handler change (Issue 1)
- 2a: Add
HeaderMapextractor tows_handler - 2b: Implement hand-rolled
Originparser (scheme, host, port) with default-port normalization - 2c: Implement allowlist match (exact, case-insensitive host, case-sensitive scheme/port)
- 2d: Reject missing / malformed / non-allowlisted
Originwith403 forbidden_originbefore ticket validation - 2e: Augment the success
tracing::info!withorigin; addtracing::warn!on rejection (never log the ticket) - 2f: Verify
cargo check -p pm-webandcargo clippy --all-targetspass
Phase 3: Tests (Issue 3)
- 3a: Add
crates/pm-web/tests/and abuild_test_appharness (no DB, minimalAppState) - 3b: Add
ws_rejects_missing_origintest - 3c: Add
ws_rejects_disallowed_origintest - 3d: Add
ws_rejects_malformed_origintest - 3e: Add
ws_allows_listed_origin_with_valid_tickettest (asserts ticket is consumed) - 3f: Add
ws_default_origin_derived_from_sso_callback_urlconfig-derivation test - 3g: Verify
cargo test -p pm-webpasses
Phase 4: Documentation
- 4a: Update
docs/security-review.mdwith a new control row for the WS Origin allowlist - 4b: (Optional, per Kelly) bump
SPEC.mdto 0.0.3 with a sentence in the Security section
Phase 5: Review
- 5a: Self-review against the 10-point acceptance criteria in the spec
- 5b: Commit on a feature branch (
issue/10-ws-origin-check) per git-workflow skill - 5c: Lessons captured below
Lessons Learned (this issue)
(filled in at completion)
- SSO callback must redirect, not return JSON — Browser OAuth2 flows require the backend to redirect to the frontend SPA, not return JSON tokens. The frontend must parse tokens from URL query parameters.
- URLSearchParams.get() already decodes — Don't double-decode with decodeURIComponent() when using URLSearchParams.
- JWKS caching prevents rate-limiting — Azure AD JWKS endpoint should be cached with TTL (1 hour) to avoid fetching on every SSO login.
- tokio::sync::Mutex over std::sync::Mutex — Axum handlers must be Send; std::sync::MutexGuard is not Send across await points.
- DashMap session cleanup — In-memory session stores (DashMap) need periodic cleanup tasks to prevent memory leaks. Pattern: tokio::spawn with interval + retain with time-based cutoff.
Host Self-Enrollment Implementation Plan
Phases
Phase 1: Database & Core Models
- 1a: Create SQL migration for
enrollment_requeststable - 1b: Define Rust data models for
EnrollmentRequestinpm-core - 1c: Add DB interaction methods (insert, list, delete) in
pm-core
Phase 2: Client-Facing API (pm-web)
- 2a: Implement
POST /api/v1/enrollto accept payloads and generatepolling_token - 2b: Implement
GET /api/v1/enroll/status/{token}to return pending/approved (PKI) statuses - 2c: Implement IP-based rate limiting for the
/enrollendpoint
Phase 3: Admin-Facing API (pm-web)
- 3a: Implement
GET /api/v1/admin/enrollmentsto list pending queue - 3b: Implement
POST /api/v1/admin/enrollments/{id}/approve(generate PKI viapm-ca, migrate tohoststable) - 3c: Implement
DELETE /api/v1/admin/enrollments/{id}/denyto purge request
Phase 4: Background Workers (pm-worker)
- 4a: Create a scheduled task to purge
enrollment_requestsolder than 24 hours
Phase 5: Frontend UI (pm-web/React)
- 5a: Add enrollment API methods and types to frontend
- 5b: Update
Hostsview to include "Pending Enrollments" filter and visual badge - 5c: Render pending hosts in the table with highlight styling
- 5d: Add Approve/Deny action buttons to pending host rows
- 5e: Implement "merge/overwrite" interactive modal for
fqdn/ip_addresscollisions on approval